FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 64098/00
by Franco BELLINI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 13 June 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 10 November 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1926 and living in Florence. He is represented before the Court by Mr A. Brini, a lawyer practising in Florence.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which he had let to A.B.
In a registered letter of 10 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.
The tenant told the applicant that he would not leave the premises.
In a writ served on the tenant on 22 December 1983, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 16 January 1984, which was made enforceable on 19 June 1984, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1984.
On 17 September 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 23 October 1987, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 December 1987.
Between 15 December 1987 and 15 March 1999, the bailiff made thirty-two attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 10 September 1999.
On 26 March 2001, the applicant reached a friendly agreement with the tenant, and the tenant is supposed to leave the premises on 31 December 2002.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings and about the denial of his right of access to a court.
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that he failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy