Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 79
October 2005
Blake v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 68890/01
Decision 25.10.2005 [Section IV]
Article 6
Civil proceedings
Article 6-1
Reasonable time
Length of civil proceedings (9 years and 2 months): admissible
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Order for an account of profits in relation to the publication of an autobiography written by a former agent of the British Intelligence Service alleged to have not been “prescribed by law”: inadmissible
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1
Deprivation of property
Order for an account of profits in relation to the publication of an autobiography written by a former agent of the British Intelligence Service alleged to have not been “prescribed by law”: inadmissible
The applicant joined the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1944 and became an agent for the Soviet Union in or around 1951. In 1961 he pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawfully communicating information to the Soviet authorities contrary to the Official Secrets Act 1911, and was sentenced to 42 years’ imprisonment. In 1966 he escaped from prison in the United Kingdom to Moscow where he has lived ever since. The applicant signed a contract with British publishers in 1989 to publish his autobiography. He was to receive advances on royalties. The Government did not attempt to stop the publication of the book, but in 1991 it brought proceedings in the High Court seeking to extract from the applicant any financial benefit he would obtain from publication, arguing that in writing and publishing the book he had acted in breach of the duty of confidence he owed to the Crown as a former member of the SIS. The applicant attempted unsuccessfully to obtain legal aid. In 1994 his solicitors were granted leave to cease to act for the applicant, as they could not continue to act on a pro bono basis. In 1995 the High Court appointed a Queen’s counsel and a junior counsel to act as amici curiae in the case. The High Court’s judgment concluded that it was not necessary to decide the question of whether the Crown could claim remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty. The Crown appealed, and in 1997 the Court of Appeal granted an injunction restraining the applicant from receiving any payment or other benefit resulting from the exploitation of the book or of any information therein relating to security and intelligence which was in his possession by virtue of his position as a member of SIS. The applicant obtained leave to appeal in 1998. The House of Lords delivered its main judgment in 2000, holding that there was no reason in principle why the courts must in all circumstances rule out an account of profits as a remedy for a breach of contract. Moreover, the Government’s entitlement to an account of profits did not confer on the Crown any proprietary interest in the debt due to the applicant from the publisher.
Admissible under Article 6(1) (reasonable time).
Inadmissible under Article 10: The applicant claimed that it was unforeseeable that an account of profits be awarded as a remedy for breach of contract. In assessing foreseeability, the general approach of domestic courts to similar matters was taken into account, noting that there existed numerous authorities for the proposition that damages for breach of contract were compensatory. Whilst the order made by the House of Lords in the present case had nodirect precedent, this was not in itself decisive. Bearing in mind that this was an exceptional case, and that there was a clear and strong public interest in preventing the applicant from profiting from his breach of contract and thereby profiting from his crimes, it could not be excluded that the ordinary rules of breach of contract would not apply to the case. Moreover, domestic courts had always afforded great importance to the protection of the secrecy of the security services. Hence, an order for an account of profits for breach of contract against the present applicant was a reasonably foreseeable development of the common law consistent with the “foreseeability” requirement of Article 10 of the Convention.
Inadmissible under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Even if the order for an account of profits could be considered to constitute an interference with the applicant’s property rights, it did not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of this Article: manifestly ill-founded.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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