ASPA v. ITALY

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 42949/12
Giovanni ASPA
against Italy

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 6 November 2025 as a Committee composed of:

 Frédéric Krenc, President,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 42949/12) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 3 June 2012 by an Italian national, Mr Giovanni Aspa (“the applicant”), who was born in 1962, is currently detained in Spoleto, and was represented by Mr C. Picciotto, a lawyer practising in Messina;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Italian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns the rejection of the applicant’s request for a reduction of his sentence from life imprisonment to 30 years’ imprisonment. stemming, in his view, from his request – which he later withdrew – to be tried under the summary procedure (giudizio abbreviato), a simplified trial form whereby a case can be decided on the basis of the file as it stands (allo stato degli atti) at the preliminary hearing.

2.  On 27 January 1998 the applicant was committed for trial for multiple crimes committed between 1986 and 1990 which, at that time, were cumulatively punishable by a life sentence with daytime isolation.

3.  On 2 January 2000 Law no. 479 of 1999 entered into force and reintroduced, for defendants liable to a sentence of life imprisonment, the option of being tried under the summary procedure, which entailed a reduction of an accused’s sentence from life imprisonment to 30 years’ imprisonment in the event of a conviction.

4.  At a hearing on 19 June 2000 the applicant asked to be tried under the summary procedure. The request was granted on 29 June 2000.

5.  On 24 November 2000 Decree‑Law no. 341 of 2000 entered into force. Section 7 of the Decree‑Law provided that “life imprisonment”, as referred to in Law no. 479 of 1999, should be taken to mean “life imprisonment without daytime isolation”. In other words, only those liable to receive a sentence of life imprisonment without daytime isolation could be eligible for a reduction of their sentence to one of 30 years’ imprisonment, while those liable to receive a sentence of life imprisonment with daytime isolation, such as the applicant, would only be eligible, in the event of a trial under the summary procedure, for a reduction of the sentence imposed to one of life imprisonment without daytime isolation.

6.  Under Section 8 of Decree‑Law no. 341 of 2000, defendants in ongoing proceedings could withdraw their requests to be tried under the summary procedure within 30 days of the date on which the legislation implementing the Decree‑Law entered into force. Accordingly, on an unspecified date the applicant withdrew his request to be tried under the summary procedure and the trial was resumed on 12 February 2021 under the ordinary procedure.

7.  On 26 July 2006 the Messina Assize Court found the applicant guilty of the majority of the charges and sentenced him to four terms of life imprisonment with daytime isolation and a total of 21 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for other crimes.

8.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 26 July 2006. On 28 November 2009 the Messina Assize Court of Appeal acquitted him of some of the charges and declared the other charges time‑barred; however, it upheld his conviction on two counts of murder, and reassessed the penalty for each murder charge and sentenced him to two terms of life imprisonment without daytime isolation.

9.  In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) ([GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009), the Court concluded that Italy had failed to discharge its obligation to grant the applicant in that case, who had been tried under the summary procedure and sentenced to life imprisonment, the benefit of Law no. 479 of 1999 (which provided for a more lenient penalty), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. It also concluded that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached as a result of the frustration of the applicant’s legitimate expectation that 30 years’ imprisonment was the maximum sentence to which he was liable.

10.  The applicant in the present case appealed on points of law, requesting, among other things, that his sentence be reduced to 30 years’ imprisonment, in accordance with the Court’s findings in Scoppola (cited above). He argued that his decision to withdraw his request for his case to be tried under the summary procedure had been based on the entry into force of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000.

11.  By judgment no. 45862 of 17 October 2011 (deposited with the court’s registry on 7 December 2012), the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal, stating, inter alia, that the applicant’s case differed from Scoppola (cited above) in that the applicant’s conviction had followed a trial conducted according to the ordinary procedure. The applicant had therefore benefited from all the guarantees of a fair trial.

12.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, alleging that the amendments made to the maximum penalty that could be imposed under the summary procedure had undermined his right to have adequate time to prepare his defence.

13.  He also relied on Article 7 of the Convention, alleging that the domestic courts had failed to grant him the benefit of the provision prescribing a more lenient penalty, as set out in Scoppola (cited above).

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

14.  At the outset, the Court notes that, when they were given notice of the application, a question was put to the parties under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention regarding the possible frustration of the applicant’s legitimate expectation that a maximum penalty of 30 years’ imprisonment would be imposed on him.

15.  The Court notes, however, that in the application form the applicant did not raise any complaint in that regard and that the applicant’s reply to the Court’s question under Article 6 § 1 cannot be considered to concern a particular aspect of his initial complaint under Article 6 § 3 (b), in so far as it relates to the requirements arising from Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 96, 1 June 2023). That complaint was therefore formulated for the first time by the applicant in his observations of 30 June 2021, after notice of the application had been given to the respondent Government.

16.  The Court reiterates that it can base its decision only on the facts complained of. Therefore, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is “evident” from the facts of the case or the applicant’s submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second‑guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not. This means that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced (ibid., §§ 90-91).

17.  In the light of the above, the Court finds that the complaint concerning the frustration of the applicant’s legitimate expectation that a maximum penalty of 30 years’ imprisonment would be imposed on him, which he raised in June 2021, was lodged more than six months[1] after the final domestic decision (see paragraph 11 above).

18.  It follows that this complaint must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

19.  The applicant alleged that, following the enactment of Decree‑Law no. 341 of 2000, he had had only 30 days to decide between the summary procedure and the ordinary procedure and that, within that period, he had essentially been forced to withdraw his request to be tried under the summary procedure, as opting for it would have inevitably resulted in the imposition of a life sentence.

20.  The Government argued that the applicant’s decision to withdraw his request to be tried under the summary procedure had been a deliberate and informed choice, made as part of his broader procedural strategy.

21.  The Court has already found that defendants liable to a sentence of life imprisonment were afforded enough time and facilities by the legislature to consider, with the assistance of their lawyers, whether to maintain a request that their cases be tried under the summary procedure or to withdraw it under section 8 of the Decree‑Law (see Scoppola, cited above, § 142).

22.  In view of the above considerations, the Court considers that the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer of his choice, was therefore in the position to adequately prepare his defence and to decide on his procedural strategy without any hindrance.

23.  It follows that this part of the application must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention, as manifestly ill‑founded.

24.  The applicant claimed that, having been sentenced to life imprisonment, he had been given a heavier sentence than the one prescribed by Law no. 479 of 1999 (which, of all the laws in force during the period between the commission of the offence and the delivery of the final judgment, had been the most favourable to him), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.

25.  The relevant principles have been summarised in Scoppola (cited above, §§ 108-09) and, more recently, in Cesarano v. Italy (no. 71250/16, §§ 78-80 and § 84, 17 October 2024).

26.  The Court observes, as did the Government, that, as a consequence of the withdrawal of his request to be tried under the summary procedure, the applicant was tried and ultimately convicted following a trial under the ordinary procedure.

27.  It reiterates that Italian law offers an accused person several different procedural paths and related penalties. Consideration must be given to the possibility of changing from one path to another (with the associated reduction of penalties); such a decision depends on the procedural and defence choices made by the accused person (see Cesarano, cited above, § 84).

28.  As the Government pointed out, a reduction of the sentence imposed on a defendant (to which he is entitled in the event of his conviction following trial under the summary procedure) is provided for by law in exchange for waiving certain procedural safeguards (see Scoppola, § 136, and Cesarano, § 84, both cited above). However, having withdrawn his request for his case to be tried under the summary procedure, the applicant secured the benefit of the rights he had waived by opting for it (see Scoppola, cited above, § 143).

29.  The facts of the present case therefore differ from those in Scoppola (cited above) in that the conviction of the applicant in the instant case followed a trial under the ordinary procedure in which he benefited from all the guarantees of a fair trial.

30.  Against that backdrop, the Court considers that the applicant was not entitled to be granted the benefit of the more lenient penalty of 30 years’ imprisonment provided for by Law no. 479 of 1999 (see paragraph 3 above), given that, following his decision to withdraw his request for his case to be tried under the summary procedure, that penalty was no longer a possible sentence for the crime of which he stood accused at his trial under the ordinary procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, Cesarano, cited above, § 82).

31.  It follows that this part of the application must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention, as manifestly ill‑founded.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 27 November 2025.

 Liv Tigerstedt Frédéric Krenc
 Deputy Registrar President

[1] Protocol No. 15 to the Convention has shortened to four months from the final domestic decision the time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. However, in the present case the six-month period still applies, given that the final domestic decision was taken prior to 1 February 2022, date of entry into force of the new rule (pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention).