FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 3040/03
by Bondo Archilovich BABUNIDZE
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 15 May 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrA. Kovler,
MrsE. Steiner,
MrK. Hajiyev,
MrD. Spielmann, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 29 December 2002,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Bondo Archilovich Babunidze, is a Russian national who was born in 1952 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 2002 Mr N. lodged an action against the applicant seeking repayment of a loan. The Myasnikovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region listed the first hearing for 11 March 2002. The applicant informed the District Court that he was unable to attend because he was in hospital. He asked for a stay of the proceedings.
The hearing of 11 March 2002 was adjourned and rescheduled for 19 March 2002. According to the Government, the District Court sent a summons to the applicant notifying him of the hearing. According to the applicant, he was not summonsed to that hearing.
On 19 March 2002 the Myasnikovskiy District Court upheld Mr N.’s action in the applicant’s absence and ordered that the applicant should repay him the loan and interest thereon. Mr N.’s representative attended the hearing and made oral submissions.
On 15 May 2002 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination.
The President of the Rostov Regional Court lodged an application for supervisory review of the judgment of 15 May 2002. On 4 July 2002 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court, by way of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the judgment of 15 May 2002 and upheld the judgment of 19 March 2002.
On 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, on a petition by the applicant for supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 4 July 2002 and upheld the judgment of 15 May 2002. The Supreme Court, in so far as relevant, held as follows:
“...it appears from the case materials [that] the first-instance court examined the case in the absence of the defendant.
The judgment of the Myasnikovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region was quashed on appeal, and the case was sent for re-examination. The judgment of the appellate court stated that the judgment of the [District] court was to be quashed because it had been made in violation of the requirements of Article 157 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure. In particular, there was no evidence in the case file that Mr Babunidze had received a telegram containing information on the date of the hearing, which is a ground for quashing a judgment according to paragraph 2 of Article 306 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure.
...
The judgment of 4 July 2002 of the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court should be quashed because it was issued in violation of the procedural legal norms.
Pursuant to Article 106 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, in force at the material time, parties to the proceedings and their representatives should be informed by a court summons about the time and place of a court hearing or about other procedural actions...
A summons should be served on the parties and their representatives in such a way [as to ensure] that they have enough time to prepare their case and arrive at the court.
Pursuant to Article 157 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, where a party fails to appear and there is no evidence that he/she was properly summonsed, the court hearing is to be adjourned.
Pursuant to Article 308 § 2 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, examination of a case in the absence of a party which was not properly notified of the date and place of the court hearing is an unconditional ground for the quashing of a judgment.
There is no evidence in the file that Mr Babunidze was notified of the time and place of the court hearing, [and] thus the appeal judgment by which the District Court’s judgment, made in violation of Article 157 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, was quashed, is lawful and substantiated. The Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court had no grounds for quashing it. ”
The case file was returned to the Myasnikovskiy District Court. After receiving the case file, the court fixed several hearings. According to the Government, the applicant was summonsed to the hearings but failed to appear on every occasion. In particular, the District Court fixed five hearings in June 2005, five in July 2005, three in August and four in September 2005. The applicant did not attend, motioning the District Court to stay the proceedings because he was undergoing outpatient treatment for hypertension.
The District Court listed a hearing for 3 October 2005. The applicant again asked the District Court to adjourn the hearing, alleging that he had sustained an injury and could not attend.
The District Court asked the hospital for information on the applicant’s state of health. On 6 October 2005 the hospital replied that the applicant had complained to a doctor about pain in a knee-joint and that that injury was not serious enough to have prevented him from participating in the hearing of 3 October 2005.
The following hearing was fixed for 10 October 2005. The District Court sent a telegram to the applicant’s home address, notifying him of the hearing. The telegram could not be delivered because the applicant was not at home. A postman left a notice in the applicant’s mail box, informing him about the telegram and noting that it had been sent by the District Court. The applicant failed to retrieve the telegram.
On 10 October 2005 the Myasnikovskiy District Court held a hearing. The applicant did not attend. The District Court considered that he had been properly summonsed and delivered judgment in Mr N.’s favour. The District Court held, in particular:
“By virtue of Article 113 of the RF Code of Civil Procedure, parties to the proceedings are to be summonsed to a hearing by a letter sent by registered mail with an acknowledgment of receipt, by a court summons with an acknowledgment of receipt, by a telegram, by phone or fax or by any other means which can guarantee the recording of the fact that the summons was sent and was received by the party. Parties must inform the court of changes to their address during the proceedings. If a party fails to notify the court of such a change, a court summons is to be sent to the addressee’s last known address and is considered to be delivered even if the addressee no longer lives or resides there (Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
At the last court hearing in which the defendant participated on 23 May 2005, he indicated the following address as his residence... This circumstance is also confirmed by the address certificate of 12 September 2005, enclosed in the case file. Under Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicant was under an obligation to inform the court of any change in his address during the proceedings, but did not do this.
Having regard to the above considerations, the court finds that under Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the summons in the form of the telegram which was sent to the defendant’s last known address, was delivered to him and considers it possible to examine the case in Mr Babunidze’s absence, in accordance with Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
The applicant appealed against the judgment, alleging defective notification of the hearing of 10 October 2005. The Rostov Regional Court accepted the statement of appeal and fixed a hearing for 30 November 2005. The applicant was summonsed. However, he asked the Regional Court to adjourn the appeal hearing on account of his ill-health.
On 30 November 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 10 October 2005 in the applicant’s absence. It addressed in detail the applicant’s complaint about the defective notifications to the hearings before the District Court. The Regional Court again confirmed that the telegram had been sent to the applicant, notifying him of the hearing on 10 October 2005. It had not been delivered because the applicant had not been at home. He had not responded to the note about the telegram. Furthermore, the applicant had been aware that the hearing of 3 October 2005 had been adjourned at his request, submitted on the same day. He had had an opportunity to ask the District Court about the date of the following hearing but had failed to do so.
Furthermore, the Regional Court pointed out that, during the re-examination of the case following the quashing of the judgment of 4 July 2002, the applicant had failed to attend more than fifteen hearings over the previous five months. He had been properly summonsed to every one of them and had had an opportunity to appoint a representative. However, he had persistently lodged motions for adjournment on the ground that he had been undergoing outpatient treatment. At the same time, he had not submitted any evidence showing that he had been unable to take part in the hearings due to his state of health. Furthermore, the applicant had not attended the hearing on 3 October 2005, complaining about an injury, although it subsequently became clear that he had been fit to take part. The Regional Court concluded that the applicant had abused his procedural rights and had procrastinated in the proceedings. The District Court had had no choice but to issue the judgment in his absence.
The Regional Court dismissed the request for an adjournment of the appeal hearing, holding as follows:
“On 30 November 2005 Mr Babunidze did not attend the appeal hearing before the Rostov Regional Court. He filed a written petition for an adjournment of the appeal proceedings on the ground that he was ill. He submitted a certificate issued on 29 November 2005 by Rostov town hospital no. 9, confirming that Mr Babunidze had several illnesses, including hypertension, stenocardia, etc., on the basis of which he was recommended for outpatient treatment.
The representative [of the plaintiff] objects to the adjournment, insisting that the defendant systematically defaults, referring to various illnesses from which he suffers, and that he intentionally procrastinates in the examination of the present case.
In accordance with Article 354 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue of which the absence of a party properly notified of the date and place of a court hearing does not prevent an appellate court from examining the case, and having regard to the fact that there is no evidence that [Mr Babunidze’s] illnesses and the state of his health on 30 November 2005 prevented him or his representative from participating in the hearing (under Article 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant has a right to participate in the appeal proceedings himself or through some form of representation, including an advocate, but [the applicant] did not consider it necessary to make use of such a right), the [Regional] court decides to reject the request [for an adjournment].”
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure of 11 June 1964 (in force until 1 February 2003):
Article 106. Court summonses
“Parties and their representatives are to be notified by court summonses of the date and place of a court hearing or certain procedural actions ...
A summons is to be served on parties and their representatives in such a way [as to ensure] that they have enough time to appear at the hearing and prepare their case...
Where necessary, parties and their representatives... may be summonsed by a phone call or a telegram.”
Article 108. Service of summonses
“Summonses are to be sent by mail or by courier. The time when the summons was served on an addressee is to be recorded on the summons and on its copy, which is to be returned to the court...”
Article 109. Receipt of summonses
“The summons is to be served on a person against his/her signature, made on a copy of the summons, which is to be returned to the court...”
Article 144. Court hearing
“A civil case is to be heard in a court session with mandatory notification to all parties to the case...”
Article 157. Consequences of a party’s or representative’s failure to attend a court hearing
“If a party to the case fails to appear and there is no evidence that the party was duly summonsed, the hearing is to be adjourned.
If the party was duly notified of the date and place of the court hearing, the hearing is to be adjourned if the court considers that the reason for the absence is valid.
A party is to inform the court of the reasons for his/her absence and provide evidence confirming the validity of the excuse. A court may examine a case in the defendant’s absence if he/she did not provide information concerning the reasons for his/her absence, if the court considers that the excuse for the absence is invalid or if the defendant intentionally delays examination of the case.
A party may ask the court to examine the case in his/her absence and to provide him/her with a copy of the judgment...”
Article 306. Grounds for the quashing of a court judgment on appeal
“Grounds for the quashing of a court judgment on appeal and for remittance of a case for fresh examination by a first-instance court are:
...
(4) violation or incorrect application of substantive and procedural legal norms...”
Article 308. Violation or incorrect application of procedural legal norms
“Violation or incorrect application of procedural legal norms shall only serve as a ground for the quashing of a judgment if such a violation led or could have led to incorrect determination of the case.
A judgment is to be quashed if:
...
(2) a court examined a case in the absence of a party which had not been notified of the date and place of a hearing...”
2. The Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation (in force from 1 February 2003):
Article 113. Court summonses and notifications
“1. Parties... are to be summonsed to court by a letter sent via registered mail with an acknowledgment of receipt, a court summons with an acknowledgment of receipt, a telegram, by phone or fax or by any other means of communication which guarantee recording of the fact that the court summonses or notifications were received by the parties.
2. A court summons is a form of court notification. Parties are notified by court summonses of the date and place of a court hearing or of particular procedural actions...
3. A summons is to be served on parties in such a way [as to ensure] that they have enough time to prepare their case and to appear at the hearing.
4. A court notification, addressed to a party, is to be sent to an address indicated by that party or his/her representative. If a party does not reside at the indicated address, the court summons may be sent to his or her place of work...”
Article 115. Service of court summonses and notifications
“1. Court summonses and notifications are to be sent by mail or delivered by a person whom the court authorises to deliver them. The time of service is to be recorded as laid down by post office regulations or on a document which is to be returned to the court.
2. With a party’s consent, a judge can serve him/her with summonses or notifications to be delivered to another party. A person authorised by the judge to deliver a court summons or another notification is to return a counterfoil of the summons or a copy of the notification bearing the addressee’s signature recording receipt.”
Article 116. Receipt of a court summons
“1. A court summons ... to a person is to be served on him or her against his or her signature on a counterfoil of the summons, which is to be returned to the court...
...
4. If the current place of residence of an addressee is unknown, an entry to this effect is to be made on the court summons, showing the date and time of the attempted service and the source of the information.”
Article 118. A change of address during the proceedings
“Parties are to inform the court of any change in their address in the course of the proceedings. If no such notification is provided, court summonses or notifications are to be sent to the addressee’s last known address and are considered to be delivered even if the addressee no longer lives or resides there.”
Article 119. Unknown place of residence of a defendant
“When a defendant’s place of residence is unknown, the court begins examination of a case once it has received information to that effect from the defendant’s last known place of residence.”
Article 167. Consequences of the parties’ and their representatives’ failure to attend a court hearing
“1. Parties are to inform the court about the reasons for their absence and provide evidence confirming the validity of the reasons.
2. If a party to the case fails to appear and there is no evidence that the party was duly summonsed, the hearing is to be adjourned. If a party was duly notified of the date and place of a court hearing, the hearing is to be adjourned if the court considers that the reason for the absence is valid.
...
4. A court can examine a case in the absence of a defendant duly notified of the date and place of a court hearing if he/she did not provide valid reasons for his/her absence and did not ask the court to adjourn the examination of the case.
5. Parties can ask a court to examine a case in their absence...”
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had not been afforded an effective opportunity to attend the hearings of 19 March 2002 and 10 October 2005 and that on 30 November 2005 the Regional Court had examined his appeal in his absence.
2. The applicant further complained that on 4 July 2002 the Presidium had quashed the judgment of 15 May 2002 and upheld the judgment of 19 March 2002.
3. Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he further complained that the domestic courts had incorrectly assessed the facts and applied the law, that they had not thoroughly examined his arguments and that the outcome of the proceedings had been unfavourable.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that the examination of the case without giving him an effective opportunity to attend the hearings on 19 March 2002 and 10 October 2005 before the District Court and the appeal hearing on 30 November 2005 had violated his right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government submitted that on 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court had accepted the applicant’s argument concerning the District Court’s failure to summons him to the hearing of 19 March 2002. The Supreme Court had ordered a re-examination of the case. In the course of the new examination the District Court had scheduled a number of hearings. The applicant had failed to appear at every one of them, pleading illness. However, there had been no evidence that the state of his health had been so poor that he had been unfit to take part in the hearing. For example, he had not attended the hearing on 3 October 2005, alleging a knee injury, although, according to the hospital, his injury had not been such as to prevent him from participating. As regards the hearing on 10 October 2005, a telegram had been sent to the applicant. He had not been at home and the postman had left a note in his mail box. The applicant had not responded to that notification. The Government further noted that the applicant had deliberately delayed the proceedings by failing to attend at least fifteen hearings without any valid reason, and thus on 10 October 2005 the District Court had rightfully concluded that the case should be examined in his absence. As to the appeal hearing on 30 November 2005, the applicant had been properly summonsed. Having regard to his previous behaviour, the Regional Court examined the appeal in his absence in compliance with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The applicant accepted that on 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation remedied the situation concerning the failure to notify him of the hearing on 19 March 2002. As regards the hearing of 10 October 2005, the District Court had not obtained any evidence that he had changed the place of his residence or that he had intentionally avoided receiving the telegram. He had been seriously ill and thus had been unable to attend the hearings before the District Court. However, before each hearing he had notified the District Court that he had been ill and had asked that the hearings be postponed. The same injustice occurred at the appeal hearing on 30 November 2005. He had asked the Regional Court to adjourn the hearing because he had been ill, but the Regional Court had disregarded his request and upheld the judgment of 10 October 2005.
The Court notes that Article 6 of the Convention does not provide for specific forms of service of documents, including summonses. The question is whether an individual’s right to a fair trial has been denied in the circumstances of the case (see, generally, Hennings v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-A; Teuschler v. Germany (dec.), no. 47636/99, 4 October 2001).
The Court notes that on 19 March 2002 the Myasnikovskiy District Court made a judgment upholding an action against the applicant. The judgment was taken in the applicant’s absence as he had not been properly summonsed to the hearing. On 15 May 2002 the Regional Court quashed that judgment on appeal, finding that the applicant’s rights had been violated by the defective notification. The case was sent back to the District Court for fresh examination. On 4 July 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the appeal judgment of 15 May 2002 and upheld the District Court’s judgment of 19 March 2002. Following the applicant’s petition for supervisory review, on 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 July 2002, upheld the judgment of 15 May 2002 and ordered a re-examination of the case by the District Court. The Supreme Court confirmed the Regional Court’s finding that there was no evidence that the applicant had been properly summonsed to the hearing of 19 March 2002 and that the District Court had violated the applicant’s rights in this respect.
