FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 26978/95
by Bror BECK
against Sweden
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 23 May 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrsW. Thomassen, President,
MrsE. Palm,
MrL. Ferrari Bravo,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrB. Zupančič,
MrT. Panţîru, judges,
andMrM. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 25 January 1995 and registered on 5 April 1995,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Swedish national, born in 1926 and living at Ratan, Sweden.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
I
On 27 March 1991 the applicant requested compensation for an occupational injury, referring to health problems allegedly resulting from his work as a sailor in the 1950’s.
On 4 September 1991 the National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket) rejected his claim.
On 30 September 1991 the applicant appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm. On 15 January 1992 he submitted several documents to the court. On 29 June 1993 the appeal was dismissed.
On 30 August 1993 the applicant appealed against the judgment. He submitted documents and written observations on 12 and 14 November and 21 December 1994.
On 29 September 1995 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm dismissed the appeal.
On 17 October 1995 the applicant appealed against the judgment. He submitted documents and written observations on 12 April and 1, 7 and 27 August 1996 and 24 February 1997.
On 26 June 1997 leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).
II
A settlement between the applicant and two other individuals in a real estate dispute was confirmed by the Sveg District Court (tingsrätten) by judgment of 18 June 1981. The judgment gained legal force.
On 27 May 1983 the District Court denied the applicant’s request that the settlement be declared null and void. Also this judgment gained legal force.
On 8 July 1985 the applicant’s counter-parties motioned, in an application for a summons on the applicant, that the applicant be ordered to pay a certain amount of money to them. During the course of this case the applicant, on 30 October 1985, submitted an application for a cross summons on his counterparties. He requested, inter alia, that the above-mentioned settlement be declared null and void. The applicant was directed to submit a final statement of evidence prior to 13 November 1985.
On 11 November 1985 the applicant was granted an extension of the time-limit until 18 November 1985. On 13 December 1985 the court enquired, as a follow-up to previous telephone calls, whether the lawyer D. intended to represent the applicant as legal aid counsel. He was directed to answer within 2 weeks. D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 24 January 1986. On 10 February 1986 D. submitted written observations. He also added new claims to the application for a cross summons. He furthermore invoked written evidence. On 17 February 1986 the court issued a cross summons to the plaintiffs, who were directed to submit an answer within 3 weeks. On 28 February 1986 the plaintiffs responded and requested that the case be dismissed on account of res judicata. They applied for a cross summons in their turn concerning compensation for a road. The applicant was directed to respond through D. within 2 weeks. On 14 March 1986 D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 27 March 1986. On that date he responded, through D., to the cross summons. The plaintiffs were directed to submit their response within a week. The response was submitted on 2 April 1986.
On 17 April 1986 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request that the settlement be declared null and void. The court found that the settlement’s validity had already been examined, which entailed an impediment to a renewed examination (res judicata).
On 2 May 1986 the applicant appealed, through D., against the decision. He also submitted an appeal petition in his own name. On 24 November 1986 he submitted further documentation. On 26 May 1987 the appellate court directed the plaintiffs to submit their observations within 10 days. They did so on 3 June 1987 and a copy was sent to D. who responded on 10 June 1987.
On 22 October 1987 the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) for Southern Norrland dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
On 19 November 1987 the applicant applied, through D., for leave to appeal against the decision. D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 4 December 1987. On 21 December 1987 D. submitted additional comments. On 16 February 1988 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) decided to request an opinion from the appellate court regarding an allegation made by the applicant that certain documentation had been wrongly added to the litigation proceedings. The opinion of the appellate court was submitted on 31 March 1988. On 2 May 1988 the Supreme Court decided to grant leave to appeal. On 5 May 1988 the plaintiffs were directed to file their submissions within 30 days. On 10 May 1988 the plaintiffs responded. On 16 June 1988 the applicant was directed to submit his final arguments prior to 4 July 1988. On that day he answered, through D., that he had nothing further to add. On 14 October 1988 the plaintiffs were requested to submit their final arguments prior to 28 October 1988. On 27 October 1988 they submitted their final observations.
On 31 January 1990 the Supreme Court confirmed the lower courts’ decisions to the extent that the applicant referred to facts that existed at the time of the District Court’s judgment of 27 May 1983. To the extent that the applicant based his appeal on circumstances which had occurred after that day, the Supreme Court referred the case back to the District Court for examination.
On 21 September 1990 the District Court confirmed its intention to hold an oral preparatory hearing on 19 October 1990. The hearing was held as scheduled. The applicant was directed to submit an additional statement of evidence within 4 weeks from having received the summary records from the hearing. The records were sent to the parties on 29 November 1990. On 15 January 1991 D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 15 February 1991. On 17 January 1991 the applicant submitted observations and requested that the pending case concerning real estate should be noted in the land register. He submitted 18 appendices, including written documentation in respect of other cases or matters. On 31 January 1991 the plaintiffs revoked their case in their capacity as plaintiffs on account of the fact that the applicant was destitute. On 1 February 1991 D. was directed to submit the applicant’s opinion in respect of the submissions of the plaintiffs, inter alia, the revocation of their case, prior to 15 February 1991.
On 12 February 1991 D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 1 March 1991. On 15 March 1991 D. requested that the court should examine the plaintiffs’ case at a main hearing, invoking, inter alia, the hearing of 3 witnesses. On 20 March 1991 the court directed the plaintiffs to submit observations and a statement of evidence within 2 weeks. On 4 April 1991 the plaintiffs submitted a statement of evidence. On 11 April 1991 the court summoned the parties to a main hearing on 22–23 May 1991. On 26 April 1991 the applicant submitted a document concerning another case. On 8 May 1991 he submitted further documents. On 13 May 1991 he submitted a statement of evidence. On 16 May 1991 he revoked the statement, referring instead to the statement of evidence submitted by D., who submitted a writ in which the basis for the applicant’s claim concerning the road compensation was clarified.
On 22–23 May 1991 the court held a main hearing. Both the applicant and D. submitted further documentation which was not invoked as written evidence. At the end of the hearing the court announced that a judgment would be issued on 27 June 1991. On 19 June 1991 the court informed the parties that the judge rapporteur had fallen ill and was hospitalised. They were further informed that the judgment would be issued on 9 August 1991.
The District Court determined the case by judgment of 9 August 1991, whereby the applicant was ordered to pay a certain amount of money to 2 other persons. An attachment order was also issued in favour of them.
On 28 August 1991 the applicant, through D., appealed against the judgment. On 12 September 1991 the applicant informed the Court of Appeal, through D., that he accepted a decision regarding the attachment being taken in connection with the impending main hearing. On 16 September 1991 the plaintiffs were directed to submit their observations within 3 weeks. On 24 September 1991 the plaintiffs submitted their observations.
On 1 October 1991 the applicant submitted 8 different documents, including writs to other authorities and courts. On 3 October 1991 he submitted a document concerning another matter. On 23 October 1991 he submitted a writ in which, inter alia, he invoked new evidence. The court directed D. to give an opinion in respect of this writ. On 28 October 1991 the applicant submitted further written observations. On 13 November 1991 D. submitted a writ relating to the evidence invoked by the applicant. On 25 November 1991
the court directed D. to present, within 3 weeks, inter alia, the reasons why new evidence should be allowed. On 18 December 1991 D. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 15 January 1992.
On 10 January 1992 the applicant requested the court to appoint new counsel for him in accordance with the provisions on legal aid. On 22 January 1992 the court directed D. to state, no later than 6 February 1992, his opinion in relation to the request. On 20 February 1992 D. submitted his opinion. On 13 March 1992 the applicant requested, inter alia, the appointment of a certain lawyer as new legal aid counsel. On 26 June 1992, referring to the summer holidays, the court informed D. that a decision in the matter would be taken as soon as possible. On 28 July 1992 the applicant submitted a further document. On 27 August 1992 he also submitted a copy of a document addressed to the Enforcement Authority (kronofogdemyndigheten). On 5 November 1992 the case files of the Court of Appeal and the District Court were transferred to the latter.
On 9 November 1992 D. informed the Court of Appeal of the name of the lawyer, N., whom the applicant wished to be represented by in the future. On 10 November 1992 N. informed the court that he was willing to be appointed as legal aid counsel for the applicant. On 18 November 1992 the Court of Appeal requested the case files back from the District Court. On 2 December 1992 the Court of Appeal relieved D. from his duties and appointed N. as the applicant’s legal aid counsel. The court directed N. to submit a statement of evidence prior to 28 December 1992. On that day N. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 28 January 1993. On 28 January 1993 he submitted a statement of evidence. On 17 February 1993 the plaintiffs argued that the new evidence should be rejected. On 2 March 1993 the applicant submitted 7 documents, all concerning other cases or matters. On 11 May 1993 he submitted 2 documents, including a letter to an administrative court of appeal.
On 13 January 1994 the applicant submitted a document concerning an instalment plan together with other documents. On 24 January 1994 he submitted a letter written by his children concerning the road compensation. On 31 January and 28 March 1994 the applicant submitted further documents. On 2 May 1994 the court directed the applicant, through N., to explain prior to 24 May 1994 why a newly invoked circumstance should not be considered encompassed by the legal force of the District Court’s previous judgment. On 20 May 1994 N. requested and was granted an extension of the time-limit until 13 June 1994. On 13 June 1994 N. withdrew the previous request to have 5 witnesses examined. He also withdrew the just-mentioned circumstance.
On 23 December 1994 N. requested the court to make an immediate decision regarding the attachment order. On 30 December 1994 the plaintiffs were directed to submit their observations in this respect prior to 17 January 1995. On 5 January 1995 they opposed any change of the attachment order.
On 7 February 1995 the court decided to revoke its previous attachment order due to the fact that it no longer served any purpose. On 10 October 1995 the court summoned the parties and witnesses to a main hearing on 22 November 1995. On 12 October 1995 the court was informed that one of the witnesses was unable to attend the hearing. On 18 October 1995 the court informed N. that another witness invoked by the applicant had died. On 22 October 1995 N. insisted that the witness who was unable to attend the main
hearing be examined. The court directed N. to state what the applicant intended to prove by the testimony in question. On 23 October 1995 N. invoked the tape recorded statements of the deceased witness. On 30 October 1995 N. withdrew the request to hear the indisposed witness. On 14 November 1995 N. submitted a writ concerning the road compensation money.
On 21–22 November 1995 the court held a main hearing. On 28 November 1995 the applicant submitted a writ to the court, inter alia informing the court of the number of his cases before the European Commission of Human Rights. On 19 December 1995 the applicant submitted a document directed to the Enforcement Authority.
On 20 December 1995 the applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland. This judgment gained legal force on 18 January 1996.
III
On 25 March 1991 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of the County of Jämtland refused to admit an action against the applicant and others relating to the attachment and forced sale of real property. The Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal and on 9 March 1993 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
IV
On 23 February 1993 the applicant applied for a summary payment order against others. On 7 April 1993 the Enforcement Authority of the County of Jämtland dismissed the request, considering it to be unfounded.
On 20 April 1993 the applicant appealed against the decision. On 2 June 1993 the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland directed the applicant to complete his appeal by stating the grounds for the appeal and his claim. On 11 June 1993 the applicant submitted a writ, which however did not state clearly either his claim or the grounds for the appeal. On 21 and 24 February 1994 the applicant submitted documents which did not concern the case. On 2 November 1994 the applicant asked the court what had happened to this case and another case of his. On 8 November 1994 the court informed him that the other case had been determined in April 1992 and that the intention was to present a report relating to the present case to the court before the end of 1994. The court also informed the applicant that, as far as possible, cases were dealt with in the order that the court was seized by them, that certain cases had priority according to the court’s rules of procedure and that the applicant’s case, although not classified as one of priority, would be determined as soon as possible.
On 20 December 1994 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the Enforcement Authority and referred the matter back for re-examination. On 10 February 1995 the Authority referred the matter to the Sveg District Court.
On 21 February 1995 the applicant informed the District Court that his application to the Enforcement Authority was to be viewed as an application for the enforcement of a summary payment order which had gained legal force, that the application was directed to the Authority and that it should therefore not be handled by the court.
On 23 February 1995 the applicant withdrew his case before the court. On 24 February 1995 the court struck the case out of its list of cases.
V
On 6 March 1995 the applicant applied for enforcement of the 1981 settlement mentioned under I. On 31 March 1995 the Enforcement Authority dismissed the application, as the applicant had failed to submit an enforceable title showing that he was entitled to the amount of money claimed.
On 12 April 1995 the applicant appealed against the decision.
On 21 April 1995 the District Court of Östersund directed the applicant to submit observations prior to 11 May 1995. On 5 May 1995 the applicant submitted observations, including a request for a prompt handling of the case. The court invited the Enforcement Authority to submit further observations prior to 19 May 1995. On 16 May 1995 the applicant submitted further observations. On 18 May 1995 the Enforcement Authority submitted its observations.
On 24 May 1995 the District Court upheld the Enforcement Authority’s decision.
On 9 June 1995 the applicant appealed against the District Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland.
On 13 June 1995 the applicant applied for legal aid. He requested, inter alia, that new evidence be allowed. On 16 June 1995 the court directed counsel for the applicant to state the names of witnesses invoked as evidence. On 4 July 1995 counsel for the applicant submitted observations.
On 13 September 1995 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision.
On 5 December 1995 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
VI
On 29 March 1994 the Public Prosecutor of Östersund decided not to start a pre-trial investigation on the basis of the applicant’s complaint against a number of officials of the Enforcement Authority and the County Administrative Board. The Prosecutor found that there was no reason to suspect that an offence had been committed.
On 20 June 1994 the Regional Prosecutor of Härnösand upheld that decision. On 4 January and 23 February 1995 the Office of the Prosecutor-General (Riksåklagaren) decided not to take any further action.
VII
On 7 September 1979 the Real Estate Formation Authority (fastighetsbildningsmyndigheten) decided that monetary compensation would be paid to the owner of certain real estate as a result of a road construction. The compensation was to be paid by means of a deposition with the County Administrative Board, since it was unclear whether the applicant or some other persons were entitled to the compensation.
On 15 March 1984 the Board rejected the applications from the applicant and 2 other persons to have the deposited amount paid out to them. This decision was upheld on 1 October 1984 by the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland. The court’s decision gained legal force on 30 October 1984.
COMPLAINTS
1.The applicant complains about the length of the proceedings mentioned under I–V and VII.
2.The applicant also complains, as regards the proceedings mentioned under VI, that the Public Prosecutor did not investigate the alleged offences committed by public officials.
THE LAW
1.The applicant complains about the duration of the above-mentioned proceedings I–V and VII.
Article 6 of the Convention reads, so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time ...”
As regards the proceedings mentioned under III and VII, however, the Court is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, as Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides that the Court may only deal with the matter within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
In the present case, and in respect of the proceedings mentioned under III, the decision of the Supreme Court, which was the final decision regarding the attachment and forced sale of real property, was given on 9 March 1993. In respect of the proceedings mentioned under VII the decision of the Court of Appeal, which was the final decision regarding the monetary compensation deposited with the County Administrative Board, gained legal force on 30 October 1984. However, the application was introduced on 25 January 1995, that is, more than six months after the dates of these decisions. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for non-compliance with the six-month rule within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
2.As regards the length of the proceedings otherwise referred to by the applicant, the Court recalls at the outset that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities. What is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings must also be taken into account (see, as a recent authority, the Humen v. Poland judgment of 15 October 1999, to be published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999, § 60).
a)As regards the proceedings mentioned under I, the Court finds that the relevant period to be taken into consideration started on 27 March 1991, when the applicant requested compensation for an occupational injury, and ended on 26 June 1997, when leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court. The proceedings thus lasted 6 years and 3 months.
The Government maintain that the case was not of an uncomplicated nature and that a further complicating factor was the manner in which the applicant conducted the proceedings on his part. Thus, some of the written documentation that he provided the courts with contributed very little to their respective determination of his claim.
The applicant maintains his complaint.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established by the case-law of the Convention organs on the question of “reasonable time”, and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.
b)As regards the proceedings mentioned under II, the Court finds that the relevant period to be taken into consideration started on 8 July 1985, when the applicant was summoned before the District Court, and ended on 18 January 1996, when the judgment of the Court of Appeal gained legal force. The proceedings thus lasted 10 years and 6 months.
The Government adduce that the proceedings were of a complex nature. A further complicating factor was the applicant’s own behaviour and that of counsel acting on his behalf. This caused delays and also served to make the case itself more complicated for the courts to handle. Also, the matter at stake cannot be said to have been of major importance for the applicant, since the validity of the settlement had already been determined by the District Court on 27 May 1983.
The applicant maintains his complaint, alleging that the authorities intentionally delayed the handling of the case.
It is true that these proceedings lasted more than 10 years. However, having regard to the facts as set out above, the Court finds that the case was of a complex nature as the proceedings involved several different cases concerning various intertwined issues. Regard should also be had to the behaviour of the applicant, who, in the Court’s view, conducted the proceedings in such a way that the case was unnecessarily delayed. Furthermore, the Court recalls that the applicant requested on numerous occasions, and was granted, extensions of
various time-limits. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the Court finds that the length of the proceedings, in 5 instances, did not exceed a reasonable time due to factors which could reasonably be attributed to the respondent State, and thus does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s right to a determination of his civil rights within a reasonable time as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
c)As regards the proceedings mentioned under IV, the Court finds that the relevant period to be taken into consideration started on 23 February 1993, when the applicant applied for a summary payment order, and ended on 24 February 1995, when the District Court struck the case out of its list of cases. The proceedings thus lasted 2 years.
The Government accept that the decision of the Enforcement Authority on 7 April 1993 to dismiss the applicant’s application for a summary payment order was due to an oversight. The applicant should instead have been informed that the matter could be referred to the District Court. However, the Enforcement Authority informed the appellate court of the mistake at an early stage. The oversight should, according to the Government, therefore not have caused any particular delays, had it not been for the applicant’s own conduct.
The applicant maintains his complaint.
The Court first notes that the case was not of a complex nature. It finds on the one hand that some delay was caused by the Enforcement Authority’s dismissal on 7 April 1993 of the application for a summary payment order. This single incident cannot, however, in itself be considered as giving rise to misgivings under Article 6. The Court recalls, on the other hand, that the applicant himself caused delay by the way he conducted the proceedings, inter alia, by failing to clearly state the object of his petition to the appellate court and by subsequently submitting irrelevant material. The Court also recalls that the applicant himself subsequently withdrew the case from the District Court. Having regard to these specific circumstances, the Court finds that the total length of the period in question does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
d)As regards the proceedings mentioned under V, the Court finds that the relevant period to be taken into consideration started on 6 March 1995, when the applicant applied for enforcement of the 1981 settlement, and ended on 5 December 1995, when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The proceedings thus lasted 9 months.
The Government assert that the fact that the case was dealt with by 4 instances in altogether 9 months under no circumstances can be considered as an excessive time-frame.
The applicant maintains his complaint.
The Court considers that the facts pertaining to this complaint do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
3.The applicant finally complains, as regards the proceedings mentioned under VI, that the Public Prosecutor did not investigate the alleged offences committed by public officials.
The Court recalls, however, that no right to have third persons prosecuted features among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
This part of the application is thus incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case, the applicant’s complaint regarding the length of the proceedings determining his right to occupational injury compensation (cf. I above),
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Michael O’BoyleWilhelmina Thomassen
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy