FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 44252/10
Ante BANIČEVIĆ and Marija BANIČEVIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 2 October 2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Anatoly Kovler, President,
Nina Vajić,
Peer Lorenzen,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 9 June 2010,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicants, Mr Ante Baničević and Ms Marija Baničević, are Croatian nationals, who were born in 1950 and 1951 respectively and live in Smokvica. They were represented before the Court by Mr M. Tvrdeić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.
The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. On 17 July 1993 the applicants’ son was killed in a road traffic accident.
4. The Dubrovnik Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Dubrovniku) on 16 November 1995 instituted criminal proceedings in the Korčula Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Korčuli) against D.T., the driver who had allegedly caused the accident.
5. On 7 September 2000 the applicants and their two children lodged a civil action for damages in the Korčula Municipal Court against the insurance company J., with which D.T. was insured. Since the criminal proceedings were pending, the Korčula Municipal Court on 8 March 2002 stayed the civil proceedings until the judgment in the criminal proceedings became final.
6. In a judgment of 12 July 2002 the Korčula Municipal Court found D.T. guilty of causing a road traffic accident and the death of the applicants’ son. However, in a judgment of 13 December 2002 the Dubrovnik County Court (Županijski sud u Dubrovniku), acting as the appeal court, terminated the proceedings against D.T. owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period. It held that since no procedural steps had been taken in the proceedings for over five years, that is, between 21 October 1996 and 26 March 2002, the prosecution of the offence in question had become time‑barred on 21 October 2001, under Article 19 of the Criminal Code.
7. On 2 June 2003 the Korčula Municipal Court granted the applicants’ civil claim for damages. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
“Under section 376(1) of the Civil Obligations Act a claim for damages becomes statute-barred three years after the injured party learned about the damage and the identity of the person who caused it (subjective time-limit), or five years after the damage occurred (objective time-limit).
In the present case the injured party learned about the damage on the day the road traffic accident in question occurred, when their son and brother died, and the three‑year limitation period started to run on that day, 17 July 1993. The claimants brought their civil action on 7 September 2000, that is to say, after the limitation period prescribed under section 376 of the Civil Obligations Act had expired.
However, section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act provides that where the damage was caused by a criminal offence, the statutory limitation period for seeking damages expires at the same time as the statutory limitation period for the criminal prosecution, where the latter period is longer.
Criminal case file no. ... shows that the damage in question was the result of a criminal offence, although these proceedings did not end in a final conviction. However, the outcome of the proceedings undoubtedly shows that the damage was the result of a criminal offence. The institution of criminal proceedings interrupts the running of the limitation period for seeking compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence. In the case at issue the statutory limitation period in respect of the criminal offence under Article 272 subparagraph (4) in conjunction with subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code is ten years; hence, the same statutory limitation period is to be applied in respect of the claim for damages in connection with that offence.
The civil action in issue was brought on 7 September 2000, that is, before the expiry of the statutory limitation period prescribed in respect of the criminal prosecution, which means that the action was lodged before the expiry of the statutory limitation period under section 377(1) of the Civil Obligations Act.”
8. On 1 September 2005 the Dubrovnik County Court, acting as the court of appeal, reversed the first-instance judgment. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
“... the statutory limitation period in respect of a claim for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence is to be assessed according to section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act only where the existence of a criminal offence and the perpetrator’s responsibility have been established in a final judgment on conviction.
Only in exceptional circumstances may a civil court assess, as a preliminary issue, whether the damage was caused by a criminal offence, namely where, owing to certain procedural requirements, it has not been possible to conduct criminal proceedings against the perpetrator (for example owing to the latter’s death); that is not the case here.
It is clear from the above that in the case under consideration, the provision to be applied is not section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act but rather section 376 of that Act.”
9. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining that the Dubrovnik County Court had misinterpreted the relevant law concerning the application of the statutory limitation period.
10. On 12 April 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
“The longer statutory limitation period in respect of a claim for compensation for damage, under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, is applicable if the damage was caused by a criminal offence. The statutory limitation period is to be assessed according to that provision only where the existence of a criminal offence and the perpetrator’s responsibility have been established by a final conviction. In the present case the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator ... has not been established by a final judgment of the criminal court. A civil court may only exceptionally assess whether the damage was caused by a criminal offence, in order to establish the applicable statutory limitation period. It can, in the course of the civil proceedings, deal with that issue only where, owing to certain procedural requirements, it has not been possible to conduct criminal proceedings against the perpetrator. In the present case, however, criminal proceedings were conducted and terminated by a second‑instance judgment dismissing the charges [on procedural grounds].”
11. The applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 25 October 2006, arguing that the lower courts had misinterpreted the rules on application of the statutory limitation period.
12. On 4 November 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint, endorsing the arguments of the lower courts. This decision was served on the applicants’ counsel on 12 December 2009.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Relevant domestic law
13. The relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 73/1991, 3/1994, 7/1996, 112/1999), as then in force, read as follows:
Section 360
“(1) The right to claim fulfilment of an obligation shall cease when the statutory limitation period has expired.
(2) The statute of limitations [bars a right to claim] when the statutory prescribed period in which a creditor could have claimed fulfilment of an obligation has expired.
...”
Section 376
“(1) A claim for damages shall become statute-barred three years after the injured party learned about the damage and the identity of the person who caused it.
(2) In any event that claim shall become statute-barred five years after the damage occurred.
...”
Section 377
“(1) Where the damage was the result of a criminal offence and the statutory limitation period for criminal prosecution is longer, the claim for damages against the person responsible becomes statute-barred at the same time as the criminal prosecution.
(2) The interruption of the statutory limitation period in respect of criminal prosecution entails the interruption of the statutory limitation period in respect of a claim for damages.
...”
Section 388
“The statutory limitation period is interrupted by the lodging of a civil action or any other action by a creditor against a debtor, before a court or other competent body, which is brought in order to secure or enforce the creditor’s claim.”
Section 392
“...
(3) Where the statutory limitation period has been interrupted by the lodging of a civil action or other request ... it shall start to run again after the termination of the proceedings.
...”
14. The relevant parts of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette no. 110/1997, 27/1998, 50/2000, 129/2000, 51/2001) provide:
Article 18
“(1) On account of the statute of limitations, the criminal legislation of the Republic of Croatia may not be applied after the period determined by this Code has elapsed. The period is calculated from the time the offence was committed, sentence was pronounced or another criminal sanction was ordered.
...”
Article 19
“(1) Criminal prosecutions for the purposes of applying the criminal legislation of the Republic of Croatia, ..., may not be instituted after expiry of the following periods, calculated from the time the offence was committed:
...
- five years if the case concerns a criminal offence punishable by more than three years’ imprisonment,
...”
Article 20
(1) The limitation period shall start to run from the date on which the offence was committed.
...
(3) The statutory limitation period shall be interrupted each time a procedural step is taken concerning the prosecution of the offence.
...
(5) The statutory limitation period shall start to run again after each interruption.
(6) Criminal prosecutions shall in all cases become time-barred after expiry of the double statutory limitation period.”
CAUSING A ROAD ACCIDENT
Article 272
“(1) Road users who, by violating the regulations on traffic safety, endanger other road users in such a manner that they cause an accident in which another sustains serious bodily injury or extensive material damage shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of between six months and five years.
(2) If the offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is committed by negligence, the perpetrator shall be punished by a fine or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years.
...
(4) If the offence referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article results in the death of one or more persons, the perpetrator shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of between six months and five years.”
15. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002) provide:
Article 127
“(1) A claim for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence shall be examined in the criminal proceedings where so requested by authorised persons, provided that this does not cause significant delays in the proceedings.
...”
Article 128
“A claim for compensation in criminal proceedings may be lodged by persons entitled to lodge such a claim in civil proceedings.”
Article 130
“Persons entitled to lodge a claim for compensation (Article 128) may, until the end of the trial, withdraw their claim in the criminal proceedings and pursue it in the civil proceedings. ... “
Article 352
“(1) The court can, by means of a judgment, dismiss the charges, acquit the accused or find him or her guilty.”
Article 353
“The court shall issue a judgment dismissing the charges:
...
(6) if the accused has been exempted from prosecution by an amnesty or pardon, or if the statutory limitation period has expired, or if other circumstances barring prosecution exist.”
16. The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005) read as follows:
Section 12
“If it is necessary for a court, in order to make its decision, to first settle an issue of the existence of a right or legal relationship, and no decision on this issue has yet been adopted by a court or other competent body (preliminary issue), the court may settle the issue itself, unless otherwise provided for under special rules.
The court’s decision on a preliminary issue shall have legal effect only in the proceedings in which the issue in question was settled.
In civil proceedings, where an issue arises in relation to a criminal offence and the perpetrator’s criminal liability, the court shall be bound by the final judgment of the criminal court by which the accused was found guilty.”
2. The practice of the domestic courts
17. In its judgment no. Rev-358/1991-2 of 19 December 1991, the Supreme Court held that if a civil action for damages had been lodged after the criminal prosecution had become time-barred, the longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act could not be applied. The relevant part reads:
“Under section 377(1) of the Civil Obligations Act a claim for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence is time-barred when the statutory limitation period for the criminal prosecution expires. The criminal prosecution of the third defendant undoubtedly became time-barred [in the course of] the criminal proceedings against him in case no. ..., in which the charges against him were dismissed, because the prosecution had become time-barred by a final judgment of 9 March 1987, in other words, before the civil action in these civil proceedings was lodged (on 21 September 1989). Therefore, the claim [for damages] also became time-barred on that date.”
18. The Supreme Court, in its decision no. Rev-2563/1992-2 of 6 April 1993, examined the possibility for a court in civil proceedings to assess the statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act if criminal liability had not been established by a final criminal court judgment. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
“The conclusion of the lower courts that section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act is applicable only if the criminal offence has been established by a final judgment of the criminal court is incorrect. This is because, according to the well-established case-law, if damage has been caused by a criminal offence but no criminal proceedings have been instituted or concluded against the perpetrator because of his or death or mental illness, or the offence at issue has been exempted from prosecution by a pardon or amnesty, or if there exist some other circumstances preventing criminal responsibility from being established or barring the criminal prosecution, the fact that the damage was caused by a criminal offence may, if the defendant has invoked the statute of limitations, be established (as a preliminary issue) in the civil proceedings.
It is also to be noted that the longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act is applicable not only in respect of the perpetrator of the criminal offence but also in respect of the person responsible for the damage.”
19. The domestic courts of appeal, on the subject of the possibility for a civil court to apply a longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, held that this could be applied only if it had been established by a final judgment of the criminal court that the damage had been caused as the result of a criminal offence.
The relevant part of the appeal decision of the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru) of 22 April 1999 (no. Gž-626/99) 1999 reads as follows:
“... The statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, as a longer limitation period, can be applied only if it has been established, by a judgment of a criminal court, that the damage was caused by a criminal offence. This limitation period cannot be applied if the criminal proceedings were terminated by a decision without a finding of guilt in respect of the person responsible. However, there is some doubt as to whether the civil court is allowed to establish whether the damage was caused by a criminal offence.
The civil court is allowed to do so only if there existed some circumstances barring the criminal prosecution, with the result that no criminal proceedings could be conducted against the perpetrator. Only then, in order to assess the statutory limitation period in respect of damage caused by a criminal offence, may the civil court itself establish whether the damage was caused by acts constituting a criminal offence.”
The same approach was followed in the appeal judgment of the Varaždin County Court (Županijski sud u Varaždinu) of 3 February 2003 (no. Gž‑151/03-2), concerning a case where the alleged perpetrator of the offence had died during the criminal proceedings.
