Legal summary
March 2026
Boyarov and Others v. Ukraine (dec.) - 79083/17, 80554/17, 52246/18 et al.
Decision 3.3.2026 [Section V]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Alleged impossibility to access certain Russian websites following the Ukrainian authorities’ decision to sanction the legal entities managing those websites: inadmissible
Facts – Following the adoption of the Law on Sanctions in 2014, in response to aggressive actions by the Russian Federation, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine adopted a decision in 2017 imposing sanctions on more than 400 individuals and legal entities in Russia, including three Russian companies providing mainly a web browser and search engine, two social media platforms and an email service. A Presidential Decree implemented this decision. The Ukrainian internet providers had thus to restrict all access to the respective Russian websites from Ukraine. The restrictive measures were extended twice and were in force at the time of the adoption of the present decision, all access to Russian websites from the territory of Ukraine being restricted.
The first applicant, allegedly a user of the websites in question, unsuccessfully challenged the Decree before the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine (“HACU”) which found that the Decree had not affected the applicant himself. The Supreme Court returned his appeal as it had rejected his request for an exemption from the court fee and the applicant had not paid it.
The second applicant, who comes from a family with Russian origins and relatives living in Russia, had no account on the social media platforms concerned, but claimed he had used them to obtain information about his relatives and friends and to communicate with them. He also used the email service in question to communicate with his bank. He did not challenge the Decree at domestic level.
The third applicant did not explain whether or how he had been using any of the restricted Russian websites.
The fourth applicant, a lawyer, had personal accounts on the restricted social media platforms and an email account on the restricted website and allegedly used them for his both personal and professional activities, including for the dissemination of legal news and analytical material.
Both the third and fourth applicants unsuccessfully challenged the Decree before the HACU and then the Supreme Court as internet users.
Law – Article 10 (all the applicants):
(1) The second and third applicants – The Court had previously examined cases in which the applicants had claimed that their freedom of expression had been violated by the inability to access certain internet services. However, none of those cases concerned social media, which was a very special modern day phenomenon. Social media were omnipresent and had become not only a means of private communication but also a medium for obtaining and sharing information and other content, including in order to exploit it commercially. The variety of social media with different purposes and functionalities allowed people to find the ones that suited them best. It was also true that once a social media page had been accessed, a person would find him or herself exposed to all sorts of information and content in different formats and could even suddenly find him or herself prompted to react to content in various ways.
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of social media and their deep roots in modern life did not mean that losing access to some of them would automatically make one able to claim to be a victim of a violation of freedom of expression. That approach would be contrary to the concept of the right of individual petition, which contrasted with the idea of an actio popularis and would open floodgates to millions of potential applicants.
The second applicant had not explained how it had been technically possible for him to communicate through the restricted social media without having his own account. While it was impossible to verify how those social media had worked at the material time, it appeared that persons who were not registered could not see a user’s page or undertake any action, so they could not see photos or posts and comment on them or write messages.
Even assuming that the second applicant had been a user of the social media in question, it appeared that he had not been using them for any self-expression – he was not a journalist or civil society activist or otherwise involved in discussions or actions on matters of general interest. Neither had he argued that he had been using that media to obtain or share any information on such matters, including in his communications with his relatives, or to maintain cultural ties with Russia as his country of origin.
Since the second applicant had only been using the social media in question to communicate on purely private topics, his complaints did not fall within the notion of “freedom of expression” within the meaning of Article 10. That conclusion also applied to the use of his restricted Russian email account as his complaint in that respect had been clearly limited to his inability to use it to communicate with his bank.
The same conclusion was a fortiori applicable to the third applicant who had not provided any detailed information as regards his use of the restricted websites apart from his statement in the domestic proceedings that he had been a “user” of them.
Conclusion: inadmissible (incompatible ratione personae).
(2) The fourth applicant – The entire internet service (website) – either of the social media or the email in question – had been restricted and could not be accessed without using special technical solutions. That restriction had not constituted a wholesale ban on internet access, but it had had the effect of blocking access to personal accounts and pages when accessed from Ukraine.
Since 2014 Ukraine had been facing unprecedented challenges in the Council of Europe’s history. War constituted, in itself, an acute and manifest threat to national security and public order. It required the swift adoption of a broad range of measures at multiple levels, across diverse sectors of governance, and at various stages of a conflict, taking into account the distinctive features of modern warfare. Starting in 2014, the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine had continued with military action of varying intensity, culminating in 2022 with a full-scale invasion. Not only had it been almost impossible to prepare in the face of certain unprecedented actions and events, but the exigencies of the situation had been such as to necessitate far-reaching and, at times, harsh measures to ensure the survival of the nation. In particular, the conflict was characterised by the widespread use of digital and information warfare as well as “soft-power” means. Russia’s use of those means had been studied and recognised at various levels, both domestically and internationally, and there had been calls for Russian disinformation and propaganda warfare to be acknowledged and exposed. Various measures had been taken across Europe in particular to counter disinformation and propaganda, including, as a starting point, the debunking of disinformation and propaganda, the imposition of entry bans and sanctions and changes in media legislation.
The Court was, as a matter of principle, ready to consider that the specific context of the conflict might make exceptional policy choices necessary. The internet services in question, highly popular in Ukraine, had been essentially controlled by the Russian Government and security services and had therefore constituted a threat to both the users’ privacy and the State’s security. “Anti-Ukrainian” communities had been documented as using those social media, there had been calls for the overthrow of power in the country or information on the location and composition of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had been disseminated using those internet services. Attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to have harmful content removed had apparently proved futile. At the same time, the restriction on accessing particular websites had not been aimed directly at internet users, but they had lost, within a very short period of time, unhindered access to, inter alia, their social media pages.
The fourth applicant had accessed the restricted websites in 2019 and 2020 and had not argued that that had entailed any additional costs or efforts or that it had been too burdensome. It did not appear that Ukraine had introduced any penalties for the use of VPN or other technologies or for accessing restricted websites.
While claiming that he had been using the restricted social media to promote himself as a lawyer and human rights defender, the fourth applicant had not provided any information as to the number of his followers or why advertising through social media would be more effective or better adapted to his situation than other methods, as to how his business might had been affected by the restriction or whether he had indeed lost his business connections or material published online, which must also have existed in other electronic formats. Furthermore, he had apparently continued to access the restricted websites for a long time after the implementation of sanctions although, knowing that they would have remained in force for at least three years, he could instead have taken action to secure a smooth transition to other platforms.
The social media and email service in question seemed to be comparable in many ways to other existing services. The fourth applicant had not made any detailed arguments showing how the features of the services in question had been unique or so substantially different from similar services making his personal use thereof indispensable for the exercise of his freedom of expression. He also had his own professional website, a Facebook page created in 2016, and TikTok and Telegram channels.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(3) The first applicant – The Court found that the first applicant could not be reproached for challenging the Decree. The wording of the relevant provisions of domestic law setting out specific procedure for challenging public authorities’ regulations and the procedures for actions against President’s decrees and their judicial interpretation in his case had left room for doubt. If those provisions had been read in conjunction with the general provisions guaranteeing the right of judicial protection, it would not necessarily have been clear to him that his action would be futile. Nor did domestic case law at the material time suggest that. However, he had failed to pursue his case in the Supreme Court as the court of last resort.
The first applicant had essentially alleged that he had had no income whatsoever and could not thus have paid the court fee. Overall, however he had failed to explain how he had been able to support himself (or pay the internet) if he had not been working or otherwise obtaining an income or financial support of any kind. Further, the HACU had deferred the payment of the court fee to ensure the first applicant’s access to court. Although there was no information whether the applicant had paid it, the amount in question (EUR 16) could not be said to have been excessive if compared with, for example, the average monthly salary (EUR 200). The applicant had not given any information as to the amount of the court fee he had been supposed to pay for his appeal before the Supreme Court which had declined to remit or defer its payment. As the applicant had not paid the fee, his appeal had not been heard.
It could not thus be found that the first applicant had been unfairly prevented from pursuing his case in the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: inadmissible (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies).
The Court also declared inadmissible the second and fourth applicants’ complaints under Article 8 as incompatible ratione personae and manifestly ill-founded respectively.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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