AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 24240/94
by Béláné BOCSI
against Hungary
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:
MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President
N. BRATZA
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs J. LIDDY
MM L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 15 December 1993
by Béláné BOCSI against Hungary and registered on 31 May 1994 under
file No. 24240/94;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
8 November 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 16 December 1996;
- the supplementary observations submitted by the applicant on
10 April 1997 and the supplementary observations in reply
submitted by the respondent Government on 1 July 1997;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Hungarian citizen residing in Füzesabony,
Hungary, was born in 1930 and is a pensioner. Before the Commission she
is represented by Mr I. Horváth, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
(a) The proceedings with a view to terminating the applicant's
placement under guardianship
On 26 June 1986 the applicant was committed to the Department of
Neurology and Psychiatry, Heves County Hospital (Heves Megyei Kórház),
Eger. On 10 July 1986 Judge T.G., a single judge at the Eger District
Court (Egri Városi Bíróság), reviewed and approved her forced
psychiatric treatment which eventually terminated on 25 September 1986.
On 17 November 1986 the Heves County Regional Court (Heves Megyei
Bíróság), upon the applicant's appeal, found that the review
proceedings of 10 July 1986 concerning her detention at the Department
of Neurology and Psychiatry had been improper. The Regional Court,
however, discontinued the proceedings having regard to the fact that
the detention had meanwhile ended.
In December 1989 the Heves County Public Prosecutor's Office
(Heves Megyei Foügyészség) initiated guardianship proceedings against
the applicant. The Public Prosecutor's Office recalled that during the
preceding years the applicant had continually been intervening, in an
inappropriate and querulous way, with various authorities to seek
remedies in a civil litigation case of her son. In the opinion of the
Public Prosecutor's Office, she suffered from querulous psychosis. The
Public Prosecutor's Office proposed that forensic psychiatry expertise
be taken.
In March 1990 the Eger District Court found that the applicant
suffered from paranoia and placed her under guardianship within the
meaning of S. 13 of the Civil Code (a Polgári Törvénykönyvrol szóló
1959. évi IV. törvény).
In 1992 the applicant brought an action to terminate
guardianship. In September 1992 the Eger District Court dismissed her
action. The District Court found that the applicant was suffering from
chronic paranoid psychosis, unchanged for years, which prevented her
from appreciating the true state of her affairs generally. The District
Court was relying on psychiatry expertise by the Szolnok Institute of
Forensic Medicine (Szolnoki Igazságügyi Orvosszakértoi Intézet),
according to which the applicant had no insight of her mental disorder
and her thoughts and behaviour were governed by a system of wrong
ideas.
On 15 December 1992 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court,
presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal. Throughout all these
proceedings she was represented by the lawyer E.G. - the sister of
Judge T.G. - acting as her guardian ad litem (ügygondnok).
On 4 February 1993 the Regional Court notified the applicant and
the guardian ad litem that a further handwritten submission, lodged by
the applicant personally, would be regarded as a petition for review
by the Supreme Court and be forwarded accordingly to the first instance
court for further action. In response to yet another submission by the
applicant, dated 18 March 1993, the Regional Court confirmed that it
had arranged for the first instance court to take action in respect of
the review.
On 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court, setting a 15-day deadline,
returned the petition to the applicant for supplementation requiring,
inter alia, that a legal representative be provided for. This decision
was served upon the applicant on 9 April 1993.
On 22 April 1993 E.G. met the applicant and explained to her
that, in her view, the Regional Court's decision had been in compliance
with the relevant laws and therefore, in the light of S. 270 (1) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (a polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi
III. törvény), no petition for review was called for in the case. The
applicant did not accept E.G.'s views and wished to have a new guardian
ad litem appointed. On 26 April 1993 E.G. submitted her resignation
to the Regional Court and requested that a new guardian ad litem be
appointed for the applicant.
On 13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal
representative, rejected the petition ex officio. This decision was
served upon the applicant on 25 June 1993.
Meanwhile, on 27 May 1993 the applicant's son had unsuccessfully
complained about the conduct of the applicant's former guardian ad
litem to the Vice President of the Regional Court (Megyei Bíróság
Elnökhelyettese).
(b) The compensation proceedings
In January 1991 the applicant brought a compensation action
before the Füzesabony District Court (Füzesabonyi Városi Bíróság)
against the hospital where she had been treated for her mental illness
in 1986. She claimed that her impaired eyesight was a consequence of
the psychiatric therapies having been applied to her.
For reasons of competence, the Füzesabony District Court
subsequently forwarded the action to the Eger District Court. On
27 June 1991 the Heves County Regional Court, upon the applicant's
motion to challenge for bias the judges at the Eger District Court,
appointed the Gyöngyös District Court (Gyöngyösi Városi Bíróság) to
proceed with the case.
In February 1992 the Gyöngyös District Court held a preparatory
hearing and, in March 1992, granted the applicant legal aid. Between
May 1992 and January 1993 the District Court was awaiting the
availability of certain documents which were then kept by the Eger
District Court, and subsequently by the Regional Court, in the context
of the applicant's action to terminate placement under guardianship.
Meanwhile, on 10 December 1992 the District Court held a hearing
and exempted the applicant from all procedural costs. Subsequently the
District Court proceeded to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence in the
case. On 8 March 1993 the expert presented her opinion finding no
causal relation between the impugned therapies and the applicant's eye
disease.
On 30 March 1993 the Gyöngyös District Court, relying on the
expert's opinion, dismissed the applicant's action.
On 3 June 1993 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court,
presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal.
On 7 October 1993 the District Court forwarded the applicant's
petition for review to the Supreme Court. On 28 April 1994 the Supreme
Court refused to give the applicant's case priority.
On 7 July 1994 the Supreme Court upheld the second instance
decision. The Supreme Court's decision was served upon the applicant's
lawyer on 13 October 1994.
During the above proceedings the applicant was represented by
three court-appointed lawyers consecutively.
B. Relevant domestic law
(a) Guardianship
Section 13 of the Civil Code provides that an adult's capacity
to perform legal actions shall be restricted (korlátozott cselekvo-
képesség) if he has been placed under guardianship with such effect.
The court shall place an adult under such guardianship if his capacity
to appreciate the true state of his affairs has - on account of his
mental state, intellectual deficiency or pathologic addiction -
permanently or periodically decreased to a great extent. According to
S. 14, any legal act of a person under such guardianship is valid, with
certain exceptions, only if it is agreed or post facto approved by his
statutory representative.
(b) Code of Civil Procedure
According to S. 74, if a party with no capacity to perform legal
actions has no statutory representative, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for him.
Section 84 provides that any person who, on account of his lack
of sufficient income and property, is not in a position to cover
procedural expenses, shall be entitled, in order to facilitate his
access to justice, to be (i) exempted from paying stamp duties;
(ii) exempted from making down-payments in regard to, and - normally -
from paying, the actual costs incurred during the proceedings;
(iii) exempted from depositing security for procedural costs and
(iv) assisted by a legal aid lawyer.
Section 87 (1) provides that, if a party has been exempted from
procedural costs, the court shall, upon the party's request, appoint
for the purposes of the proceedings a local lawyer as the party's legal
aid lawyer, on condition that such an appointment is necessitated by
the circumstances of the case.
According to S. 270 (1), a party may, unless the law provides
otherwise, request the review by the Supreme Court of the final
judgment, alleging that a breach of law has taken place. Section 73/A
requires the party bringing the petition for review to be represented
by a lawyer in default whereof the petition shall first be returned for
supplementation and then - in the eventual absence of a legal
representative - be rejected ex officio.
Section 312 (2) provides that, in proceedings concerning an
action to terminate placement under guardianship, the party under
guardianship shall have full capacity to conduct legal proceedings. The
court may, nevertheless, appoint a guardian ad litem for him, if need
be.
(c) Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983 on Lawyers (az ügyvédségrol szóló 1983.
évi 4. tvr.) (as in force in the relevant period)
Section 16 (1) provides that a lawyer, (i) who represents the
opposing party in another set of proceedings; (ii) who is a relative,
the guardian or tutor of the opposing party or (iii) whose interest in
the instant case is adverse to that of his client or who is biased
towards his client, cannot represent his client as a legal aid lawyer,
as a court-appointed defence counsel or as a guardian ad litem or ad
hoc.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention about
the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her placement under
guardianship.
2. Moreover, as regards her action to terminate guardianship, the
applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the
proceedings were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly
biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in
particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in
the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her
sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986.
Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in
charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously
taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her
son.
3. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that, in the case concerning the termination of placement
under guardianship, she did not have access to a review by the Supreme
Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her as her guardian ad litem.
4. As regards the compensation proceedings, the applicant complains
under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that, for the above reasons,
Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court,
was not impartial in this case, either.
5. Furthermore, she complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 15 December 1993 and registered
on 31 May 1994.
On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48
para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
8 November 1996. On 16 December 1996 the applicant submitted
observations in reply.
Meanwhile, on 3 December 1996 the Commission decided to grant the
applicant legal aid.
On 10 April 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for
that purpose, the applicant's lawyer submitted observations in reply
to the respondent Government's observations.
On 1 July 1997 the Government submitted supplementary
observations.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention about the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her
placement under guardianship.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Commission recalls that placement under guardianship may
amount to an interference with the right to respect for one's private
life within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the
Convention (cf. No. 8509/79, Dec. 5.5.81, D.R. 24, p. 131). The
Commission considers that in the present case the court decisions
refusing to terminate the applicant's placement under guardianship may
be seen as an interference with her right to respect for her private
life.
It remains to be considered whether this interference can be
justified on any of the grounds enumerated in Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
The Commission notes that the applicant's placement under
guardianship was maintained in pursuance of S. 13 of the Hungarian
Civil Code and finds, therefore, that the interference was prescribed
by law.
The Commission further finds that the relevant provisions of
Hungarian law providing the placement under guardianship of persons
suffering from mental disorders can be regarded as pursuing the
legitimate aim of the protection of "health or morals" and "the rights
and freedoms of others".
Furthermore, the Commission considers that the maintenance of the
applicant's placement under guardianship could be regarded as being
necessary in a democratic society, since on the evidence before the
relevant courts the applicant was suffering from an illness which
prevented her from appreciating the true state of her affairs
generally.
The Commission, therefore, finds that the interference with the
applicant's private life was justified in accordance with
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. The applicant's
complaint in this respect does not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that the proceedings regarding her action to terminate the
guardianship were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly
biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in
particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in
the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her
sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986.
Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in
charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously
taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her
son.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, so far as
relevant, provides as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... ,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."
a. As regards the complaint about the lawyer E.G.'s appointment as
the applicant's guardian ad litem in the case, the Commission observes
at the outset that paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention guarantees the impartiality of the tribunal rather than that
of lawyers or guardians.
In any event, considering the duties incumbent on courts to
ensure an effective exercise of procedural rights, the Commission notes
that, according to S. 312 (2) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure,
in a case concerning an action to terminate placement under
guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity to conduct legal
proceedings. Consequently, at any time during the proceedings, she
could have appointed a lawyer to represent her. Having regard also to
S. 16 (1) of Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983, the Commission considers that
the relevant Hungarian laws enabled the applicant to dismiss her
guardian ad litem and to appoint an independent lawyer. In this respect
the Commission notes that the applicant never took any action towards
this end in the course of the proceedings.
b. As regards the complaint about lack of impartiality on the part
of Judge T.K., the Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged
involvement in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not
sufficient to give rise to legitimate doubts as to his impartiality
(cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgment of
24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 28, paras. 72-73).
In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no
indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing
by an impartial tribunal.
It follows that this part of the application must likewise be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that, in the case concerning the
termination of placement under guardianship, she did not have access
to a review by the Supreme Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her
as her guardian ad litem.
The Government submit that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court
returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation
requiring that a legal representative be provided for. Since the
applicant, despite the Supreme Court's warning, failed to provide for
legal representation or to notify the Supreme Court that she was unable
to do so, her petition for review was eventually rejected ex officio.
The Government maintain that the review proceedings before the
Supreme Court constitute an extraordinary remedy subject to special
formal requirements. However, in the light of the relevant
jurisprudence of the Court (cf. Eur. Court HR, Granger v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174, p. 17, para. 44;
Pretto and others v. Italy judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A
no. 71, p. 12), the Government consider that in the present case the
Supreme Court's procedure was in compliance with Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government observe that,
in accordance with Sections 84, 87 (1) and 312 (2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the applicant had, throughout the proceedings, the right to
appoint an independent lawyer. Legal aid was likewise available to her
and was actually granted by the Gyöngyös District Court in the second
set of proceedings. Lastly, the Government point out that the applicant
is free to bring a similar action anew any time in the future, given
the very nature of the relevant procedure.
The applicant submits that a petition for review by the Supreme
Court is an extraordinary remedy of a sophisticated nature, subject to
severe formal requirements, e.g. compulsory representation by a lawyer,
the non-observance of which leads to the rejection of the petition. She
maintains, recalling the Airey judgment (Eur. Court HR, Airey v.
Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32), that given the
resignation of the guardian ad litem, legal aid should have been
arranged for in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Legal aid
was, in any event, necessitated by the complexity and importance of
what was at stake for her in the case.
Furthermore, the applicant observes that her petition for review
was rejected by the Supreme Court, due to the absence of a lawyer
representing her, on 13 May 1993, although the letter containing the
resignation of her former guardian ad litem had been received by the
Regional Court on 26 April. The fact that her petition was forwarded
to the Supreme Court by the Regional Court without having appointed a
new guardian ad litem resulted in the rejection of her petition for
review ex officio. In her view, both the Regional Court and the Supreme
Court failed to comply with domestic law, i.e. with Sections 74 and
87 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to ensure effective access
to review proceedings. Due to the legal limitations applicable to the
representation of persons under guardianship, she was not in a position
to appoint an independent lawyer, either.
In sum, the applicant, referring to the relevant case-law
(Eur. Court HR, Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February
1975, Series A no. 18; "Belgian Linguistic" judgment of 23 July 1968,
Series A no. 6), considers that the rejection of her petition for
review due to the absence of a legal representative restricted her
right of access to court to such an extent that the very essence of the
right was impaired.
The Commission observes at the outset that Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to
set up courts of appeal or of cassation. Nevertheless, a State which
does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable
to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees
contained in Article 6 (Art. 6). Therefore, Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) is indeed applicable to proceedings in cassation. The way
in which it applies must, however, clearly depend on the special
features of such proceedings (Eur. Court HR, Delcourt v. Belgium
judgment of 17 January 1970, pp. 14-15, paras. 25-26); account must be
taken of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order
and of the role of the appellate court therein (Eur. Court HR, Fejde
v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 67, para.
26). Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not prevent
Contracting States from regulating access to appeal jurisdictions, in
order to ensure the proper administration of justice (No. 12275/86,
Dec. 2.7.91, D.R. 70, p. 47), especially as far as the obligation to
be represented by a lawyer is concerned (No. 16598/90, Dec. 11.12.90,
D.R. 66, p. 260). The requirement of a lawyer to lodge an appeal before
a higher court is a common feature of the legal systems in several
member States of the Council of Europe (Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment,
op. cit., p. 27, para. 69).
The Commission further recalls that it is essential that the
person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to
be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of
representation. Special procedural safeguards may be called for in
order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their
mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves
(cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Megyeri v. Germany judgment of
12 May 1992, Series A no. 237, p. 11, para. 22). However, a refusal to
appoint a guardian to a person not able to litigate in connection with
a case which has no prospect of success does not interfere with the
right, in civil cases, of access to court (No. 10877/84, Dec. 16.5.85,
D.R. 43, p. 184).
The Commission notes that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court
returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation
requiring that a legal representative be provided for. On 22 April 1993
the then guardian ad litem, while refusing to represent the applicant
before the Supreme Court, explained to her that the Regional Court's
decision had been in compliance with the relevant laws and, therefore,
a petition for review would offer no prospect of success. On
13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal
representative, rejected the petition ex officio.
The Commission observes that, according to S. 312 (2) of the
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, in a case concerning an action to
terminate placement under guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity
to conduct legal proceedings and, consequently, to appoint an
independent lawyer to represent her before the Supreme Court. A legal
aid system is provided for by Sections 84 and 87 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, aimed at facilitating low-income litigants' access to
justice.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the fact
that the Supreme Court, subsequent to the ad litem guardian's
resignation, did not provide the applicant ex officio with a new
guardian ad litem did not amount to a denial of access to review
proceedings. The applicant, whose action had been based on the very
claim that her mental state no longer required her to be placed under
guardianship, could reasonably be expected to arrange for her
representation before the Supreme Court. Her submissions do not,
therefore, disclose any appearance of a breach of her right of access
to court, as enshrined in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must likewise be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the
Regional Court, was not impartial in the compensation proceedings. She
submits that Judge T.K. had previously taken unfavourable decisions in
respect of other actions brought by her son.
The Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged involvement
in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not sufficient
to give rise to legitimate doubt as to his impartiality in this set of
proceedings, either (cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment, op. cit.,
p. 28, paras. 72-73).
In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no
indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing
by an impartial tribunal.
It follows that this part of the application must likewise be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
5. Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.
The Government submit that the overall length of the proceedings
cannot be regarded as unreasonably long. There were no substantial
periods of inactivity on the part of the courts involved. In
particular, between May 1992 and January 1993 the Gyöngyös District
Court was awaiting the arrival of documents which were kept by the Eger
District Court and the Regional Court for the purposes of the other set
of proceedings pursued by the applicant. However, the Gyöngyös District
Court was not inactive even during this period, namely, it proceeded
to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence.
The applicant submits that the reason forwarded by the Government
to explain the delay of a duration of almost a year, i.e. the non-
availability of certain documents kept by other courts, cannot justify
the protraction of the proceedings.
The Commission observes that the applicant's complaint relates
to proceedings which started in 1991, i.e. prior to 5 November 1992
which is the date of the entry into force of the Convention with
respect to Hungary. However, the Commission recalls that the Convention
only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry
into force with respect to that Party (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78,
D.R. 14, p. 146). The proceedings in question had lasted approximately
one year and nine months prior to 5 November 1992. This period would,
if considered alone, fall outside the scope of the Commission's
considerations ratione temporis. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after this date, account must
be taken of the then state of proceedings (cf. Eur. Court HR, Foti and
others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18,
para. 53).
The Commission notes that the Supreme Court upheld the second
instance decision on 7 July 1994 and this decision was served upon the
applicant's lawyer on 13 October 1994. The proceedings in question thus
lasted somewhat less than two years subsequent to 5 November 1992.
The Commission recalls that in civil cases the reasonableness of
the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
particular circumstances of the case, namely, its complexity, the
conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities
and what is at stake for the applicant. In this instance the
circumstances call for an overall assessment (cf. Eur. Court HR, Ficara
v. Italy judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-A, p. 9,
para. 17).
The Commission notes that the proceedings complained of related
to a compensation action. The case did not involve any issues of
particular complexity. Furthermore, no particular delays can be
attributed to the parties. As to the conduct of the judicial
authorities, the Commission observes that, subsequent to
5 November 1992, there occurred no particular delays in the first and
second instance proceedings. Nevertheless, there was, in the review
proceedings, some delay between October 1993 and October 1994.
However, the Commission, having regard to the fact that the
applicant's case was dealt with by three court instances, considers
that the overall length of the proceedings, i.e. some two years after
ratification, does not appear substantial enough to have exceeded an
acceptable limit in the circumstances of the present case (cf., mutatis
mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Cesarini v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992,
Series A no. 245, p. 26, para. 20). In reaching this finding, the
Commission has taken into account that the proceedings had lasted less
than two years before the Convention's entry into force in regard to
Hungary. The applicant's complaint about the length of proceedings does
not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy