FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48728/99
by Egidio and Gabriella BLASETTI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 5 September 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 March 1999,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are two Italian nationals, living in Rome. They are represented before the Court by Mr A. Barbàra, a lawyer practising in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A.M.C. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to A.N.
In a registered letter of 12 July 1990, the owner informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. The tenant told the owner that she would not leave the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenant on 18 December 1990, the owner reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 3 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 8 July 1991, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.
On an unspecified date F.B, the applicants’ father, became the owner of the apartment by transfer of property.
On 25 January 1993, the new owner served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 12 May 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 May 1993.
On 21 May 1993, the bailiff made one attempt to recover possession which proved unsuccessful as the owner was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 1 July 1993, the owner served a second notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 23 September 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 September 1993.
Between 29 September 1993 and 15 June 1995, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as the owner was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 16 March 1995, the owner made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.
On 16 July 1997, the owner served a new notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 5 September 1997, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 23 July 1997.
Between 23 July 1997 and 21 November 1997, the bailiff made two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as the owner was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
On 20 September 1997, the owner died and his children – the applicants – inherited the apartment.
On 21 May 1998, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 5 June 1998, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 1 July 1998.
Between 1 July 1998 and 15 July 1999, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 14 September 1999, the applicants recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their inability to recover possession of their apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicants further complain under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government submit that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies, firstly because they had failed to bring proceedings in the administrative courts challenging the refusal to provide police assistance and, secondly, because they had never challenged the justification of the adjournments ordered by the bailiff by lodging an application under Article 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) which deals with objections to enforceable acts.
With regard to the first objection of non-exhaustion, the Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
With regard to the second objection of non-exhaustion, the Court notes that although the applicants could have applied to the judge responsible for enforcement proceedings challenging the adjournments by the bailiff if they had been unlawful, in the instant case the bailiff had not acted unlawfully but could not enforce the eviction order without police assistance. Accordingly, since an objection cannot be lodged against a decision not to provide police assistance, it cannot be deemed to be an effective remedy. Furthermore, the Government have not cited any decisions of the Italian courts showing otherwise. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicants’ property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy