AUGUSTIN S.A. v. SWITZERLAND



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 19798/92

                      by AUGUSTIN S.A.

                      against Switzerland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 30 November 1994, the following members being present:

           MM.   H. DANELIUS, Acting President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 10 January 1992

by AUGUSTIN S.A. against Switzerland and registered on 6 April 1992

under file No. 19798/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant company, may

be summarised as follows.

      The applicant company is registered in Switzerland.  Its sole

board member is Mr. O.M. Augustin, a Swiss citizen residing in Scuol

in Switzerland.  Before the Commission the applicant company is

represented by Mr R. Viletta, a lawyer practising in Guarda.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

      The applicant company is the proprietor of real property in the

Sent municipality.  In 1973/74 approximately 600 m2 of this real

property was allocated to the building zone of the municipality.  In

1988 the Sent municipality revised its building plan and again planned

to attribute the area concerned to a building zone.

      In 1990 the Government (Regierung) of the Canton of Graubünden

approved the building zone in principle.  However, it did not approve

attribution to the building zone of the 600 m2 appertaining to the

applicant company's real property.  The Government considered in

particular that the real property at issue amounted to a "spot or small

building zone" (Punkt- oder Kleinbauzone) which had no connection to

the remaining settlements (Siedlungsgefüge) of the municipality.

A "spot building zone" would only be possible where a municipality had

remote farmhouses, but this was not the case in Sent.

      The applicant company filed with the Federal Court (Bundes-

gericht) a public law appeal (staatsrechtliche Beschwerde) based on

Section 84 para. 1 (b) of the Federal Judiciary Act

(Organisationsgesetz; see below, Relevant domestic law).  The appeal

was directed against the failure of the Government of the Canton of

Graubünden to approve attribution of its real property to the building

zone.

      In its public law appeal the applicant company maintained that

the real property at issue complied with the requirements for a

building zone, and that the opinion of the Government was arbitrary.

Thus, the real property was already developed (erschlossen) and partly

built over.  It could not be said that the real property constituted

a "spot building zone" as it was not at all isolated and distant from

the centre of Sent.  The fact that there was a forest zone between the

real property and the village merely served the purpose of reducing the

building zones.

      On 26 March 1991 the Federal Court dismissed the public law

appeal, the decision being served on 10 July 1991.  The Court decided

in so-called preliminary proceedings according to Section 92 para. 1

of the Federal Judiciary Act (see below, Relevant domestic law).

      In its decision the Federal Court first recalled some principles

of attributing real property in particular building zones.  Thus,

overly dimensioned building zones had to be avoided and an orderly

settlement of the country had to be achieved.  The separation of the

building zone from the remaining area of the municipality aimed at

limiting building activities to the building zone and avoiding

dispersed settlements (Streubauweise).  Small building zones, which

promoted dispersed settlements, ran counter to the fundamental

objective of separating the building zone from the non-building zone.

The decision continues (excluding references to case-law):

           "The disputed part of the real property of the applicant

      company lies approximately 110 m to the West of the entrance to

      the Sent village, below the connecting road in the direction of

      Scuol.  It is surrounded by real property which has been

      attributed to the remaining municipality area or the forest zone.

      There are no buildings in a surrounding circle of approximately

      100 m and to the West of the real property of the applicant

      company in the direction of Scuol.  The aerial photographs

      submitted by the applicant company also show a separation between

      the houses in the village zone and the real property which should

      be attributed to the building zone.  Thus, the area is

      particularly peripheral, clearly separated from the village core

      of Sent, and surrounded by land which has not been built over.

      In respect of the zone for public buildings mentioned by the

      applicant company at the western village border above the road,

      which should serve to construct a car park, the Government

      expressly stated in its decision of approval of 7 May 1990 that

      only a subterranean construction would be possible.  In the

      Report of the Cantonal Authority for Historical Monuments of the

      Canton of Graubünden of 9 September 1976, to which the applicant

      company refers, it is stated that the house to be built on the

      real property at issue would lie in a part which could not be

      seen below the road at the western village entrance.  It further

      transpires from this report that the planned building should be

      constructed in its own rural area which would be separate from

      the village centre and would not further impair the impression

      of the village.  Contrary to the opinion of the applicant company

      the real property at issue cannot be qualified as a mainly built

      over-area, as it does not qualify for settlements ...  This

      conclusion is also not altered by the applicant company's

      argument that its real property has been developed.  According

      to the Federal Court's case-law, real property which has already

      been developed or contains buildings may or must, if necessary,

      be attributed to the non-building zone ... It cannot therefore

      be criticised as being unconstitutional if in these circumstances

      the Government considered that the real property at issue had no

      connection with the village zone for which reason it constituted

      an unlawful small building zone which could not be approved.  For

      the Federal Court, which is not the highest planning authority

      ..., there is in the instant case no reason to interfere with the

      margin of appreciation which falls to the cantonal authorities

      when determining the limits of the various zones."

      "Der umstrittene Teil des Grundstücks der Beschwerdeführerin

      liegt ca. 110 m westlich des Dorfeingangs von Sent, unterhalb der

      Verbindungsstrasse Richtung Scuol.  Er ist von Land umgeben, das

      dem übrigen Gemeindegebiet oder der Forstzone zugewiesen ist.

      In einem Umkreis von ca. 100 m and westlich des beschwerde-

      führerischen Grundstücks Richtung Scuol befinden sich keine

      Bauten.  Die von der Beschwerdeführerin aufgelegte fotografische

      Luftaufnahme zeigt zudem eine klare Zäsur zwischen den Häusern

      in der Dorfzone and dem zur Einzonung beantragten Grundstücks-

      teil.  Es handelt sich demnach um ein ausgesprochen peripheres,

      vom Dorfkern von Sent deutlich abgesetztes Areal, das von

      unüberbautem Gelände umgeben ist.  Im Zusammenhang mit der von

      der Beschwerdeführerin erwähnten Zone für öffentliche Bauten am

      westlichen Dorfrand oberhalb der Strasse, welche der Errichtung

      einer Autoeinstellhalle dienen soll, hat die Regierung in ihrem

      Genehmigungsentscheid vom 7. Mai 1990 ausdrücklich darauf

      hingewiesen, dass lediglich eine unterirdische Anlage in Frage

      komme.  Im Bericht der kantonalen Denkmalpflege Graubünden vom

      9. September 1976, auf den sich die Beschwerdeführerin beruft,

      wird festgestellt, dass sich das damals auf dem fraglichen

      Parzellenteil geplante Wohnhaus an einer wenig einsichtigen

      Stelle unterhalb der Strasse beim westlichen Dorfeingang befinde.

      Dem Bericht kann weiter entnommen werden, dass die geplante Baute

      in einer eigenen Landschaftskammer erstellt werden soll, die vom

      Dorfkern abgeschieden sei and das Ortsbild nicht weiter

      beeinträchtige.  Entgegen der Meinung der Beschwerdeführerin kann

      daher der fragliche Grundstücksteil nicht zum weitgehend

      überbauten Gebiet gezählt werden, da er keine Siedlungsqualität

      besitzt ... Daran kann auch der Hinweis der Beschwerdeführerin,

      ihr Grundstück sei erschlossen, nichts ändern.  Nach der

      bundesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung dürfen oder müssen auch

      Grundstücke mit Erschliessungsanlagen oder Gebäuden allenfalls

      einer Nichtbauzone zugeteilt werden ... Wenn die Regierung unter

      diesen Umständen davon ausgegangen ist, das umstrittene Areal

      stehe mit der Dorfzone nicht mehr in Zusammenhang, weshalb es als

      gesetzwidrige Kleinbauzone nicht genehmigt werden könne, so ist

      dies verfassungsrechtlich nicht zu beanstanden.  Für das

      Bundesgericht, das nicht oberste Planungsbehörde ist ... ,

      besteht jedenfalls im vorliegenden Fall kein Anlass, in den

      Ermessenspielraum, der den kantonalen Behörden bei der

      Festsetzung der Zonengrenzen zusteht, einzugreifen."

B.    Relevant domestic law

      Section 84 para. 1 (a) of the Federal Judiciary Act

(Organisationsgesetz) states:

      "Against cantonal decrees and orders (decisions) an appeal may

      be lodged with the Federal Court:

      a.   against the violation of constitutional rights of the

           citizen."

      "Gegen kantonale Erlasse oder Verfügungen (Entscheide) kann beim

      Bundesgericht Beschwerde geführt werden:

      a.   wegen Verletzung verfassungsmässiger Rechte der Bürger."

      Section 91 of the Act states:

      "1.  As a rule, the public law decisions of the Federal Court

      are taken on the basis of written proceedings conducted by the

      Court President or an instructing judge.

      2.   Upon a party's request, and in case of special reasons, the

      Federal Court may exceptionally conduct an oral hearing."

      "1.  Die staatsrechtlichen Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtes

      erfolgen in der Regel auf Grundlage eines durch den Präsidenten

      oder einen Instruktionsrichter zu leitenden schriftlichen

      Verfahrens.

      2.   Ausnahmsweise kann das Bundesgericht, wenn eine Partei es

      verlangt und besondere Gründe dafür vorliegen, eine mündliche

      Schlussverhandlung anordnen."

      Section 92 of the Act states:

      "1.  A committee of three judges of the public and

      administrative law division may in non-public deliberations

      unanimously decide to reject manifestly inadmissible appeals or

      appeals which are indubitably unfounded.

      2.   The decision must be summarily reasoned."

      "1.  Ein Ausschuss von drei Mitgliedern der staats- and

      verwaltungsrechtlichen Abteilung kann ohne öffentliche Beratung

      bei Einstimmigkeit auf offensichtlich unzulässige Beschwerden

      Nichteintreten beschliessen oder Beschwerden, die er ohne

      irgendwelche Zweifel als unbegründet erachtet, abweisen.

      2.   Die Enscheidung ist summarisch zu begründen."

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant company complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention of a breach of its right of access to court.  Thus, the

Federal Court only examined the complaint of arbitrariness and had no

full powers to review the facts and the law.  It could not annul the

contested decision, and it reached its decision only in summary

proceedings.  The applicant company also appears to complain of errors

in the Federal Court's decision.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention the applicant company

also complains that no oral hearing was held by the Federal Court.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant company complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the proceedings before the Federal

Court and their outcome.

a)    Insofar as the applicant company appears to complain of errors

in the Federal Court's decision the Commission recalls that under

Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure the

observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the

Convention.  In particular, it is not competent to deal with an

application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by

domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out

in the Convention.  The Commission refers on this point to its

established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3

p. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No.

7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, 45).

b)    It is true that the applicants invoke Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention which states, insofar as relevant, that

"in the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone

is entitled to a ... hearing by (a) tribunal ...".

      The Commission recalls the Convention organs' case-law according

to which disputes over building plans amount to "the determination of

... civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of

28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-A, p. 12 et seq., paras. 30 et seq.).

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention thus applies to the

proceedings at issue.

c)    The applicant company complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention of a breach of its right of access to

court in that the Federal Court had no full powers to review the facts

and the law.

      The Commission recalls the case-law of the Convention organs

according to which the Convention calls at least for one of the

following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply

with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), or they do not

so comply, but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body

that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article

6 para. 1 (see Eur. Court H.R., Albert and Le Compte judgment of

10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, para. 29).

      In the present case after the Government of the Canton of

Graubünden gave its decision, the applicant company seised the Federal

Court by means of a public law appeal, and the latter dismissed the

appeal.

      In examining whether the Federal Court constituted a "tribunal"

within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

the Commission must consider the circumstances of the case before it

(see Eur. Court H.R., Zumtobel judgment of 21 September 1993,

Series A no. 268-A, para. 32).

      In the present case, the applicant company complains that the

Federal Court did not have full powers of review and only examined the

complaint of arbitrariness.

      However, the applicant company has not indicated any particular

complaint which the Federal Court was not competent to examine in view

of its limited jurisdiction.  The Commission has therefore generally

considered the complaints raised by the applicant company before the

Federal Court.  It notes that in essence the applicant company in its

public law appeal requested that the real property should be attributed

to the building zone of the Sent municipality to which it effectively

belonged.

      In examining the Federal Court's reply to this complaint, the

Commission notes, on the one hand, that the Court, in its decision of

26 March 1991, apart from leaving a certain margin of appreciation to

the planning authorities, did not refrain from examining any issue on

the ground that it declined jurisdiction (see Eur. Court H.R., Zumtobel

judgment, loc. cit.).

      On the other hand, the Federal Court explained, with reference

to its previous case-law, why it considered that the real property did

not appertain to the Sent building zone.  Thus, the area at issue was

surrounded by a forest zone and was clearly separated from the village.

Relying inter alia on aerial photographs, the Federal Court concluded

that the area could not be qualified as mainly built over.  The fact

that the area was developed or contained buildings could not alter this

conclusion.

      Thus, the Federal Court in fact gave a detailed and substantive

reply to the applicant company's complaint.  It cannot be said that the

Court did not effectively consider and reply to the applicant company's

complaints.

      There is therefore no indication that the applicant did not have

access to a court within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and this part of the application is

therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the

applicant company also complains that no oral hearing was held by the

Federal Court.

       However, according to the Convention organs' case-law, Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not prevent a person from

waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the

entitlement to have his case heard in public, although any such waiver

must be made in an unequivocal manner and must not run counter to any

important public interest (see Eur. Court H.R., Schuler-Zgraggen

judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 19, para. 58).

      In the present case, the Commission notes that according to

Section 91 of the Federal Judiciary Act, in public law appeal

proceedings the Federal Court will as a rule decide on the basis of

written proceedings, and only exceptionally conduct an oral hearing.

      In such circumstances, the applicant company could be expected

to apply for an oral hearing if it attached importance to it.  As no

such request was raised, it can reasonably be considered that the

applicant company unequivocally waived its right to a public hearing

before the Federal Court (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Schuler-Zgraggen

judgment, loc. cit., p. 20).  There is also no indication that the

dispute raised issues of public importance such as to make a hearing

necessary.

      It follows that the remainder of the application is also

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

     Secretary to the                   Acting President of the

      Second Chamber                         Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (H. DANELIUS)

 

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