Information Note on the Court’s case-law 217
April 2018
Baydar v. the Netherlands - 55385/14
Judgment 24.4.2018 [Section III]
Article 6
Criminal proceedings
Article 6-1
Fair hearing
Summary reasoning in the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a request to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union: no violation
Facts – The applicant, in the context of his cassation appeal in criminal proceedings, requested the Supreme Court refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Supreme Court, referring to section 81(1) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, dismissed the applicant’s request and stated that its decision required no further reasoning, “as the grievances do not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal uniformity or legal development”.
Law – Article 6 § 1: In previous cases, not concerning the context of domestic accelerated proceedings, the Court held that national courts, against whose decisions there was no remedy under national law, were obliged to give reasons for their refusal to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in light of the exceptions provided for in the case-law of CJEU (see Dhahbi v. Italy, 17120/09, 8 April 2014, Information Note 173). At the same time, it was acceptable under article 6 § 1 of the Convention for national superior courts to dismiss a complaint by mere reference to the relevant legal provisions governing such complaints if the matter raised no fundamentally important legal issue (see John v. Germany (dec), 15073/03, 13 February 2007) and similarly to dismiss an appeal on points of law without further explanation if it was deemed to have no prospect of success (see Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) [GC], 12686/03, 20 March 2009, Information Note 117). The Court, however, had to ascertain that decisions of national courts were not arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable.
Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act allowed the Supreme Court to dismiss an appeal in cassation for not constituting grounds for overturning the impugned judgment and not giving rise to the need for a determination of legal issues, while section 80a of the same Act allowed it to declare an appeal in cassation inadmissible for not having any prospect of success. The aim of those provisions was to keep the length of proceedings reasonable and allow the courts of cassation or similar judicial bodies to concentrate on their main tasks of ensuring uniform application and correct interpretation of the law.
Following the Supreme Court’s explanation of its practice concerning the application of the above provisions, it was inherent in a judgment dismissing or declaring inadmissible an appeal in cassation that there was no need to seek a preliminary ruling since the matter did not raise a legal issue that needed to be determined. The summary reasoning contained in such a judgment therefore implied an acknowledgement that a referral to the CJEU could not lead to a different outcome in the case.
Moreover, in accordance with the relevant CJEU’s case-law, domestic courts, against whose decisions there was no remedy under national law, were not obliged to refer a question about the interpretation of EU law if the answer to that question could not have any effect on the outcome of the case, whatever it might be (see the CJEU judgment in Lucio Cesare Aquino v. Belgische Staat, C-3/16, 15 March 2017).
Therefore, in the context of accelerated procedures within the meaning of section 80a or 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, no issue of principle would arise under Article 6 § 1 where an appeal in cassation, including a request for referral, was declared inadmissible or dismissed with summary reasoning, where it was clear from the circumstances of the case that the decision was not arbitrary or otherwise manifestly unreasonable.
In the instant case, in accordance with the relevant domestic provisions, the applicant’s appeal in cassation had been considered and decided by three members of the Supreme Court, after having taken cognisance of the applicant’s written grounds of appeal, the Advocate General’s advisory opinion and the applicant’s written reply. The applicant’s appeal on points of law had therefore been duly examined and no unfairness could be discerned in the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(See also Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium, 3989/07, 20 September 2011, Information Note 144)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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