CASE OF AKIMENKOV v. RUSSIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF AKIMENKOV v. RUSSIA

(Applications nos. 2613/13 and 50041/14)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

6 February 2018

FINAL

06/05/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Akimenkov v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Helena Jäderblom, President,
Luis López Guerra,
Dmitry Dedov,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 2613/13 and 50041/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Georgiyevich Akimenkov (“the applicant”), on 9 January 2013 and 15 June 2014 respectively.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr D.V. Agranovskiy, a lawyer practising in Elektrostal. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3. The applicant complained about his prosecution for participation in mass disorder. He submitted that his arrest and pre-trial detention had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and complained that various aspects of his detention had amounted to degrading treatment.

4. On 10 September 2013 and 13 October 2014 the applications were communicated to the Government. The applications were granted priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on 13 June 2013 and 13 October 2014 respectively.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow.

A. The demonstration of 6 May 2012

6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below.

7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square.

8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day.

9. The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act.

B. The applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention

10. The applicant is a political activist and a member of an opposition movement called Levyy Front. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to participate in the demonstration and, according to him, did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his customary activities, including taking part in authorised public events.

11. On 10 June 2012 the applicant was detained on suspicion of participation in acts of mass disorder and committing violent acts against the police on 6 May 2012. On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow held a hearing on the investigating authorities’ request to detain the applicant pending the completion of the criminal investigation. In view of the need to provide additional evidence in support of the request, the court adjourned the hearing and authorised the applicant’s detention for seventy‑two hours.

12. On 14 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 10 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that the applicant’s state of health did not preclude his being detained. The District Court concluded that the applicant, faced with the risk of a prison term, might obstruct the proper administration of justice or abscond.

13. On 19 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Article 212 § 2 (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of having thrown an unidentified solid object towards the police.

14. On 11 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 14 June 2012.

15. On 8 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant requested to be released, arguing that all the necessary investigative acts had already been carried out. He presented personal guarantees from two State Duma deputies in support of an undertaking by him to appear before the investigating authorities and the courts for examination of his case. The applicant also requested his release on health grounds and submitted a medical document from 2004 which showed that he had a number of eye conditions.

16. On the same day the District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 November 2012. It relied on the reasons for and the nature of the crime which had been committed, which gave sufficient grounds to presume that the applicant might reoffend, influence and threaten witnesses and other participants of the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. In addition, the applicant had negative reports related to his place of residence. In particular, he had no permanent employment or family and had been repeatedly brought to administrative responsibility. His state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. Lastly, the court held that in view of the above circumstances the custodial measure could not be replaced by a more lenient preventive measure.

17. On 12 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 8 August 2012.

18. On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that his detention was detrimental to his health, in particular his eyesight. He referred again to the personal guarantees of two State Duma deputies in support of his request for a milder preventive measure. On the same day the court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2013. The court referred to the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offence imputed to the applicant, along with information about his personality, namely that he had no permanent employment or regular source of income and had negative reports from his place of residence.

19. On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated. The classification of the offence remained unchanged. According to the new indictment, between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square unidentified persons had called those present to move outside the agreed meeting area and to disobey lawful police orders, leading to mass disorder accompanied by violence against public officials. Between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m. that day the applicant had taken part in acts of mass disorder, in particular, he had repeatedly shouted anti-government slogans. During that period of time the participants of the mass disorder threw pieces of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police, which hit them on various parts of their body. The applicant, no later than at 8 p.m., found a flagpole and threw it at an unidentified police officer, hitting him in the chest.

20. On 26 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 29 October 2012.

21. On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 10 June 2013. It stressed the complexity of the case, reiterated the grounds given in the previous orders and noted that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. The applicant asked to be released on bail and presented personal guarantees from a well‑known writer and two directors of prominent NGOs, but the court considered that a milder preventive measure could not be applied. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 3 April 2013.

22. On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request to extend the applicant’s detention and set a new term of 6 July 2013 on the same grounds as previously.

23. On 16 May 2013 the Moscow City Court examined an appeal by the applicant against its decision of 23 April 2013 and reversed it on the grounds that the prosecutor’s office would have enough time to bring an indictment by 10 June 2013, adding that after that date the trial court could consider a new extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention.

24. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges.

25. On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which had initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The court also pointed out that the applicant’s state of health was not incompatible with his being kept in custody. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 2 July 2013.

26. On 18 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began the trial in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers.

27. The applicant made an application for release during a court hearing on 6 August 2013 but it was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day.

28. On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation submitted a complaint to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention and requested an alternative preventive measure for him.

29. On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman’s request.

30. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of ten defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order.

31. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act which applied, inter alia, to pending criminal proceedings against people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code.

32. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.

C. Conditions of detention and medical assistance

33. The applicant has moderate myopia, complex myopic astigmatism and a congenital coloboma of the choroid.

1. Remand prison IZ-77/5

34. From 23 June 2012 to 17 September 2012 and from 4 November 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/5 in Moscow. Upon his arrival there he was given a medical check which did not reveal any health issues.

35. In IZ-77/5 the applicant was detained in cells 320 (until 29 June 2012), 406 (until 17 September 2012, then from 4 to 30 November 2012), 509 (until 10 December 2012), 506 (until 19 June 2013), and 507 (until 29 June 2013).

36. The cells had the following characteristics:cell 320: 33.7 square metres and eight sleeping places;cell 406: 38.4 sq. m and nine sleeping places;cell 509: 18.2 sq. m and four sleeping places;cell 506: 16.4 sq. m and four sleeping places;cell 507: 16 sq. m and four sleeping places.

37. The parties agreed that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceeded the design capacity. They also agreed that the size of the cells and the number of detainees had allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had had an individual sleeping place in every cell.

38. The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in the cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, were excessively hot in the summer and cold in the winter, they all had a lavatory pan which was separated from the living space by a plastic partition to chin level, which did not provide enough privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke and that although the window in the cell could be opened, it overlooked a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish and had let in fumes. There was therefore a constant lack of fresh air in the cell, which the ventilation system could not compensate for. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also stated that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. Finally, he alleged that the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for access to drinking water.

39. According to the Government, the cells were equipped with ventilation; the state of the sanitary facilities had been satisfactory; the cells had been cleaned and bedding changed once a week; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise per day; and the cells had been disinfected and subjected to pest control monthly. They provided measurement tables for the remand prison, which had been created in August 2013. They showed that the level of light in the cells in which the applicant had been detained had ranged between 152 and 264 lux, the standard being 150 lux. The temperature in the cells had measured between 26oC and 28oC and humidity between 41% and 47%, while the permissible level was up to 28oC and 65% respectively. The Government also noted that detainees had access to a gym upon a written request.

40. On 11 July 2012 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the head of the remand prison order a medical examination for the applicant. He alleged that there had been a rapid deterioration of his eyesight.

41. On 16 July 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about excessive heat in his cell and a deterioration of his eyesight.

42. On 30 July 2012 the applicant requested that the head of the remand prison organise a medical examination owing to his worsening eyesight.

43. On 27 August 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist. He was diagnosed with severe myopia, amblyopia, esotropia, and a congenital coloboma of the iris. The doctor noted that the applicant had last been examined in October 2004 and recommended that he have a special examination to determine his disability status (медико-социальная экспертиза).

44. On 8 November 2012 the chief of IZ-77/5 requested another ophthalmologic consultation, repeating the applicant’s complaints about the deterioration of his eyesight.

45. On 23 November 2012 the applicant was taken for another outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who concluded that there were no negative developments in his state of health. The doctor also recommended that he have eye tests once a year.

46. On 13 December 2012 the applicant underwent the special examination for recognition of the status of being disabled, which he was refused.

47. On 29 March and 19 April 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about the poor quality of his mattress and the deterioration of his eyesight.

2. Remand prison IZ-77/1

48. On 17 September 2012 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ-77/1 in Moscow (Матросская тишина), which had a medical wing. The applicant remained there until 4 November 2012 and underwent a series of medical examinations, including blood tests, an echography, a chest photofluorography and an electrocardiogram.

49. According to the applicant, the prison cell measured 4 by 3.5 square metres and housed four inmates, including himself. The window measured 1.75 by 0.5 metres and was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. The artificial light was dim and flickering and was turned on even at night. There was no mechanical ventilation and the cell was damp, with broken window panes letting in the cold. A shower was allowed once a week and the toilet was only separated from the rest of the cell by a low wall. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day and the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for getting access to drinking water.

50. According to the certificate issued by the prison governor on 13 November 2013, the applicant was held in cell 707 in IZ-77/1. That cell had measured 16 square metres and had housed four inmates, including the applicant. The cell had one window measuring 115 by 170 cm and the state of the glazing was inspected every day and fixed whenever necessary. The temperature in the cell had been maintained at 18oC. Artificial light was provided by a fluorescent lamp with two 40-watt tubes from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. and by a 40-watt lamp during the night, in line with requirements. The windows had no shutters, only a metal grill with 20-mm metal bars; the size of the mesh was 100 by 200 mm. Inmates had to clean the cell each day with chlorine bleach and detergent provided by the facility. The applicant had been able to shower once a week for fifteen minutes. The cell had been disinfected and subjected to pest control measures regularly.

51. On 16 October 2012 the applicant was examined by a commission of four doctors, including an ophthalmologist. They issued a report which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

“... According to the [the applicant’s] medical documents, dated from 1997 to 2004, [he had been diagnosed with] medium myopia, complex myopic astigmatism, a congenital coloboma of the choroid, and a vascular congenital coloboma of the iris. Partial optic atrophy.

According to the results of the medical examination in [IZ-77/1] carried out on 5 October 2012 [he has] high myopia of the right eye. High-degree amblyopia of the left eye, esotropia. A congenital coloboma of the iris [and] of the choroid.

...

There have been no negative developments compared with the previous evaluation reports (medical examinations).”

52. On 31 October 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/1 to check the conditions of the applicant’s detention. Its report read as follows:

“[The applicant] is being held in a cell in the remand prison’s medical wing. There are two other detainees in the cell. The cell is one of the worst in the medical wing of [IZ-77/1]. It is cold, the radiator is lukewarm and the glass in the hinged window is broken. The cell has not been renovated for a long time. Dirty, scuffed walls. There is no refrigerator or television, the radio socket is broken. [The applicant] complains that he has not received any treatment in the hospital for three weeks. The medical wing of the remand prison has no ophthalmologist and he was taken for a consultation to the [city hospital] ... According to the chief physician of the medical wing ... [the applicant] had 10% sight in one eye and 20% sight in the other. But the prison doctors could not recommend his release ... because only totally blind detainees are eligible.

... [The applicant’s] detention is detrimental to his health, his eyesight is deteriorating as each day goes by: the light is always on in the cell, day and night. The light is dim; that is bad for his eyesight.

...

The members of the [commission] consider that [the applicant’s] detention ... is a way to pressure him into giving the evidence the investigation wants. [He] risks losing his remaining eyesight. It is evident that he has been placed in the worst cell, cold and damp, instead of being treated in the hospital. He has been deprived of the possibility to receive visits from his family and has found himself in an information vacuum, without any television, radio or press. No adequate treatment or medical care.”

53. On 2 November 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the previous diagnoses and identified no change in the applicant’s condition.

54. The discharge summary (выписной эпикриз) issued on 4 November 2012 contained the results of the applicant’s medical examinations carried out in IZ-77/1. The head of the prison’s medical wing concluded that they did not reveal the presence of any of the serious conditions which were listed as being incompatible with custody and there were thus no obstacles to the applicant’s detention.

3. Remand prison IZ-77/2

55. On 30 June 2013 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ-77/2 in Moscow (Бутырская тюрьма) where he was held until his release on 19 December 2013.

56. In IZ-77/2 the applicant was detained in cells 52 (until 7 July 2013), 01-a (until 12 July 2013), 703 (until 2 September 2013), 332 (until 19 September 2013), and 327 (apparently until his release).

57. The cells had the following characteristics:cell 52: 26.96 sq. m and five sleeping places;cell 1-a: 53.01 sq. m and twenty sleeping places;cell 703: 11.42 sq. m and two sleeping places;cell 332: 11.22 sq. m and three sleeping places;cell 327: 9.25 sq. m and three sleeping places.

58. According to the applicant, the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, especially because of a lack of regular outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. In particular, the lavatory pan was only separated from the living space by a chest-high partition which did not provide sufficient privacy. In addition, the applicant did not take a shower after his transfer to IZ-77/2 until at least 30 July 2013, as he indicated in his letter.

59. According to the Government, the conditions in the cells at IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell, which provided the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were disinfected and subjected to a pest control procedure once every three months or whenever necessary; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise daily; the cell had been cleaned and the bedding changed weekly; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window. Artificial light was provided from a 100-watt bulb by day and a 75-watt bulb by night. The glazing of the windows let in sufficient daylight.

60. On 12 July 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical wing of IZ‑77/2 for an additional examination and adjustment of his treatment. He had been discharged on 18 July 2013 after refusing further treatment.

61. According to a statement of 7 November 2013 issued by IZ-77/2, the applicant’s state of health had been satisfactory and doctors had recommended that he have regular consultations with an ophthalmologist.

D. Transfer between the detention centre and the court

62. The applicant’s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back was identical to that in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 69-73).

E. Conditions in the courtroom

63. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 and in the end of July moved to hearing room no. 635 at the Moscow City Court. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, which was equipped with metal cages.

64. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (ibid., §§ 74-77).

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

65. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides as follows:

Article 212 Mass disorder

“1. The organisation of mass disorder, accompanied by violence, riots, arson, destruction of property, the use of firearms, explosives and explosive devices, as well by armed resistance to a public official, shall be punishable by four to ten years’ deprivation of liberty.

2. Participation in the types of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punishable by three to eight years’ deprivation of liberty.

3. The instigation of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article, or the instigation of participation in such acts, or the instigation of violence against citizens, shall be punishable by a restriction of liberty for up to two years, or community service for up to two years, or deprivation of liberty for the same term.”

66. For a summary of the relevant domestic law provisions governing pre-trial detention and for the practice of the domestic courts in that matter see the case of Zherebin v. Russia (no. 51445/09, §§ 16-25, 24 March 2016).

67. For a summary of the applicable regulations and the European standards for prison conditions see Ananyev and Others v. Russia (nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 55 et seq., 10 January 2012).

68. The Amnesty Act of 18 December 2013 was passed by the State Duma with regard to the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It applied, inter alia, to pending criminal proceedings against people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code.

69. Article 27 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) states that criminal proceedings against a suspect or an accused person should be terminated following the Amnesty Act with the consent of that person. However, the application of the Amnesty Act does not entitle a suspect or an accused person to rehabilitation (реабилитация), including compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and the restitution of various rights, as provided for in Article 133 § 1 of the CCrP.

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

70. Given their common factual and legal background, the Court decides that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION DURING PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

71. The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article 3 of the Convention referring to various aspects of his pre-trial detention. In particular, he complained about the conditions of his detention in the remand prisons. Next, he alleged that he had not received adequate medical assistance while in detention. Further, he complained about the conditions of his transfer to and from court and the conditions of his detention in the convoy room at the Moscow City Court. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. Admissibility

72. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Conditions of detention in the remand prisons

73. The applicant alleged that the poor conditions of his detention in all remand prisons, including those in the medical wing of IZ-77/1, had been in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The parties’ submissions as regards the material conditions of detention have been summarised in paragraphs 34-39, 47-50, and 55-59 above.

74. The main facts relevant to the assessment of the conditions of detention, in particular the size of the cells, the number of inmates detained there concurrently with the applicant, and the sanitary and hygiene arrangements were not in dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, they disagreed on whether those conditions had amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant maintained, in particular, that four square metres of personal space had been insufficient to avoid overcrowding in IZ-77/5 and IZ-77/1. Furthermore, he complained of inadequate ventilation and lighting, of a lack of separation between the lavatory and the living space, of limited access to drinking water and about the one-hour limit on daily outdoor exercise in all the remand prisons. He also contended that the cell in IZ-77/1 was cold. The Government, on the contrary, contended that the applicant’s conditions of detention had been in conformity with the applicable standards for personal space, light, room temperature, sanitary facilities and hygiene arrangements.

75. The Court recently reiterated the general principles governing the application of Article 3 of the Convention to conditions of detention as well as the principles concerning prison overcrowding in Muršić v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 96-141, ECHR 2016). In particular, the Court confirmed that the requirement of 3 square metres of floor space per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation should be maintained as the relevant minimum standard for its assessment under Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 110 and 114). It also stated that a weighty but rebuttable presumption of a violation of Article 3 arose when personal space available to a detainee fell below 3 square metres. That presumption could be refuted by demonstrating, in particular, that the cumulative effects of the other aspects of the conditions of detention compensated for the scarce allocation of personal space. In that connection, the Court takes into account such factors as the length and extent of the restriction, the degree of freedom of movement and the adequacy of out-of-cell activities, as well as whether or not the conditions of detention in the particular facility are generally decent (ibid., §§ 122-38).

76. In the present case, the Court observes that in IZ-77/5 and IZ-77/1 the applicant was held in cells that allowed him about four square metres of personal space, which complies with the required standard. On certain occasions in IZ-77/2 the applicant was afforded personal space of 2.6 square metres. The Court notes that this reduction in the required personal space was not especially long as it lasted from 7 to 12 July 2013 (see, for example, Kurkowski v. Poland, no. 36228/06, §§ 66-67, 9 April 2013). In addition, the applicant was always provided with an individual bed; he has never alleged that the arrangements of the cells, such as fixtures like tables, beds and toilets, impeded him from moving freely within the cell (see Vladimir Belyayev v. Russia, no. 9967/06, § 34, 17 October 2013; see also, by contrast, Manulin v. Russia, no. 26676/06, § 46, 11 April 2013, and Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833/04, § 87, 27 January 2011). Furthermore, in IZ‑77/2 the applicant spent most of the day outside the cells participating in court hearings as the examination of his criminal case had already started by July 2013.

77. As regards other aspects of the physical conditions of detention in all the remand prisons, the Court notes that the applicant was allowed a one‑hour period of outdoor exercise daily; in IZ 77/5 he had access to a gym upon a written request. Also, each cell where the applicant was detained in IZ-77/5 and IZ-77/2 had unobstructed access to natural light. The windows were not fitted with metal shutters or other devices preventing natural light from entering into the cell (compare with Babushkin v. Russia, no. 67253/01, § 48, 18 October 2007). Where available, a small window pane could be opened for fresh air and the cells provided sufficient artificial light and ventilation. The temperature and humidity levels were within the appropriate limits, in particular according to the measurement tables for IZ‑77/5. The lavatories in the cells were separated from the living space, although the partition did not reach the ceiling (contrast with Glotov v. Russia, no. 41558/05, § 28, 10 May 2012). It must be noted that the time for taking a shower, limited to fifteen minutes a week, has been considered as manifestly insufficient for maintaining proper bodily hygiene by the Court (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 158, 10 January 2012, with further references). However, the applicant did not complain about the other practical arrangements for showering, such as a limited number of functioning showerheads or a lack of privacy due to the fact that inmates were taken to shower halls in groups (ibid.). Finally, the prison authorities regularly carried out the necessary pest control and disinfection measures. They also provided detergent products for cleaning the cells on a daily basis.

78. Some elements in the applicant’s account of the conditions in the medical wing of IZ-77/1 were disputed by the Government, in particular, the allegations of insufficient light and cold in the cell. The Court notes that the parties provided different descriptions of the size of the window (see paragraphs 49-50 above). It takes into account the evidential material produced by the Government that cell no. 707 had one window measuring 115 by 170 cm. Even though it had a metal grill with 20-mm metal bars, that arrangement could not significantly reduce the provision of natural light to the cell (contrast Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146/01, § 82, 12 June 2008), which was additionally lit with a fluorescent lamp with two 40-watt tubes. The Court further notes that the applicant complained about the cell being cold, which was also noted by the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities (see paragraph 52 above). However, according to the certificate issued by the prison governor the temperature in the cell was maintained at +18oC, which the Court has previously accepted as adequate (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829/04, § 111, 31 May 2011).

79. The Court acknowledges that the applicant’s conditions of detention in all the remand prisons fell short of the Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the European Prison Rules and the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture in some aspects. These include, in particular, infrequent hot showers, restricted out‑of‑cell activities and limited access to drinking water. The Court also notes in that regard the report issued by the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities, which noted a broken pane of glass, the lack of a fridge or television, a broken radio socket, and dirty, scuffed walls in the cell in IZ-77/1 (see paragraph 52 above). Nevertheless, taking into account the cumulative effect of these conditions and the fact that the applicant was only detained in IZ-77/1 for a month and a half, the Court does not consider that the conditions of his detention reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for similar reasoning, Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, § 98; Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710/07 and 3 others, §§ 137-38, 17 January 2012; and compare Vladimir Belyayev, cited above, § 36). As regards the reduction in the minimum required personal space in IZ-77/2, the Court stresses its reasonably short duration, the fact that the applicant spent most of the day outside the cell and the general adequacy of the conditions of detention in that facility. The Court finds that those factors are capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

80. The Court therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of detention in any of the remand prisons.

2. Alleged failure to provide adequate medical assistance

81. The applicant alleged that his eyesight had seriously deteriorated during his detention and that he had not received any treatment for that problem. He relied on the medical report of 16 October 2012 as proof that his myopia had worsened. The Government disagreed with the applicant and argued that he had been regularly examined by medical specialists, including ophthalmologists, and had been provided with the requisite treatment. They pointed out that from 17 September 2012 to 4 November 2012 the applicant had undergone an inpatient examination in the prison medical wing and that in 2012 he had had three consultations with an ophthalmologist at a specialist ophthalmology clinic. He had also undergone a special examination, but it had not led to him being given any disability status.

82. The Court reiterates that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released “on compassionate grounds”, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000‑XI; Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 95, ECHR 2002-VI; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)). The “adequacy” of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994/09, § 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko, cited above, § 100; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242/03, § 84, 21 December 2010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, § 115, 29 November 2007; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649/05, § 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee’s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, §§ 109 and 114; Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 211, 13 July 2006; and Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, § 79, 4 October 2005).

83. On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be “compatible with the human dignity” of a detainee, but should also take into account “the practical demands of imprisonment” (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 140, 22 December 2008).

84. In the present case, the applicant argued that no action had been taken by the authorities, in spite of his rapidly deteriorating eyesight. The Court notes, however, that the pre-detention diagnosis of the applicant’s myopia dated back to 2004, eight years prior to his detention (see the medical report of 16 October 2012 cited in paragraph 51 above). In the absence of any information about his diagnosis immediately before his arrest, it is impossible to establish that the progress of his myopia from medium to high was attributable specifically to the period in detention. The Court has examined the applicant’s medical files submitted by the Government and has found that following his complaints he was given a comprehensive medical examination and was taken to an ophthalmologist on at least three occasions. None of the medical reports drawn up after those consultations indicate any threat to the applicant’s eyesight or the need for further tests or treatment. There is nothing in the case file to cast doubt on those reports. Furthermore, the applicant did not argue that he had not been prescribed, or provided with, correctional glasses or contact lenses appropriate to his degree of myopia. According to the last examination in the remand prison, the only recommendation he received was to have regular consultations with an ophthalmologist (see paragraph 61 above). The Court therefore finds no reason to believe that the Russian authorities failed to provide the applicant with adequate medical assistance.

85. In view of the above, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.

3. Conditions of transfer to and from court

86. The applicant alleged that his transfers from the remand prisons to court and back had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He complained about the frequency and the length of those transfers, of appalling conditions at the prison assembly sections and in the police vans, and about the intensity of the schedule, which did not leave him sufficient time to sleep. The applicant argued that the combination of the above factors had led to physical exhaustion and mental distress.

87. The Court examined the conditions of transfer to and from court, which were common to the applicant and his co-defendants, in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 103-11). It found that those conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of a lack of sufficient rest and sleep on the days of court hearings, overcrowding and generally poor conditions in the prison assembly sections and convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, lengthy transfers between the remand prisons and the court and poor conditions during the transfers. The Court sees no reason to depart from those findings in the present case. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that respect.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONFINEMENT IN GLASS CABINS AND METAL CAGES DURING COURT HEARINGS

88. The applicant complained that his confinement in glass cabins and metal cages during court hearings had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention.

89. The Government contended that placing defendants behind metal barriers in courtrooms was a technical measure aimed at ensuring the security of all detainees. The applicant and his co-defendants had been kept in the same (if not better) conditions while in court as any other detained defendant in criminal proceedings.

A. Admissibility

90. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints about his confinement in glass cabins had been lodged out of time. They repeated their submissions made in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, § 113) in that regard.

91. The Court observes that the Government did not raise the issue of the applicant’s compliance with the six-month rule as regards his confinement in metal cages. It has previously found that the application of that rule should not be set aside solely because a Government have not made a preliminary objection based on it (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 29, 29 June 2012, and Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000‑I). The Court therefore considers it appropriate to address this issue in the present case.

92. The Court reiterates that the applicant’s confinement in glass cabins and metal cages concerned two distinct periods with materially different conditions of detention, which cannot be regarded as a continuous situation for the purposes of calculating the six-month time-limit set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, § 114). Furthermore, the Court has previously accepted that no remedy was available to applicants in relation to courtroom arrangements and that the six-month time-limit should be calculated from the date the alleged ill‑treatment ceased (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 87, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).

93. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the alleged ill‑treatment took place during the first‑instance hearing, which finished on 19 December 2013 owing to the termination of criminal proceedings against the applicant. The Court further notes that the alleged ill-treatment by placement in glass cabins began on 6 June 2013 and ended on an unidentified date in the middle of September 2013, when the proceedings moved to the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (see paragraph 63 above). The applicant lodged his complaint in that regard on 30 July 2013, while he was still being placed in glass cabins. The complaint about the confinement in metal cages was not lodged until 23 March 2015 as part of the applicant’s submissions in reply to the Government’s observations on application no. 50041/14, that is more than six months after the termination of criminal proceedings against the applicant.

94. The applicant has not submitted that there existed any exceptional circumstances preventing him from complying with the six months’ rule. The Court therefore considers that the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention about being placed in metal cages was lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

95. In contrast, the Court finds that the applicant has complied with the six months’ rule as regards the complaint about being placed in glass cabins. It notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

96. The Court summarised the principles on confinement in glass cabins in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 120-22). It has examined the conditions of detention in hearing rooms nos. 338 and 635 at the Moscow City Court, which were common to the applicant and his co‑defendants, including Mr Belousov (ibid, §§ 123-28), and found a violation in respect of issues identical to those in the present case. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, but no violation of Article 3 as regards the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 635.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

97. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...

...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

A. Admissibility

98. As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention, the Court notes that it was the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow which ordered that measure and that the same court subsequently extended it on several occasions. After the case had been sent for trial, the detention order was issued by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The domestic courts acted within their powers in making those decisions and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid or unlawful under domestic law. Accordingly, the applicant’s detention was imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.

99. As regards the allegation that the applicant’s detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed criminal offences, his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention overlaps to a large extent with his complaint under Article 5 § 3 about the authorities’ failure to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the extensions of his detention pending criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that while Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention is mostly concerned with the existence of a lawful basis for detention within criminal proceedings, Article 5 § 3 of the Convention deals with the possible justification for such detention. Moreover, according to the Court’s established case-law under the latter provision, the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a sine qua non for the validity of continued detention (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 87, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). The Court therefore deems it more appropriate to deal with this complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kovyazin and Others v. Russia, nos. 13008/13 and 2 others, § 71, 17 September 2015; Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, § 46, 15 May 2014; and Khodorkovskiy, cited above, § 165).

100. Furthermore, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint of a violation of Article 5 § 3 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

101. The parties made essentially the same submissions under Article 5 of the Convention as in Kovyazin and Others (cited above, §§ 73-74). The relevant general principles applicable in this case were summarised by the Court in that judgment (ibid., §§ 75-78).

102. The period of detention to be taken into consideration in this case started on 10 June 2012, the date of the applicant’s arrest, and ended on 19 December 2013, when he was released following the application of the Amnesty Act. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration is one year and six months. The Court also notes that the criminal trial in the applicant’s case began on 18 June 2013, which is one year after his arrest. Having regard to the considerable length of detention in the light of the presumption in favour of release, the Court finds that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for maintaining that measure against the applicant.

103. It follows from the applicant’s detention orders and the Government’s observations that the primary reason for his continuous detention was the gravity of the charges. Firstly, the domestic courts considered that the applicant, faced with the risk of prison, was likely to abscond, influence witnesses, or interfere with the administration of justice. Secondly, they seemed to suggest that the very nature of the offences in question, together with information about the applicant’s character, made it likely that he would reoffend and obstruct the course of the criminal proceedings.

104. The Court has previously examined similar complaints lodged by the applicant’s co-defendants and found a violation of their rights set out in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, §§ 133-38, and Kovyazin and Others, cited above, §§ 82-94). The Court noted, in particular, the domestic courts’ reliance on the gravity of the charges as the main factor for the assessment of the potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice, and their reluctance to pay proper attention to a discussion of each applicant’s personal situation or to have proper regard to factors pointing in favour of release. It also noted the use of collective detention orders, without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds for detention, in respect of each co-defendant and the failure to thoroughly examine the possibility of applying a less rigid measure of restraint, such as bail.

105. Having regard to the material in its possession, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Indeed, the specific offence imputed to the applicant – shouting political slogans and throwing a flagpole which hit a police officer but caused no lasting harm – may have initially warranted his pre-trial detention. However, with the passage of time the nature and the seriousness of the offence as grounds for the applicant’s continued detention inevitably became less and less relevant (see Kovyazin and Others, cited above, § 85, and Artemov v. Russia, no. 14945/03, § 75, 3 April 2014). The Court further notes that the applicant’s detention was extended by the same collective orders as those of his co-defendants, without any individual assessment of his situation (Kovyazin and Others, cited above, §§ 92-93). In addition, the domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s requests for an alternative preventive measure, without even considering the guarantees signed by parliamentary deputies, a well-known writer and the directors of prominent NGOs agreeing to vouch for him (see paragraphs 15-16, 18 and 21 above).

106. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

107. The applicant alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. He complained, in particular, of disruptive security measures at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square and argued that his pre-trial detention and prosecution for participation in acts of mass disorder had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. He relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:

Article 10

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Article 11

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

108. The Government’s submissions on the admissibility and the merits of the case were identical to those in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 156‑57 and 160-63).

109. The applicant submitted that on 6 May 2012 he went to take part in a peaceful meeting which had been authorised by the Moscow authorities. He alleged that the episodes of disorderly behaviour and the clashes between the protesters and the police had been caused, or compounded by, the authorities’ crowd-control measures. The applicant insisted that he was a peaceful, law-abiding individual who had not planned to take part in acts of mass disorder. He had never pleaded guilty to the offence he had been charged with and had only agreed to terminate the criminal proceedings against him following the Amnesty Act because his eyesight had been deteriorating. In the applicant’s view, his ensuing prosecution and the severity of the charges against him had had the aim of discouraging him, other opposition supporters and the public at large from attending demonstrations.

110. The Court notes that while the criminal proceedings in question were still pending at the time when the applicant lodged the first application, they were subsequently terminated following the Amnesty Act. It reiterates in this connection that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], no. 22479/93, § 73, ECHR 1999‑VI). In the instant case, the applicant was not entitled under the domestic law to compensation for damages or the restitution of various rights for the measures against him (see paragraph 69 above). Nor did the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in its decision of 19 December 2013 acknowledge the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly owing to those measures (see paragraph 32 above). The applicant may not therefore be considered to have lost his victim status on account of the termination of the criminal proceedings against him following the application of the Amnesty Act (see, mutatis mutandis, Gülcü v. Turkey, no. 17526/10, §§ 99-100, 19 January 2016).

111. On the other hand, regard being had to the essence of the applicant’s complaints, the Court will examine whether despite the termination of the criminal proceedings he could still demonstrate that his pre-trial detention and prosecution for a criminal offence amounted to an interference with the exercise of his rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. It notes that criminal proceedings not culminating in a criminal conviction may, depending on the circumstances, amount to an interference with those rights (see Döner and Others v. Turkey, no. 29994/02, § 89, 7 March 2017).

112. The Court observes that the applicant was not convicted of the criminal offence of mass disorder, unlike those of his co-defendants who were ineligible to be amnestied (see Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, § 177). Therefore the detrimental consequences of his prosecution, as presented by the applicant, were limited to those which were connected with his pre-trial detention. The Court has found above that his detention for one year and six months was not justified under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 102-106 above) and that that preventive measure was associated with prison transfers and courtroom arrangements which constituted treatment contrary to Article 3 (see paragraphs 87 and 96 above).

113. In examining whether the same facts also gave rise to an interference with the applicant’s rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the Court notes the applicant’s allegation that the excessively long pre-trial detention and the severity of the charges were intended to discourage him and other opposition supporters from attending demonstrations and participating in political debate. However, unlike in the case of the applicant’s convicted co-defendant Mr Belousov, the Court does not find sufficient grounds to accept that allegation. Mr Belousov was charged under Article 212 of the Criminal Code of mass disorder which consisted of staying at the site of the rally and chanting anti-government slogans, in addition to a separate charge of violent acts against police officers under Article 318 of the Criminal Code. In that case the Court found that acts which were peaceful had accounted for a striking one‑and‑a‑half‑year addition to the applicant’s prison term (see Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, §§ 177‑78).

114. In the present case, by contrast, the charges of mass disorder under Article 212 of the Criminal Code covered both the peaceful and violent acts imputed to the applicant, namely chanting anti-government slogans and throwing a flagpole at the police. The judicial proceedings did not establish whether the applicant had indeed committed those acts because his prosecution was terminated before the end of the trial. The essential details relating to his conduct at the site of the rally remained unclear, and no assessment was given of the degree of violence in the impugned acts or the possible role of the applicant in the initial acts of aggression which led to the disruption of the public event. Consequently, the applicant has not demonstrated that the crowd-control measures complained of, or the ensuing criminal charges, related to the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly or to the political message expressed thereby. Accordingly, there are no grounds to conclude that the measures constituted an interference with the rights to freedom of expression or to freedom of peaceful assembly.

115. It follows that the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION

116. The applicant complained under Article 18 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had pursued the aim of undermining his right to freedom of assembly. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention. Article 18 of the Convention reads as follows:

“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

117. In their submissions under this head the parties reiterated their arguments as regards the alleged interference with the right to freedom of assembly.

118. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the complaints examined above under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 110-115, the Court considers that that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

119. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

120. The applicant claimed 1,100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

121. The Government contested the claim as unreasonable and excessive.

122. The Court observes that it has found violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention in respect of the applicant. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

123. The applicant did not submit any claims under this head. Accordingly, there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

C. Default interest

124. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;

2. Declares the complaints raised under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the conditions of detention and transfer, the alleged failure to provide medical assistance and the confinement in glass cabins in courtrooms, and under Article 5 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

3. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of detention in the remand prisons;

4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the alleged failure to provide the applicant with adequate medical assistance;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of transfer to and from court;

6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the confinement in a glass cabin in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court;

7. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the confinement in a glass cabin in hearing room no. 635 at the Moscow City Court;

8. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

9. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

10. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 February 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Stephen PhillipsHelena Jäderblom
RegistrarPresident

 

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