Information Note on the Court’s case-law 202
December 2016
Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC] - 53080/13
Judgment 13.12.2016 [GC]
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions
Loss of disability benefits due to newly introduced eligibility criteria: violation
Facts – In 2001 the applicant was granted a disability pension, which was withdrawn in 2010 after her degree of disability was re-assessed at a lower level using a different methodology. She underwent further examinations in the following years and was eventually assessed at the qualifying level. However, new legislation which had entered into force in 2012 introduced additional eligibility criteria, which the applicant did not fulfil and which related to the duration of the social-security cover. As a consequence, although her degree of disability would otherwise have entitled her to a disability allowance under the new system, her applications were refused. The applicant complained that she had lost her means of support, guaranteed only by a disability allowance, as a result of legislative changes applied by the authorities without equity, in spite of the fact that there had been no improvement in her health.
In a judgment of 10 February 2015 (see Information Note 182) a Chamber of the Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In particular, it held that the applicant had been totally divested of her disability care due to a drastic and unforeseeable change in the conditions of her access to disability benefits.
On 1 June 2015 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the Government’s request.
Law – Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(a) Applicability – In certain circumstances a legitimate expectation of obtaining an asset could enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. A legitimate expectation had to be of a nature more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision. At the same time, a proprietary interest recognised under domestic law – even if revocable in certain circumstances – could constitute a possession.
Amendments to social-security legislation may be adopted in response to societal changes and evolving views on the categories of people who need social assistance. Where the domestic legal conditions for the grant of any particular form of benefit or pension have changed and where the person concerned no longer fully satisfies them due to a change in these conditions, careful consideration of the individual circumstances of the case – in particular, the nature of the change in the requirement – may be warranted in order to verify the existence of a sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law.
The applicant fulfilled all the conditions of eligibility for receiving a disability pension as of right for almost ten years. The decision granting her a disability pension in accordance with the provisions of the relevant act and which formed the basis of her original entitlement could thus be regarded as representing an existing possession. Throughout that period, she could, on the basis of the act, entertain a certain legitimate expectation of continuing to receive disability benefits should her disability persist to the requisite degree.
The question was whether, at the time of entry into force of the new legislation in 2012, the applicant still had a legitimate expectation of receiving disability benefit. The change in the law effectively imposed on a certain category of insured persons, including the applicant, a condition which had not been foreseeable during the relevant potential contributory period and which they could not possibly satisfy once the new legislation entered into force. During the intervening period between the discontinuation of the applicant’s disability pension in 2010 and the legislature’s introduction of the new contribution requirement in 2012, the applicant not only continued to be part of the social-security system but also continued to fulfil the relevant length-of-service requirements for disability benefits. As such, while not in receipt of a pension, she continued to entertain a legitimate expectation covered by the notion of possession in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The applicant’s right to derive benefits from the social-insurance scheme in question was infringed in a manner that resulted in the impairment of her pension rights. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was thus applicable.
(b) Compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – The Court was satisfied that the interference complied with the requirement of lawfulness and pursued the communal interest of protecting the public purse, by means of rationalising the system of disability-related social-security benefits. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 required that any interference be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised. The requisite fair balance would not be struck where the person concerned bore an individual and excessive burden. The applicant had been subjected to a complete deprivation of entitlement, rather than to a commensurate reduction in her benefits. She did not have any other significant income on which to subsist and she had difficulties in pursuing gainful employment and belonged to a vulnerable group of disabled people.
The disputed measure, albeit aimed at protecting the public purse by overhauling and rationalising the scheme of disability benefits, consisted in legislation which, in the circumstances, failed to strike a fair balance between the interests at stake. Such considerations could not justify legislating with retrospective effect and without transitional measures corresponding to the particular situation, entailing as it did the consequence of depriving the applicant of her legitimate expectation that she would receive disability benefits. Such a fundamental interference with the applicant’s rights was inconsistent with preserving a fair balance between the interests at stake. There was no reasonable relation of proportionality between the aim pursued and the means applied. Despite the State’s wide margin of appreciation, the applicant had had to bear an excessive individual burden.
Conclusion: violation (nine votes to eight).
Article 41: EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 10,000 in respect of pecuniary damage.
(See Kopecky v. Slovakia [GC], 44912/98, 28 September 2004, Information Note 67; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.)[GC], 65731/01 and 65900/01, 6 July 2005; Kjartan Ásmundsson, 60669/00, 12 October 2004, Information Note 68; Klein v. Austria, 57028/00, 3 March 2011, Information Note 139; Moskal v. Poland, 10373/05, 15 September 2009, Information Note 122; see also, the Factsheet on Persons with disabilities and the European Convention on Human Rights)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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