BARUTÇUZADE AHMET VASIF EFENDI VAKFI AND HAKKI v. CYPRUS

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Applications nos. 19698/24 and 21245/24
BARUTÇUZADE AHMET VASIF EFENDI VAKFI against Cyprus
and Inci HAKKI against Cyprus

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 4 December 2025 as a Committee composed of:

 Gilberto Felici, President,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The applicant organisation in application no. 19698/24 is a Muslim religious trust (vakf) which administers donated property on behalf of over 50 beneficiaries. The applicant in application no. 21245/24 is recognised by the applicant organisation as the heir of its previous appointed trustee (mutevelli) and currently acts as the administrator of its properties.

2.  The case concerns two plots of land (nos. 252 and 253) owned by the applicant organisation and situated in the areas effectively controlled by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (“the government-controlled areas”). Following the 1974 events, the applicant organisation lost physical possession of the plots in question. Some time later, the plots were placed under the custodianship of the Minister of the Interior acting as the Custodian of Turkish-Cypriot properties in the government-controlled areas (“the Custodian”), in accordance with the 1991 Law on the Administration of Turkish-Cypriot Properties in the Republic and Other Related Matters (Law no. 139/1991 – “the Law”).

3.  In accordance with section 6A of the Law, an action can be brought in respect of alleged human rights violations resulting from the implementation of the Law. Persons who believe that their human rights have been breached owing to a decision of the Custodian can apply to the civil courts and claim, inter alia, compensation. The remedy provided under section 6A of the Law was introduced in 2010.

4.  Over the years, the applicants initiated numerous sets of domestic proceedings seeking, inter alia, the restitution of the plots in question or compensation for the alleged interference with their property rights.

5.  As regards civil proceedings, the applicants applied to the civil courts twice.

6.  First, in 2010 they lodged a civil action (no. 7413/10) against the Custodian and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (which had previously rented a building situated on plot no. 253, with the authorisation of the Custodian). The civil action was summarily dismissed on 27 June 2012. That decision was upheld on appeal (civil appeal no. 320/12) by a judgment of 11 December 2019.

7.  Second, the applicants lodged a civil action (no. 9120/12) against the Custodian seeking the release of plot no. 252 from custodianship. On 24 February 2020 the Nicosia District Court dismissed the case, finding that there were no grounds to release the plot from custodianship. It also rejected the applicants’ argument that certain provisions of the Law were unconstitutional. The applicants did not challenge that decision on appeal.

8.  As regards administrative proceedings, it is apparent from the relevant documents in the case file that the applicants applied to the administrative courts three times (recourse no. 59/13, which was dismissed at first instance on 24 February 2016; recourse no. 209/11 and subsequent appeal no. 249/12, which was dismissed by a final judgment of the Supreme Court – acting as a second‑instance court – on 5 March 2020; and recourse no. 1/2013 and subsequent appeal no. 74/2018, which was dismissed by a final judgment of the then newly established Supreme Constitutional Court – acting as a second-instance court – on 27 May 2024). In each set of proceedings, the applicants challenged different decisions, actions, or periods of inaction on the part of the Custodian, all of which they argued had been of an administrative or public nature and thus subject to judicial review by the administrative courts. The domestic courts repeatedly dismissed their recourses for want of jurisdiction in respect of acts or omissions of the Custodian.

9.  Most relevantly, in the final judgment of 27 May 2024 in respect of appeal no. 74/2018, the Supreme Constitutional Court reiterated that, according to well-established case-law, matters concerning the custodianship of Turkish-Cypriot properties in the government-controlled areas were civil‑law matters (falling under the jurisdiction of the civil courts) and excluded from the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.

10.  Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants in both applications complained of an interference with their property rights on account of their inability under the custodianship regime to use the property in question or profit from it, and of the inability to receive compensation for the loss of their property and their right to use it. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, they complained that the refusal of the authorities to return their property to them had been based on discriminatory grounds – namely, their ethnic origin as Turkish Cypriots. The applicants further complained that they had no effective remedy in respect of their complaints, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.

11.  The applicants also separately raised other complaints under various Convention provisions, as follows:

The applicant organisation in application no. 19698/24 complained under Article 6 of procedural irregularities during the proceedings in respect of civil action no. 7413/10 and the subsequent appeal no. 320/12. Relying on Article 15, it further submitted that the custodianship regime was an “emergency measure” for which the respondent State had not sought a derogation under the Convention.

Relying on Article 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, the individual applicant in application no. 21245/24 complained that her right to respect for her private life and to freedom of movement had been breached by the Law, which required that she reside in the government-controlled areas in order to be able to lodge a claim for the recovery of her property.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

12.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.

13.  The applicants in both applications complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of an interference with their property rights owing to their inability to access, use, or otherwise benefit from their property in the government-controlled areas, as well as the inability to receive compensation for such interference by the Custodian. They further complained that the authorities’ refusal to return their property to them was based on discriminatory grounds, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention taken alone. In addition, they complained that they did not have an effective remedy in that regard at their disposal, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.

14.  The applicants’ complaints that their property rights had been breached and that the breach had been based on discriminatory grounds constituted part of their complaint that they lacked an effective remedy in that regard. It is therefore appropriate to examine those complaints together. The Court will start by examining whether an effective remedy existed, as that issue is also connected to the question of admissibility of the applications and whether the applicants have exhausted the relevant domestic remedies.

15.  The Court refers to the general principles regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, as summarised in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69‑77, 25 March 2014). Complaints intended to be made before the Court should first have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see, for instance, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 142, ECHR 2010; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 37, ECHR 1999‑I; and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV). The existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009, and Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 71).

16.  In Kazali and Others v. Cyprus ((dec.), nos. 49247/08 and 9 others, 6 March 2012), having examined arguments as to the availability and effectiveness of the Law (which, at that time, had recently been amended to introduce section 6A), the Court found:

“152.  In conclusion, the new provisions in Law 139/1991 are formulated in broad terms and by express reference to the guarantees of the Convention as interpreted by this Court. They allow the applicants to make a claim to the Custodian alleging a violation of their Convention rights and, in the absence of a favourable response, to lodge a case in the District Court. The remedies available include an order for restoration of the property and an order for payment of compensation to cover pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses.

153.  The Court therefore cannot exclude that Law 139/1991 as amended provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by Turkish Cypriots. The applicant property owners in the present cases have not made use of this mechanism and their complaints under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention must therefore be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies ...”

That conclusion was reiterated in Izzet Mehmet and Others v. Cyprus ((dec.), nos. 6860/09 and 12 others, § 25, 19 June 2012); Mehmet Yilmaz v. Cyprus ((dec.), nos. 4722/05 and 3 others, § 18, 28 August 2012); Sahap v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 24536/10, § 15, 4 September 2012); Inal v. Cyprus (no. 40682/10, 25 September 2012); and Karamanoğlu and Others v. Cyprus (no. 1685/10, § 15, 12 March 2013).

17.  It is therefore evident from the above, as well as from the wording of section 6A of the Law, that the domestic legal order offers a remedy by which individuals can complain of human rights violations arising from the actions of the Custodian. To date, there has been no judgment of the Court raising an issue with the availability or effectiveness of the remedy in question.

18.  Importantly, the applicants have not substantiated their allegation that the relevant civil-law remedy is ineffective. In the present applications, they essentially argued that the administrative jurisdiction was the appropriate jurisdiction for deciding their claims under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, despite repeated domestic decisions finding that the appropriate forum for raising such complaints was the civil rather than the administrative courts. The applicants did not appeal against the 2020 judgment of the District Court in respect of civil action no. 9120/12 (see paragraph 7 above), and they lodged the present applications with the Court within four months of the third-in-line domestic judgment by an administrative court rejecting their recourses for want of jurisdiction (see paragraph 9 above). The applicants have not raised any arguments or provided any information or evidence to substantiate their assertion that the civil‑law remedy provided for by section 6A of the Law is ineffective and that they were therefore exempted from the obligation to exhaust that remedy before applying to the Court.

19.  In the absence of a final domestic judgment by a civil court or any substantiation of the alleged ineffectiveness of the relevant civil-law remedy by the applicants, the Court considers that they failed to address their complaints to the proper judicial body before applying to it. The Court reiterates that the existence of mere doubts about the prospects of success of a particular domestic remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust it (see paragraph 15 above, and the case-law cited therein).

20.  The Court considers, in line with domestic law and its own case-law on the matter (see paragraph 16 above), that the grievances raised by the applicants under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, as well as under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, have to be addressed in a civil action brought in the domestic courts against the Custodian and the State and pursued until the final level of jurisdiction.

21.  The Court therefore finds that the applicants should have availed themselves of the remedy offered by section 6A of the Law. It follows that their complaints under Article 14 of the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

22.  In view of the above-mentioned findings as regards the existence of an effective remedy, the applicants’ complaint under Article 13 must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

23.  The applicants also separately raised other complaints under various Articles of the Convention (see paragraph 11 above).

24.  The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

25.  It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 15 January 2026.

 Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
 Deputy Registrar President

Appendix

List of cases: