Communicated on 23 July 2020
Published on 10 August 2020
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 40234/16
AMIS TELEKOM DOO
against Serbia
lodged on 24 June 2016
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The applicant in the present case is a broadcasting company. The case concerns the refusal of domestic administrative authorities to render a decision on the merits regarding the applicant company’s request for broadcasting licences lodged with a competent body in 2005 (see, mutatis mutandis, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 136-158, ECHR 2012) and the length of these proceedings.
On 26 November 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant company’s right to a trial within a reasonable time, awarded it 500 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and rejected the remainder of the appeal as premature. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (10 December 2018), the impugned proceedings were still pending. The case raises issues under Articles 6, 10 and 13 of the Convention as well as under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has the length of the administrative proceedings in the present case been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, may the amount awarded by the Constitutional Court in respect of non-pecuniary damage be regarded as adequate and reasonable bearing in mind the duration and significance of the impugned proceedings?
2. Having regard to the Court’s case-law (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, ECHR 2012), has there been an interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression, in particular, its right to impart information and ideas, within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention? Did the alleged interference in the present case fall within the State’s margin of appreciation in the realm of media licensing, to which reference is expressly made in Article 10 § 1? If so, was that interference prescribed by law and necessary in terms of Article 10 § 2?
3. Having regard to the Court’s case-law (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above), has there been an interference with the applicant company’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? If so, was that interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties?
4. Having regard to the Court’s case-law (see Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, no. 14134/02, § 70, 11 October 2007), did the applicant company have at its disposal an effective domestic remedy for its Convention complaints, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?
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