FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 30223/15
Hakob ABAJYAN
against Armenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 12 February 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Andreas Zünd, President,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 30223/15) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 16 June 2015 by an Armenian national, Mr Hakob Abajyan (“the applicant”), who was born in 1990, and was represented by Ms H. Gyurjinyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the alleged denial of access to a lawyer during the early stages of criminal proceedings and its impact on the overall fairness of the trial, raising issues under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.
2. On 31 August 2011 A. and her husband, Y., were murdered.
3. On 1 September 2011 A.’s body was found but the location of Y.’s body was unknown at the relevant time.
4. On 26 October 2011 the applicant and his father, who had both known the victims, were taken to the police station on suspicion of murder. The applicant stated in writing that his rights had been explained to him and that he did not wish to have a lawyer. He was then questioned and gave statements about his whereabouts and phone calls on the day of the murders. Subsequently, he was formally arrested on suspicion of murdering A. The arrest record listed the applicant’s procedural rights as a suspect, including the right to legal assistance and the right not to self-incriminate, and was signed by him.
5. Between 9.40 p.m. and 11.10 p.m. the applicant was questioned again and confessed that he and his father had killed both victims, giving detailed information about the murders. Before his questioning, the applicant again stated in writing that he did not wish to be assisted by a lawyer and that he was capable of defending himself.
6. At around midnight, lawyers N. and R., hired by the applicant’s mother, arrived at the police station but were not allowed to see the applicant. The applicant subsequently made a written statement that he did not wish to be assisted by those lawyers or by any other lawyer in general.
7. On 28 October 2011 the investigators conducted a reconstruction of the crime scene, during which the applicant confirmed that he did not wish to be assisted by a lawyer and provided a detailed account of the events. He showed where Y.’s body had been buried and other items related to the murders. Later that day, he was again interviewed, once again refusing to be assisted by a lawyer and reiterating his confession. Both the crime scene reconstruction and the subsequent interview were video recorded, documented in writing and the document was signed by the applicant.
8. On 29 October 2011 the applicant and his father were charged with aggravated murder. At a later stage in the proceedings, those charges were expanded to include aggravated kidnapping and unlawful possession of firearms and, in respect of the applicant’s father, also aggravated fraud and incitement to false testimony.
9. On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) ordered the detention of applicant and his father. At his detention hearing, the applicant stated before a judge that he did not want a lawyer.
10. On the same date the applicant was admitted to the Nubarashen Detention Facility of the Ministry of Justice.
11. On 31 October 2011 the applicant addressed a written request to the investigator, seeking to have lawyers N. and R. involved in the proceedings.
12. On 8 November 2011 lawyers N. and R. were involved as the applicant’s defence counsel.
13. On 23 December 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecuting authorities, alleging that he had been beaten and coerced into waiving his right to a lawyer and making self-incriminating statements. He claimed that his statements had been dictated to him and did not reflect the truth. On 1 January 2012 he lodged another complaint, alleging that he had sustained injuries from that ill-treatment and requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted against the police officers. Both complaints were referred to the Special Investigative Service (“the SIS”) for examination.
14. On 20 February 2012 the SIS concluded that the applicant’s allegations did not disclose a criminal offence and it refused to institute criminal proceedings. In reaching its conclusion, the SIS relied on, inter alia, the results of its inquiries, the record of a visual examination of the applicant’s body upon his admission to the detention facility, the video-recordings of the crime scene reconstruction and the applicant’s subsequent interview, witness statements and a forensic medical examination of the applicant’s body. The relevant forensic medical expert report had noted a small discoloration on the applicant’s hand and a hematoma under one of his toenails but concluded that those could not have originated during the relevant period, namely between 26 and 29 October 2011. The applicant appealed against the SIS’s decision to the courts but his appeals were dismissed as unfounded.
15. On 5 June 2012 the case was sent to the District Court for examination on the merits.
16. At trial, the applicant’s father admitted to causing Y.’s death, claiming that it had occurred accidentally during a fight and that he did not remember the details. He denied any involvement in A.’s murder. The applicant pleaded not guilty and retracted his pre-trial self-incriminating statements, claiming that they had been obtained under duress, in particular as a result of beating and of manipulation by promises not to seek life imprisonment in respect of his father. He also submitted that his right to a lawyer had been breached and requested that his pre-trial statements be declared inadmissible. He further stated that he agreed, in substance, with his father’s trial statements and refused to give any new statements of his own concerning the charges.
17. On 4 November 2013 the District Court convicted the applicant’s father and the applicant as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment and 16 years’ imprisonment respectively. The court relied on, inter alia, the applicant’s pre-trial statements, the record of the crime scene reconstruction of 28 October 2011, the trial statements of the applicant’s father, many witness statements, call detail records, records of crime scene examination, autopsy reports, other documents and physical evidence. The District Court also examined the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and breach of his defence rights and found them groundless.
18. The applicant lodged an appeal.
19. On 3 July 2014 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.
20. The applicant lodged a further appeal on points of law.
21. On 23 December 2014 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
22. The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention that he had been denied access to a lawyer during the early stages of the criminal proceedings and that the subsequent use of evidence obtained in the absence of a lawyer had rendered his trial unfair. He submitted that the waiver of his right to legal assistance had not been voluntary.
23. The general principles concerning the right of access to a lawyer have been summarised in Beuze v. Belgium ([GC], no. 71409/10, §§ 119-50, 9 November 2018) and, concerning the question of waiver of that right, in Simeonovi v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 21980/04, § 115, 12 May 2017).
24. The Court observes that from the moment the applicant was brought to the police station on suspicion of murder, he was subject to a “criminal charge” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 and his right of access to a lawyer became effective (see Beuze, cited above, §§ 119 and 124).
25. It is undisputed that the applicant was not assisted by a lawyer between 26 October and 8 November 2011. The main question is whether he had validly waived his right to legal assistance. The Court observes that the applicant wrote and signed several waivers before making any statements. These waivers were clear and explicit and were corroborated by video‑recordings of the crime scene reconstruction and his subsequent interview on 28 October 2011. He also reiterated his waiver once more at his detention hearing before a judge on 29 October 2011.
26. The applicant’s allegation that he had been beaten and coerced into waiving his right to a lawyer is not supported by evidence. Upon admission to the detention facility his body was visually examined and no injuries were recorded. He signed the relevant record without any objections. Furthermore, although the applicant had defence counsel as of 8 November 2011, he did not raise any complaint concerning ill-treatment or coercion for more than six weeks after that date. Even when he did so on 23 December 2011, he did not mention any injuries. He referred to the alleged injuries only in his application of 1 January 2012, claiming to have forgotten to mention them previously on account of his emotional state. Even if the Court were to accept that he might have forgotten, it does not find it plausible that his two lawyers would also have overlooked such injuries.
27. Moreover, after he had retracted his previous statements, he gave new, contradictory explanations as to how he had learned about the location of Y.’s body, first claiming to have learned about it from his father and later alleging that the information had been provided by a police officer. Such contradictions further undermine the credibility of his allegations.
28. Furthermore, his allegations were examined by the SIS, a special investigative body separate from the police, but no evidence was found to support them. The District Court also examined the applicant’s allegations in detail and found them groundless. Moreover, it reviewed the video-recordings of the crime scene reconstruction and the applicant’s subsequent interview and established that the applicant had clearly had no visible injuries at the relevant time.
29. In these circumstances, the Court finds no basis for concluding that the applicant was ill-treated or coerced into waiving his right to a lawyer.
30. As regards the applicant’s argument that his waiver had not been made in the presence of his defence counsel, as required by Article 72 § 2 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (as in force at the material time), the Court notes that the applicant had waived his right before the lawyers hired by his mother arrived at the police station. In any event, the non-compliance of that procedural requirement could not, on its own, render the applicant’s waiver invalid (see Fariz Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 40321/07, § 55, 14 January 2021).
31. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant validly waived his right to a lawyer.
32. However, on 31 October 2011 the applicant explicitly requested that lawyers N. and R. be involved in the proceedings. From that moment, his previous waivers ceased to have effect (see Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, no. 40464/05, § 81, 16 February 2017). Nevertheless, his lawyers were allowed to provide him legal assistance only eight days later, on 8 November 2011. The Court considers that such delay amounted to a restriction of the applicant’s right of access to legal assistance and that no compelling reasons have been demonstrated for such restriction.
33. The Court must therefore determine whether that procedural failing irretrievably prejudiced the overall fairness of the proceedings, applying very strict scrutiny and having regard to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in its case-law (see Beuze, cited above, §§ 145 and 150).
34. The Court notes that the applicant was not particularly vulnerable on account of, for example, age or mental capacity. There is no indication that he was questioned or participated in any investigative measure during the period in which his access to a lawyer was restricted. The applicable legal framework governing admissibility of evidence was respected and there is nothing to suggest that the evidence used in the conviction was obtained unlawfully. The applicant had an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use. The evidence of the applicant’s guilt was extensive. The quality of the evidence does not raise concerns and the circumstances in which it was obtained do not cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy. Notably, the applicant’s statements were detailed and disclosed many facts – including the location of Y.’s buried body and even the description of his clothing prior to exhumation – that had been unknown to the authorities. His statements were also corroborated by other evidence. The crime scene reconstruction and the applicant’s subsequent interview were fully documented in writing and were video recorded. Moreover, the applicant did not promptly retract his confession and self-incriminating statements, waiting one and a half months before doing so. The applicant’s guilt was assessed by professional judges at two levels of jurisdiction, who examined the circumstances of the case in detail. The public interest in the prosecution of those accused of two murders was particularly weighty. The combination of the foregoing factors demonstrates that the proceedings as a whole were fair.
35. In conclusion, the Court finds that the applicant validly waived his right to legal assistance during the period when his confessions and self‑incriminating statements were made. Although there was an unjustified delay in granting him access to a lawyer after he had requested it, that restriction did not irretrievably prejudice the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.
36. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 March 2026.
Martina Keller Andreas Zünd
Deputy Registrar President