FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 33067/07
by Anatoliy Semenovich BABCHUK
against Ukraine
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 13 September 2011 as a Committee composed of:
Boštjan M. Zupančič, President,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Angelika Nußberger, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 June 2007,
Having regard to the comments submitted by the respondent Government on 8 November 2010,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Anatoliy Semenovich Babchuk, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1941 and lives in Krasnyy Luch. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Valeria Lutkovska, of the Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 1 February 2001 the applicant instituted court proceedings against Mr K., seeking compensation for damage caused to his car as a result of the traffic accident. He also sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage in this connection.
On 20 May 2005 the Antratsyt Court delivered a judgment. On 3 October 2002 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld it. On 26 October 2005 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal in cassation lodged on 4 November 2002, quashed the above decisions and remitted the case for fresh examination.
Between 10 January and 26 September 2006 the proceedings were suspended as the applicant objected to the examination of the case in the absence of the defendant, who was placed on the wanted list.
On 13 December 2006 the Antratsyt Court partially allowed the applicant’s claim and awarded him certain amounts in damages.
On 26 February 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.
On 26 April 2007 the applicant lodged the appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court, which on 11 May 2007 rejected it as unsubstantiated.
According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings the applicant specified his claim on one occasion and lodged numerous procedural petitions (challenged a judge and the court’s jurisdiction, etc.). Six hearings were adjourned at his or his representative’s requests and one hearing due to both parties’ failure to appear. The above adjournments caused by the applicant protracted the proceedings by approximately four months. Four further hearings were adjourned due to the respondent’s or his representative’s failure to appear; two hearings were adjourned for unspecified reasons. Two expert examinations were ordered by the courts at the respondent’s requests (lasted in total for about five months) and one examination was ordered at the applicant’s request (lasted for about four months).
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the proceedings in his case.
He also complained under the same provision and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about and on account of the unfavourable outcome of the proceedings.
THE LAW
1. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the unreasonable length of the proceedings in his case. The above provision provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government disagreed that there had been a violation of the above provision stating that the case had been complex and that the applicant, who had fully enjoyed his procedural rights, had contributed to the overall duration of the proceedings. They also explained that the period of the first examination of the case by the Supreme Court had been caused by its backlog, a temporary problem which had been solved in February 2007 by introduction of the legislative measures.
The Court notes that the overall duration of the proceedings, which began on 1 February 2001 and ended on 11 May 2007, was six years three months and ten days before three judicial instances.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, for instance, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the case was not particularly complex. It further considers that, even though the proceedings were of certain importance for the applicant, what was at stake for him did not call for a particularly urgent decision on his case vis-à-vis other cases. Nor does it appear that the applicant treated his case as urgent given, in particular, his objection to the examination of the case in the absence of the respondent, who was on a waiting list for eight and a half months (see above).
The Court notes that certain delays could be attributed to the domestic courts and could perhaps have been avoided (in particular, a period of the first examination of the case by the Supreme Court and the adjournments of the hearings due to the respondent’s or his representative’s failure to appear or for unspecified reasons). However, the applicant also caused delays. A four-month delay was caused by the adjournments of seven hearings requested by the applicant or his representative or following both parties’ failure to appear. The applicant specified his claim and lodged various procedural petitions (challenged a judge and the court’s jurisdiction, etc.). One of the expert examinations, which lasted for about four months, was ordered at his request. Furthermore, the applicant lodged his appeals in cassation in the end of the procedural time-limits (see, for instance, Azim Denizcilik Ticaret Ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 1018/04, 22 June 2010). In this connection, the Court recalls that although a party to civil proceedings cannot be blamed for using the avenues available to him under domestic law in order to protect his interests, he must accept that such actions necessarily prolong the proceedings (see Malicka-Wasowska v. Poland (dec.), no. 41413/98, 5 April 2001).
In sum, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, to the facts that the applicant was responsible for part of the delays and that there was no reason for the domestic courts to examine his case with particular urgency, the Court finds that the overall length of the proceedings did not in itself exceed what may be considered “reasonable”.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The Court has examined the applicant’s remaining complaints. Having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Stephen PhillipsBoštjan M. Zupančič
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy