CASE OF BANK SADERAT IRAN v. GREECE

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF BANK SADERAT IRAN v. GREECE

(Application no. 31687/15)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

22 July 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Bank Saderat Iran v. Greece,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Peeter Roosma, President,
 Ioannis Ktistakis,
 Lətif Hüseynov, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 31687/15) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 June 2015 by Bank Saderat Iran (“the applicant bank”), which is registered in Iran and has a registered address in Athens. In the proceedings before the Court the applicant was represented by Mr V. Chirdaris and Mr N. Aggelakos, lawyers practising in Athens;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Articles 6, 13 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Greek Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent’s delegates, Mr K. Georgiadis, Senior Adviser, and Ms I. Kotsoni, Legal Representative at the State Legal Council, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

the comments submitted by the Agrotiki Trapeza Ellados bank regarding the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;

Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The applicant is a bank registered in Tehran in Iran which in 1976 established a branch in Athens. On 7 May 1980 the Agrotiki Trapeza Ellados bank (Αγροτική Τράπεζα Ελλάδος – “Agrotiki Trapeza (ATE)”) lodged an action against the applicant bank and two of its agents in the Athens Civil Court of First Instance, claiming compensation for actions committed by them which ATE alleged were unlawful. On 17 September 1980 the applicant bank lodged an action against ATE and its agents, claiming compensation for the alleged participation of some of them in unlawful acts. On 22 March 1984 ATE lodged a second action against the applicant bank, claiming interest from the date of service of its first action.

2.  On 5 November 1980 the first action of ATE and the action of the applicant bank were examined jointly. Following decision no. 3414/1981 of 27 February 1981, further evidence was requested. A hearing for the second action of ATE was set on 30 May 1984, but was cancelled. On 26 July 1989 ATE requested another date for a hearing for this action. The case resumed on 25 October 1989 when the hearing was again cancelled. On 1 February 1994 ATE requested another date for a hearing for this action which was set on 22 September 1994.

3.  Following further adjournments, the case was resumed on 2 November 1995 when all three actions were heard. In decision no. 3018/1996 of 27 March 1996, the part of the proceedings relating to one of the applicant bank’s agents was struck out and the filing of further evidence within four months was ordered. On 19 November 1999 ATE requested a hearing on the two actions relating to the principal claims. This took place on 11 January 2001 when the case was adjourned until 7 March 2002 but then that hearing was cancelled. In parallel, on 4 January 2001 ATE requested a hearing on the action relating to the interest claim which was set on 7 March 2002 but that hearing was cancelled.

4.  On 7 July 2002 ATE requested a hearing on all three actions and the case resumed on 22 January 2004. Decision no. 3220/2004 was delivered on 4 June 2004 ordering the submission of further evidence. On 14 September 2005 ATE requested a hearing and on 26 October 2006 the hearing was cancelled. On 9 November 2006 ATE requested another hearing which took place on 3 May 2007, when the president of the court withdrew from the case and a new hearing was set for 25 September 2008. However, as the president withdrew from the case, the hearing was rescheduled for 12 November 2009 and judgment no. 4622/2010 of the Athens Court of First Instance was delivered on 15 July 2010, partially allowing the two actions lodged by ATE and ordering the applicant bank to pay the amount of 325,772.77 euros (EUR) plus interest and EUR 150,754.22 plus interest for the damage caused to ATE. It also adjourned the hearing of the applicant bank’s action about which the parties have submitted no further information.

5.  On 18 November 2010 the applicant bank appealed against the judgment of 15 July 2010. On 27 July 2012 ATE was placed under liquidation and its claims were transferred to the Trapeza Piraios bank (Τράπεζα Πειραιώς), which succeeded ATE in the pending proceedings. The applicant bank maintained, among other things, that ATE’s claims for interest were time-barred in accordance with Article 250 § 15 of the Civil Code and the general five-year limitation period. It argued that Article 34 § 8 of Law no. 4332/1929, which provided that all claims of ATE would be time-barred after a limitation period of twenty years, should not have applied because it was contrary to the Constitution.

6.  In judgment no. 4551/2013 of 22 July 2013, the Athens Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant bank’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It is noted that in accordance with its founding law no. 4332/1929 ATE was founded as the main financial institution with a mission to facilitate access to credit for the development of agriculture, improve the conditions for the association and co-ordination of agricultural activities and relevant transactions. Working in close collaboration with the State, it would implement the State’s programme aiming at the development of the national production. The appellate court held that provisions which were favourable to ATE, which included the twenty-year limitation period, continued to apply and were not contrary to the Constitution even after the transformation of the bank into a societe anonyme in 1990 (Law no. 1914/1990). The transformation had not changed the special preferential legal status of ATE which continued to constitute the main institution for the support of agricultural credit and the favourable provisions were then set out in Law no. 1914/1990 despite the change of its statute. It referred to judgment no. 2001/2002 of the Court of Cassation which had made a similar finding on the constitutionality of the remaining provisions in force in favour of ATE.

7.  On 7 March 2014 the applicant bank appealed on points of law against Trapeza Piraios, arguing that the provisions in favour of ATE were contrary to the constitutional principle of equality and the obligation not to treat substantially similar situations differently. It maintained that although ATE had initially been a legal entity under public law as regards certain aspects, in 1990 it had been transformed into a private company and the provisions that were favourable to it should have ceased to apply because they had not been justified by overriding public-interest considerations. The special limitation period of twenty years placed ATE’s debtors at a disadvantage compared with debtors of other banks or lenders.

8.  The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law in judgment no. 2259/2014 (delivered on 18 December 2014), an official copy of which was available on 3 February 2015. It confirmed on this matter the findings of the appellate court holding that ATE had been founded as a banking entity with a public benefit purpose, providing financial assistance and other support for agricultural activities. The favourable provisions including the one in question had remained in force under Law no. 1914/1990 even after its transformation and were not contrary to the Constitution.

9.  The applicant bank complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the application of the twenty-year limitation period instead of the general five-year one to the ATE claims violated its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, it complained that the length of the proceedings leading to judgments no. 4622/2010 of the Athens Court of First Instance and no. 4551/2013 of the Court of Appeal had been excessive and that it had no effective domestic remedy for its complaint.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

10.  The Government submitted that the applicant bank had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because it had not made a claim alleging a violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions at any point in the domestic proceedings. It had relied instead on the principle of equality and the European Union competition law. The applicant bank contended that although it had not explicitly referred to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, its arguments had amounted to the same allegations in practice and had enabled the national courts to redress the alleged violation. The Court does not need to examine this objection as the complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons.

11.  The Government further submitted that the applicant bank could not claim to have had “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The amounts that the applicant bank was ordered to pay were owed to ATE and the fact that the applicant bank could not avoid their payment due to the application of the twenty-year limitation period did not interfere with its right to property. The Government raised in essence a ratione materiae objection. The applicant bank argued that as it “would be obliged to pay” the large amounts in question, this undoubtedly constituted an interference with its possessions which was unlawful as based on a provision that should not have applied and was disproportionate.

12.  The Court reiterates that an applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. No legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see, among many authorities, Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002‑VII, and Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, §§ 50-52, ECHR 2004‑IX).

13.  By way of contrast, the hope of a debtor to have the domestic courts set aside a provision laying down a special limitation period which had been established in favour of the creditor cannot be considered a “possession”. The financial liability of the applicant bank arose from a court judgment (see paragraph 4 above). The applicant bank unsuccessfully challenged the applicable limitation period in favour of its creditor and its arguments that maintaining this favourable provision was contrary to the Constitution were dismissed by the appellate court referring to relevant case-law and confirmed by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 5-8 above).

14.  The Court concludes that the applicant bank cannot, for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, be deemed to have had “existing possessions” or a claim amounting to a “legitimate expectation” in the sense of the Court’s case-law. It had a mere hope that a debt owed to ATE would not be considered collectible because of a shorter limitation period than the special one which had been applied.

15.  Accordingly, this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

16.  The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

17.  The applicant bank maintained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement and that the responsibility for the delay lay with the authorities. The Government submitted that the length of the proceedings had been reasonable having regard to the complexity of the case, the volume of the documentation, the succession between ATE and Trapeza Piraios banks (see paragraph 5 above) and the lodging of the appeal by the applicant bank four months after the delivery of the first-instance judgment.

18.  The period to be considered started on 7 May 1980, when ATE lodged the first action against the applicant bank. It ended on 22 July 2013, when the Court of Appeal delivered judgment no. 4551/2013. The proceedings lasted more than thirty-three years for two instances.

19.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed, in accordance with its well-established case‑law, in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Vassilios Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, no. 50973/08, § 26, 21 December 2010).

20.  The Court has on many occasions examined cases raising questions akin to the duration of proceedings before civil courts and concluded that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 (see Glykantzi v. Greece, no. 40150/09, § 71, 30 October 2012, and the cases cited therein).

21.  Only delays imputable to the authorities can justify a finding that a reasonable time has been exceeded, contrary to the Convention. As regards the adjournments and cancellations of hearings, the Government did not argue that those were imputable to the parties. However, the periods during which ATE had not sought a hearing following the cancellation of a hearing or the expiration of the time-limit set by the court for submitting evidence lasted in total approximately fourteen years and five months (see paragraphs 2-4 above). The Court notes that the applicant bank did not submit whether during these time-spans it took any actions to have the case resumed on the initiative of the parties. The blame cannot therefore be attributed only to the State for the total length of proceedings incurred.

22.  The Court finds that the matter had serious consequences for the applicant bank. It further accepts that the case was of a certain complexity which itself was however not sufficient to justify the overall length of proceedings. The delays in this case which were attributable to the State authorities total more than nineteen years for two instances. Having regard to its case-law, it considers that the Government have advanced no argument justifying a different conclusion in the present case. The length of the proceedings was therefore excessive and there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

23.  The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000‑XI).

24.  The Court has already had the opportunity to observe that at the material time the Greek legal system did not offer the interested parties a remedy enabling them to complain about the length of proceedings (see, among many other authorities, Glykantzi, cited above, § 54). In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in that the applicant bank had no domestic remedy whereby it could enforce its right to a “hearing within a reasonable time” as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

25.  The applicant bank claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and EUR 3,075 for each of its representatives for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. It also claimed EUR 2,809,699.32 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

26.  The Government submitted that the applicant bank’s claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage as a result of the alleged violation of Articles 6 and 13 were excessive, unjustified, and vague and that the claimed costs and expenses were not real, necessary or justifiable and should not have exceeded EUR 1,000.

27.  The Court finds it appropriate to award the applicant bank EUR 9,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of violation of its rights related to the length of proceedings, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

28.  Furthermore, costs and expenses are only recoverable to the extent that they relate to the violation found (see Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10, § 134, 26 April 2016). Having regard to the fact that the applicant bank’s complaints were only partially successful and that a substantial portion of its pleadings concerned an inadmissible part of the application, and also to the documents in the Court’s possession, it considers it reasonable to award EUR 3,075 covering costs under all heads of the two representatives together, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant bank.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant bank, within three months, the following amounts, at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 3,075 (three thousand and seventy-five euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant bank, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 July 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma
 Deputy Registrar President