The Court recalls that under Article 34 of the Convention it is entitled to receive applications from persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals “claiming to be the victim of a violation” by a High Contracting Party of the rights contained in the Convention and its Protocols. In situations where an alleged violation has already occurred, subsequent events can give rise to a loss of the status of “victim”, provided that the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36).
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the parties agreed that the Regional Court and then the Supreme Court, in their judgments of 15 May 2002 and 14 October 2003, respectively, had acknowledged the violation of the applicant’s rights by the District Court’s failure to summons him to the hearing of 19 March 2002.
As to redress, the Government argued that the subsequent fresh examination of the case by the courts at two levels of jurisdiction constituted adequate and sufficient redress for the breach of the applicant’s rights. The applicant, however, disagreed. He averred that in the course of the new examination the District and Regional Courts had once again failed to provide him with an effective opportunity to participate in the hearings. In particular, the District Court had not summonsed him to the hearing on 10 October 2005 and the Regional Court had held an appeal hearing in his absence on 30 November 2005.
In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is only where the redress can be considered to be appropriate and sufficient that the applicant may lose his victim status (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 193, ECHR 2006). This question of redress goes to the heart of the issue as to whether the requirements of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention were complied with in the particular circumstances of this case, that is, whether the applicant was provided with an opportunity to participate effectively in the re-examination of his case.
The Court observes that, prior to 10 October 2005, the District Court fixed at least sixteen hearings to which the applicant was summonsed. The District Court provided the applicant with ample opportunity to attend the hearings, present his arguments, submit evidence and challenge the submissions of the other party to the proceedings. The applicant, however, failed to attend every one of the hearings, pleading his poor health. The Court does not need to consider whether the state of the applicant’s health prevented him from participating. It finds that although the applicant’s efforts to ensure the representation of his interests in the proceedings through his participation in the hearings are understandable, he could have retained a representative and instructed him on the case. The manner in which the applicant preferred to exercise his procedural rights undoubtedly contributed to the extension of the proceedings and gave the impression that he was attempting to delay the proceedings. In this respect, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that, according to a medical certificate, the applicant was fit to participate in the hearing on 3 October 2005 but that he again asked for an adjournment on the ground of illness.
As regards the hearing on 10 October 2005 at which the District Court issued the judgment, the Court notes that the District Court sent a telegram to the applicant’s home address. A postman could not deliver the telegram because there was no one at home. However, he left a note in the applicant’s mailbox informing him about the telegram. The applicant did not retrieve the telegram from the post office. On 10 October 2005 the District Court held a hearing in his absence. It considered that the applicant had been summonsed to the hearing but could not be reached because he had changed his place of residence and had not notified the court of that change.
The Court observes, and the applicant did not dispute this fact, that the District Court’s telegram had been delivered to his home address in time to provide him with an opportunity to attend the hearing on 10 October 2005. Furthermore, the postman left a note ensuring that the applicant would learn about the telegram. The applicant did not provide any explanation as to the reason for his failure to respond to the notification. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the District Court could reasonably consider that the applicant had not retrieved the telegram because he had changed his place of residence.
The Court further observes that the Russian law in force at the material time imposed an obligation on parties to proceedings to inform a court about a change in their place of residence. The Court notes that on 3 October 2005 the applicant asked the District Court to adjourn the hearing. As he was aware of the ongoing proceedings and awaiting a new hearing, he should have promptly notified the District Court of his change of residence or indicated any other address at which the District Court could have maintained correspondence with him. The applicant did not comply with that requirement of Russian law. Following the applicant’s failure to notify it of his place of current residence, the District Court had the right to examine the case in the applicant’s absence. It found in a reasoned judgment that a due notification of the hearing on 10 October 2005 had been sent to the applicant and that his failure to attend was attributable to his own negligence (see, in contrast, Mokrushina v. Russia, no. 23377/02, § 23, 5 October 2006).
Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant was provided with an effective opportunity to attend the hearings before the District Court, including the most recent one on 10 October 2005, and to present his case. The Court notes that the applicant’s absence at the hearings before the District Court was the product of his own will and his failure to comply with the requirements of the domestic law (see Davich v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 59995/00, 3 July 2006).
It remains to be determined whether a similar effective opportunity to attend was afforded to the applicant in respect of the hearing before the Regional Court.
The Court notes that the applicant was informed of the appeal hearing fixed for 30 November 2005. He does not claim that the summons was served on him so late as to deprive him of an opportunity to attend, and there is no reason to presume so. The applicant applied for an adjournment, but he did not provide the Regional Court with sufficient evidence showing that he had been unfit to participate in the hearing. The Court again reiterates that if the applicant was unable, for whatever reason, to attend the hearing, he could have appointed a representative or could have submitted more detailed written pleadings in support of his arguments. In this respect, having regard to the applicant’s behaviour in the course of the proceedings before the District Court and, in particular, his numerous motions to adjourn, the Court cannot overlook the demands of efficiency and economy that are to be met by the national authorities in the administration of justice (see Belan v. Russia (dec.), no. 56786/00, 2 September 2004). In such circumstances, the national authorities cannot be blamed for the failure to secure the applicant’s presence (see Chernysheva v. Russia (dec.), no. 77062/01, 10 June 2004).
Therefore, having regard to the content of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 14 October 2003 and the subsequent re-examination of the applicant’s case during which he had been afforded an effective opportunity to attend hearings and present his arguments, the Court finds that the national authorities have acknowledged, and then afforded redress for, the alleged breach of the Convention which occurred as a result of the authorities’ failure to summons the applicant to the hearing of 19 March 2002 (see Fedosov v. Russia (dec.), no. 42237/02, 5 January 2007; Hans-Joachim Enders v. Germany, no. 25040/94, Commission decision of 12 April 1996; Nikishina v. Russia (dec.), no. 45665/99, 12 September 2000; and, mutatis mutandis, Hajiyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 5548/03, 16 June 2005).
It follows that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention and that this complaint is to be rejected, pursuant to Articles 34 and 35 §§ 3 and 4.
2. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court had quashed the judgment of 15 May 2002, by which a re-examination the case had been ordered. Article 6 § 1, in so far as relevant, is cited above.
The Court notes that on 15 May 2002 the Rostov Regional Court, acting on appeal, quashed the judgment of 19 March 2002 by which the applicant had been ordered to repay the loan, and ordered a re-examination of the case. On 4 July 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court, by way of the supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 15 May 2002 and upheld the judgment of 19 March 2002. On 14 October 2003, however, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 July 2002, upheld the judgment of 15 May 2002 and again authorised re-examination of the applicant’s case.
The Court thus considers that on 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court acknowledged a violation of the applicant’s rights, indicating that the Presidium’s judgment of 4 July 2002 had been issued in breach of Russian law. The Court further finds that following the Supreme Court’s judgment, the applicant was afforded redress in the form of a re-trial before the courts at two levels of jurisdiction. Having regard to the Court’s findings above, the Court considers that such a redress was sufficient and adequate, having the effect of rendering the applicant “no longer a victim” of the alleged violation (see Fedosov, cited above, and Nikishina, cited above).
It follows that the present complaint should also be rejected pursuant to Articles 34 and 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained that the domestic courts had incorrectly assessed the facts and applied the law, that they had not thoroughly examined his arguments and that the outcome of the proceedings had been unfavourable.
Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and declares the application inadmissible.
Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
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