AKIYEV v. RUSSIA and 11 other applications

Published on 20 October 2025

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 22607/25
Dilyaver AKIYEV against Russia
and 11 other applications
(see list appended)
communicated on 3 October 2025

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASES

The applications concern the banning of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (hereinafter – “the Mejlis”) by the “Supreme Court of Crimea” on 16 April 2016.

The Mejlis, operating in Crimea, is the high representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people and was founded in 1991 to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatars before the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, as well as before international organisations. Consisting of thirty-three members elected by and accountable to the Qurultai (the general assembly of Crimean Tatars), the Mejlis is the high representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people. It functions as the permanent executive body between the sessions of the Qurultai (held every five years), implementing its decisions and representing the Crimean Tatar people. The most recent full Qurultai session took place in Bakhchysaray, Crimea, in October 2013, when the current Mejlis composition was elected.

On 15 February 2016, relying on the anti-extremism provisions of the Russian Federation legislation, the “Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea” brought before the “Supreme Court of Crimea” an action against the Mejlis, seeking a judgment declaring the Mejlis an extremist organisation and consequently banning its activities. On 12 April 2016 the activities of the Mejlis were temporarily suspended pending the “court’s decision”. On 26 April 2016 the “Supreme Court of Crimea” granted the prosecutorial action. On 29 September 2016 the Administrative Division of the Russian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Mejlis. This appeal judgment is final and not amenable to any further appeal.

The present applications were brought by twelve members of the Mejlis.

The applicants complain that the order for the dissolution of the Mejlis and the ban on its activity constituted an interference with their freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention.

The applicants complain under Article 18 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 11, that the real purpose of the above-indicated ban was to silence and to punish the Mejlis and its members for their political opposition.

Relying on Article 7 of the Convention, the applicants argue that the designation of the Mejlis as an “extremist organisation” retroactively criminalised legitimate activities of Crimean Tatars and exposed them to prosecution under the vague and unforeseeable Russian anti-extremism laws, which lacked clarity given that they blurred the line between extremism and lawful activity. They further argue that the retroactive imposition of Russian law in occupied Crimea, without proper publication, constituted a violation of Article 7 of the Convention, as also reflected by the safeguards set out in Articles 64 and 65 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The applicants further complain under Article 8 of the Convention that their right to respect for private life has been impaired as a result of continuous surveillance, with the consequence that any of their activities could give rise to criminal or administrative sanctions.

Lastly, and relying on Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IV, the applicants complain under Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 11, that no distinction was made between the specific status of the Mejlis as a representative body of the indigenous peoples and other public associations of Crimean Tatars.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1.  Have the applicants complied with the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention?

2. Can the applicants, in view of their personal capacity as Mejlis members, claim to be victims of a violation of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 34?

3.  In the affirmative, has there been a violation of the applicants’ right to freedom of association, contrary to Article 11 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 1123-28, 25 June 2024)?

4.  Were the restrictions imposed by the respondent State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by that provision, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1351‑82)?

5.  Does the designation of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People as an extremist organisation, triggering the applicability of Russian anti-extremism legislation in Crimea, comply with the requirements of Article 7 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1274-78)?

6.  Was the legislation of the Russian Federation, on which the Mejlis was designated as an extremist organisation, officially published in Crimea at the time of the proceedings concerning the Mejlis? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Government are requested to provide a copy of the official publication of the full text. If it was not published, can the law on the basis of which the Mejlis was sanctioned be considered sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, as required by Article 7 of the Convention?

7.  Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life, in breach of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention?

8.  Have the applicants suffered discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 11 (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1181-90)?

In particular, have the applicants been subjected to a difference in treatment by failing to recognise the Mejlis’ specific status as a self‑governing body of the indigenous peoples?

APPENDIX

List of applications: