Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 134
October 2010
Aune v. Norway - 52502/07
Judgment 28.10.2010 [Section I]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Decision to deprive applicant of parental responsibilities and to authorise the adoption of her son by his foster parents: no violation
Facts – When five months old, the applicant’s son A., who was born in 1998, was taken unconscious to hospital and treated for a brain haemorrhage. Shortly afterwards, aware that his parents had a history of drug abuse and suspecting that he had been ill-treated, the authorities placed him in compulsory foster care, initially as an interim emergency measure and then permanently. The applicant has spent periods in detoxification centres since 2000. Since the autumn of 2005, she has been drug-free, has set up a business with her current partner, obtained a driving licence and planned to take up studies. In 2005 the local social affairs board (the “Board”) deprived the applicant of her parental responsibilities with respect to A. and authorised his adoption by his foster parents. That decision was ultimately upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court in 2007 after it found that, despite positive developments in her situation, the applicant was unable to provide A. with proper care. Furthermore, although well adjusted in his new family, A. remained vulnerable, and needed reassurance that he would stay with his foster parents. Indeed, his need for absolute emotional security was likely to increase as he grew up as he became aware that both his mother and father had been heavy drug abusers and that he had been exposed to serious ill-treatment. Nor could the Court ignore the fact that the biological family, particularly the applicant’s father and his partner, had protested about A.’s placement as they had fostered the applicant’s other son and considered that the two boys should be together. There was a possibility that that conflict would continue if he was not adopted. It was also emphasised that A.’s foster parents had facilitated contact with the biological family far beyond their entitlement, both as regards the circle of people concerned and the extent of the contact. Indeed, there was no doubt that that openness to permitting contact would continue.
Law – Article 8: The interference with the applicant’s private and family life had had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the best interests of her son. For formal reasons, the Court had no jurisdiction under the Convention to examine the justification for the compulsory public-care measures. The only question that the Court could examine was whether it had been necessary to replace the foster-care arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the applicant’s legal ties with her son would be broken. Bearing in mind that authorisation of adoption against the will of the parents should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, the Court was satisfied that such circumstances had existed in the applicant’s case. The applicant had not questioned the social authority and national court findings concerning the suitability of her son’s foster parents or his attachment to them. Furthermore, nothing had come to light in the proceedings before the Court which would make it differ from the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the applicant was unable to provide proper care for her son. A. had no real attachment to his biological parents and the social ties between the applicant and A. had been very limited. Indeed, A.’s particular need for security – which would no doubt increase with time – had been significantly challenged by the applicant’s wish for A. to live with her father and by the conflict around A.’s placement in foster care. The applicant had stated clearly before the Court that there was no risk that the earlier conflicts would resume as she would not seek to have A. returned to live with her and that she considered it was in his best interest to grow up with his foster parents. However, from the material submitted to the Court and the pleadings of the applicant’s lawyer, it appeared that there had still been a latent conflict which could challenge A.’s particular vulnerability and need for security. Adoption would counter such an eventuality. Moreover, from what the Court understood, the disputed measures corresponded to A.’s wishes.
As to the doubt raised by the applicant about whether the foster parents would continue to be open to contact (in the event of adoption it no longer being the applicant’s legal right to have such contact), the Court observed that, after the Supreme Court’s judgment, the number of visits had remained the same, which clearly confirmed that the national courts had been correct in their assessment of the foster parents’ good will. The disputed measures had not in fact prevented the applicant from continuing to have a personal relationship with A. and had not “cut him off from his roots”.
The Court was therefore satisfied that the decision to deprive the applicant of parental responsibilities and to authorise the adoption had been supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting A.’s best interests.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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