GRAND CHAMBER
ADVISORY OPINION
on the status of monastic premises and the jurisdiction of the courts to examine a dispute concerning them
Requested by
Ukraine’s Supreme Court
(Request no. P16-2025-001)
STRASBOURG
5 March 2026
This opinion is final. It may be subject to editorial revision.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
Mattias Guyomar, President
Arnfinn Bårdsen,
Ivana Jelić,
Lado Chanturia,
Ioannis Ktistakis,
Kateřina Šimáčková,
Georgios Serghides,
Péter Paczolay,
María Elósegui,
Peeter Roosma,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
Sebastian Rădulețu,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Stéphane Pisani,
Mateja Đurović,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and of John Darcy, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 February 2026,
Delivers the following opinion, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. By a letter of 11 July 2025 to the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), Ukraine’s Supreme Court submitted a request under Article 1 of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Protocol No. 16” and “the Convention”), for an advisory opinion on the questions set out below.
2. Initially submitted in Ukrainian, a translation of the request into one of the Court’s official languages was required (Rule 34 § 7 of the Rules of Court). On 21 August 2025 the Supreme Court provided an English translation. In keeping with the Court’s practice, the request is considered to have been formally lodged on this date.
3. On 15 September 2025 the panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber, composed in accordance with Article 2 § 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 93 § 1, decided to accept the request.
4. The Grand Chamber was constituted on 16 September 2025 in accordance with Rules 24 § 2 (g) and 94 § 1.
5. At the invitation of the President, the parties to the domestic proceedings submitted written comments on the request for an advisory opinion (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 94 § 3). The Supreme Court provided further information of relevance to the request, at the invitation of the President (Rule 94 § 2).
6. Written comments were received from the European Centre for Law and Justice, which had been given leave by the President to intervene (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 44).
7. The Ukrainian Government and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights decided not to exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16).
8. Copies of the submissions received were transmitted to the Supreme Court, which decided not to avail itself of the opportunity to comment on them (Rule 94 § 6).
THE QUESTIONS ASKED
9. The Supreme Court asked the following questions:
“1. Do the premises of religious buildings – monasteries (monastic cells) – constitute a “home” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention?
2. Does the national court’s jurisdiction extend to disputes concerning the right of a former nun to use the premises of a monastery, where such right arose from an oral agreement with the monastery based on its purpose and the nun’s admission thereto, but was terminated as a result of the nun leaving the disputed premises due to a conflict and differences of opinion with the leaders of the religious organization?”
THE BACKGROUND AND THE DOMESTIC pROCEEDINGS
The parties to the domestic proceedings and their relationship10. The parties in the domestic case are the Religious Organisation Spaso-Preobrazhenskyi (Holy Transfiguration) Monastery of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (“the UGCC”), which owns the buildings that are concerned by the proceedings, and F., who is a former nun.
11. The UGCC is one of the autonomous Eastern Catholic Churches. It is in full communion with the Holy See.
12. At the relevant time, a convent of enclosed nuns was housed within the monastery. F. entered the convent in 2004 and formally became a nun when she took her perpetual vows (Order of the Lesser Schema) in 2009. She remained in that religious community until 2017.
13. In 2011 the relevant village authorities registered F.’s place of residence as being in the monastery building, as required by domestic law at the time (see paragraph 46 below).
14. The Supreme Court explained that, in terms of domestic civil law, F.’s right to use the premises derived from a “personal fixed-term servitude”, which itself arose from an oral agreement with the monastery “conditioned by the purpose of the monastery’s functioning and her acceptance into monastic life” (see paragraph 27 below).
15. In April 2017 a decision was taken by the UGCC’s Major Archbishop to close the convent to which F. belonged for “violation of the rules” and “ignoring instructions” from the bishop and the Major Archbishop. A new administrator was appointed to manage the affairs of the convent until such time as a new religious community was established in the same premises. According to the monastery’s submissions in the domestic proceedings, the decision to close the convent was upheld by the Pope on 1 February 2019.
16. In May 2017, against a background of conflict between the new administrator and members of the convent, F. and a number of other nuns left. They addressed a number of appeals to various UGCC authorities, expressing their disagreement with the fact that the administrator had been appointed without a prior election, and stated that they did not wish to live in constant conflict with her.
17. From February 2018 several attempts were made by F. and others who left the convent to return to the premises, but they were unable to gain access as the locks had been changed in the meantime.
18. In March 2019, F. was sanctioned by the church authorities for disobedience. In August 2020 F. received a written warning from the church authorities, giving her one month to change her behaviour, failing which she would be dismissed from the monastic state. The decision to revoke her status as a nun was taken in October 2020. The UGCC’s Major Archbishop and, ultimately, the Pope rejected her appeals against that decision.
19. In 2020 a new religious community of nuns was established in the monastery’s premises.
The monastery’s application and F.’s counter-application20. In September 2020 the monastery applied to the domestic courts for a declaration that F. had lost her right to use the monastery premises. It argued that F. had initially acquired the right to use a cell at the monastery on the basis of a servitude (easement) which arose from an oral agreement with the monastery, and which was derived from her status as a member of the monastic community. That servitude had expired, within the meaning of Article 406 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 42 below), in that F. had waived it by moving out of the convent and the circumstance forming the basis of the servitude had thus been terminated. The monastery explained that the relevant declaration was necessary in order to de-register F. as a resident of the monastery. The monastery’s application for a declaration was later withdrawn (see paragraph 26 below).
21. In November 2020 F. lodged a counter-application, seeking to be granted unimpeded access to her former cell.
Proceedings before the domestic courts and their decisions22. On 24 September 2021 the first-instance court rejected the monastery’s application and allowed F.’s counter-application.
Referring to this Court’s judgment in Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, §§ 40-44, 2 December 2010) the court stated that, under the Convention, the notion of a “home” was not limited to premises which were lawfully occupied or which have been lawfully established. It held that the cell constituted F.’s home within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. Her eviction from that cell had to be subjected to a proportionality assessment. In weighing her rights against those of the monastery, her rights as a long-term resident prevailed.
The court found that the building in question was a residential building and the fact that it was used for religious purposes did not change that reality. The monastery had failed to prove that F. had renounced the servitude established in her favour, since she had not moved out of the monastery of her own free choice, but rather on account of conflicts and tensions with other persons living there, and had subsequently been prevented from returning. It had not been shown that F. had removed all her personal belongings when she left.
No evidence had been submitted to the effect that, when moving into the monastery premises, F. and the owner of the property had agreed on any specific and clear conditions which, if not complied with, would result in a loss of the right to use the residential premises. The mere fact of the creation and dissolution of a monastic community, exclusion from the convent or dismissal from monastic status had no legal significance for the case, in the absence of evidence that those circumstances had formed the preconditions for F. moving into the cell.
23. In April 2022 the Ternopil Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and terminated the proceedings, considering that this was a canon-law dispute and that the civil courts therefore did not have jurisdiction.
24. On an appeal by F., the case was transferred to the Joint Chamber of the Civil Court of Cassation (part of the Supreme Court), in order to resolve a divergence in the domestic case-law regarding the competence of the civil courts to examine housing disputes involving Church property.
25. The Joint Chamber quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case for re-examination on appeal. It found, referring to the definition of “home” in this Court’s case-law (citing, for example, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, as well as Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy, cited above), that a monastic cell was a “home” in the Convention sense and that the matter was therefore to be considered as being governed by domestic civil law. It also held, citing Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC] (no. 56030/07, §§ 69, 123, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), that the autonomy of religious organisations was not unlimited and did not preclude the possibility and necessity of judicial supervision of compliance with the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
26. Following the remittal of the case, the monastery withdrew its application for a declaration, since the Joint Chamber had held that, in submitting the case to the civil courts, the parties had acknowledged the impossibility of resolving their dispute within the framework of canon law.
27. Having re-examined the case on appeal, in December 2023 the Khmelnytskyi Court of Appeal (to which the case had meanwhile been transferred) decided to follow the Joint Chamber’s approach with regard to the applicability of Article 8 and of domestic civil law, and to the courts’ competence to examine the case. On the merits, it held that F. had obtained a personal servitude to live in the property and noted that, when the case was decided at first instance, she was still registered as residing there. In view of her continued registration, F. had a continuing link with the premises. It had not been proven that she had voluntarily waived her right to use the premises, in that the reason for her departure had been a conflict with other persons living there. Because F. had lived in the property for a long time and was registered there, her rights outweighed those of the monastery, since the loss of one’s home was a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home. The closure of the convent and the revocation of F.’s status as a nun were not relevant, since her residence in the premises was governed by civil law; there was thus no interference with the religious organisation’s autonomy.
Referral of the case to the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court28. The monastery lodged a cassation appeal, arguing that, in view of the principle of the autonomy of religious organisations, the dispute had to be regarded as coming within the scope of canon rather than civil law. F.’s occupancy of the monastic cell had been based exclusively on canon law and on her membership of the religious community. She had therefore had no civil right to use the monastery premises, but only a canon-law privilege to remain in the convent as long as she was a member of it, and she had lost that privilege. Granting F.’s application would breach the principle of enclosure in canon law and would violate the freedom of religion of the religious community and its members.
29. For her part, F. submitted that there was no indication in the relevant official documentation that the buildings in question had a religious function; instead, they were documented as being ordinary civil buildings. F. had been registered as residing in the building on the basis of her civil documents. The evidence indicated that her residence in the premises had been registered without any conditions being imposed by the owner.
30. A panel of the Civil Court of Cassation referred the case to the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. It considered that a decision was needed from the Grand Chamber in order to resolve an exceptional legal issue, namely, to determine which rules (canon law or civil law) should regulate the right to reside in a monastery for a person who belongs (used to belong) to the monastic order, and which court (civil or ecclesiastical) should determine that question.
The Supreme Court’s request for an advisory opinion31. On 25 June 2025 the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”) decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court and to stay the domestic proceedings in the meantime. The Supreme Court’s reasons can be summarised as follows.
32. The Supreme Court stated that it had to determine the question of the national courts’ jurisdiction in a dispute over what at least one of the parties considered to be internal ecclesiastical matters. It referred to the provisions of the Constitution and to the relevant domestic law providing for separation of Church and State and for the rights of religious organisations to use their property without interference (see paragraphs 37 and 44 below). It also quoted a number of provisions of canon law (see paragraph 47 below) and the monastery’s internal rules, providing for an enclosed way of life for its members, with restricted access for outsiders, and for cells as places of prayer, spiritual exercises and work for the benefit of the community.
33. The Supreme Court stated that it had analysed the Court’s case-law as it pertained mainly to the rights under Article 8 of the Convention, having regard to the principle of the autonomy of religious organisations (notably Fernández Martínez, cited above) and the right of access to a court (notably Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 56665/09, 14 September 2017).
34. Citing Fernández Martínez (§§ 69, 132), the Supreme Court observed that the autonomy of religious organisations was not unlimited and did not exclude judicial review of the observance of rights guaranteed by the Convention. It noted that in the Fernández Martínez case this Court had examined the question of the rights of a religious organisation and the applicant’s employment rights.
35. The Supreme Court also noted that in the Károly Nagy case this Court had examined whether, in dismissing a case with a religious component, the State courts had breached the applicant’s right of access to a court. In view of the relevant Hungarian legislation and case-law, this Court had found that the reasoned refusal of the domestic courts to examine the applicant’s case had been neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable, and had rejected the applicant’s Article 6 complaint as being inadmissible ratione materiae.
36. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the case before it raised the issue not only of access to a court but also of the balance to be struck between that right and the rights of the religious organisation, and the enjoyment by an individual of housing rights. The circumstances of the case were therefore substantially different from Fernández Martínez and Károly Nagy (both cited above) and other cases previously examined by the Court. Accordingly, it considered that the case raised questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, namely the joint interpretation and application of the rights defined in Article 6 (access to a court in disputes with a religious element), Article 8 (right to respect for home; right of an individual to use premises within a monastery), and Article 9 (autonomy of religious organisations).
RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE
Relevant domestic lawConstitution of Ukraine37. Article 35 § 3 of the Constitution provides that “[T]he Church and religious organisations in Ukraine are separate from the State, and the school – from the Church. No religion shall be recognised by the State as compulsory.”
38. Article 47 § 1 provides that “Everyone has the right to housing” (житло, zhytlo in Ukrainian) and that “The State creates conditions that enable every citizen to build, purchase as property, or to rent housing...”
Civil Code39. Article 379 of the Civil Code, entitled “The concept of housing”, defines the housing (житло) of a natural person as a residential building, a flat, or other residential premises intended and suitable for permanent or temporary residence.
40. Article 401 § 1 provides that the right to use someone else’s property (servitude or easement – in Ukrainian сервітут) may be established with respect to a plot of land, other natural resources or other immovable property in order to meet the needs of other persons, where those needs cannot be met in any other way. Article 401 § 2 provides that a servitude may belong to the owner of an adjacent plot of land, or to another specifically identified person (personal servitude).
41. Article 402 § 2 provides that a servitude may be established by contract, law, will or court decision.
42. Article 406 § 1 provides that a servitude shall be deemed to have terminated in certain circumstances, such as renunciation (waiver) by the person in whose interests the servitude is established, expiry of the term for which it was established, termination of the condition that formed the basis for establishing the servitude, and failure to use the servitude for three consecutive years. Article 406 § 2 provides that a servitude may be terminated by a court decision at the request of the property owner if there are particularly weighty circumstances.
Housing Code43. Article 1 of the Housing Code (1983) provides that citizens have a right to housing (житло). Article 4 provides that residential buildings, together with residential premises in other buildings located in the territory of Ukraine, constitute the housing stock.
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations Act (1991)44. Section 5 of the Act provides that the Church and religious organisations in Ukraine are separate from the State and that the State does not interfere in the activities of religious organisations where those activities are conducted within the limits of the law. Section 18 of the Act provides that religious organisations possess, use and dispose of the assets that they own, and that religious organisations can only be limited in the exercise of their property rights in those cases, and in accordance with the procedure, prescribed by law.
Freedom of Movement and Free Choice of Residence in Ukraine Act (2003)45. Section 3 defines a “place of residence” as a housing unit (житлo) with an address obtained in accordance with the procedure established by law, in which a person resides.
46. Until 30 November 2021 section 6 of the Act (which was removed by law no.1916-IX of 30 November 2021) provided that any person who moved to a new place of residence had to register it as such by submitting documents to the relevant registration authority. No one could have more than one official residence; if a person had several de facto places of residence, he or she had to choose which of those he or she wished to register as his or her official address.
Relevant canon law47. The following provisions of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (promulgated by Pope John Paul II on 18 October 1990) were invoked in the domestic proceedings.
Canon 410 defines the religious (monastic) state as a stable mode of common life in an institute approved by the Church.
Canon 433 defines a monastery as a religious house in which the members strive toward evangelical perfection by observing the rules and traditions of monastic life.
Canon 462 provides that definitive assumption of monastic status by a person involves profession of three lifelong vows of obedience, chastity and poverty.
Canon 477 provides that the enclosure shall be observed in monasteries in the manner prescribed in their rules (typicons) and gives the monastery’s superior the right to admit exterior persons in individual cases for particular reasons.
Canon 495 provides that members of religious communities who have unlawfully left the monastery must return to it without delay and that the superiors must receive them back if they return moved by sincere penitence. Otherwise, it provides that such persons shall be punished according to the canon law, including through dismissal [from the community].
THE COURT’S OPINION
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS48. The Court finds it useful to restate here that the aim of the advisory procedure is to further enhance the interaction between the Court and national authorities and thereby reinforce the implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as stated in the Preamble to Protocol No. 16. The procedure allows the designated national courts and tribunals to request the Court to give an opinion on “questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the protocols thereto” arising “in the context of a case pending before [them]” (see Advisory opinion as to whether an individual may be denied authorisation to work as a security guard or officer on account of being close to or belonging to a religious movement [GC], request no. P16-2023-001, the Conseil d’État of Belgium, § 61, 14 December 2023).
49. The aim of the procedure is not to transfer the dispute to the Court, but rather to give the requesting court guidance on Convention issues when determining the case before it. The Court has no jurisdiction either to assess the facts of a case or to evaluate the merits of the parties’ views on the interpretation of domestic law in the light of the Convention, or to rule on the outcome of the proceedings. Its role is limited to providing an opinion in relation to the questions submitted to it. It is for the requesting court or tribunal to resolve the issues raised by the case and to draw, as appropriate, the conclusions which flow from the opinion delivered by the Court for the provisions of national law invoked in the case and for the outcome of the case (ibid., § 61).
50. The Court has inferred from Article 1 §§ 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 16 that the opinions it delivers under this Protocol “must be confined to points that are directly connected to the proceedings pending at domestic level”. Their value also lies in providing national courts with guidance on questions of principle relating to the Convention applicable in similar cases (ibid., § 62).
51. In formulating its opinion, the Court will take due account of the written observations and documents submitted in the course of the proceedings before it. Nevertheless, the Court’s task is not to reply to all the grounds and arguments submitted to it or to set out in detail the basis for its reply. Under Protocol No. 16, the Court’s role is not to rule in adversarial proceedings on contentious applications by means of a binding judgment but rather, within as short a time frame as possible, to provide the requesting court or tribunal with guidance enabling it to ensure respect for Convention rights when determining the case before it (ibid, § 64).
THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE SUPREME COURTThe first question52. The requesting court’s first question is formulated in broad general terms. However, as stated above, in advisory opinion proceedings the Court must confine itself to points that are directly connected to the proceedings pending at domestic level. The requesting court’s second question shows how its first question relates to the pending domestic proceedings: it refers to a dispute concerning “the right of a former nun to use the premises of a monastery” in circumstances where she had left those premises on account of a conflict with the leaders of the relevant religious organisation.
53. The Court will therefore tailor its answer to the particular context of a private dispute between a religious organisation and one of its (former) members.
54. The Court’s interpretation of the concept of “home”, as that term is used in Article 8 of the Convention, is well established. It has given an autonomous meaning to the term, which is to be interpreted broadly and does not depend on classification under domestic law. Rather, it is defined by reference to the relevant factual circumstances, namely the existence of sufficient and continuous links with a specific place (see, as a recent authority, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, § 1151, 9 July 2025). In its interpretation and application of the Article 8 guarantee, the Court has had regard to the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely, to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities (see National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, nos. 48151/11 and 77769/13, § 154 in fine, 18 January 2018).
55. The Court considers it relevant to clarify that the autonomous concept of “home” in Article 8 of the Convention is not necessarily identical in its meaning and implications to the notion of “housing” used in domestic law, although the same Ukrainian term (житло) can be used for the notion of “home” in the official Ukrainian translation of the Convention and for “housing” in the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraphs 38, 39 and 43 above).
56. Given that the Convention concept of “home” depends in the first place on the factual circumstances, several factors can be taken into account in deciding on the existence of “sufficient and continuous links” to the convent premises. Some of these, for example the fact that F. had left the monastery premises several years previously but still wished to return, or the fact that she had left her belongings there, were raised in the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 22 and 27 above).
57. The Court considers, however, the following considerations to be especially relevant in determining the existence of “sufficient and continuous links” in the particular context raised in the domestic proceedings.
58. The first consideration is the basis on which F. occupied the monastic cell. The question is whether there was a basis in civil law for her occupancy or whether she occupied it solely on the basis of her status within the relevant religious community as a nun or a novice (see paragraphs 12 and 18 above). This is a point disputed by the parties to the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 22, 28 and 29 above). If the requesting court finds that it was on the latter basis, then the principle of the autonomy of religious organisations, which is at the very heart of the protection afforded by Article 9 of the Convention, would become particularly relevant.
59. In this regard the Court takes note of the submissions made by the monastery to the effect that under the relevant provisions of canon law, a nun’s residence within the premises of an enclosed convent is inextricable from her membership of the community that is living out its religious vocation there.
60. The Court would point out in this connection that in accordance with the principle of the autonomy of religious organisations, it has held that the State is prohibited from obliging a religious community to admit new members or to exclude existing ones (see Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania [GC], no. 2330/09, §§ 136 and 137, ECHR 2013). Religious communities must be completely free to determine at their own discretion the manner in which new members are admitted and existing members are excluded (see Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, no. 77703/01, §§ 146 and 150, 14 June 2007). Moreover, Article 9 of the Convention does not guarantee any right to dissent within a religious body (see Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun”, cited above, § 137). In the event of a disagreement over matters of doctrine or organisation between a religious community and one of its members, the individual’s freedom of religion is exercised through freedom to leave the community (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, § 80, 15 September 2009).
61. The second consideration is that the monastic cell in issue in this case is not an independent or self-standing housing unit, but is an integral part of a monastery building that houses an enclosed religious community whose members live out their religious vocation through their common life together, separated from the world.
62. For the purposes of Article 8, the view can be taken that it is the convent itself that should be regarded as a “home”, shared by those who currently lead the monastic life together within it. The possibility of such potentially conflicting claims to a “home” in relation to the same premises should be taken into account when the scope of that notion is determined in the pending proceedings.
63. A third consideration to be taken into account is that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention protects the rights of religious organisations, including monasteries, to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions (see, for example, The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A). In this area, the matters concerned by Article 9 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 can be closely linked (see Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 412/03 and 35677/04, §§ 173-74, 22 January 2009, and Midyat Mor Gabriel Monastery Foundation v. Türkiye, no. 13176/13, §§ 36-68, 3 October 2023). As pointed out by the Supreme Court, domestic law also guarantees the right of religious organisations to manage their property without unjustified restrictions (see paragraph 44 above).
64. The recognition of a specific part of a building that is used as a place of worship by a religious community as the “home” of a person who is not a member of that community may well interfere with the religious organisation’s rights to manage and use that place of worship under Article 9 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, a point made by the monastery, which is the party directly concerned by the domestic proceedings, in its submissions to this Court.
65. For these reasons, and having regard to the principle that the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see, for example, M.A. v. Denmark [GC], no. 6697/18, § 144, 9 July 2021), the fact that a person previously occupied convent premises as a member of a monastic community but is no longer a member of that community should be a central factor in assessing whether he or she can be considered to have retained “sufficient” links with such premises.
66. Having regard to the considerations set out above, the Court considers that the first question posed by the Supreme Court can be answered as follows. The premises of a monastery or convent, including monastic cells, can be considered the “home”, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, read in the light of Article 9, of those persons who have sufficient and continuous links to those premises. If those links are solely based on religious grounds, then the status of those persons within the relevant religious community occupying the premises becomes particularly important.
67. If the requesting court, guided by the present opinion, draws the conclusion that the cell which was previously occupied by F. is to be properly regarded as her “home” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, it would follow that the relevant procedural safeguards which the Court has derived from that provision would need to be applied. As is shown in the Court’s practice, what this would mean in a particular case can vary depending on the nature of the dispute and the parties to it. Mostly, the Court has examined cases involving State-owned or socially owned accommodation. In that context, it has stated that any person at risk of losing his or her home should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention. In cases arising out of disputes between private parties, however, the Court has stated that the requirement of a proportionality analysis did not automatically apply (see, in particular, F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76202/16, §§ 37-46, 6 November 2018). This is consistent with what the Court has identified as the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely, to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities (see the case-law reference at the end of paragraph 54 above).
68. Finally, while the requesting court’s question concerned protection of the “home” aspect of Article 8, the Court would observe, for the sake of completeness, that the protection of the “private life” aspect might possibly be of relevance in the domestic proceedings. It has defined a person’s “home” as being the place where private and family life develops, it being clear that a person’s private life is not spatially limited to the place that counts as their home within the meaning of Article 8 (see the case-law reference at the end of paragraph 54 above). Here too the essential object and purpose of Article 8, set out in the preceding paragraph, can be recalled.
The second question69. The second question is framed in terms of the requesting court’s jurisdiction with respect to the type of dispute involved in the proceedings forming the background to this request. However, the Court would clarify that the relevant issue in relation to the “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not so much that of the jurisdiction of a particular domestic court, but whether the dispute concerns the determination of a “civil right” that is claimed by a party, a matter that will be addressed below. While closely related, the issue of the scope and limits of the jurisdiction of a domestic court is not, as such, governed directly by Article 6, but rather by the relevant provisions of domestic law. It is not therefore for the Court, in the context of proceedings under Protocol No. 16, to determine in general terms whether the national court’s jurisdiction extends to what it has described as “disputes with a religious element” (see paragraph 36 above). Rather, it will be for the requesting court to rule on this matter, drawing as appropriate on the reply given by the Court to the second question posed (see paragraph 49 above; see also Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC] (no. 56665/09, § 73, 14 September 2017).
70. The Court thus considers that the second question essentially asks about the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the proceedings now pending before the Supreme Court, that is, whether by virtue of that provision F. is entitled to have her claim determined by a court that satisfies its various requirements. As the requesting court has explained in its request, the core legal issue before it is whether the dispute should be subject to adjudication by the national courts, or whether the relevant legal relationship is to be dealt with and ultimately resolved internally by the religious organisation, without recourse to judicial review at the national level.
71. Having made that clarification, the Court would add that whichever conclusion the requesting court draws on the issue raised under the first question, this would not, in any case, directly answer the second question, since the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention is not dependent on the conclusion in respect of the applicability of Article 8.
72. As concerns the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court’s case-law is well established; among many other authorities, it was set out in the Károly Nagy judgment (cited above), a precedent that the requesting court has taken account of in its consideration of the case before it (internal references omitted):
“60. The Court has reiterated time and again that for Article 6 § 1 in its ‘civil’ limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute over a ‘right’ which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether that right is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play ....
61. Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for civil ‘rights and obligations’ in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State concerned .... Moreover, as can be seen from the Court’s well-established case-law, it is necessary to maintain a distinction between procedural and substantive elements: fine as that distinction may be in a particular set of national legal provisions, it remains determinative of the applicability and, as appropriate, the scope of the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention, which can, in principle, have no application to substantive limitations on a right existing under domestic law ...
62. In order to decide whether the ‘right’ in question really has a basis in domestic law, the starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts ... The Court recalls that it is primarily for the national authorities, in particular the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court’s role is limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention. That being so, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it is not for the Court to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national courts ... Thus, where the superior national courts have analysed in a comprehensive and convincing manner the precise nature of the impugned restriction [of access to a court], on the basis of the relevant Convention case-law and principles drawn therefrom, this Court would need strong reasons to differ from the conclusion reached by those courts by substituting its own views for those of the national courts on a question of interpretation of domestic law and by finding, contrary to their view, that there was arguably a right recognised by domestic law ...”
73. The complaint of the applicant in the above case was that the domestic courts had declined to examine the merits of his pecuniary claim against the church authorities, following his removal from pastoral service on disciplinary grounds. The Grand Chamber, applying the principles set out above, found that Article 6 was not applicable. It observed that it was clear that under Hungarian law claims involving the internal laws and regulations of a church could not be enforced by State organs, and that where it was established that a dispute concerned an unenforceable ecclesiastical claim the domestic courts had to terminate the proceedings. The main issue in the domestic proceedings had therefore been the exact nature of the applicant’s relationship with the church in question. The Grand Chamber further noted the position of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the matter, and its differentiation between relations governed by ecclesiastical law, which could not be litigated through the domestic courts, and legal relationships between a church and its members, which were governed by State law. In the latter case, the State courts were required to examine the merits of such disputes, while also respecting church autonomy.
74. The consistency of the positions taken by the courts to which the applicant had applied is underlined in the Károly Nagy judgment:
“72. The Court notes that in the applicant’s case all national courts – i.e. the labour court, the civil court and the Supreme Court – after a detailed examination of the issue of the State courts’ jurisdiction and the right of access to a court of persons in ecclesiastical service, discontinued the proceedings holding that the applicant’s claim could not be enforced before national courts since his pastoral service and the Letter of Appointment which it was based on had been governed by ecclesiastical rather than the State law ... The Court furthermore notes that these findings are in line with the principles set by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 2003 ...”
75. The Court was satisfied that domestic law did not provide churches with unfettered immunity against any and all civil claims; it was clear that claims that did not concern the internal laws and rules of a church could be decided by the courts. In view of the clear overall legal and jurisprudential framework in Hungary at the material time, the discontinuance of the proceedings brought by the applicant before the State courts was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable. This led to the conclusion that the applicant did not have any right, even on arguable grounds, that was recognised under domestic law, meaning that Article 6 was inapplicable to the facts of the case.
76. The Court would further direct the attention of the requesting court to a number of other cases that are of relevance to the matter under consideration.
77. In the case of Dudová and Duda v. the Czech Republic (dec.) (no. 40224/98, 30 June 2001), the applicants were priests whose service had been terminated by the diocesan council. In the subsequent proceedings, they sought both the payment of salary that they regarded as being owed to them, and also the annulment of their dismissal, arguing that it was not within the competence of the diocesan council to take such a decision. While the first part of their claim was ultimately successful, the domestic courts declined to examine the other part, taking the view that to do so would represent an impermissible interference with a religious matter. Ruling on a complaint raised before it by the applicants, the Czech Constitutional Court confirmed that position. This Court concluded that the proceedings brought by the applicants did not at all concern a “right” that could be said, even on arguable grounds, to exists in the domestic legal order.
78. In the case of Ahtinen v. Finland (no. 48907/99, 23 September 2008), the applicant was a priest who sought to challenge the decision of the Cathedral Chapter to transfer him to another parish. Under Finnish law, no ordinary appeal lay against such a decision. An extraordinary appeal lay to the Supreme Administrative Court, by which the person concerned could raise the complaint that he or she had not been provided with an opportunity to be heard and that the decision violated his or her right, or if another procedural error had occurred which might likewise have affected the decision. The applicant made use of that appeal. Before this Court, he complained under Article 6 that he had not been properly heard on the real reasons for his transfer, and that the decision-making procedure followed by the Cathedral Chapter had not been impartial.
79. The Court decided to join the issue of the applicability of Article 6 to the merits of the case. In determining whether the proceedings concerned any “right” held by the applicant, the Court noted that the transfer of clergy from one parish to another was, formally, at the discretion of the Cathedral Chapter, which told against the existence of any “right”. The Court took note of several factors that confirmed this: clergy transfers were not subject to consent; no appeal was provided for against a decision to transfer, and this was clearly what the legislator had intended; the arrangement was in keeping with an old tradition of the church. The existence of a limited, extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court did not alter the conclusion that there was no substantive right in domestic law that the applicant could claim.
80. The Court also took note of the position of the church in the domestic legal system, and its independence in matters such as clerical appointments and service. Priests were therefore aware, when taking up service, that they could later be transferred to another parish. In entering the priesthood, the applicant undertook to abide by the rules of the church as these were incorporated in domestic legislation and regulations. The Court affirmed its position in the Dudovà and Duda case, in which it agreed with the domestic court that the judicial determination of issues such as the continuation of a priest’s service within a church would be contrary to the principles of autonomy and independence of churches guaranteed by national law, including provisions of constitutional rank. The Court concluded that Article 6 did not apply.
81. Also relevant is the case of Ţîmpău v. Romania (no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023). The applicant taught the Orthodox religion in a State school. In order to hold that post, it was necessary to have the endorsement of the church authorities. Her endorsement was withdrawn by the local Archbishop, leading to her dismissal from the school. She attempted to have that decision reviewed by the civil courts, which refused to do so for lack of jurisdiction. Under domestic law, confirmed by the Romanian Constitutional Court, religious communities were permitted to apply their internal rules, and any challenge to a decision taken in that context could only be brought before the ecclesiastical courts. She complained that the domestic courts had violated her right to a court. Applying the principles set down in the Károly Nagy judgment, the Court accepted that the position taken by the courts that examined the applicant’s claim had been in line with established domestic practice. It noted that none of the domestic courts had accepted the applicant’s arguments that she had been denied the possibility of challenging the Archbishop’s decision in the ecclesiastical courts, and that they had given reasons for their decision. Their dismissal of her claim came after a detailed examination of the issue in dispute, and their findings were not inconsistent with the principles established in relevant constitutional and domestic practice. Their finding that they lacked jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s claim was thus neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable. The Court concluded that the applicant had no “right” which could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, rendering Article 6 inapplicable to that case.
82. What these cases show is that the question of the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention does not involve, as the requesting court has suggested, the striking of a fair balance between the relevant Convention rights of the parties to the proceedings. Instead, they illustrate that the decisive issue is whether the proceedings concern a “right” that is recognised, at least on arguable grounds, in domestic law. That, as the Court has consistently held, is primarily a matter for the national authorities, in particular the courts. In that regard, and as stated above, this Court’s role is relatively limited. Its role is all the more limited under Protocol No. 16, since, in contrast to cases brought under Article 34 of the Convention following the completion of domestic proceedings and the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the proceedings are ongoing. The requesting court has yet to give its ruling on the matter, and, as a “highest court”, will ultimately decide, guided by this Court’s opinion, whether the proceedings before it are such as to attract the application of Article 6 of the Convention.
83. The above-mentioned cases also illustrate that, in examining the question of the existence of a substantive civil right under domestic law, it is important that the courts subject the claim as asserted before them to careful examination, and that they provide cogent reasons for their conclusions, in a manner consistent with relevant domestic law and case-law, including any constitutional-level provisions guaranteeing the autonomy of religious organisations.
84. The Court observes that the wording of the second question uses the term “right” in relation to F’s claim and her situation (“the right of a former nun to use the premises of a monastery, where such right arose...”). It further notes that F’s use of the cell at the time is described by the requesting court as being based on a personal fixed-term servitude arising from an oral agreement with the monastery, conditioned by the monastery’s purpose and her acceptance into monastic life. This point is contested between the parties, with the monastery arguing that F’s residence at the time in the convent was not based on any legal right but on privilege under canon law, and that the agreement was unilaterally terminated by F. when she decided to leave. F. has argued that the monastery granted her a “personal perpetual servitude right for permanent residence” and expressed disagreement with the manner in which the Supreme Court characterised the situation in its request.
85. This is a matter for the requesting court to resolve. Should it conclude that, in view of the termination of her agreement with the monastery, F. cannot now claim any “right”, even on an arguable basis, in relation to the cell that she previously occupied, it would follow that it is not required, under Article 6 of the Convention, to determine the merits of that claim. In that eventuality, and as seen in the cases referred to above, the Supreme Court should clearly demonstrate in its reasoning – particularly given the contrary position that was reached by the lower courts – that F. does not, as a matter of domestic law, have any cognisable right with respect to the part of the monastic premises at issue in the proceedings.
86. In her submissions in the present proceedings, F. relied on the fact that she was officially registered as residing at the premises of the monastery, and that this registration was carried out for an indefinite period “as a private individual, a citizen of Ukraine, not as a nun”. While, again, it is for the Supreme Court to assess the validity and pertinence of this submission, the Court would point out that in Károly Nagy the applicant relied, in support of his position, on the fact that the allowance he received from the church was subject to income tax. The Court was not convinced by this argument, observing that the autonomy of tax law may allow State authorities to levy tax also on income which does not stem from private-law relations governed by State law (cited above, § 73). The main issue in that case was, as already noted above, the exact nature of the applicant’s legal relationship with the church.
87. As for the significance of the Fernández Martínez judgment, referred to by the Supreme Court in its request, the applicant in that case did not raise any complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, since his case was examined by the domestic courts. The case instead involved a complaint examined under Article 8 of the Convention. In that context, the question whether a fair balance had been struck between the applicant’s rights (respect for his private life) and those of the Catholic Church (right of religious organisations to autonomy) was at the core of the case. As stated earlier, this is not relevant to the issue of the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention, and so the Fernández Martínez case affords no guidance on this specific point.
88. If, however, the requesting court goes on to find that, in the light of the relevant domestic principles, provisions and case-law at the time the proceedings were instituted, the right claimed by F. is at least arguable, and that the other conditions (see Károly Nagy, cited above, § 60) are also satisfied, then she would in principle be entitled under Article 6 to a determination of her claim in compliance with the requirements of a fair civil trial, which have been set out in the Court’s well-established case-law under that provision. That is not to prejudge in any way the conclusion that would ultimately be reached by the domestic courts.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Delivers the following opinion:
1. The premises of a monastery or convent, including monastic cells, can be considered the “home”, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, read in the light of Article 9, of persons having sufficient and continuous links to those premises. If those links are solely based on religious grounds, then the status of those persons within the relevant religious community occupying the premises becomes particularly important.
2. The applicability of Article 6 of the Convention, and thus of the right of access to a court guaranteed by it, to proceedings before a domestic court depends on whether the dispute concerns a right which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. That is primarily a matter for the national court to resolve. In so doing, it should subject the claim as asserted before it to careful examination and provide cogent reasoning for the conclusion reached on this issue, having regard to the relevant domestic law and case-law. In the case that is pending before the requesting court, the domestic provisions and case-law concerning the autonomy of religious organisations will be of particular relevance to this assessment.
If the national court concludes that, given the facts of the case and the relevant domestic law, the plaintiff in the proceedings (F.) cannot now claim any “right”, even on an arguable basis, in relation to the cell that she previously occupied, it would follow that it is not required, under Article 6 of the Convention, to determine the merits of that claim. If, however, the national court’s conclusion is that the right claimed by the plaintiff is at least arguable and that the other conditions for applicability of Article 6 are also met, then she would, in principle, be entitled to a determination of her claim in compliance with the requirements of a fair civil trial, which have been set out in the Court’s case-law under that provision.
Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 5 March 2026.
John Darcy Mattias Guyomar
Deputy to the Registrar President