FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 62019/17
Ștefan BIRĂU
against the Republic of Moldova
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 3 April 2025 as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Gilberto Felici,
Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 62019/17) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 August 2017 by a Moldovan national, Mr Ștefan Birău (“the applicant”), who was born in 1977, lives in Chișinău and was represented by Mr V. Postolache, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their then Agent, Mr D. Obadă, Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the European Court of Human Rights;
the parties’ observations;
Considering that Ms Diana Sârcu, judge elected in respect of the Republic of Moldova, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court);
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. This case concerns the quashing of a judgment favourable to the applicant as the domestic courts examined (and subsequently upheld) an allegedly time‑barred appeal.
2. On 6 June 2016 the Chișinău District Court handed down a judgment favourable to the applicant, rejecting M.L.’s civil claims against him.
3. On 22 June 2016, being represented by a lawyer, M.L. lodged a preliminary appeal against the judgment of 6 June 2016.
4. On 14 September 2016 the Chișinău Court of Appeal decided not to examine M.L.’s appeal before she paid the court fees and submitted the reasons for her appeal, setting a ten-day time-limit running from the service of the court ruling.
5. On 18 October 2016 a copy of the court ruling was served at M.L.’s home address and at M.L.’s lawyer’s office.
6. On 28 October 2016 M.L. paid the court fees and on 1 November 2016 the Chișinău Court of Appeal received her submissions giving reasons for her appeal.
7. On 13 December 2016 the Chișinău Court of Appeal returned M.L.’s appeal without examining it, finding that the reasons for appeal had been submitted three days past the ten-day time-limit, which had ended on 28 October 2016.
8. M.L. appealed against that decision, arguing that she had been out of the country from 15 to 22 October 2016 and that she had learned about the court ruling on 23 October 2016 upon her return. She contended that her lawyer had not received the court ruling either, as her office was under reconstruction, and it was not her signature on the proof of receipt.
9. On 15 February 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the court ruling of 13 December 2016, finding that the court fees had been paid on 28 October 2016, while the reasons for the appeal had been submitted before the date of the hearing, which had not jeopardised or delayed the examination of the case. The Supreme Court of Justice remitted the case to the appellate court for an examination on the merits.
10. On 14 August 2018, examining the appeal on the merits, the Chișinău Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 6 June 2016 and granted M.L.’s claims against the applicant. This decision was finally upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice on 30 January 2019.
11. The applicant complained that the proceedings had been unfair and in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because the domestic courts had examined (and subsequently upheld) a time‑barred appeal.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
12. The applicant submitted that the reasons for M.L.’s appeal had been submitted three days past the ten-day time-limit set by the Chișinău Court of Appeal, but the domestic courts had nevertheless examined and subsequently upheld the appeal, contrary to the principle of legal certainty enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
13. The Government disputed the applicant’s allegations and argued that the application should be declared inadmissible. They considered that the reasons for the appeal had been lodged in time, as they had been submitted before the first hearing. They submitted that such a practice had not jeopardised or delayed the proceedings and was in line with the case-law applicable at that time. The Government submitted four decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice handed down in 2016 and 2017 taking a similar approach to that in the present case. They also submitted that returning the appeal without examination would have amounted to “excessive formalism” and would have limited M.L.’s access to a court.
14. The applicant submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice was contrary to the normal reading of the domestic law, according to which reasons for appeals submitted after the time-limit set by the court were declared time-barred and the appeal was returned without examination. He referred to conflicting solutions at the level of the Supreme Court of Justice in respect of allowing reasons for appeals submitted past the due date and submitted nine decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice handed down between 2017 and 2022, in which, other than in the cases submitted by the Government, the appeal was returned without examination.
15. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing must be interpreted in the light of the rule of law. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally determined an issue their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). The rules on time-limits for appeals are undoubtedly designed to ensure the proper administration of justice and compliance with, in particular, the principle of legal certainty. Those concerned must expect those rules to be applied (see, inter alia, Magomedov and Others v. Russia, nos. 33636/09 and 9 others, § 87, 28 March 2017, with further references).
16. Furthermore, in Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 13279/05, §§ 49-58, 20 October 2011), the Court recapitulated the conditions in which conflicting court decisions of domestic supreme courts were in breach of the fair trial requirement enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The criteria that guide its assessment consist in establishing whether “profound and long-standing differences” exist in the case-law of a Supreme Court, whether the domestic law provides for machinery for overcoming these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been applied and, if appropriate, to what effect.
17. The Court notes that until 2017 the case-law of the Supreme Court of Justice was consistent in its approach to accepting reasons for appeals as being lodged in time if they were submitted before the date of the first scheduled hearing. On 14 April 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice issued advisory legal opinion no. 99 shifting to a stricter approach in the observance of the procedural time-limits for submitting reasons for appeals. The new approach is consistently reflected in that court’s decisions of 2018, 2021 and 2022 submitted by the applicant.
18. The Court recalls that case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice since a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see Atanasovski v. “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 36815/03, § 38, 14 January 2010, and Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin, cited above, § 58). The Court notes that the present case indeed reveals a change in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Justice in 2017 in respect of the admissibility of appeals, the detailed reasons of which were lodged outside the preparatory time-limit granted by the courts themselves. However, the Court was not presented with any evidence that the practice was inconsistent before or after it had evolved from a less strict to a more strict approach. The applicant did not submit any case-law concerning the relevant period to substantiate his allegations. Accordingly, when on 15 February 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice handed down its decision in his case, there were no “profound and long-standing differences” in the relevant case-law on this procedural issue.
19. The Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. Its role is limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin, cited above, § 49). This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of procedural rules such as time-limits for filing documents or lodging appeals (see, mutatis mutandis, Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII).
20. In the present case the Court notes that the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 15 February 2017 to quash the appellate ruling dismissing the appeal and to order the examination of the appeal on the merits was in line with the domestic case-law applicable at the relevant time (see paragraphs 17–18 above). The applicant has failed to adduce any evidence or arguments to the contrary.
21. It follows that the complaint of the breach of the principle of legal certainty enshrined in the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as a result of allowing the examination of a time-barred appeal is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 May 2025.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President