THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 63800/10
Daniel ALOJZ
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 21 January 2014 as a Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall, President,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ján Šikuta,
Luis López Guerra,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Kristina Pardalos,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 October 2010,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Daniel Alojz, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1956 and lives in Banská Bystrica.
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. On 3 and 5 April 2009, respectively, the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody pending trial on drug‑related charges.
5. On 28 October 2009, he submitted a request to the Trenčín District Court (Okresný súd), as the remand court, for his release. The request arrived there by mail on 30 October 2009.
6. As by law the request fell to be determined first by the Public Prosecution Service, the District Court sent it to the District Office of Public Prosecution, which dismissed it and returned the matter to the District Court on 18 November 2009.
7. The District Court scheduled an in-chambers hearing (neverejné zasadnutie) of the applicant’s request for 4 December 2009. However, the hearing was rescheduled for 18 December 2009 at the request of the applicants’ lawyer, who was unable to attend on the former date as she was to attend a conference.
8. Meanwhile, on 9 December 2009, the applicant was indicted to stand trial on the above-mentioned charges. As a consequence, the case was assigned to a new judge, as the trial judge.
9. Following the hearing of 18 December 2009 before the trial judge, on the same day, the District Court dismissed the request. When the decision was pronounced, the applicant immediately lodged an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť).
10. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajský súd) on 28 January 2010. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant through the intermediary of the District Court on 18 February 2010.
11. On 19 February 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd), concerning the length of the proceedings on his request for release of 28 October 2009.
12. On 20 April 2010 the Constitutional Court appointed a legal‑aid lawyer to represent the applicant. The lawyer restated the applicant’s complaint on 21 May 2010. In a standardised and prescribed form (petit), the lawyer directed the complaint against the District Court, alleging that the applicant’s right to a speedy review of the lawfulness of his detention had been breached in the proceedings on the applicants’ request for release of 28 October 2009. He claimed 1,500 euros (EUR) in damages.
13. On 22 June and 25 August 2010 respectively, the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible and found a violation of the applicant’s right to a speedy review of the lawfulness of his detention. It awarded him EUR 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
14. The Constitutional Court observed that it had taken the District Court fifty-one days to decide on the applicant’s request and that it had done so with final effect only after ninety-two days. As to the amount of damages awarded, the Constitutional Court referred to the length of the proceedings under the responsibility of the District Court, the circumstances of the case, and the seriousness of the violation of the applicants’ rights.
15. The applicant unsuccessfully requested release also on other occasions, both prior to and after the request of 28 October 2009.
The trial on the merits ended with the District Court and the Regional Court convicting the applicant and sentencing him to ten years in prison on 23 February and 2 June 2011 respectively.
The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was rejected on 29 February 2012. He subsequently sought the re-opening of his trial, but was unsuccessful.
COMPLAINTS
16. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that, following his request for release of 28 October 2009, the lawfulness of his detention had not been determined speedily.
He raised a similar complaint in respect of his other requests for release.
17. The applicant also alleged that his rights under Articles 6, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, as well as under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, had been violated.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the proceedings on the applicant’s request for release of 28 October 2009
18. The applicant alleged that the proceedings in respect of his request for release of 28 October 2009 had been incompatible with the speediness requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
1. Parties’ arguments
19. As to the proceedings before the Regional Court, the Government objected that the applicant had failed to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
As to the proceedings before the District Court, the Government considered that, in view of the redress obtained by the applicant under the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 25 August 2010, he had lost his status of a victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of the violation alleged. In support of their assertion, the Government submitted that the violation of the applicant’s rights had been only technical, that his pre-trial detention as such had been lawful, and that the length of the proceedings before the District Court had been partly attributable to the applicant’s lawyer, in that a hearing had been postponed at her request for reasons pertaining to her. Therefore, in view of all the circumstances, the redress afforded by the Constitutional Court had been adequate.
20. In reply, the applicant reiterated all of his complaints. He pointed out that the duration of the determination of his request comprised not only the time attributable to the District Court but also that attributable to the Regional Court. He contested that any delays were attributable to his legal‑aid lawyer because, in his submission, the District Court could have summoned her assistant. He also contested the non-exhaustion argument, claiming that, in substance, his constitutional complaint concerned the contested proceedings in their entirety and raised a number of other arguments which the Constitutional Court had overlooked.
2. The Court’s assessment
21. The Court deems it appropriate first to entertain the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In that respect, it reiterates that, as a general rule, the scope of the Constitutional Court’s examination of a case following an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution is defined and limited by the summary of the motion for commencement of the proceedings, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form (petit) (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 48, 20 June 2006) by the complainant. The Court has accepted on a number of occasions that, in order to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of complaints about length of proceedings, applicants must formulate their constitutional complaints in a manner permitting the Constitutional Court to examine the overall duration of the proceedings, taking into account the above-cited requirement (see, for example, Obluk, cited above, § 62; Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, § 53, 26 September 2006; and Majchrák v. Slovakia, no. 21463/08, § 42-44, 23 October 2012). In other words, the constitutional complaint about length of proceedings should be directed against all the courts involved in the determination of a given matter.
22. In the present case, the applicant, represented by a lawyer, directed his constitutional complaint exclusively against the District Court, claiming that following his request for release of 28 October 2009, his right to a speedy review of the lawfulness of his detention had been breached (see paragraph 12 above).
It follows that, in so far as the applicant’s present complaint concerns the phase of the proceedings on the request for release of 28 October 2009 before the Regional Court, the applicant cannot be considered as having complied with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
23. The Court will accordingly proceed to examine the applicant’s complaint, in so far as it concerns the District Court.
24. The Court observes that the applicant submitted his request for release on 28 October 2009 and that it was decided on by the District Court on 18 December 2009, that is to say, after fifty days.
25. In view of the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation of the applicant’s right to a speedy review of the lawfulness of his detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see paragraph 13 above), the Government’s admission (see paragraph 19 above), and its own case‑law on the subject (see the summary in, for example, Osváthová v. Slovakia, no. 15684/05, § 77, 21 December 2010), the Court has no difficulty in accepting that the proceedings before the District Court concerning the applicant’s request for release were not in conformity with the speediness requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
26. The next question to be answered is whether, in view of the redress obtained under the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 25 August 2010, the applicant can still claim to be a victim of the violation alleged.
27. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive the applicant of his or her status as a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention claimed (see Rosselet-Christ v. Slovakia, no. 25329/05, § 49, 26 October 2010, with further references).
28. Since in its judgment of 25 August 2010 the Constitutional Court expressly acknowledged a breach of the applicant’s right, under Article 5 § 4, to a speedy review of the lawfulness of his detention, the only issue which arises in that respect in the present case is whether the redress afforded to him can be considered as appropriate.
29. In its judgment, the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant EUR 500 in non-pecuniary damages, referring to the length of the proceedings under the responsibility of the District Court, the circumstances of the case, and the intensity of the violation of the applicants’ rights (see paragraph 14 above).
30. The Court notes that the compensation awarded in the present case by the Constitutional Court is somewhat lower than the Court’s own awards in similar cases (for comparison see, for example, Kadem v. Malta, no. 55263/00, 9 January 2003; Rapacciuolo v. Italy, no. 76024/01, 19 May 2005; Vejmola v. the Czech Republic, no. 57246/00, §§ 47 and 56, 25 October 2005; and – more recently - Gál v. Slovakia, no. 45426/06, 30 November 2010; Karlin v. Slovakia, no. 41238/05, 28 June 2011; Rahmani and Dineva v. Bulgaria, no. 20116/08, 10 May 2012; Shakurov v. Russia, no. 55822/10, 5 June 2012; Abidov v. Russia, no. 52805/10, 12 June 2012; and Alikhonov v. Russia, no. 35692/11, 31 July 2012).
31. The Court reiterates the importance of a reasonable amount of just satisfaction being awarded in the domestic system for the remedy in question to be considered as effective under the Convention. Whether the amount awarded may be regarded as reasonable, however, falls to be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case. These include not merely the duration of the proceedings in the specific case, but the value of the award judged in the light of the standard of living in the State concerned, and the fact that, under the national system, compensation will in general be awarded and paid more promptly than would be the case if the matter fell to be decided by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention (see Dubjaková v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 67299/01, 19 October 2004).
32. In assessing the reasonableness of the amount of the Constitutional Court’s award, the Court considers it of relevance that the applicant’s request for release of 28 October 2009 was lodged with the District Court, whereas the authority to consider it in the first place was the Public Prosecution Service, to which the complaint had accordingly to be transmitted; that consequently the request then had to be sent back to the District Court; and that a hearing before the latter was delayed by two weeks for reasons attributable to the applicant’s lawyer (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). Another factor to be taken into account is that, in the period under consideration, the applicant was indicted, as a result of which his request for release fell to be determined by a different judge (see paragraph 8 above).
33. In conclusion, in the light of all the material in its possession, including the promptness of the findings and the award made by the Constitutional Court in the present case, the Court considers that the sum awarded to the applicant cannot be considered as unreasonable.
The Court therefore finds that, as far as the applicant’s request for release of 28 October 2009 was determined by the District Court, he can no longer claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of the alleged violation of his right to a “speedy” review of the lawfulness of his detention under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
34. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
B. Remaining alleged violations
35. The applicant alleged that the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been breached also in the proceedings on his other requests for release. In addition, he alleged that his rights under Articles 6, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, as well as 4 of Protocol No. 7, had been violated.
36. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Santiago QuesadaJosep Casadevall
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy