AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 34329/96
by Lyas Rachid Bruno BENAHMED
against the Netherlands
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:
MM J.-C. GEUS, President
M.A. NOWICKI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 October 1996
by Lyas Rachid Bruno BENAHMED against the Netherlands and registered
on 20 December 1996 under file No. 34329/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1972, and resides in
Amsterdam. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr G.P. Hamer,
a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
1. Particular circumstances of the case
On 7 April 1993, the applicant was arrested and detained on
remand on suspicion of attempted theft and unlawful possession of a
fire arm. The police did not allow him to contact his regular lawyer,
Mr Hamer, despite the applicant's explicit request to be assisted by
Mr Hamer nor did the police inform any lawyer on call (piket-advocaat)
of the applicant's arrest and detention. The applicant was released on
9 April 1993.
On 5 January 1994, the applicant was arrested and detained on
remand on suspicion of attempted manslaughter. During the initial phase
of this detention the applicant was not allowed to have any contacts
with the outside world with the exception of certain privileged
officials, including his lawyer. He was released at some unspecified
date in June 1994.
By summons dated 18 February 1994, the applicant was ordered to
appear on 8 April 1994 before the Magistrate (politierechter) of the
Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Haarlem in connection with
the facts for which the applicant had been arrested on 7 April 1993.
This summons did not reach the applicant as it was sent to his official
home address at M. street in Amsterdam and as, at that time, he was
detained on remand without the right to have contacts with the outside
world. Also his lawyer was unaware that these criminal proceedings had
been instituted since the applicant had remained without legal
assistance at the time of his arrest and detention in April 1993.
On 8 April 1994, following proceedings in absentia as neither the
applicant or his lawyer had appeared, the Magistrate convicted the
applicant of attempted theft and unlawful possession of a fire arm and
sentenced him to two months' imprisonment.
On 2 June 1994, this judgment was served on the applicant in
person in the remand centre where he was detained. The applicant filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam.
At the hearing of the applicant's case before the Court of Appeal
on 10 May 1995 both the applicant and his lawyer were present. The
Court of Appeal heard the applicant and pleas for the prosecution and
the defence.
By judgment of 24 May 1995, following adversarial proceedings,
the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 8 April 1994, convicted the
applicant of attempted theft and unlawful possession of a fire arm and
sentenced him to six weeks' imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument raised by the defence
that the initial summons should be declared null and void and that the
case should be referred back to the Magistrate. The Court of Appeal
held on this point, inter alia, that there is no provision in the law
or any treaty to the effect that the judicial authorities, in a case
where an accused has a permanent place of residence, must verify
whether the accused is detained on other grounds. It further held that
the Magistrate had no reasons to take into account the possibility that
the applicant could be detained at the time of the hearing before the
Magistrate. The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad).
By judgment of 11 June 1996, the Supreme Court rejected the
applicant's appeal in cassation. The Supreme Court accepted the grounds
on which the Court of Appeal had rejected the argument that the initial
summons should be declared null and void and that the case should be
referred back to the Magistrate.
2. Relevant domestic law
The rules governing the procedure of the serving of judicial
notifications are set out in Articles 585 - 590 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, hereinafter "CCP").
According to Article 585 para. 3 CCP summonses and notifications
(dagvaardingen en aanzeggingen) must be served (betekening). Pursuant
to Article 587 para. 1 CCP, a serving takes place by the delivery
(uitreiking) of a judicial communication (gerechtelijke mededeling) by
the postal services.
Article 588 CCP, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
"1. The serving takes place: a. upon the person who has been lawfully deprived of his liberty in the Netherlands in connection with the criminal proceedings to which the judicial notification relates: in person; b. upon all others: in person or, in case the serving in person is not prescribed and the communication is presented in the Netherlands: 1* to the address where the addressee is registered in the basic personal data administration, or 2* if the addressee is not registered in the basic personal data administration, to the permanent or temporary domicile of the addressee, or 3* if the address is not registered in the basic personal data administration and a permanent or temporary domicile is not known, to the Registrar of the Regional Court before which or in whose judicial district the case will be heard or has been heard previously. 2. ... 3. Where in a situation referred to in paragraph 1, section b. under 1* or 2*, a. the addressee is not found, the serving takes place by delivery present at that address who declares himself willing to transmit the document without delay to the addressee; b. nobody is found, the serving takes place by delivery to the addressee or a person authorised by the addressee at a place the address of which is indicated in a written message which must be left behind; c. the delivery has not taken place, the communication is returned to the authority which issued it. When it appears that the addressee on the day of presentation and at least five days thereafter has been registered in the basic personal data administration as residing at the address indicated on the communication, the communication shall subsequently be delivered to the Registrar of the Regional Court before which or in whose judicial district the case will be heard or has been heard previously. The Registrar will then send the communication without delay by regular mail to that address and annotates this on the act of delivery referred to in Article 589 4. ..." Article 590 CCP, insofar as relevant, provides: "1. The serving is null and void, where the delivery has not taken place in accordance with the conditions set out in Articles 588 paras. 1 and 3, and 589. 2. ... 3. Where the addressee is registered as resident in the basic personal data administration, whereas at the trial it appears that he resides in fact at another address, the judge may order the appearance of the suspect who has not appeared." Under Article 399 para. 1 CCP, an accused who has been convicted in absentia in a final judgment (einduitspraak) by the first instance court may file an objection (verzet). Such an objection entitles the accused to a full retrial by the same court (Article 403 CCP). An objection may not be filed by an accused who has the opportunity to appeal to a higher court with jurisdiction as to both fact and law (Article 399 para. 2 CCP). It follows from Article 399 para. 1 CCP that no objection may be filed against a judgment in absentia given on appeal. COMPLAINT The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 of the Convention that he was harmed in his defence rights in that the judicial authorities fell short of their obligation under the Convention to secure that he was informed of the hearing of his case before the Magistrate and thus provide him with the opportunity to defend himself. He submits that, given the contents of his criminal record, the authorities could have suspected that the applicant was detained at the relevant time and/or have contacted his regular lawyer. THE LAW The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the Convention that he was harmed in his defence rights in that the judicial authorities failed to inform him of the hearing of his case before the Magistrate. Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads: "1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing .... by a ... tribunal established by law. ... 2. ... 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; b. to have adequate time ... for the preparation of his defence; c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing ... ; ...." The Commission recalls that the guarantees contained in paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are constituent elements, amongst others, of the general notion of a fair trial referred to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Hennings v. Germany judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-A, p. 11, para. 25) and that the object and purpose of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention taken as a whole show that a person "charged with a criminal offence" is entitled to take part in the hearing of his case and that the Contracting States must exercise diligence in order to ensure that the rights guaranteed by this provision are enjoyed in an effective manner (cf. Eur. Court HR, Colozza v. Italy judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, pp. 14-15, paras. 27 and 28). The Commission further recalls that an accused must be informed with sufficient notice about the date and place of the trial (cf. No. 8231/78, Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 28, p. 5). The Commission notes that the summons to appear before the Magistrate on 8 April 1994 never reached the applicant, as it was sent to the applicant's home address whereas he was detained at that time. Consequently, the proceedings before the Magistrate resulted in the applicant's conviction after proceedings held in absentia. However, the Commission further notes that, following the applicant's appeal against his conviction by the Magistrate, adversarial proceedings were held before the Court of Appeal. In its judgment of 24 May 1995, the Court of Appeal quashed the Magistrate's conviction in absentia. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention insofar as his complaint relates to the proceedings in absentia before the Magistrate. The Commission further finds no indication that the subsequent proceedings before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court fell short of the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as regards fairness of proceedings. It follows that the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously, DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS Secretary President to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
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