Legal summary
January 2024
Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.) - 71200/17
Decision 5.12.2023 [Section II]
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions
Article 14
Discrimination
Complaints as to the non-granting of State annuity allowance and continued free use of State housing to a former President’s widow after Constitutional rulings annulling relevant legal provisions and legislative intervention: partially struck out; partially inadmissible
Facts – In 2002 the applicant married a former President of the Republic of Lithuania. On 28 July 2010, following her husband’s death in June of that year, the applicant lodged a request to be granted State annuity on the basis of Article 4 § 1 of the Law on the State annuity of the President of the Republic of Lithuania (“the State annuity Law”) which provided the widow(er) of a President such a right. She did not receive a response. Subsequently, by a ruling of 3 July 2014 the Constitutional Court held that provision to be unconstitutional and the applicant was informed that as from that date there was no legal basis to grant her State annuity. No payments were made during the interim period. In June 2016 the Seimas annulled the provisions regarding the President widow(er)’s annuity. It incorporated the matter into the new version of the Law on State pensions limiting the right to State annuity to individuals who had performed the role of the President’s spouse for no less than three years during the President’s term of office. The applicant’s claim for damages for the unpaid State annuity up to the above ruling was rejected on procedural grounds.
In November 2020 the applicant was granted the State annuity of the widow of a signatory of the Lithuanian Act of Independence upon her request. The sum was calculated from 23 July 2010.
In the meantime, the applicant also sought that the Government provide her with housing under Article 23 § 4 of the Law on the President of the Republic of Lithuania which also provided the widow(er) of a former President such a right. On 15 December 2017 the Constitutional Court declared that provision to be unconstitutional. In the meantime, in 2010 the applicant entered into a loan-for-use agreement for a five-year period for a State-owned house, in which she had lived with her husband, which despite her requests was not renewed on its expiry. The applicant’s subsequent appeals against this decision were unsuccessful. Alternative residential housing under a loan-for-use agreement was proposed to the applicant upon expiry of the 2010 agreement which she declined.
Law – Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14:
(a) As to the State annuity – The applicant had lost her entitlement to the benefit of State annuity due to the amendment of the legal regulation as a result of the Constitutional Court’s finding of 3 July 2014 rather than any change in her personal situation. Therefore, the facts corresponded to the second of the situations set out in Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC] and might thus result in an interference with the rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Careful consideration of the individual circumstances of the case – in particular, the nature of the change in the requirement – might be warranted in order to verify the existence of a sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law.
The applicant underscored that, in 2016, the Seimas had tailored another piece of legislation in order to exclude her specifically from the potential recipients of the President’s survivor’s annuity by limiting the right to that annuity. Therefore, her complaint could be divided into two parts.
(i) As to the period between 28 July 2010 and 2 July 2014 – The Regional Administrative Court had found that from 28 July 2010, when the applicant had lodged her request for the State annuity and had not received any response from the State authorities, she should have been aware of the breach of her rights. The Supreme Administrative Court had spoken of the fact that her request had been set in motion, yet the decision had not been implemented, “even though the applicant had such expectation”. That assessment of the applicant’s pecuniary interest corresponded to that of the Court. The applicant’s request had also received support from two State authorities – the Ministry of Social Care and Labour and the Ministry of Justice – and a draft resolution of the Government had been prepared. Accordingly, with regard to the State annuity payments that had been withheld from the applicant between 28 July 2010 and 2 July 2014, during which time she had been statutorily qualified to receive the State annuity on account of her status as the President’s widow, the applicant could have entertained at least a “legitimate expectation” that those payments would be granted and paid to her on the basis of Article 4 § 1 of the Law on the State annuity, as it stood at the time when she had lodged her request. The Court thus rejected the Government’s plea of incompatibility ratione materiae.
It further rejected the Government’s non-exhaustion plea. Given the applicant’s grievance regarding legal nihilism and in the light of the principle of the rule of law, the Court, with all due deference to the domestic court’s competence to establish the questions of fact and the domestic law, did not find it persuasive that in the light of the political turmoil which had clearly surrounded the applicant’s request for the State annuity, and given the domestic courts’ own apparently disparate interpretation as to when the statute of limitations had begun, it had been foreseeable that she should have lodged a claim for damages by a particular date and that that date should have been clear to her. The question of the application of the statute of limitations in respect of the applicant’s claim had not been devoid of uncertainty. Therefore, the Court could not share the Government’s contention that it had been as a result of the applicant’s oversight that her right to the State annuity had not been implemented, or the damage caused by the Government’s failure to act had not been compensated.
(ii) As to the period between 3 July 2014 to this day – Having regard also to the wide margin of appreciation given to the States in the field of social policy, the Court did not find the Constitutional Court’s findings in its ruling of 3 July 2014 to be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The applicant complained, despite acknowledging that as of the date of that ruling she had lost the right to State annuity, that the request to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of Article 4 § 1 had been lodged specifically with her in mind. While the Court gave a certain weight to that grievance, it also noted that to that date there had not been a comparable situation and that the applicant’s case had been prompted by her being the first individual in such circumstances.
(iii) Final considerations – In 2020 the applicant had requested and been granted another kind of social benefit – the annuity of the widow of a signatory. Under Lithuanian law the signatory’s annuity was paid as a social benefit and an individual who had a right to both the annuity of the widow(er) of the President of the Republic and another type of State pension had to choose between those social benefits. Thus, even though the applicant’s claim for damages had been rejected by the courts on procedural grounds, she had been granted the annuity as the widow of a former President who had been a signatory of the Act of Independence. She had been paid the sum of EUR 35,150 and part of that payment – EUR 10,485 – had related to the period between 28 July 2010 and 2 July 2014, which had been precisely the period during which the President’s widow(er)’s annuity had not been paid to her. Accordingly, the matter regarding the applicant’s complaint of not having been granted and paid the President’s widow(er)’s annuity had been effectively resolved.
Conclusion: struck out (matter resolved).
(b) As to housing –
(i) As to the period prior to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 15 December 2017 – The domestic courts had established that, in the circumstances and considering the loan-for-use agreement, the applicant “had had no basis to expect” that, after the expiry of the time-limit for that agreement, she would continue to have a right to use the house in question. Further, no issue arose with regard to the fact that, unlike a former President, who had been granted residence for life, the applicant had not been entitled to the same social guarantee. The difference in treatment had had its basis in their different social statuses and therefore no issue regarding the applicant’s alleged discrimination arose. In addition, the State authorities had demonstrated a willingness to provide social assistance to the applicant through proposing alternative residential housing in 2015, which the latter had declined. The Court was thus unable to find that, in accordance with the domestic law in force at the material time, the applicant had had a legitimate expectation that she would be permitted to use the house in question beyond the initial five-year time-limit.
Conclusion: inadmissible (ratione materiae).
(ii) As to the period after the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 15 December 2017 – Finding nothing arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable in the Constitutional Court’s and the civil courts’ reasoning, the Court could not hold that the applicant was in a relevantly similar situation to that of the President of the Republic, given the significant legal and factual differences between them. She therefore could not claim to have been discriminated against vis-à-vis such persons. Even assuming that the applicant had had a legitimate expectation to obtain free accommodation, her complaint that she had not been granted State housing subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 2017 had not amounted to discrimination within the meaning of Article 14.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(See also Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 53080/13, 13 December 2016, Legal summary)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
To access legal summaries in English or French click here.
For non-official translations into other languages click here.