FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 59636/00
by Paolo CALVO and Others
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18 April 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsE. Steiner, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 July 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Italian nationals, born respectively in 1949, 1941, 1943, 1946 and 1956 and living in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Rome, which they had let to M.P., S.P. and L.P.
In a registered letter of 19 June 1991, the applicants informed the tenants that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenants on 5 July 1991, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 18 December 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 November 1992.
On 19 December 1992, the applicants served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises.
On 20 January 1993, they served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 March 1993.
Between 5 March 1993 and 2 February 2000, the bailiff made twenty-seven attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
In the meantime, on 6 October 1998, one of the applicants, P.C., had made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son.
On 3 February 2000, the tenants left spontaneously the premises and the applicants recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their inability to recover possession of their apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicants further complain under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies on the ground that they failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicants’ property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues, which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy