SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 15665/04
by Olivér BÁNHEGYI
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 11 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Antonella Mularoni,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
Sally Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 February 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Olivér Bánhegyi, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1948 and lives in Szeged. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
In 1993 the applicant bought half of a real-property. According to the records of the Land Registry, at the time of the purchase the real-estate was unencumbered.
In 1995 the applicant requested a building permit in order to construct a house on his land. In June 1995 the Notary of Szeged refused his request establishing that, pursuant to the Construction Plan of Szeged enacted in 1989, a road should be built on the applicant’s land. On the applicant’s appeal, the Csongrád County Administrative Office upheld the first-instance administrative decision. The applicant sought judicial review. His case was finally dismissed by the Csongrád County Regional Court on 30 May 1996.
Subsequently, the applicant requested the Szeged Municipality to offer him a substitute property (cseretelek), which claim was refused in July 1996. The applicant sought judicial review. The Szeged District Court dismissed his action in November 1996. The Csongrád County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as time-barred on 25 September 1997.
In March 1999 the applicant requested the Municipality to initiate the expropriation of his real-estate before the Administrative Office. The Municipality informed the applicant that, since it did not have sufficient means, expropriation was impossible.
The applicant turned with his expropriation claim to the Administrative Office on 10 July 2001.
On 17 August 2001 the Administrative Office, refused to order the Municipality to request the expropriation of the applicant’s land, which was an obligatory formal requirement to commence the procedure. It was of the view it had no jurisdiction to deal with the issue, since the Municipality enjoyed total independence in initiating such proceedings even if the applicant could legally expect the expropriation of his land.
The applicant appealed. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, since it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case, transferred it to the competent Csongrád County Regional Court in November 2001. The Regional Court, establishing that the Administrative Office had erroneously refused the applicant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction, quashed the administrative decision and remitted the case to the Administrative Office in January 2002.
In the meantime, the Administrative Office ordered the Municipality to pay the applicant 2,754,720 Hungarian forints (approximately 11,200 euros) in compensation for the building ban imposed on his real-estate. The Municipality sought judicial review. Its motion was dismissed by the Regional Court in April 2002.
Subsequently, in April 2002 the Administrative Office ordered the Szeged Municipality to submit a request for expropriation. Based on this request, the Administrative Office expropriated the applicant’s property and awarded him 3,262,250 HUF in compensation (approximately 13,265 Euros) in January 2003. The applicant, being dissatisfied with the sum, sought judicial review.
The Regional Court, finding that the Administrative Office had established the amount of compensation in breach of the law, quashed the decision and remitted the case to the first administrative level in June 2003.
In July 2003 the Administrative Office again requested the Municipality to submit a request for expropriation. In the meantime, the applicant brought an action against the co-owners of the real-estate before the Szeged District Court, asking the court to establish that he was the owner of a building erected on the land well before the expropriation proceedings. The Csongrád County Regional Court, acting as a second-instance court, finally dismissed the applicant’s action in May 2004. The applicant’s motion to re-open the case was to no avail.
In April 2004 the Municipality requested the suspension of the proceedings pending the litigation between the applicant and the co-owners, since the outcome of those proceedings could affect the amount of compensation.
Subsequently, on 14 June 2004 the Administrative Office again requested the Municipality to submit a request for expropriation. On 30 June 2004 the Municipality complied.
Subsequently, the applicant challenged the Administrative Office for bias, which motion was dismissed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 10 August 2004.
In the ensuing proceedings, the Administrative Office appointed a real-estate expert. On 12 October 2004, it expropriated the applicant’s real estate and awarded him 9,700,000 HUF in compensation (approximately 39,460 Euros), from which it deducted the compensation already awarded. On 25 October 2004 the Administrative Office ex officio partly modified its decision. The applicant, being dissatisfied with the sum, sought judicial review before the Regional Court.
On 27 January 2005 the Regional Court, finding that the Administrative Office’s decision had been in compliance with the law, upheld it. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. On 28 June 2005 the Supreme Court declared the petition admissible. On 23 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s petition. The domestic courts relied on documentary evidence, the opinion of a real-estate expert and the parties’ testimony.
The final decision of the review bench of the Supreme Court was served on the applicant on 5 January 2006.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that the expropriation proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time and that his property rights were violated as he was unable to use his real-estate or obtain compensation in due time, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
2. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant also complains about the unfairness of the proceedings.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that the length of the expropriation proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government submitted that the expropriation proceedings in question started only on 10 July 2001, when the applicant turned directly with his claim to the Administrative Office, and ended in November 2005. They were of the view that the inactive period between June 2003 and May 2005 was due to another set of ongoing proceedings which dealt with an important preliminary question. Therefore, the length of the proceedings was not unreasonable.
The applicant contested that argument.
The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 10 July 2001 and ended on 23 November 2005. The applicant’s previous attempts to make the Municipality initiate the expropriation were not an integral part of the proceedings before the Administrative Office, even though their subject matter was the same. The proceedings thus lasted four years and four months for one administrative and two court levels, including two remittals.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II)
In the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that there was no particular period of inactivity imputable to the authorities. Moreover, the overall length of the proceedings did not exceed the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
2. Moreover, the applicant complained about the length of the proceedings under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Having regard to its foregoing conclusion under Article 6 § 1, the Court considers that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
3. As regards the applicant’s challenge to the outcome and fairness of the expropriation proceedings, the Court notes that it is essentially of a “fourth-instance” nature: there is no indication in the case file that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
4. As to the alleged unfairness of the proceedings relating to the building permit, the Court observes that the final decision in that respect was given by the Csongrád County Regional Court on 30 May 1996. However, the application was only lodged on 6 February 2004, i.e. more than six months later. It follows that this complaint was lodged out of time and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
5. As to the proceedings relating to an offer of substitute real-estate, the Court notes that the applicant failed to pursue a proper appeal. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
6. Lastly, as to the outcome and the unfairness of the proceedings concerning the ownership of the building already erected on the property, the Court notes that these complaints are, again, essentially of a “fourth-instance” nature: there is no indication in the case file that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy