FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 29833/21
Ismail BALENOVIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 28 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Frédéric Krenc, President,
Davor Derenčinović,
Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 29833/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 6 June 2021 by a Croatian national, Mr Ismail Balenović (“the applicant”), who was born in 1987 and lives in Pula, and was represented by Mr S. Radobuljac, a lawyer practising in Zagreb;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto concerning non‑enforcement of a judgment against a private individual and the length of domestic proceedings.
Civil proceedings concerning the disturbance of property rights2. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim in the Pula Municipal Court, requesting it to order his neighbour E.R. to: (i) build a retaining wall on his own plot in order to cease disturbing the applicant’s property and cut down trees to prevent landslides and the passage of rats; (ii) rebuild a stone wall demolished by the applicant in the same dimensions as before; or (iii) compensate the applicant for the value of the demolished stone wall, estimated at 47,000 Croatian kunas (HRK; equivalent to approximately 6,240 euros (EUR)).
3. An expert report obtained during the proceedings established that the elevation of E.R.’s plot was about one metre higher than the applicant’s, thus causing landslides and requiring the construction of a concrete retaining wall on E.R.’s plot. The expert also recommended building a new stone wall on the applicant’s plot. A construction project was drawn up, but there was limited information concerning the spatial positioning of the walls. The estimated costs were HRK 15,765 (approximately EUR 2,092) for the retaining wall and HRK 13,821 (approximately EUR 1,834) for the stone wall. It was also noted that E.R. would need to be granted a temporary right of passage to access the applicant’s plot for construction purposes.
4. On 31 July 2015 the Municipal Court allowed the applicant’s civil action in part. It ordered E.R. to build a retaining wall on his own plot and cut down trees and roots along the border. The operative part of the judgment made no reference to the dimensions or exact positioning of the retaining wall, the construction costs or the applicant’s obligation to provide access to his plot. The statement of reasons only referred to the proposed height of the retaining wall.
5. The applicant’s claims for construction of a stone wall according to the dimensions specified in his civil action and for compensation for the estimated costs were dismissed. It was held that the applicant had demolished the stone wall himself purely for aesthetic reasons in order to create a wider passageway. He had also failed to preserve evidence in the relevant court to document the state of the stone wall prior to its demolition.
6. On 12 August 2015 the applicant appealed against the part of the decision relating to the old stone wall. On 19 August 2015 E.R. appealed against the part of the decision finding that he had disturbed the applicant and that he was obliged to build a retaining wall.
7. On 19 October 2017 the Pula County Court allowed E.R.’s appeal in part, holding that he had no obligation to remove the trees. It upheld the order for E.R. to build a retaining wall, with no further clarification concerning the scope of that obligation. Conversely, the applicant’s appeal was dismissed.
Enforcement proceedings8. On 27 July 2018 the applicant submitted a motion for enforcement, seeking authorisation to build the retaining wall on E.R.’s plot himself, and an order for E.R. to make an advance payment for the construction costs. Although the dimensions of the retaining wall had not been specified in the final court judgment, the applicant enclosed the construction expert opinion obtained in the civil proceedings and two additional projects which he had procured from another architect and land surveyor, with costs amounting to HRK 50,108 (approximately EUR 6,650).
9. On 10 August 2018 the Municipal Court issued the writ of execution.
10. On 15 October 2018 E.R. appealed, complaining that the projects enclosed with the motion for enforcement and the construction costs he had been ordered to pay did not comply with either the dimensions of the retaining wall indicated in the expert report obtained in the civil proceedings or the estimated costs in the final court judgment.
11. On 29 January 2019 the Varaždin County Court allowed E.R.’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s motion for enforcement, holding that, contrary to section 29(1) of the Enforcement Act, the final court judgments of 31 July 2015 and 19 October 2017 did not specify the exact location or dimensions of the retaining wall that E.R. had been ordered to build.
12. On 25 March 2019 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 19 November 2020.
Civil proceedings concerning the obstruction of the enforcement of a final court judgment13. In 2020 E.R. brought a civil action against the applicant, claiming that he had obstructed him from voluntarily complying with the final court judgment (see paragraph 4 above). E.R. sought access to the applicant’s plot in order to undertake construction of the retaining wall and a specification from the Municipal Court of the exact scope of his obligation and the construction costs. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of those proceedings.
Complaints14. Before the Court, the applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, of non-enforcement of the civil court judgment against E.R. and of excessive length of the proceedings.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTNon-enforcement of a final court judgment15. The Court notes at the outset that the civil courts allowed the applicant’s claim for the construction of a retaining wall but dismissed his claim for the construction of a stone wall on his own plot (see paragraph 5 above).
16. Accordingly, in so far as he may be understood to complain about the courts’ failure to order the construction of a stone wall, he has no enforceable claim in that regard. This part of his complaint is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto (compare Molnar Gabor v. Serbia, no. 22762/05, § 48, 8 December 2009) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
17. The only complaint that falls to be examined is that related to the failure to enforce the applicant’s claim for construction of the retaining wall.
18. The general principles concerning the execution of a final binding judicial decision have been summarised in Fuklev v. Ukraine (no. 71186/01, § 84, 7 June 2005), Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 33509/04, § 69, ECHR 2009) and Topciov v. Romania ((dec.) no. 17369/02, 15 June 2006). In particular, a successful litigant may be required to undertake certain procedural steps and to act with a certain diligence in order to recover a judgment debt (see Burdov, cited above, § 69). The State is not required to enforce every civil judgment, whatever it may be and whatever the circumstances; it must equip itself with an adequate and sufficient legal arsenal to ensure compliance with the positive obligations incumbent on it. The Court’s task is only to examine whether the measures adopted by the national authorities were adequate and sufficient (see Topciov, cited above).
19. In that connection, the Court notes that under domestic law, plaintiffs are required to specify their claim in their civil action (section 186(1) of the Civil Procedure Act). Moreover, an enforcement title against a debtor is only enforceable if it specifies the subject matter and scope of the debtor’s obligation (section 29(1) of the Enforcement Act).
20. During the civil proceedings, the applicant never specified his claim for the construction of the retaining wall, not even after the court had obtained an expert report to clarify the issue (see paragraph 3 above), nor did he request the expert to supplement his report in that regard. Furthermore, upon receiving the Municipal Court’s judgment, which consequently also failed to specify the scope of E.R.’s obligation in the operative part and provided insufficient information in the statement of reasons, the applicant did not appeal against that part of the judgment (see paragraphs 6-7 above).
21. Therefore, the Court finds that the obligation established by the final court judgment remained unspecified primarily on account of the applicant’s failure to fulfil the clear and precise procedural requirements set out in domestic law, which he could have foreseen from the outset, as he was represented by a lawyer throughout the civil proceedings. The Court reiterates that no reasonable expectation can be derived from the erroneous procedural steps taken by the applicant in the civil proceedings (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, § 120, 5 April 2018, and compare ZIPP BRATISLAVA SPOL. S.R.O. v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 27903/10, §§ 28-29, 19 November 2013).
22. Turning to the enforcement proceedings, the Court firstly notes that in his motion for enforcement, the applicant presented a different construction project to that considered by the civil courts and sought to have enforced construction costs that were much higher than those set out in the statement of reasons of the final court judgment (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). The writ of execution so issued also failed to specify the dimensions and exact position of the retaining wall on E.R.’s plot.
23. The Court further notes that E.R. subsequently brought a civil action against the applicant to specify his obligations, arguing that the applicant had obstructed him from voluntarily complying with the final court judgment. In such circumstances, the Court has limited power to determine whether the domestic authorities were obliged to assist the applicant in enforcing the final court judgment which E.R. had attempted to comply with, but was prevented from doing so by the applicant (contrast Nikoloudakis v. Greece, no. 35322/12, § 52, 26 March 2020) or to assess the significance of their refusal to do so for the applicant (in a similar context of non-enforcement of an order to construct a wall, compare Borg and Vella v. Malta (dec.), no. 14501/12, § 41, 3 February 2015).
24. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the State cannot be held responsible for the non-enforcement of the final court judgment which was unenforceable on account of the applicant’s non-compliance with formal requirements (compare Poweract Industries v. Turkey (dec.), no. 109/04, 6 October 2009).
25. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
Length of proceedings26. The general principles concerning the reasonableness of the length of proceedings have been summarised in Frydlender v. France ([GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
27. The civil proceedings in the present case lasted from 23 May 2012 until 19 October 2017, that is, five years and almost five months, at two levels of jurisdiction. While this period may seem somewhat protracted, the Court notes that the applicant contributed to its length by causing a stay for some three months and by failing to secure crucial evidence concerning the stone wall prior to instituting the proceedings, which consequently required two expert reports and supplements (see paragraph 5 above).
28. Bearing in mind what was at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, as well as that he essentially complained about a situation that he himself had helped bring about (compare Poweract Industries, cited above), the Court is satisfied that the overall length of the civil proceedings in the present case cannot be considered excessive.
29. The subsequent enforcement proceedings lasted from 27 July 2018 until 7 December 2020, that is, two years and four months, at three levels of jurisdiction, a period which cannot be considered unreasonable.
28. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 18 June 2026.
Liv Tigerstedt Frédéric Krenc
Deputy Registrar President