FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 28204/22
Ion BANU
against Romania
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 November 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Ana Maria Guerra Martins, President,
Anne Louise Bormann,
Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 28204/22) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 June 2022 by a Romanian national, Mr Ion Banu, who was born in 1954 and lives in Ghidigeni (“the applicant”), and was represented by Mr M. Capmare, a lawyer practising in Bucharest;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns an alleged infringement of the principle of legal certainty, guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in the context of enforcement proceedings between a bank and the applicant, in which the domestic courts issued several final judicial decisions with different outcomes regarding the application of the rules on the statute of limitation.
2. On 10 May 2006 the private company owned by the applicant (“the company”) contracted a loan from a Romanian bank, CEC Bank (“the bank”), whose main shareholder is the State. The loan was secured by a mortgage deed concluded on the same date in respect of a real estate property owned by the applicant and his wife.
3. After the company owned by the applicant defaulted on the payment of the instalments, the bank requested the forced execution with a bailiff’s office in several successive proceedings, which were challenged by the company, as well as by the applicant in his capacity as guarantor.
4. In a first set of proceedings, the bank initiated enforcement proceedings through a bailiff against the company based on the loan contract. The company challenged these enforcement proceedings before domestic courts. It invoked, among other grounds, that the statute of limitation had taken effect.
5. In a series of final judicial decisions rendered in 2015 between the parties, including one given on 20 November 2015, the domestic courts held that the creditor bank could request enforcement based on the loan contract until 27 April 2014. The courts noted that the bank had lodged the request for enforcement based on the loan contract on 17 July 2013. Thus, the objections to the enforcement were dismissed.
6. However, in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, by a final decision of 11 November 2016, the Galați County Court (“the County Court”) allowed a new objection to the enforcement lodged by the company and declared void all acts issued in the enforcement proceedings. It held that the creditor’s right to initiate enforcement proceedings regarding the loan contract was statute barred as of 21 June 2013.
7. In a second set of proceedings, the bank requested the enforcement through a bailiff against the applicant and his wife based on the mortgage deed concluded to guarantee the loan.
8. The applicant and his wife challenged these subsequent enforcement proceedings. They invoked the statute of limitation concerning the bank’s right to institute enforcement proceedings based on the loan contract. They claimed that this also applied to the enforcement of the mortgage deed, given the latter’s accessory nature, based on the res judicata effect of the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 of the County Court (see paragraph 6 above).
9. On 16 October 2019 the Tecuci District Court allowed the debtors’ objection on these grounds.
10. By a final decision of 17 December 2021, the County Court allowed the bank’s appeal and reversed the first-instance court decision. To decide so, that court held that the bank’s right to initiate enforcement proceedings in respect of the loan contract was not time-barred as of 21 June 2013. It gave effect to the same res judicata principle but based on the final judicial decisions issued in the previous proceedings between the parties in 2015 (see paragraphs 4-5 above).
11. The County Court observed that there were conflicting final judicial decisions between the parties concerning the same issue, namely the statute of limitation of the enforcement proceedings, and ruled that the principle of res judicata gives precedence to earlier decisions over later ones. It also remarked that in the proceedings that ended with the final decision of 11 November 2016 the domestic court had not been aware of the existence of the final decision of 20 November 2015 regarding the same parties and issue.
12. In this context, the County Court noted that the parties had not asked for the review (revizuire) of these conflicting judicial decisions pronounced in different sets of proceedings between them. Nonetheless, it held that any party could invoke the res judicata effect of a final judicial decision in subsequent proceedings linked to the previous ones based on Article 431 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”; efectul pozitiv al puterii de lucru judecat). Thus, it concluded that the final judicial decision that should be given preference was that of 20 November 2015 and not that of 11 November 2016, given its anteriority. Therefore, it concluded that the statute of limitation concerning the second enforcement proceedings based on the mortgage deed had not taken effect.
13. The applicant lodged a request for review (cerere de revizuire) against the decision of the County Court of 17 December 2021, based on Article 508 (1) point 8 CCP (contrariety of final judicial decisions). He claimed that the impugned decision breached the res judicata effect of the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 of the County Court. By a final decision of 15 March 2022, the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed this request for review. To decide so, it held that this amounted to an appeal in disguise, which was inadmissible, as it was not allowed by the domestic law in force.
14. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained of an alleged infringement of the principle of legal certainty, as in his view the decision of the County Court of 17 December 2021 infringed the res judicata effect of the final decision of the same court of 11 November 2016 on the statute of limitation regarding the creditor’s right to request enforcement proceedings.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
15. The applicant complained of a breach of the principle of legal certainty guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
16. The Court recalls that the general principles regarding legal certainty have been established in the previous cases Brumărescu v. Romania ([GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII) and Riabykh v. Russia (no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003-IX) and have been summarised, for example, in the judgment Protsenko v. Russia (no. 13151/04, §§ 25-28, 31 July 2008).
17. Legal certainty presupposes respect for the principle of res judicata, that is to say the principle of the finality of judgments (see Esertas v. Lithuania, no. 50208/06, §§ 20-21, 31 May 2012). Departures from this principle are justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see, for instance, Ryabykh, cited above, § 52).
18. Finally, the Court observes that in all legal systems the res judicata effects of judgments have limitations ad personam and as to material scope (see Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 47797/99 and 68698/01, § 66, 12 January 2006).
19. Turning to the facts of the case under examination, the Court notes that although the two enforcement proceedings at issue were not the same (see above paragraphs 4-6 and 7-8 respectively), it cannot be ignored that both concerned exactly the same legal relations and the same circumstances, which were crucial for deciding the dispute (see paragraph 11 above).
20. In the present case, unlike in Brumărescu, cited above, the 2016 final decision was not quashed. A significant part of it was rendered devoid of any legal effect, however, as in a new set of separate proceedings the question concerning the statute of limitation regarding the enforcement proceedings was decided differently (see paragraph 12 above).
21. While the Court held previously that such a situation may also amount to a breach of the principle of legal certainty in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Esertas, cited above, § 25), the present case differs significantly in that the domestic courts in the new set of proceedings were faced with two earlier final decisions that had opposite views on the same crucial legal matter. The Court notes that in the case under examination, in contrast to Esertas, cited above, by the decision of 17 December 2021 the domestic court only held that the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 that the applicant invoked in his favour as res judicata was contrary to earlier final judicial decisions between the parties on the same aspects dating from 2015 (see paragraphs 10-12 cited above).
22. In this context, the overruling of the judgment in the applicant’s favour was not motivated by a different interpretation of the applicable domestic law and a fresh examination of the relevant matter, but by the need to rectify the breach of the res judicata principle of the final judicial decisions rendered in 2015 by the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 which had concluded to the opposite on the same issue. The proceedings that ended with the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 had been tarnished by such a fundamental defect because the impugned decision of 17 December 2021 concluded that the domestic court had not been aware of the existence of the final judicial decisions of 2015 (see paragraph 11 in fine). This ground can be regarded as a fundamental defect within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, given the crucial role played by the respect of res judicata principle for the fairness of proceedings, and can justify a departure from the principle of legal certainty (contrast Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, no. 53176/17, §§ 74 and 82, 14 December 2021).
23. In the same vein, it must also be noted that the parties had failed to lodge a request for review against the final judicial decision of 11 November 2016 based on the res judicata effect of the final judicial decisions rendered in 2015 (see paragraph 12 above). There was, therefore, a pressing social need to disregard the judgment in question, given that there was no other legal means available to correct this fundamental defect of two or more conflicting final judicial decisions rendered by the domestic courts regarding the issue of the statute of limitation (see, mutatis mutandis, Trapeznikov and Others v. Russia, nos. 5623/09 and 3 others, § 38, 5 April 2016; contrast Şamat v. Turkey, no. 29115/07, § 64, 21 January 2020).
24. It is to be further noted that the proceedings at issue in the present case were lodged by a party to the proceedings, namely the applicant himself, and not by a third‑party State official with no connection to the proceedings, as was the case, for instance, in Androne v. Romania (no. 54062/00, § 47, 22 December 2004), where the extraordinary appeal in question was lodged by the General Prosecutor’s Office. The Court observes that the applicant was provided with ample opportunities to present his arguments that were given due consideration by the domestic courts.
25. The approach of the domestic courts in this case did not represent a “second chance” for the defendant bank to obtain a fresh examination of the dispute already examined in earlier contentious proceedings and determined by way of a final court decision (contrast Gražulevičiūtė, cited above, § 80). In the presence of conflicting final judicial decisions regarding the same legal relations and circumstances, the County Court had no choice but to give preference, according to the domestic law and the principle of res judicata, to the earlier final decision of 2015 which had not been considered in the subsequent set of proceedings in 2016, even if it meant devoiding the final decision of 11 November 2016 of legal effects. The Court, being mindful of its subsidiary role, reiterates that the domestic courts were best placed to interpret and apply the rules of substantive and procedural law, and considers that the relevant domestic decision of 17 December 2021 of the County Court does not disclose any manifestly arbitrary reasoning. As a result, the procedure as applied in the particular circumstances of this case constituted the next logical element in the chain of legal means available in the domestic system to rectify this fundamental defect within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, rather than an extraordinary means of reopening the proceedings, and was therefore not incompatible with the principle of legal certainty enshrined in the Convention or the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
26. Consequently, the special circumstances of the present case can be regarded as exceptional grounds justifying the final decision of 11 November 2016 being rendered devoid of legal effects. The Court finds that the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the applicant’s interest and the general interest in correcting miscarriages of justice (see, mutatis mutandis, Lenskaya v. Russia, no. 28730/03, §§ 40-44, 29 January 2009).
27. In the light of the above considerations and all the materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or its Protocols.
28. Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § § (3) (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 27 November 2025.
Valentin Nicolescu Ana Maria Guerra Martins
Acting Deputy Registrar President