ADAMČO v. SLOVAKIA

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 15008/22
Branislav ADAMČO
against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 27 May 2025 as a Chamber composed of:

 Ivana Jelić, President,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Frédéric Krenc,
 Alain Chablais,
 Artūrs Kučs,
 Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 March 2022,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant, Mr Branislav Adamčo, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1978 and is detained in Leopoldov. He was represented before the Court by Mr P. Piovarčí, a lawyer practising in Košice.

2.  The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová.

The circumstances of the case

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4.  While the applicant was serving a prison sentence, he was the unsuccessful claimant in a libel action. He was consequently ordered to pay the costs. On the last day of the period for appealing (15 July 2016), he lodged an appeal against that order with the prison authorities. It was the liability of the latter to ensure the transmission of the appeal, by means of postal services, to the relevant court (see paragraph 14 below). It would later be established in the ensuing proceedings that the prison authorities posted the appeal on 18 July 2016.

5.  On 30 October 2017 the Košice Regional Court rejected the appeal as belated, holding that by having been posted on that day (see the previous paragraph), it was out of time. The written version of the decision indicated that it was not subject to ordinary appeal, but that it could be appealed against on points of law on grounds specified in the Civil Contentious Procedure Code (“the CCPC”) under Article 420 (Law no. 160/2015 Coll., as amended; for more details, see paragraphs 17 and 18 below).

6.  On 27 November 2017 the applicant submitted an application under Article 122 of the CCPC (“the Article 122 application”), which is a provision regulating what is referred to as a discharge of the effects of missing a time‑limit (odpustenie zmeškania lehoty – see paragraph 15 below). In that application, the applicant demonstrated that he had deposited his appeal with the prison authorities as specified above and argued that this was within the statutory period for appeals. Accordingly, he requested a finding that his appeal had been lodged within the time-limit.

7.  On 20 July 2021 the Michalovce District Court dismissed the Article 122 application, concurring with the Regional Court that the applicant’s appeal had been belated and finding no grounds for excusing his failure to lodge it within the time-limit. In particular, the applicant had been aware of the internal regulations on the handling of inmates’ post in prison and the fact that his appeal would not be posted on the same day as he had deposited it with the prison authorities. In addition, the time he had had for bringing his application had been ample.

8.  The applicant, assisted by a lawyer, challenged the decision of 20 July 2021 by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution. He reiterated his arguments above and stated that requests similar to his Article 122 application had been granted to him on two occasions in a criminal-law context in the past (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below). In his submission, there had been a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention.

9.  As would be established later from the Government’s observations before the Court, in connection with the applicant’s constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court requested explanations from the prison administration, which, in a letter of 14 October 2021, summarised the applicable rules, procedures and practice, and confirmed that the applicant’s appeal had been deposited and posted as specified in paragraph 4 above.

10.  On 30 November 2021 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that an Article 122 application was an extraordinary remedy impacting on legal certainty of other parties to the proceedings. Its application was appropriate in instances where the time-limit for appealing had been missed on excusable grounds. The applicant, however, had not pursued his right of access to a court by appropriate means, since he had supported his Article 122 application by an argument that he had actually lodged the appeal within the time-limit. The outcome of the applicant’s Article 122 application was accordingly correct, even though the grounds given in that connection by the District Court (see paragraph 7 above) were not. In sum, the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded. No appeal lay against that decision.

11.  On 18 September 2009 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court granted a request submitted by the applicant under Article 64 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 301/2005 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”; for more details, see paragraph 19 below) to restore the time-limit for appealing against a decision concerning the costs of the applicant’s previous detention on remand. Prior to the Regional Court’s decision, the applicant’s appeal had been rejected as belated. The Regional Court found that, on the basis of new evidence, that assessment did not correspond to the facts, since the applicant had in fact deposited his appeal with the prison authorities within the time‑limit.

12.  In an unrelated case, on 5 May 2012 an investigator of the Trenčín District Directorate of the Police dismissed a case of suspicion of the commission of the offence of abuse of official power and, on 27 June 2012, the Trenčín District Office of Public Prosecution Service dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant against that decision as belated. Subsequently, in response to a request by the applicant under Article 64 § 1 of the CCP, the Public Prosecution Service restored the time-limit after having established the date on which he had deposited his interlocutory appeal with the prison authorities.

13.  In a decision of 30 May 2016 the Košice Regional Court examined on the merits the applicant’s interlocutory appeal against a decision concerning the expunging of an entry of his previous conviction in the register of convictions (zahladenie odsúdenia). Taking into account his request under Article 64 § 1 of the CCP, it did so, despite the fact that the interlocutory appeal had been posted by prison authorities after the expiry of the statutory period for appealing, since the applicant had deposited the appeal with them within that period.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

14.  Under the Civil Contentious Procedure Code, a time-limit is considered to have been respected if, by its last day, the application subject to the time-limit is (i) lodged with the respective court or (ii) deposited with authorities who are liable to ensure its delivery to that court (Article 121 § 5). Authorities liable to ensure such delivery comprise prison authorities (see the decisions of the Supreme Court of 5 February 2014 and 28 February 2017, in unrelated appeals on points of law nos. 7Cdo 142/13 and 5Cdo 591/15, respectively).

15.  Under Article 122 a court is to discharge a party of the effects of missing a time-limit if the party or the party’s representative or guardian missed the time-limit on excusable grounds and this prevented them from taking an action to which they were entitled. An application to that effect is to be submitted within fifteen days of the cessation of the obstacle and it is to be accompanied by the action which was missed.

16.  Pursuant to Article 238 a decision which has been served and cannot be appealed against becomes final.

17.  A decision by a court of appeal may be challenged by an appeal on points of law in the instances provided for by law (Article 419), which include the situation specified in the subsequent paragraph.

18.  Any decision on the merits by a court of appeal and any decision by a court of appeal whereby proceedings are concluded is amenable to appeal on points of law if, by an erroneous procedural action (nesprávny procesný postup) on the part of a court, the party concerned has been prevented from exercising his or her own procedural rights to an extent incompatible with the right to a fair trial (Article 420 (f)). A party may be prevented from exercising his or her own procedural rights not only by a procedural action, but also by a judicial decision, including a decision whereby a court of appeal erroneously rejects an appeal for being belated (see the decision by the Supreme Court of 5 February 2014 cited in paragraph 14 above).

19.  Article 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates a restoration of a time-limit (navrátenie lehoty) as follows. If the person facing charges, his or her defence counsel, a victim, or another person participating in the proceedings misses a time-limit for bringing an action for a procedural remedy on important grounds, the body deciding on such an action is to restore the time-limit. A request for the restoration of the time-limit is to be submitted within three days of the cessation of the obstacle, and it is to be accompanied by the action in question, if the action has not yet been brought (Article 64 § 1). If the action was already rejected as belated, the decision to reject the action is to be quashed at the same time that the decision restoring the time-limit is given (Article 64 § 2).

20.  The decision-making process in relation to Article 122 applications is focused on establishing the circumstances in which a time-limit has been missed. The remedy that it is to provide is of an extraordinary nature because it concerns decisions which have become final and binding (see the decision by the Constitutional Court of 27 March 2019, case no. I. ÚS 101/19).

21.  In a decision of 21 September 2016 (case no. I. ÚS 581/16) the Constitutional Court dealt with the admissibility of an individual complaint in a situation where an appeal had been rejected as belated and the complainant argued that this had involved an erroneous procedural action of the lower courts. The Constitutional Court held that the decision to reject the appeal amounted to a decision whereby the proceedings had been concluded within the meaning of Article 420 of the CCPC and that, in the circumstances, the remedy to be pursued in relation to that decision was an appeal on points of law under letter (f) of that Article (see paragraph 18 above). As that remedy had not been exhausted, the complaint was inadmissible.

22.  In a case that gave rise to an appeal on points of law (no. 5Cdo 591/15) the Supreme Court dealt with a situation in which an objection (odpor) against a payment order in a private dispute was rejected as belated because it had been posted after the expiry of the statutory period for appealing. In its decision of 28 February 2017, the Supreme Court noted that the person bringing the objection was in prison and the courts rejecting his objection had failed to make an enquiry into when he had deposited it with the prison authorities. In such circumstances, the rejection of the objection had been premature and it had prevented the person in question from acting before the court within the meaning of the provisions on admissibility of appeals on points of law.

COMPLAINTS

23.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the dismissal of his Article 122 application had been contrary to his right of access to a court and that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had not been adversarial in that he had not been given an opportunity to comment on the grounds for the rejection of his complaint, which had been different from those on which his Article 122 application had been dismissed.

THE LAW

24.  The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

25.  The Government contested the admissibility of the application on threefold grounds.

First, the proceedings at its core had concerned a request for a discharge of the effects of missing a time-limit, which was a procedural matter without a direct impact on the sphere of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations. Accordingly, his complaints were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention.

Second, the Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s decision of 30 November 2021 to the effect that the applicant had failed to pursue his right of access to a court by appropriate means (see paragraph 10 above) and argued that the proper way of doing so had consisted of appealing on points of law under Article 420 (f) of the CCPC. By not having done so, he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies (Article 35 § 1 of the Convention).

Third, in the Government’s submissions it followed that an Article 122 application was not an effective remedy for Convention purposes, which was why its use had not affected the running of the time-limit for the introduction of an application (Article 35 § 1 of the Convention). The final domestic decision had accordingly been that of 30 October 2017 and the application had been introduced on 17 March 2022, that is, out of time.

In addition, the Government argued that the Constitutional Court’s decision had been consistent with established practice and had thus been by no means surprising. Therefore, at any rate, the complaints were manifestly ill‑founded.

26.  The applicant argued that the dismissal of his Article 122 application had contradicted the established practice to the effect that a time-limit was considered to have been respected when, by the last day of the time-limit, the action for a procedural remedy such as an appeal was deposited with the prison authorities. At the same time, it had been at odds with the decisions taken previously in similar situations in a criminal-law context (see paragraphs 11 et seq. above). The Constitutional Court’s finding that he had not pursued his right of access to a court by appropriate means (see paragraph 10 above) had deviated from its approach in a similar case of his (see Adamčo v. Slovakia [Committee], no. 20877/19, § 6, 2 June 2022) and the Constitutional Court had stopped short of elucidating which means had been appropriate. As regards the suggestion that he should have asserted his rights by way of an appeal on points of law, such an appeal had only been available against decisions whereby the proceedings in question had been concluded. Presuming that the decision to reject his appeal had not been of that kind, he had not appealed on points of law, but had rather proceeded by way of an Article 122 application. That remedy had been effective, domestic remedies had been exhausted, and his Convention complaints had been introduced within the time-limit.

27.  The applicant pointed out that, furthermore, the grounds on which the Constitutional Court had decided in his case had been different from those considered in the past and argued that they had taken him by surprise. Deciding on such grounds without giving the applicant an opportunity to comment had been contrary to his right to a fair hearing.

28.  In response to the Government’s further objections (see paragraph 25 above), the applicant submitted that the part of the proceedings subject to his complaint, which had concerned the costs of the proceedings on the merits, had formed an integral part of the libel proceedings as a whole. By way of his Article 122 application, he had sought to assert his right of access to a court and had therefore benefited from the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention.

29.  Moreover, as he had established from the contents of the Government’s observations before the Court, the Constitutional Court had obtained additional elements from the prison administration in reply to his complaint (see paragraph 9 above), and he had never been given an opportunity to comment on them. In the applicant’s view, as such elements had played an important role in the assessment of his constitutional complaint, this had exacerbated the violation of his right to a fair hearing.

30.  The Court notes that the application comprises two interrelated complaints concerning access to a court (essentially with regard to the order for costs) and adversarial trial (with regard to the phase of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court). It further notes the Government’s inadmissibility objections on several counts, which also interrelate to a certain extent. On the facts of the case, it considers that these matters are to be examined together as follows.

31.  The proceedings giving rise to the present application concerned costs of the proceedings in a libel action and as such were auxiliary to the proceedings on the merits. Reiterating that costs proceedings constitute a continuation of the substantive litigation and accordingly are part of a “determination of ... civil rights and obligations” (see Robins v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1997, § 29, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V), there is no issue with the applicability of the guarantees of Article 6 to these proceedings.

32.  The applicant’s appeal against the costs order was rejected as belated (see paragraph 5 above) and he claims that the refusal of his remedy against that decision has curtailed his right of access to court. On the facts, the question arises whether the applicant has chosen the appropriate procedural avenue with a view to having his appeal examined despite its initial rejection.

33.  The applicant pursued his rights by way of an Article 122 application and the domestic courts ultimately concluded that that was not the appropriate way for doing so. In support of that finding, the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 10 above) explained that the remedy under Article 122 of the CCPC was available in situations where the applicable time-limit was missed, whereas the applicant’s argument was that he had in fact not missed it (see paragraph 10 above). The Court considers that finding consistent with the wording of the applicable statutory rule and its established interpretation (see paragraphs 15 and 20 above).

34.  The applicant relied on previous decisions in similar matters in a criminal-law context (see paragraphs 11 et seq. above). However, those were based on different procedural rules from the rules applicable in the civil‑law context at stake in the present case. In particular, the applicable criminal-law provisions specifically envisage restoration of a time-limit after the belated remedy had already been rejected (see paragraph 19 above). In contrast to that, there seems to be no basis for the application for Article 122 of the CCPC once the remedy in question (as the original appeal in the present case) has been rejected.

35.  It is precisely the fact that the Constitutional Court recognised the applicant’s chosen course of action as incorrect which distinguishes the present case from that resolved by the Court in Adamčo (cited above, § 6) to which the applicant refers. That distinction concerns the position on exhaustion of domestic remedies and has no bearing on the Court’s assessment of the other case on its merits (ibid., §§ 9-16).

36.  As regards the remedy proposed by the Government, that is an appeal on points of law under Article 420 (f) of the CCPC, the Court notes first of all that a reference to it was included in the decision to reject the applicant’s appeal itself (see paragraph 5 above).

37.  Such an appeal on points of law is available inter alia against any decision by a court of appeal whereby proceedings are concluded if, by an erroneous procedural action on the part of a court, the party concerned has been prevented from exercising his or her own procedural rights to an extent incompatible with the right to a fair trial. As established already in 2014 and 2016, this provision extends to situations where a party is prevented from exercising their procedural rights by a judicial decision, including a decision whereby a court of appeal erroneously rejects an appeal for being belated (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above). Application of these rules with regard to a remedy pursued by an inmate in a situation similar to the applicant’s was confirmed in a further decision dated 28 February 2017 (see paragraph 22 above).

38.  The Court finds it indecisive (i) that the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint for being manifestly ill-founded, rather than for non‑exhaustion of ordinary remedies, and (ii) that it did not identify the remedy that was to be exhausted. In that regard, it notes that the constitutional decision responded to the applicant’s complaint as it had been formulated, that is in relation to the decision to dismiss his Article 122 application, and not the decision to reject his appeal. The court found that the former decision had been correct, albeit on different grounds. In addition, in the constitutional proceedings, the applicant was represented by a lawyer. As the applicable rules on appeals on points of law and decisions on their interpretation predate (see the preceding paragraph) the decision of 30 October 2017 to reject the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 5 above), he could not have been surprised by the Constitutional Court’s decision, which was consistent with them.

39.  In sum, unlike in the applicant’s previous case (cited at paragraph 26 above), in the present proceedings the Government’s non-exhaustion objection finds support both in the domestic courts’ own decisions in his very case and in the existing practice at the relevant time. It must accordingly be sustained.

40.  As to the applicant’s complaint about the adversarial nature of the constitutional proceedings, the Court observes at the outset that they were an extension of the proceedings on his Article 122 application, a remedy that has been found above as unavailable in his situation. Even assuming that the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to the constitutional proceedings in such a context, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded as follows.

41.  To the extent that, prior to deciding on the case, the Constitutional Court had obtained observations from the prison administration on which the applicant had no opportunity to comment (see paragraphs 9 and 29 above), no such observations were noted in the Constitutional Court’s decision and there has been no argument or other indication that any elements from them were in any way accepted or reflected in the Constitutional Court’s reasoning. The observations concerned the deposition and posting of the applicant’s appeal, supporting in fact the applicant’s factual assertions, whereas the Constitutional Court’s decision was based on the interpretation of Article 122 of the CCPC with regard to situations in which a procedural remedy was rejected erroneously.

42.  In sum, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 19 June 2025.

 Ilse Freiwirth Ivana Jelić
 Registrar President