Carême v. France (dec.) [GC]

Legal summary

April 2024

Carême v. France (dec.) [GC] - 7189/21

Decision 9.4.2024 [GC]

Article 35

Article 35-3-a

Ratione personae

Complaint by the former mayor of the municipality of Grande-Synthe of insufficient action by France to prevent climate change:inadmissible (incompatible ratione personae)

Facts – In November 2018 the applicant, acting on his own behalf and in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Grande‑Synthe, asked the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Ecological Transition and Solidarity to take all necessary measures to curb greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions produced on French territory in order to comply with the State’s undertakings in that respect; to take all necessary legislative and regulatory initiatives to “make it obligatory to give priority to climate matters” to prohibit all measures likely to increase GHG emissions; and to implement immediate climate‑change adaptation measures in France. In the absence of a response from the authorities, in January 2019 the applicant, in the same capacity, applied to the Conseil d’État for judicial review of the implicit rejection decisions constituted by the authorities’ failure to reply to the requests.

In November 2020 the Conseil d’État ruled that the applicant did not have an interest in bringing proceedings based on the mere fact that his current residence was located in an area likely to be subject to flooding by 2040. This finding was premised on the conclusions of the public rapporteur according to which there was no indication as to where the applicant’s residence would be in the years to come, let alone in twenty years or more, so that his personal interest appeared to be affected in too uncertain a manner. It ruled, however that the municipality had such an interest in view of its level of exposure to the risks arising from the phenomenon of climate change and the direct and certain impact on its situation and the interests for which it was responsible.

In July 2021 the Conseil d'État set aside the authorities’ implicit rejection of the municipality’s request stating that the reduction in GHG emissions had been small in 2019 and insufficient in 2020. It also found that compliance with the pathway set to achieve emission reduction targets of reducing GMG emissions by 40% compared to 1990 levels by 2030 and by 37% compared to 2005 levels did not appear feasible unless new measures were rapidly adopted. It ordered the authorities to take additional measures by the end of March 2022 to achieve the GHG emission reduction targets set out in Article L. 100-4 of the Energy Code and Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/842. The Conseil d’Etat ordered further measures in 2023 following an action by the municipality for non-execution of the 2021 judgment.

In the meantime, in May 2019, the applicant was elected to the European Parliament and moved from Grande-Synthe to Brussels.

Relying on Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention the applicant alleged that France had failed to take sufficient steps to prevent climate change and that this failure entailed a violation of his right to life and the right to respect for his private and family life and his home, relating, in particular, to the risk of climate‑change‑induced flooding to which the municipality of Grande‑Synthe would be exposed in the period 2030‑40.

On 31 May 2022 a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber.

Law – The Court referred to the general principles on the victim status of physical persons under Article 34 in the context of complaints under Articles 2 and 8 concerning climate change set out in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]. Having regard to the key factors for victim status set out in that judgment as well as the domestic proceedings at hand, the Court found no reason to question the hypothetical nature of the risk relating to climate change affecting the applicant, as stated by the Conseil d’État. Moreover, the applicant, did not currently live in France and had no relevant links with Grande-Synthe: after becoming a member of the European Parliament, he had moved to Brussels; he did not own, and no longer rented, any property in Grande‑Synthe and his only concrete link with the municipality was the fact that his brother lived there. In the absence of additional elements of dependency, the family-life aspect of Article 8 could not be relied on.

Accordingly, he could not claim to have victim status under Article 34 as regards the alleged risks linked to climate change threatening that municipality for the purposes of any potentially relevant aspect of Article 8 (private life, family life or home). That was true irrespective of the status he had invoked, namely that of a citizen or former resident of that municipality. The same considerations applied as regards his complaint under Article 2.

Holding otherwise, and given the fact that almost anyone could have a legitimate reason to feel some form of anxiety linked to the risks of the adverse effects of climate change in the future, would make it difficult to delineate the actio popularis protection – not permitted in the Convention system – from situations where there was a pressing need to ensure an applicant’s individual protection from the harm which the effects of climate change might have on the enjoyment of their human rights.

Furthermore, the applicant had no right to apply to the Court or to lodge a complaint with it on behalf of the municipality of Grande‑Synthe. Leaving aside the fact that he was no longer the mayor, according to the Court’s well‑established case‑law decentralised authorities that exercised public functions, regardless of their autonomy vis‑à‑vis the central organs – which applied to regional and local authorities, including municipalities – were considered to be “governmental organisations” that had no standing to make an application to the Court under Article 34.

Notwithstanding its above findings, the Court took note of the fact that the interests of the residents of Grande‑Synthe had, in any event, been defended by their municipality before the Conseil d’État in accordance with national law.

In conclusion, the applicant’s complaint was inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3.

Conclusion: inadmissible (incompatible ratione personae) (unanimously).

(See also Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 53600/20, 9 April 2024, Legal Summary; Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement)

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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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