COMPLAINT
20. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that, owing to the erroneous application of the statutory limitation period, they had been deprived of their right of access to court.
THE LAW
21. The applicants complained that they had not had access to court as provided under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
1. The parties’ arguments
22. The applicants submitted that the decision of the national courts finding their civil claim to be statute-barred had been unfair and had deprived them of their right of access to court. They argued that the wording of section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, which provided for a longer statutory limitation period in respect of claims for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence, had been vague and without any specific and clear rules governing its application. In any event, nothing had prevented the court in the civil proceedings from applying that statutory limitation period when the criminal court had failed to adopt a judgment on the merits of the charges concerning the criminal offence. This was because section 12 of the Civil Procedure Act provided for the possibility of establishing in the civil proceedings, as a preliminary issue, whether the damage had been caused by a criminal offence.
23. The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that they failed to rely on Article 29 § 1 of the Constitution, which corresponded to Article 6 of the Convention, when lodging their constitutional complaint. They also pointed out that the applicants had failed to lodge a civil claim for compensation in the criminal proceedings.
24. The Government also stressed that the applicants had had access to court since they had brought their civil action before four levels of jurisdiction in the domestic courts, which had examined their complaints. The Government also stressed that the civil courts had not been allowed to examine whether the damage had been caused by a criminal offence. They could have done so only exceptionally if certain procedural bars had existed in respect of the criminal prosecution. In the present case, the criminal court had never established whether a criminal offence had been committed, since the prosecution had become time-barred and the charges had been dismissed. Therefore, there had been no grounds to apply the longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act. Had the applicants, however, lodged their civil claim for compensation in the criminal proceedings or their action in the civil proceedings within the general statutory limitation period, they could have interrupted the running of the limitation period; however, they had failed to do so.
2. The Court’s assessment
25. The Court finds that it is not necessary to address all of the Government’s objections as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
26. The Court has held on many occasions that Article 6 § 1 embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is, the right to institute proceedings before a court, constitutes one aspect only; however, it is an aspect that makes it in fact possible to benefit from the further guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 6. The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are indeed of no value at all if such proceedings are not first initiated. And in civil matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts (see, among many other authorities, Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 January 1975, §§ 34 in fine and 35-36, Series A no. 18; Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, §§ 91‑93, ECHR 2001-V; and Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95, § 52, ECHR 2001‑VI). For the right of access to be effective, an individual must have a clear, practical opportunity to challenge any act interfering with his or her rights (see, for example, Bellet v. France, 4 December 1995, § 36, Series A no. 333‑B).
27. The right of access to court is not, however, absolute. It may be subject to legitimate restrictions such as statutory limitation periods, security for costs orders, etc. (see Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, §§ 51‑52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV; Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, §§ 62‑67, Series A no. 316-B; and Golder, cited above, § 39). Where the individual’s access is limited either by operation of law or in fact, the Court will examine whether the limitation imposed impaired the essence of the right and, in particular, whether it pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 57, Series A no. 93; Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego v. Poland, no. 42049/98, § 29, ECHR 2004‑IX; and Szwagrun-Baurycza v. Poland, no. 41187/02, § 49, 24 October 2006). If the restriction is compatible with these principles, no violation of Article 6 will arise (see Z and Others, cited above, §§ 92‑93).
28. The Court notes that, after the applicants had opted to lodge an action for damages in the civil courts against company J., as the insurance company of the alleged perpetrator of the road traffic accident, their claim was examined on the merits and granted at first instance. However, they were told later by the higher courts that their action was statute-barred, leaving their claim without any final determination on the merits.
29. In this respect the Court reiterates that the sole fact that the applicants were able to lodge a civil action in the domestic courts does not necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention since the degree of access afforded by the national legislation must also be sufficient to secure the individual’s “right to a court”, having regard to the principle of the rule of law in a democratic society (see Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, no. 41727/98, § 26, ECHR 2001‑XII). Article 6 § 1 of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way it embodies the “right to a court”, which, according to the Court’s case-law, includes not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a “determination” of the dispute by a court (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 25, ECHR 2002‑II, and Menshakova v. Ukraine, no. 377/02, § 52, 8 April 2010). The Court must therefore examine whether the applicants’ right of access to a court was unduly restricted by the domestic courts’ decision not to determine their claim for damages on the merits on the ground that it had become time-barred.
30. The Court would firstly reiterate that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature. The Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see, for example, Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports 1997‑VIII, and Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 28 October 1998, § 43, Reports 1998‑VIII).
31. The Court has already held that statutory limitation periods serve several important purposes, namely to ensure legal certainty and finality, protect potential respondents from stale claims which might be difficult to counter and prevent the injustice which might arise if courts were required to decide upon events which took place in the distant past on the basis of evidence which might have become unreliable and incomplete because of the passage of time (see Stubbings and Others, cited above, § 51; see also, mutatis mutandis, Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 92, ECHR 2004‑VIII, and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44302/02, §§ 68-69, ECHR 2007‑X). Therefore, litigants should expect those rules to be applied (see, mutatis mutandis, Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98, § 33, ECHR 2000‑I).
32. As the above considerations show, the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the Convention. What the Court needs to ascertain in a given case is whether the nature of the time-limit in question and/or the manner in which it was applied are compatible with the Convention (see Vrbica v. Croatia, no. 32540/05, § 66, 1 April 2010). This means, in particular, that the Court must satisfy itself that the application of the statutory limitation periods could be regarded as foreseeable for the applicants, having regard to the relevant legislation and case-law and the particular circumstances of the case (see Osu v. Italy, no. 36534/97, § 35, 11 July 2002; Vrbica, cited above, § 72; and Majski v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 16924/08, § 69, 19 July 2011).
33. The Court notes that section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act provides for a longer statutory limitation period for claims for damages if the damage was caused by a criminal offence. This longer statutory limitation period thus operates in favour of the victims of crime, allowing them to claim compensation within the longer statutory time-limit prescribed for the criminal offence at issue. However, according to the established practice of the domestic courts, this statutory limitation period is applicable only where it has been established by a final judgment of the criminal court that the damage was caused by a criminal offence.
34. The Court notes that in the present case the applicants lodged their civil action for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court on 7 September 2000. At that time the statutory limitation period for the offence at issue was still running, in accordance with section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, and the parallel criminal proceedings against the perpetrator were still pending; however, the general statutory limitation period under section 376 of the Civil Obligations Act had expired more than four years previously.
35. In this respect the Court notes that there was nothing to prevent the applicants – nor do they claim otherwise – from lodging their civil action for damages within the general statutory limitation period under section 376 of the Civil Obligations Act (see paragraphs 3 and 5). This would have allowed the civil courts to examine the applicants’ claim on the merits irrespective of the expiry of the statutory limitation period in the criminal proceedings or any other outcome of the criminal proceedings. Instead, the applicants waited for four years and thus created a situation in which the outcome of the criminal proceedings had a decisive influence on their civil action. As to the applicants’ argument that the civil courts could have examined the fact that the damage had been caused by a criminal offence under section 12 of the Civil Procedure Act, the Court notes that nothing in the material submitted to it concerning the domestic case-law clearly supports such expectations. In this connection the Court would reiterate that it is not its task to interpret and apply domestic law and that it cannot take over that role from the domestic courts.
36. The Court notes that, although section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act leaves some doubt as to the manner of application of the statutory limitation period for civil actions seeking compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence, any possible lack of clarity was remedied by the established practice of the domestic courts. This allowed the applicants to foresee under what circumstances they might expect that their civil action would be dismissed on the ground that it had become time-barred. However, by failing to lodge their civil action within the general statutory limitation period the applicants, although legally represented, placed themselves in a situation in which they risked having their civil action declared time-barred.
37. Therefore, it cannot be said that the statutory limitation periods themselves, or the manner in which they were applied in this case, impaired the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court.
38. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares inadmissible the application.
Søren NielsenAnatoly Kovler
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy