SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 42373/98
by Éva BÓDINE BENCZE
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting on 12 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrGaukur Jörundsson,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 June 1998,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Éva Bódiné Bencze, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1931 and lives in Vác, Hungary.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
In February 1993 the applicant’s mother died. According to her last will, the inheritance of her children including the applicant – the statutory heirs – was reduced to their minimum legal share, and the grandchildren were appointed as the main heirs.
On 3 February 1994 the applicant and her siblings, four plaintiffs altogether, brought an action challenging the validity of the will. They claimed that their mother, given the deterioration of her health, had not been in possession of her full faculties.
On 11 April 1994 the Gödöllő District Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias.
On 13 June 1994 the District Court held a hearing and, on 29 June 1994, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ action, noting that the will in question had been drafted by a lawyer, who had previously consulted the late mother’s doctor.
Upon the plaintiffs’ appeal, on 25 October 1994 the Pest County Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision and remitted the case to the first instance court. The Regional Court held that there had been a breach of substantial procedural rules in the course of the first-instance proceedings.
On 29 September 1995 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s repeated motion for bias.
In the resumed proceedings, on 23 November 1995, 13 February and 17 September 1996 the District Court held hearings. On the latter occasion the proceedings were temporarily interrupted on account of the death of one of the plaintiffs.
On 8 October and 11 November 1996 the District Court issued orders for the plaintiffs to complete the file.
The next hearing took place on 27 April 1998.
On 13 May 1998 a further hearing was held and the District Court decided to appoint a valuation expert. On 7 January 1999 the expert carried out an inspection of the disputed objects belonging to the estate. On 18 January 1999 he presented his opinion to the District Court.
On 28 April, 16 June and 15 September the District Court held further hearings. On 28 September 1999 the applicant filed a memorandum in which she modified her claims.
On 21 October 1999 another hearing took place.
On 28 October 1999 the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action. In its reasoning, the District Court established, inter alia, the actual scheme of inheritance in the case, a comprehensive inventory of the estate and the various claims pursued in the inheritance proceedings. The District Court held that the late mother’s state of health had not been such as to influence her faculties when making her will.
On 5 November 1999 the plaintiffs appealed. On 20 March 2000 the applicant extended her claims.
On 28 March 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing, quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first instance court for the second time. The Regional Court held that there had been a breach of substantial procedural rules in the course of the first instance proceedings in that the District Court had failed to examine all the claims brought by the plaintiffs.
In the resumed proceedings, on 23 May 2000 the District Court interrupted the proceedings on account of the death of another plaintiff.
After the continuation of the proceedings was ordered, on 31 October 2000 a hearing was held and a real estate expert was appointed, who presented his opinion on 20 March 2001.
On 30 March 2001 the Pest County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias.
A further hearing took place on 28 June 2001.
On 18 September 2001 the District Court gave a judgment in the case accepting part of the applicant’s claims.
On 3 November 2001 the applicant appealed.
The proceedings are still pending before the Pest County Regional Court.
B. Relevant domestic law
Article 339 (1) of the Civil Code provides that any person who unlawfully causes damage to another shall be liable to pay compensation.
According to Article 349, the official liability of the State administration may be established only if the relevant ordinary remedies have been exhausted or have not been found adequate to redress the damage. Unless otherwise specified, this provision also covers the liability for damage caused by the courts or the prosecution authorities.
THE LAW
1. The applicant’s complaint relates to the length of the proceedings and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in its relevant parts, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to her under Hungarian law in that she did not bring an official liability action under Article 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, seeking compensation for the protracted proceedings. The applicant contests this.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant parts, provides as follows:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law ...”
The Court reiterates that, in respect of the length of civil proceedings still pending, a remedy can only be considered effective if it can be brought rapidly during those proceedings and if it provides direct and speedy protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1. A further set of civil court proceedings, like an official liability action under Article 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, cannot be regarded as such redress or, therefore, an effective remedy (see Erdős v. Hungary (dec.), no. 38937/97, 3 May 2001, unpublished; Úri v. Hungary, application no. 31973/96, Commission decision (final) of 10 September 1998, unpublished; Mr T.K. and Mrs T.K. v. Hungary, application no. 26209/95, Commission decision of 21 May 1997, unpublished).
The Court further notes that the Government have not referred to the availability of any other domestic procedure which would have allowed the applicants to obtain other forms of redress, such as an acceleration of the proceedings (cf. Holzinger v. Austria (No. 1) (preliminary objections), no. 23459/94, §§ 22 to 25, 30 January 2001).
In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant’s complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2. The Court notes that it has not been disputed that the proceedings began on 3 February 1994 and are still pending. They have therefore already lasted over eight years before two court instances and after two remittals of the case to the first instance court.
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government reject the allegation.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy