CASE OF AMURUBA v. HUNGARY

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF AMURUBA v. HUNGARY

(Application no. 8167/07)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 July 2014

This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Amuruba v. Hungary,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Robert Spano, judges,
and Abel Campos, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 8167/07) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Nigerian national, Mr Longinus Amuruba (“the applicant”), on 7 February 2007.

2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his pre-trial detention lasted an unreasonably long time.

4. On 23 November 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Tiszalök.

6. On 11 November 2002 the applicant was arrested in Spain on charges of drug trafficking. On 12 November 2002 his pre-trial detention was ordered. On 2 May 2003 he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. While he was serving this sentence in a Spanish prison, he was granted a leave, from which he did not return. Subsequently, he absconded.

7. It appears that simultaneously another investigation was in progress on the side of the Hungarian authorities who suspected that the applicant and his Hungarian common-law wife were involved in a drug trafficking network operating between Spain, Hungary and South America. In this context, a European arrest warrant was issued by the Hungarian Miskolc District Court. Acting upon this warrant, the Spanish police arrested the applicant on 8 August 2005. The applicant was then obliged to serve the remainder of his Spanish sentence.

8. For the purposes of the ongoing Hungarian investigation, on 3 April 2006 the applicant was temporarily extradited for six months to Hungary where his pre-trial detention was ordered. After the expiry of the temporary extradition, on 29 September 2006 he was transferred back to Spain in order to complete his sentence. After serving the remainder of the sentence, on 20 November 2006 he was definitively extradited to Hungary.

9. On 21 November 2006 his pre-trial detention was ordered by the Miskolc District Court. His detention was subsequently prolonged at the statutory intervals (on 14 December 2006, 8 March 2007, 13 September 2007 and 22 April 2008) on the grounds that there was a risk of absconding and repetition of crime. The applicant’s respective appeals were dismissed on 27 December 2006 and 11 June 2008.

10. On 4 June 2009 the applicant requested the termination of his pre‑trial detention or its replacement by a less stringent measure on the ground that the duration of his pre-trial detention had exceeded the statutory limit of three years. The Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court rejected this argument. It held that the period of the applicant’s first pre-trial detention in 2006 during his temporary extradition to Hungary had been credited against his Spanish sentence, and that therefore the period in question was to be counted only from the day after his definitive extradition on 20 November 2006. The court also held that the circumstances invariably justified the continued detention. The Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld this decision on 16 July 2009.

11. On 12 June 2009 the applicant was convicted of aggravated drug trafficking by the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, a ten-year ban from Hungary and confiscation of assets in the amount of 5 million Hungarian forints (HUF).

12. On 9 June 2010 the Debrecen Court of Appeal quashed this judgment on procedural and substantive grounds and remitted the case. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was reordered on the ground that there was a risk of absconding and repetition of offences. The applicant again requested the termination of the detention or its replacement by a less stringent measure. On 5 August 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision with regard to the continuation of the detention. The Supreme Court held that the applicant, an inveterate drug-dealer, might re-offend or abscond in the face of the impending severe sanction.

13. On 4 October 2010 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s pre-trial detention for fear of absconding and repetition of crime. The measure was prolonged on 1 June 2011.

14. On 25 January 2012 the applicant was sentenced to seven years’ and six months’ imprisonment, confiscation of property in the value of HUF 5 million and a five-year ban from Hungarian territory.

15. On 11 July 2012 the Court of Appeal increased the sentence to nine years and six months and the ban to ten years.

16. The applicant submits that on 3 December 2012 he was ill-treated by staff of Miskolc Prison. However, he has not submitted any evidence to support this allegation.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

17. The applicant complained that his detention on remand had lasted unreasonably long, in breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

18. The Government contested that argument.

A. Admissibility

19. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

20. The Government argued that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was justified for fear of absconding and repetition of crime.

The applicant contested these views in general terms.

21. The Court notes that the applicant was in pre-trial detention from 21 November 2006 until 12 June 2009, and again from 9 June 2010 until 25 January 2012, that is, for altogether more than four years and two months.

22. The Court reiterates that the question of whether or not a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 152 et seq., ECHR 2000‑IV).

23. It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of the above-mentioned requirement of public interest justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the well-documented facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (see Muller v. France, 17 March 1997, § 35, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II).

24. The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (ibid.).

25. The Court observes that, throughout the entire period, the principal reasons for the applicant’s detention on remand were the danger of absconding and that of repetition of crime. Given that the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes, was a foreigner with no known possibilities of subsistence in Hungary and with a history of absconding, the Court is satisfied that the reasons relied on by the domestic authorities were initially relevant and sufficient.

26. However, it cannot be overlooked that the applicant’s detention on remand eventually exceeded four years, indeed a very long period of time. In particular, the applicant was subjected to a second period of pre-trial detention lasting more than one-and-a-half years after the quashing of the first judgment.

27. The Court therefore considers that the domestic authorities should have certainly shown special diligence in conducting the proceedings, and this against the background of the applicant’s already excessively lengthy detention. However, there is nothing in the case file or in the parties’ submissions demonstrating that such special diligence was exercised to expedite the proceedings. Therefore, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was not justified in its full length.

There has thus been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

28. The applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the outcome of the case against him.

In so far as the applicant’s complaint may be understood to concern assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, there is no appearance that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

29. Moreover, the applicant complains under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention, and also relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, that he was discriminated against in the course of the criminal proceedings conducted against him.

The Court considers that there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant’s Article 14 rights. Moreover, Hungary has not ratified Protocol No. 12, a fact rendering the related complaint incompatible ratione personae.

It follows that these complaints are respectively manifestly ill-founded, and incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

30. Lastly, relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant complains about brutality on the side of the staff of Miskolc Prison.

The Court observes that this allegation is devoid of any evidence and is therefore wholly unsubstantiated.

It follows that this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

31. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

32. The applicant claimed 1,750,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and EUR 1,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

33. The Government contested these claims.

34. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage and awards him, on the basis of equity, EUR 4,200 under this head.

B. Costs and expenses

35. The applicant also claimed EUR 62,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

36. The Government contested this claim.

37. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer in the Strasbourg proceedings, the sum of EUR 500 under this head.

C. Default interest

38. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint concerning the length of the pre-trial detention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 4,200 (four thousand two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 July 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Abel CamposHelen Keller
Deputy RegistrarPresident

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