AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 12526/86
by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 7 January 1991, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
S. TRECHSEL
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. J.-C. GEUS
A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 June 1986
by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED against Sweden and registered
on 10 November 1986 under file No. 12526/86;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government
on 31 March 1989, on 8 June 1989 and on 11 May 1990 and the observations
submitted by the applicants on 18 May 1989, on 13 March 1990 and on
5 July 1990;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The application was originally lodged by Elsa Björkgren and
Sture Ed, both Swedish citizens living in Johanneshov and Stockholm,
respectively. They were both retired. On 4 January 1990 the first
applicant died. Her husband and sole heir, Tage Björkgren, decided to
pursue the application. The applicants are represented by Jan Axelsson,
a lawyer practising in Stockholm.
The applicants, who were brother and sister, owned the
property Sicklaön 13:48 in the municipality of Nacka in the County of
Stockholm.
Soon after the applicants' father's acquisition of the
property, on which a dwelling-house and certain other buildings had
previously been constructed, Regulations for Non-Planned Areas
(utomplansbestämmelser) were introduced, requiring a permit for
construction on the property.
According to the applicants a prohibition on construction
(byggnadsförbud) was, in 1948, issued to prevent urban development
(tätbebyggelse) within an area not covered by a town plan or a building
plan. In the Government's view the applicants in this respect
probably refer to a prohibition on construction similar to the kind of
prohibition based on Section 56 of the 1959 Building Ordinance
(byggnadsstadgan), according to which the authorities were, in
principle, obliged not to grant permits for such new buildings or
major alterations of buildings as would have resulted in urban
development within an area not covered by a town plan or a building
plan.
In 1954 the applicants acquired the property as a gift from
their father.
On 25 August 1976 Mrs. Björkgren's request for a provisional
decision regarding an exemption from the prohibition on construction
was refused by the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden; hereinafter
"the Committee") of the municipality of Nacka. Mrs. Björkgren wished
to erect a new house on the property with the intention of making it
the permanent home of the applicants.
On the same day the Committee, under penalty of a fine of
10.000 SEK, ordered the applicants to demolish those buildings on the
property which were considered to be beyond repair. These were
subsequently pulled down by the applicants, with the exception of the
dwelling-house.
Following a proposal for a town-plan for the area, the County
Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen; hereinafter "the Board") of the
County of Stockholm on 18 February 1977, on the municipality's
request, issued a prohibition on construction of all new buildings
until 18 February 1978, pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building
Act (byggnadslagen). Such a prohibition was valid for only one year,
but it could be prolonged for two years at a time.
A similar prohibition on construction was issued on 28 March
1978. This was valid until 18 March 1979.
On 27 March 1979 the Board again issued a similar prohibition
on construction. This was valid until 28 March 1981.
On 21 November 1979 the Committee's decision, insofar as it
concerned the request for an exemption from the prohibition on
construction, was upheld on appeal by the Board, which, however,
quashed the demolition order, since it was considered possible that
the dwelling-house could be restored and that it might be of
historical interest. On 23 February 1981 the Administrative Court of
Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm rejected the Committee's appeal.
On 24 February 1981 the Board prolonged the prohibition on
construction until 28 March 1983. The applicants' appeal in this
respect was rejected by the Government on 29 April 1982.
On 21 October 1982 the Government rejected Mrs. Björkgren's
appeal regarding the provisional opinion.
On 7 June 1984 the Board issued a new prohibition on
construction pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building Act. This
was valid until 7 June 1985.
On 13 June 1984, the Committee, under penalty of a fine of
5.000 SEK, issued a new demolition order concerning the dwelling-
house, finding that the poor condition of the house excluded repair.
Mrs. Björkgren states that, on 15 December 1984, she lodged a
request for a building permit, but never obtained any answer. This has
not been confirmed by the Government.
On 7 March 1985 the applicants' appeal against the demolition
order of 13 June 1984 was rejected by the Board, which, however,
divided the penalty between the applicants.
On 31 May 1985 the Board prolonged the prohibition on
construction until 31 May 1987. This decision was upheld on appeal by
the Government on 17 October 1985.
On 9 March 1986 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the
decision by the Board of 7 March 1985.
On 9 June 1986 the applicants' request to the Supreme
Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) for a re-opening of the case
(resning) concerning the prolongation of the prohibition on
construction issued on 31 May 1985 was refused.
On 24 June 1986 Mrs. Björkgren, in a letter to the Minister of
Housing and Physical Planning (bostadsministern), requested that the
municipality of Nacka should buy the applicants' property.
On 23 July 1986 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave
to appeal against the decision by the Administrative Court of Appeal
of 9 March 1986.
By letter of 10 October 1986 the Minister of Housing and
Physical Planning informed Mrs. Björkgren that the municipality of
Nacka had no legal obligation to buy or acquire the applicants'
property and that she should contact the municipality, if she objected
to the new town plan under preparation.
On 15 June 1987 a new town plan was adopted by the
municipality of Nacka, to the effect that a special prohibition on
construction entered into force in accordance with Sections 14 and 35
of the Building Act.
On 30 June 1987 the municipality applied for a permit from the
Board to expropriate the applicants' property, on which the
dwelling-house still remained.
On 1 July 1987 the new Plan and Building Act (plan- och
bygglagen) entered into force. As a result, the general and special
prohibitions on construction were cancelled.
On 19 October 1987 the Board granted the municipality of Nacka
a permit to expropriate the applicants' property on the grounds that
it was required for future urban development in accordance with
Chapter 2 Section 1 of the 1972 Expropriation Act (expropriations-
lagen). The applicants appealed to the Government, arguing that,
under the terms of Chapter 2 Section 12 of this Act, the purpose of
the expropriation could appropriately be attained by other means and
that the detriment to the applicants' interest occasioned by such
expropriation would outweigh any advantage gained.
On 22 January 1988 the new town plan, according to which
dwellings containing two stores were allowed to be erected on the
applicants' property, was confirmed by the Board.
In its decision of 28 April 1988 rejecting the applicants'
appeal regarding the expropriation permit, the Government stated that
on the basis of the preparatory works to the 1972 Expropriation Act no
decisive consideration could be given to the interests of a property
owner in the determination of the right of priority to land required
for urban development. Even though a property owner was equally
willing to develop a property in the intended way, the municipality
had to be given a permit to expropriate the property at issue.
On 17 October 1988 the municipality of Nacka requested the
Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen) of Stockholm to decide on the
question of compensation to the applicants. The applicants were
offered 165.000 SEK by the municipality. In the municipality's view,
the dwelling-house had lost its historical value and was now in a
state which prevented repair.
On 20 November 1989 the applicants sold their property to a
tenant-owners' society with which the municipality had come to a
development agreement (exploateringsavtal). The expropriation
proceedings instituted before the Real Estate Court were therefore
discontinued and the case was struck from the Court's list.
The selling price has not been submitted by the applicants.
However, in their view they received a marginally better price for
their property than could be expected to be awarded by a court, but it
was considerably lower than a free market price. The applicants were
also granted, for the same price as offered to the public, the right
to acquire a flat in the dwelling-house erected by the tenant-owners'
society.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court
determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions
on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an
expropriation permit in respect of their property. They allege a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
2. The applicants furthermore complain that the prohibitions on
construction, seen as a whole, caused severe deterioration of their
property and deprived them of its practical use; that the prohibitions
on construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition
order of 13 June 1984 interfered with their right to the peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions; and that the decision to issue the
expropriation permit deprived them of their property. They allege
violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
3. The applicants finally complain that they did not have an
effective remedy before a national authority for the above violations
of their rights under the Convention. They allege a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 10 June 1986 and registered
on 10 November 1986.
On 12 December 1988 the Commission decided that notice of the
application should be given to the respondent Government and that the
parties should be invited to submit written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the application.
After an extension of the time-limit, the Government's
observations were submitted on 31 March 1989. The applicants'
observations in reply were submitted on 18 May 1989.
Further observations were submitted by the Government on
8 June 1989. The applicants submitted further observations on
13 March 1990. After an extension of the time-limit the Government
submitted further observations in reply on 11 May 1990. Further
observations by the applicants were submitted on 5 July 1990.
The Commission decided to grant legal aid to the applicants on
14 April 1989.
THE LAW
1. Mr. Tage Björkgren, the husband and sole heir of Mrs.
Björkgren, has expressed the wish to pursue the application introduced
by Mrs. Björkgren who died on 4 January 1990. He argues that as he is
the sole heir of Mrs. Björkgren, he has acquired the initial and
legitimate interest in having a violation established by the
Commission, especially since all complaints have a bearing on his late
wife's property.
The Government submit that the estate cannot arguably claim
to be a victim entitled to lodge an application under Article 25
(Art. 25) of the Convention. In the Government's opinion a transfer
of the victim notion can be accepted only if a person can be said to
have been affected by the original alleged violation in a way similar
to that in which the original victim was affected.
Under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention the
Commission "may receive petitions... from any person... claiming to be
a victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth in (the)
Convention".
The Commission recalls its case-law (No. 10474/87,
Dec. 6.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 116 with further references) according to
which the applicant's death does not in itself dispose of his or her
complaint. In principle, it falls to the Convention organ before which
the case is pending to decide whether the application should be
further examined or whether it should be struck off the list of cases.
In the examination of this question, special consideration must be
given to the intentions exposed by the applicant's legal successor as
well as to the nature of the complaint. However, the heir of a
deceased applicant cannot claim a general right to have the
examination of an application introduced by a deceased person
continued by the Commission (Kofler v. Italy, Comm. Report 9.10.82,
D.R. 30 p. 9 para. 16).
The present complaints relate to the applicants' property,
including the first applicant's estate. As regards the latter, the
Commission finds that the claim is transferable and that Mr. Björkgren,
as the sole heir, has a sufficient legal interest in the outcome of
the proceedings before the Convention organs. It concludes that the
husband of Mrs. Björkgren may take over and continue the proceedings
instituted by Mrs. Björkgren before the Commission.
2. The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court
determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions
on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an
expropriation permit. They allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar
as it is relevant, as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal..."
The Government submit that the proceedings of which the
applicants complain must be examined separately.
The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting
construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption
from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with
the first prohibition on construction and terminating with the
expropriation proceedings. Thus, the Commission should deal with this
whole series of events.
The Commission considers that in the light of the nature of
the applicants' complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6) the proceedings
concerned must be examined separately.
(a) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 of the
Convention refers to the prohibitions on construction issued on
18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978, on 27 March 1979 and on
7 June 1984 as well as to the prolongation on 24 February 1981 of the
prohibition on construction, the Commission considers that it is not
required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicants
disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention, as Article
26 of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with
the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which
the final decision was taken".
In the present case the decisions of the Board, which were the
final decisions regarding the issuing of new prohibitions on
construction, were given on 18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978,
on 27 March 1979 and on 7 June 1984. The decision of the Government,
which was the final decision regarding the prolongation of the
prohibition on construction, was given on 29 April 1982. However, the
application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June 1986, that is,
more than six months after the dates of the above decisions.
Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence
of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended
the running of that period.
It follows that the complaint in this respect under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time and must be
rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
(b) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention refers to the prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the
prohibition on construction, the Commission refers to the above six
months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
The Commission furthermore recalls that according to its established
case-law the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26
(Art. 26) refers solely to the final decision involved in the
exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally
recognised rules of international law. In particular, only a remedy
which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for this purpose
(see e.g. No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60, Yearbook 4 pp. 276, 282; No.
9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155, 187).
The Commission finds that, in the present case, the
applicant's request for a re-opening of the case concerning the
prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the prohibition on construction was not
an effective remedy under the generally recognised rules of
international law. Consequently, the decision regarding this request
cannot be taken into consideration in determining the date of the
final decision for the purpose of applying the six months time-limit
laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26).
The final decision regarding the prolongation of the
prohibition on construction issued on 7 June 1984 is accordingly the
decision of the Government which was given on 17 October 1985, whereas
the present application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June
1986, that is, more than six months after the date of this decision.
Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence
of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended
the running of that period.
It follows that also the complaint in this respect under
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time
and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the
Convention.
(c) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention refers to the proceedings concerning the
expropriation permit ending with the Government's decision of 28 April
1988, the Commission considers that the issues to be decided are
whether the decision to issue an expropriation permit was decisive for
the applicants' "civil rights and obligations" and, if so, whether a
genuine dispute of a serious nature arose between the applicants and
the authorities in relation to this decision. In the affirmative, it
would have to be determined whether the applicants had at their
disposal a procedure satisfying the conditions of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention with regard to that dispute.
The Government waive objections against the admissibility of
the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) and admit that
it was not at the time possible under Swedish law to have the decision
of 28 April 1988 reviewed by a court.
The Commission finds that the complaint in this respect under
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention. As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been
established, the complaint is admissible.
3. The applicants complain that the decision to issue the
expropriation permit, the prohibitions on construction, seen as a
whole, and the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, in
combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984 violated
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties."
The Government submit that each measure complained of must be
examined separately. Insofar as the applicants' complaint under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the prohibitions on
construction based on the decisions of 18 February 1977, 28 March
1978, 27 March 1979 and 7 June 1984, the complaint is inadmissible,
since the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedies. Insofar as
the complaint concerns the prohibitions on construction based on the
decisions of 24 February 1981 and 31 May 1985 and the prohibitions on
construction in combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984,
the applicants did not introduce their complaint within six months
from the dates of the final domestic decisions. The complaint in this
respect is therefore also inadmissible.
The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting
construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption
from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with
the first prohibition on construction and ending with the
expropriation proceedings. Thus, the Commission should deal with this
series of events as a whole.
The Commission recalls that the Court in the Sporrong and
Lönnroth case (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 23 September 1982, Series
A No. 52, p. 23, para. 60) considered that the expropriation permits
and the prohibitions on construction at issue should in principle be
examined together, as they had the single objective of facilitating
development in accordance with successive plans prepared for that
purpose. Moreover, the present applicants' complaint about the
demolition order is linked to the prohibitions on construction. The
Commission therefore finds that the measures of which the applicants
complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention
must be seen as a whole and be examined together.
Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the expropriation permit, the
Government submit that the interference was justified in view of the
aim pursued and as being effected in the general interest; that, at
the time when the applicants lodged their complaints, the question of
compensation for the expropriation was still pending before the
Stockholm Real Estate Court, which, when considering the question of
compensation, could also review the expropriation permit under certain
circumstances; that the applicants can therefore not be considered to
have exhausted domestic remedies; and that in, any case, consideration
should be given to the agreement reached regarding compensation.
Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) refers to the prohibitions on construction and
to the prohibitions on construction in combination with the demolition
order, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly
ill-founded; that the decisions were justified under the second
paragraph of the provision since they were made in the general
interest in order to control the use of the applicants' property; that
the prohibitions on construction only prevented the applicants from
erecting new buildings or from building substantial additions to the
existing one; and that the applicants never requested an exemption
from these prohibitions. The Government invoke the wide margin of
appreciation enjoyed by the State when deciding matters falling under
this provision.
The applicants contend that the decision to issue the
expropriation permit was an unlawful deprivation of their possessions
which did not serve the public interest or the purpose of the
interference. The situation of which they complain is similar to the
Sporrong and Lönnroth case (loc. cit.) in the sense that their right
of ownership was rendered precarious by the expropriation permit.
Thus, the case should be examined under the second sentence of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and, therefore, be distinguished from the Allan
Jacobsson case in which the interference was examined under the second
paragraph of this provision, inter alia, on the ground that no
expropriation permit was issued (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 25
October 1989, Series A No. 163, p. 16, para. 54).
The applicants contend that the prohibitions on construction,
seen as a whole, constituted an unjustified interference, as they had
to bear an individual and excessive burden, not having the possibility
of claiming compensation for the prohibitions; that they objected to
the prohibitions in several applications and appeals; and that they
once asked for a preliminary opinion regarding an exemption from a
prohibition.
Insofar as their complaint refers to the prohibitions on
construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition
order, the applicants contend that the bad state of the building was
caused by the prohibitions on construction, which prevented repair.
The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) raises the issue whether the cumulative effect
of, on the one hand, the decisions to prohibit construction, seen as a
whole, and, on the other hand, the expropriation permit may be said to
be justified under this provision, or, alternatively, whether the
prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, were justified under
the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).
The Commission does not, for the reasons stated below, find it
necessary to determine whether the complaint should be examined under
the first or the second sentence of Article 1 (Art. 1). It notes that
the applicants acquired their property only after a prohibition on
construction had already come into effect. The Court has found that a
property owner cannot reasonably have been unaware of the state of the
law as to the restrictions on the use of his property already imposed
on the property when this was acquired by him (above-mentioned Allan
Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit., p. 18, paras. 59-61).
Furthermore, the Commission observes that the decisions to
prohibit construction issued under Sections 15 and 35 of the Building
Act were only valid for one year, with the possibility of a
prolongation for a period of two years at a time. The need to
maintain them was thus examined at regular intervals. Moreover, the
proceedings following a request for a provisional or final decision
regarding an exemption from a prohibition on construction provided a
possibility for weighing the public interest against that of the
individual (above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit.,
pp. 18-19, para. 62). Finally, contrary to the Sporrong and Lönnroth
case where the expropriation permits were in force for twenty-three and
eight years, respectively, the expropriation permit was, in the
present case, in force for only two years before the development
agreement was reached and the expropriation proceedings were
discontinued.
In view of the above considerations an examination of this
complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of
a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicants finally complain that they had no effective
remedy before a national authority for the above violation of their
rights under the Convention. They allege a violation of Article 13
(Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Government submit that no separate issue arises under this
provision.
The Commission finds that the issue under Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention, insofar as it concerns the absence of a court
determination with regard to the expropriation permit, is closely
linked to the corresponding issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention which the Commission has found above to be admissible. This
complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is therefore
also admissible.
Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention concerns the absence of a court determination with
regard to the decisions to prohibit construction, the Commission has
found above that the corresponding complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention must be rejected as introduced out of time.
Consequently, the complaint in this respect under Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention must be rejected on the same grounds.
Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the
Convention concerns the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission has found above that the complaint under Article
1 (Art. 1) is manifestly ill-founded. The Commission finds, for similar
reasons, that the applicants' claim of a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be regarded as "arguable" for the purpose of
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner
judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A No. 172, para. 33).
Accordingly, Article 13 of the Convention does not in this respect
entitle the applicants to a remedy in domestic law. Consequently,
this complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) is also manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the
case, the applicants' complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
and Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention concerning the
absence of a court determination of the lawfulness of the
expropriation permit;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(J. RAYMOND) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy