CASE OF BALČIŪNAS AND ŽURAVLIOVAS v. LITHUANIA

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF BALČIŪNAS AND ŽURAVLIOVAS v. LITHUANIA

(Application no. 34575/05)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

26 November 2013

This judgment is final. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Balčiūnas and Žuravliovas v. Lithuania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Dragoljub Popović, President,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Seçkin Erel, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 5 November 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 34575/05) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Lithuanian nationals, Mr Saulius Balčiūnas and Mr Vladimiras Žuravliovas (“the applicants”), on 14 September 2005.

2. The applicants were represented by Mr V. Kumpa and Mr R. Petravičius, lawyers practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.

3. On 11 December 2006 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

4. The applicants were born in 1938 and 1947 respectively and live in Vilnius.

5. By decision of the Vilnius District Court on 9 June 1995 the applicants’ action against a building company for attribution of ownership rights to two partially-built houses was dismissed. The court declared null and void the sale contracts on the basis of which the applicants claimed title to the houses, and recognised the ownership rights of the building company in respect of the houses.

6. The applicants’ appeal was dismissed by the Vilnius Regional Court on 5 September 1995. The court noted, inter alia, that the applicants could request the company to cover their expenses for construction of the houses. That decision was final.

A. First set of civil proceedings

7. On 5 January 1996 the applicants brought a new action, claiming property rights to the houses. On 18 March 1996 the Vilnius District Court stayed the proceedings, ordering an expert examination with a view to establishing the sum of money invested by the applicants in the construction. The expert examination was concluded on 18 April 1997.

8. On 27 September 1996 the applicants brought a further action, claiming reimbursement of expenses which they had incurred while terminating the construction after the alleged sale of the partially-built houses. These proceedings were joined to the proceedings regarding the claim to ownership.

9. A number of hearings took place on 11 November, 16 and 30 December 1997, 9 February, 9 April, 10 June, 6 October 1998, 21 January 1999, 28 August, 8 October, 20 November, 4 December 2001, 17 January, 27 February, 11 July, 4 September, 22 October, 27 November 2002, 7 January 2003, 3 February, 3 and 31 March, 17 April, 12 May, 24 and 25 June, 15 and 22 December 2003.

10. On 16 December 1997 the applicants dropped the claim to ownership but the claim concerning the expenses remained.

11. On 4 February 1998 the applicants modified their claim by increasing the amounts of expenses to be reimbursed.

12. On 10 June and 6 October 1998 the hearings were adjourned due to non-appearance of the applicants.

13. On 21 January 1999 the Vilnius District Court stayed the examination of the applicants’ claim until the resolution of a case brought by the building company (see paragraph 22 below) observing that relevant documents were included in the latter case.

14. In the meantime, criminal proceedings were instituted against a manager of the building company, on a charge of unlawfully selling the company’s property. The criminal proceedings were discontinued and resumed several times.

15. On 21 February 2000 and, repeatedly, on 16 May 2001 and 7 January 2003 the Vilnius District Court sent requests to another court for relevant material from a related civil case to be transmitted. It appears that the examination of the merits was stayed during that period.

16. On 28 August and 20 November 2001 the hearings were adjourned upon the request of the parties as they were involved in friendly settlement negotiations and the first applicant was considering abandoning his claim (although he had not done so).

17. On 8 October and 4 December 2001, 17 January 2002 the hearings were adjourned as one of the applicants failed to appear; his participation was declared mandatory.

18. On 27 February 2002 the Vilnius District Court suspended the proceedings pending the determination of criminal proceedings concerning the same parties (see paragraph 14 above). Upon the applicants’ appeal, that decision was quashed by the Vilnius Regional Court on 6 May 2002.

19. From 11 July 2002 until 17 April 2003 several hearings were adjourned, inter alia, because of the failure of prosecutors to provide the court with information about the related criminal case.

20. On 25 June 2003 the applicants’ case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court. The latter examined the applicants’ claim on 22 December 2003, and dismissed it as unsubstantiated. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 11 October 2004.

21. On 22 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ cassation appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the applicants’ had failed to substantiate their claim regarding recovery of the expenses incurred.

B. Second set of civil proceedings

22. On 13 May 1997 the building company brought a claim for damages against the applicants and third persons for unlawful appropriation of the disputed houses.

23. On 25 September 1997 the proceedings brought by the building company were stayed because of other related civil cases involving the same parties, inter alia, the first civil case (see paragraph 7 above).

24. The first-instance court inquired several times into progress in the other civil cases, with a view to recommencing examination of the case. In September 2005 the plaintiff informed the court that other proceedings were still pending. At the same time the applicants informed that they did not object to resuming examination of the case but were not aware whether the circumstances for its suspension still existed. One more inquiry was sent by the court in 2006.

25. Neither the Government nor the applicants provided information about any procedural steps taken during the period from 2007 to 2010.

26. On 12 January 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court decided not to examine the claim concluding that the plaintiff had failed to pursue its action and to inform the court of the need for a further suspension of the case. It appears that the court possessed no information about the outcome of the related civil cases which had been the cause of the suspension.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicants complained that both sets of civil proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

28. The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the suspension of both sets of proceedings (see paragraphs 13 and 23), was inevitable in the circumstances and that duration should be deducted from the overall length in respect of each of these cases. Moreover, the applicants’ conduct also contributed to the protraction of the proceedings. Finally, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust all effective domestic remedies in relation to their length of proceedings complaint.

29. In Maneikis v. Lithuania (no. 21987/07, § 21, 18 January 2011) the Court found that in 2005, when the applicants lodged their application with the Court, there were no effective remedies in Lithuania to complain about the length of domestic court proceedings. It follows that the Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies must be dismissed.

30. As concerns the length of the first set of civil proceedings, the period to be taken into consideration began on 5 January 1996 and ended on 22 March 2005. The proceedings lasted approximately nine years and two months at three levels of jurisdiction. Although the proceedings were suspended on several occasions for some three years because of other ongoing proceedings, the overall period in question is of a considerable length. In view of such lengthy proceedings, this part of the application must be declared admissible.

31. With regard to the duration of the second set of civil proceedings the period to be taken into consideration began on 13 May 1997 and ended on 12 January 2010. It has thus lasted twelve years and eight months for a single level of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court considers that this part of the application is likewise admissible.

32. Having regard to the fact that both parallel proceedings were examined during the same period of time and were intrinsically linked, they should be considered as a whole and the longer duration should be taken into consideration (see, mutatis mutandis, Heyrman v. Belgium (dec.), no. 25694/06, 9 October 2012).

33. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

34. The present case cannot be considered as particularly complex. With regard to the conduct of the authorities, the Court considers that it might be reasonable for national courts to await under certain circumstances the outcome of parallel proceedings as a measure of procedural efficiency. However, this decision must be proportionate having regard to the special circumstances of the case (see König v. Germany, 28 June 1978, § 110, Series A no. 27; and Herbst v. Germany, no. 20027/02, § 78, 11 January 2007).

35. Examination of the case was stayed since September 1997 due to the ongoing related civil proceedings and remained suspended until January 2010 when the court terminated the proceedings without examining the claim. Despite the fact that the court of first instance inquired several times about the outcome of those related proceedings, it did not decide to end the proceedings until 12 January 2010. This delay cannot be justified only by a procedural necessity.

36. As concerns the conduct of the applicants it should be noted that in view of the long lasting proceedings they were not active and diligent enough to advance them (see paragraph 24 above). However, the Court also observes that the applicants, being the defendants in the civil case, had limited means to expedite the proceedings.

37. The Court has held on a number of occasions that a principle of domestic law or practice that the parties to civil proceedings are required to take the initiative with regard to the progress of the proceedings, does not dispense the State from complying with the requirement to deal with cases in a reasonable time. The manner in which a State provides for mechanisms to comply with this requirement – whether by way of increasing the numbers of judges, or by automatic time-limits and directions, or by some other method – is for the State to decide. If a State lets proceedings continue beyond the “reasonable time” prescribed by Article 6 of the Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be responsible for the resultant delay (see, Price and Lowe v. the United Kingdom, nos. 43185/98 and 43186/98, § 23, 29 July 2003; Beggs v. the United Kingdom, no. 25133/06, § 239, 6 November 2012).

38. It appears that in the present case the authorities did not take all necessary and reasonable steps to advance the proceedings in question. As a result, the Court does not find this delay to be sufficiently justified, having particular regard to the overall length of the proceedings, which would have necessitated particular expeditiousness on behalf of the domestic courts.

39. It follows that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

40. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

41. The applicants also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that they were deprived of reimbursement of the expenses incurred in the construction. They disputed the finding of the national courts that they had failed to substantiate the claim against the building company.

42. With regard to the instant dispute over the property rights, the Court observes that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not concern the regulation of civil law rights between parties under private law (see, Garzičić v. Montenegro, no. 17931/07, § 37, 21 September 2010).

43. In the present case the relations for compensation of expenses between the applicants and the private building company were regulated according to the rules of private law. Therefore, the decisions of the courts cannot be seen as an unjustified State interference with the property rights of the losing party. Indeed, it is the very function of the courts to determine such disputes, the regulation of which falls within the province of domestic law and outside the scope of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kuchar and Stis v. Czech Republic (dec.), no. 37527/97, 21 October 1998; see also S.Ö., A.K., Ar.K. and Y.S.P.E.H.V. v. Turkey (dec.), no. 31138/96, 14 September 1999; and Toziczka v. Poland, no. 29995/08, § 51, 24 July 2012).

44. It follows, this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 thereof.

45. Lastly, invoking Articles 6 § 1 and 13 the applicants complained that they had no effective remedy allowing them to recover building expenses.

46. The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy where there is an “arguable claim” of a violation of a substantive Convention provision (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131). In view of its finding above that the applicants’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is inadmissible, the Court concludes that the applicants had no such “arguable claim” and Article 13 is, therefore, not applicable. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

47. Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, Mr S. Balčiūnas claimed 194,118 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 56,200 euros (EUR)) and five percent annual interest in respect of pecuniary damage. Mr V. Žuravliovas claimed LTL 128,906 (approximately EUR 37,300) and five percent annual interest in respect of pecuniary damage. The Government contested those claims.

48. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects these claims.

49. The applicants did not submit any claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the delays in the civil proceedings complained of. The Court therefore makes no award under this head.

50. The applicants also claimed EUR 2,317 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, the latter item being billable by their lawyers. The Government did not agree with the claim.

51. The Court finds that the costs and expenses have been necessarily incurred in order to afford redress for the violation found. However, they cannot be awarded in full as the Court has dismissed the applicants’ complaints in part. Having regard to all the circumstances, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,000.

52. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaints concerning the excessive length of the two civil proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) to be converted into Lithuanian litas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 November 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Seçkin ErelDragoljub Popoviċ
Acting Deputy RegistrarPresident

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