Legal summary
August 2025
B.A. v. Iceland - 17006/20
Judgment 26.8.2025 [Section II]
Article 3
Effective investigation
Positive obligations
Alleged failure to adequately protect the applicant and conduct an effective investigation into her complaints of domestic violence and sexual assault: no violation
Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Alleged failure to adequately protect the applicant and conduct an effective investigation into her complaints of domestic violence and sexual assault: no violation
Article 14
Discrimination
Alleged gender-based discrimination in handling of domestic violence cases: no violation
Facts – In December 2017 the applicant lodged a complaint against her former partner, alleging physical, psychological and sexual violence during their relationship between 2011 and 2014. During the police investigation the applicant was assisted by her officially appointed legal representative. When questioned, she stated that she had never sought immediate medical attention following any of the alleged incidents. Her formal partner, who denied any wrongdoing, and eleven witnesses were also questioned; most witness accounts were based on disclosures made by the applicant after her relationship had ended. There were no direct witnesses to the alleged violence. The file also included a certificate from the centre for victims of sexual abuse (stating that the applicant had reported experiencing severe mental, physical and sexual violence), documents from a psychiatric ward recording her depression and anxiety, and a statement from a psychologist diagnosing her with post-traumatic stress disorder following an alleged sexual offence.
In June 2019 the police informed the applicant of their decision to discontinue the investigation, decision upheld by the State Prosecutor. With respect to the alleged sexual violence, given the former partner’s denial and the available evidence, there was insufficient support for the allegations and further investigation was unlikely to improve the evidentiary position. Regarding the alleged physical violence, as Article 218b of the General Penal Code (the “GPC”), which specifically criminalised domestic violence, had not been enacted until 2016, the alleged conduct could only be considered under Article 217 on assault. As the statute of limitations for offences under Article 217 had expired, prosecution was no longer possible.
Under the Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, the applicant alleged that the authorities had failed to protect her and to conduct an effective investigation into her complaints of domestic violence and sexual assault and that she had suffered discrimination as a woman due to the authorities’ systematic failure to effectively investigate and prosecute domestic violence.
Law – Articles 3 and 8:
The alleged violence, if proven, had been sufficiently serious to attain the minimum level of severity required to bring it within the scope of Article 3. Although the threshold under Article 3 had thus been met, the Court examined the applicant’s complaints concurrently under Articles 3 and 8.
(i) Legislative framework – Although Article 218b had not been introduced until 2016, the legal framework had already provided for enhanced punishment in domestic violence cases. Article 70(3) of the GPC had stipulated that a close relationship between the perpetrator and the victim should be considered an aggravating circumstance where the relationship increased the gravity of the offence. This provision had thus allowed for heavier penalties in domestic violence cases prosecuted under the rape and general assault provisions of Articles 194, 217 and 218. While requiring the criminalisation of domestic violence, the Istanbul Convention did not prescribe specific standalone offences and allowed for the inclusion of domestic violence either as a constituent element of particular offences or as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing for other offences.
Insofar as criminal proceedings could be initiated ex officio, the legislative approach adopted by Iceland conformed with the relevant international standards.
Articles 217 and 218 of the GPC had criminalised assault, with a two-year limitation period for less serious offences under Article 217. While a longer limitation period might arguably be considered desirable in domestic violence cases given its nature and victims’ particular vulnerabilities, the two-year period had not been, in itself, contrary to the requirements of the Convention, insofar as States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in setting limitation periods.
Concerning the alleged sexual violence, at the material time Article 194 of the GPC had focused on the absence of consent rather than the use of force, in line with the evolving standards for the protection against rape. While subsequent amendments to Article 194 had placed a more explicit emphasis on consent, this did not indicate that the legal framework in force at the relevant time had been inadequate.
As regards the alleged psychological violence, before Article 218b had been introduced, apart from criminalising threats and gross defamation of closely related persons under Articles 233 and 233b of the GPC, Icelandic law had contained no specific provision criminalising other types of psychological abuse in close relationships. An explicit obligation to criminalise such conduct had been introduced by the Istanbul Convention in 2011. Iceland had begun preparing for its adoption as early as 2012 by reviewing its legislation, leading to the introduction of Article 218b in 2016, two years before ratification. Even though Articles 233 and 233b, applicable before that time, had not been specifically designed to address the complex dynamics of coercive control and emotional abuse in intimate relationships, the Istanbul Convention did not require States to adopt a particular legislative approach. Having regard to the emerging but not yet consolidated European consensus on criminalising psychological violence during the relevant period, and the existence of various legal remedies, the legislative framework, whilst showing room for improvement that Iceland subsequently implemented, did not fall below minimum Convention standards.
(ii) Adequacy of the investigation – The applicant’s allegations had concerned events occurring between three and six years before she had lodged her complaint with the police. Domestic violence’s victims often hesitated to file charges until some time had passed, such as after the end of their relationship with the alleged perpetrator. While such delays should not in themselves prejudice victims’ claims, given the particular dynamics of domestic violence, they might nonetheless affect the evidentiary position.
The investigation had been comprehensive and thorough. The police had questioned eleven witnesses and gathered the available documentation. The fact that witness statements had primarily consisted of accounts of what the applicant had told them, rather than of any direct observations of violence, reflected the nature of domestic violence investigations rather than any failing on the part of the authorities.
Concerning the alleged physical violence, the statute of limitations for offences under Article 217 of the GPC had already expired when the applicant lodged her complaint. Nonetheless, the authorities had not summarily rejected her allegations on that basis alone, but had conducted a comprehensive investigation in order to establish the relevant facts. There was no reason to call into question the authorities’ classification of the alleged acts as falling under Article 217 rather than Article 218 of the GPC, the latter of which would have been subject to a longer limitation period. The authorities had also expressly considered the applicability of Article 218b, which carried a longer limitation period. They had made a genuine effort to ascertain the facts and explore legally relevant options before determining that prosecution had not been feasible due to both the expired limitation period and the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law.
As regards the alleged sexual violence, the authorities had conducted a thorough investigation and evaluation of the available evidence. Their conclusion that it was insufficient to sustain a prosecution could not be regarded as arbitrary or based on manifestly unreasonable assumptions.
The alleged psychological violence, not raised in the applicant’s initial complaint to the police, had nevertheless been subject to investigation. Concerning the potential application of Article 233b, the State Prosecutor’s decision had been based on an assessment of the case-file as a whole and had not been confined to the classification adopted by the police. There was no basis on which to criticise the domestic authorities for concluding that, in light of the statements from the applicant and the witnesses, the allegations of psychological violence had not been sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction.
While there were delays in the investigation, it had been completed within fourteen months. The delays had not resulted in the loss of evidence or any legal avenue for prosecution.
The inability to secure a prosecution had been a consequence of the evidentiary challenges rather than any deficiency in the legislative framework or any shortcoming in the investigation which as a whole had met the threshold of effectiveness required by Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8:
Since the applicant had not alleged individual discriminatory treatment, the Court had to examine whether she had presented prima facie evidence of structural bias or disproportionate effect capable of shifting the burden of proof onto the Government.
It was undisputed that sexual and domestic violence in Iceland predominantly affected women. The statistics presented by the applicant indicated that the vast majority of victims had been women, while most perpetrators had been men. However, this fact did not in itself reflect discriminatory policies or conduct by the authorities or the disproportionate effect of general measures rather than a broader societal issue.
Iceland ranked highly in international gender equality assessments and had implemented numerous reforms aimed at combating sexual and domestic violence, including the legislative reforms in 2016 introducing Article 218b and the creation of specialised investigation teams in 2018. While such general measures did not preclude the possibility of discrimination in practice, they provided relevant context for determining whether apparent disparities resulted from discriminatory intent or omission.
As regards the legal framework, domestic violence had not been comprehensively criminalised until 2016, but this did not in itself demonstrate either discriminatory intent or effect. The previous legal framework had nonetheless provided various protections through provisions on sexual violence, assault, threats, and gross defamation of closely related persons, as well as enhanced sentencing for assaults committed within a close relationship. The 2016 reforms reflected the authorities’ commitment to strengthening protection against domestic violence rather than any indication of discriminatory complacency.
The present case did not suggest that police officers or prosecutors had attempted to dissuade the applicant from pursuing her complaint, implied that she was at fault, or displayed prejudicial attitudes towards female victims.
The particular challenges in prosecuting domestic violence cases could not in themselves establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the absence of evidence of prejudicial treatment or disproportionate effect. While raising concerns about data collection that warranted attention from the authorities, the limited statistical evidence adduced by the applicant was insufficient to establish prima facie evidence of structural bias or disproportionate effect. Furthermore, the observations of international monitoring bodies, while identifying areas for improvement, did not suggest the existence of institutional attitudes or practices indicating discriminatory treatment of female victims of domestic violence.
Taking also into account the various legislative and policy measures adopted by the authorities to combat sexual and domestic violence, stem impunity and protect victims, the Court found that the applicant had not sufficiently established a prima facie case of structural bias or disproportionate effect, capable of shifting the burden of proof to the State.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(See Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, the Istanbul Convention, adopted on 11 May 2011)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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