CASE OF BAYRAMALIYEV v. TÜRKİYE

 

 

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF BAYRAMALIYEV v. TÜRKİYE

(Application no. 49068/20)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

9 April 2026

 

 

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

 

In the case of Bayramaliyev v. Türkiye,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 María Elósegui, President,
 Gilberto Felici,
 Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Sophie Piquet, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 49068/20) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 27 October 2020 by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Tural Bayramaliyev (“the applicant”), who was born in 1984 and was represented by Mr A. Karakırık, a lawyer practising in Istanbul;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 5 of the Convention to the Turkish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Abdullah Aydın, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye;

the parties’ observations;

the decision of the Azerbaijani Government not to exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention);

the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the application by a Committee;

Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application concerns the applicant’s allegations that his detention for extradition purposes had been unlawful and that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention had been ineffective.

2.  The applicant is an Azerbaijani national. According to the latest information in the case file, he is currently in prison in Azerbaijan, after being extradited and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

3.  On 11 September 2017 a Red Notice was issued by the National Central Bureau of Interpol for Azerbaijan on the basis of an arrest warrant issued in absentia by the Sabail District Court, in relation to fraud allegedly committed by the applicant.

4.  On 14 March 2018 the applicant was apprehended by the authorities in Istanbul. On the same day, the Istanbul Anadolu Second Magistrate’s Court ordered the provisional detention of the applicant under section 14 of the Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Law no. 6706) and Article 16 § 4 of the European Convention on Extradition (“the Extradition Convention”). The provisional detention order was made on the basis of the Red Notice issued in respect of the applicant.

5.  On 10 April 2018 the Ministry of Justice forwarded an extradition request by the Azerbaijani authorities, and its supporting documents, to the Istanbul Anadolu Second Assize Court (“the Assize Court”). The supporting documents included the decision of the Sabail District Court seeking the applicant’s arrest and the allegations of fraud against him.

6.  On 17 April 2018 the Assize Court issued a preliminary report (tensip zaptı) for the extradition proceedings, wherein it set the first hearing for 15 May 2018. The court also decided to continue the applicant’s detention; to do so, it ordered protective measures directly under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as provided for by section 16 of Law no. 6706, rather than an extension of the provisional detention.

7.  While in detention, the applicant lodged an application for international protection with the Immigration Authority. On 10 May 2018 his international protection application was rejected. Following an interview with the applicant and an examination of his submissions, it was determined that he had failed to demonstrate that he had a well-founded fear of persecution or ill-treatment upon his return to Azerbaijan. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Istanbul First Administrative Court.

8.  On 15 May 2018 the Assize Court declared the extradition request admissible. The court dismissed the applicant’s claim that the warrant for his arrest had been issued for political reasons, finding that allegation unsubstantiated. It further ordered that the applicant be released from detention and placed under house arrest.

9.  On 21 May 2018 the public prosecutor requested that the Assize Court place the applicant in detention. The prosecutor cited a complaint from an Azerbaijani consular officer regarding threats made by the applicant after his release. Arguing that the applicant’s earlier use of a forged passport indicated that he was a flight risk, the prosecutor asserted that detention was necessary to ensure that the extradition could be carried out.

10.  On 29 May 2018 the Assize Court, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, once again ordered his detention.

11.  On 12 June 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation against the Assize Court’s decision declaring his extradition request admissible. He argued that his detention had exceeded the maximum duration of 40 days allowed under section 14 of Law no. 6706 and Article 16 § 4 of the Extradition Convention. Additionally, he submitted that the extradition request submitted by the Azerbaijani authorities had been incomplete, since it had lacked supporting documents substantiating the allegations against him. He further put forward several allegations regarding the lawfulness of the proceedings initiated against him in Azerbaijan.

12.  On 12 July 2018 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the judgment declaring the extradition request admissible had been in accordance with the law.

13.  On 30 July 2018 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, he argued that his extradition would result in a serious risk of his being killed or subjected to ill‑treatment. Under Article 5 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that his detention had exceeded the maximum duration allowed under domestic law. He further submitted that the extradition request submitted by the Azerbaijani authorities had been incomplete, and that the Assize Court had failed to comply with the requirements of domestic and international law when finding it admissible.

14.  On 2 August 2018 the Directorate General for International Law and Foreign Relations at the Ministry of Justice (“the Directorate General”) requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior submit their opinion in relation to the applicant’s extradition, pursuant to section 19 of Law no. 6709. On 4 October 2018 the Directorate General reiterated the request, stressing to the ministries the urgency of the matter given that the applicant was currently in detention.

15.  On 8 October 2018 the Directorate General requested information from the Constitutional Court on the outcome of the applicant’s individual application, and whether that court had delivered any interim measures that would hinder his extradition. On 12 October 2018 the Constitutional Court responded, submitting that no interim measure had been ordered that would prevent the applicant’s extradition.

16.  On 19 October 2018 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted its opinion to the Directorate General. While it assessed that there were no political impediments to the applicant’s extradition, the Ministry noted that the applicant had appealed against the decision refusing him international protection (see paragraph 7 above). Consequently, the Ministry submitted that it would be appropriate to defer the extradition until the proceedings regarding the request for international protection had been concluded. On 13 November 2018 the Ministry of the Interior issued a similar opinion.

17.  On 23 December 2018 the Directorate General enquired with the Istanbul First Administrative Court about the outcome of the applicant’s appeal and was informed that the case was pending.

18.  On 4 January 2019 the Istanbul First Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection of his international protection application. It found that he had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution on political grounds.

19.  On 31 January 2019 the Directorate General once again asked the administrative court about the outcome of the applicant’s appeal. On 4 February 2019 the Istanbul First Administrative Court informed the Directorate General that it had been dismissed with final effect.

20.  On 14 March 2019 the Justice Minister submitted the extradition request to the President of Türkiye for approval, pursuant to section 19 of Law no. 6706. On 20 March 2019 the applicant’s extradition was approved.

21.  Following the President’s approval, the Turkish police initiated contact with their Azerbaijani counterparts to coordinate the applicant’s extradition. On 11 April 2019 the applicant was handed over to the Azerbaijani authorities at Istanbul Airport and extradited to Azerbaijan.

22.  On 20 April 2020 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s individual application inadmissible, having joined it to 233 other cases which it considered to raise similar issues. It examined the complaints under two heads: administrative detention and deportation. Regarding administrative detention, the court relied on the reasoning in its plenary judgment in the case of B.T. (no. 2014/15769, 30 November 2017). In that decision, it had held that an action for damages before the administrative courts constituted an effective remedy which had to be exhausted only if the detention in question had previously been declared unlawful by a magistrate’s court. The court further specified that where a magistrate’s court had dismissed an objection to detention – such that the unlawfulness of the measure had not been established – an applicant was entitled to lodge an individual application with the Constitutional Court immediately following that decision. As regards deportation, the Constitutional Court observed, without distinguishing the applicant’s specific situation, that some of the applicants in the joined cases had left Türkiye voluntarily, while the deportation orders in respect of others had been annulled. Consequently, it decided to strike that part of the applications out of its list of cases.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 (f) OF THE CONVENTION

23.  The applicant argued that his detention pending extradition had been unlawful, as it had exceeded the 40-day maximum period of detention allowed under Article 16 of the Extradition Convention. He further alleged that the extradition proceedings had not complied with the requirements of domestic and international law. To that end, he alleged that the extradition request issued by the Azerbaijani authorities had not included all the necessary supporting documents required under Article 12 of the Extradition Convention, since the request had included neither a detailed statement of the alleged offences for which the extradition had been requested, nor the time and place of their commission.

 

24.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to duly exhaust the domestic remedies regarding this complaint. They further asserted that the applicant’s detention pending extradition had been in accordance with law, and that the time-limits provided for in Law no. 6706 and the Extradition Convention had been complied with. They argued that the extradition process had been carried out with the required diligence and care.

25.  The Court does not consider it necessary to assess whether the applicant had duly exhausted the domestic remedies for this complaint, as it considers in any event that this part of the application should be rejected for the following reasons.

26.  The relevant domestic legal framework can be found in M.C. v. Türkiye (no. 31592/18, §§ 26-27, 4 June 2024).

27.  The general principles concerning detention pending deportation or extradition under Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention are set out in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 16483/12, §§ 88-92, 15 December 2016), Shiksaitov v. Slovakia (nos. 56751/16 and 33762/17, §§ 53-56, 10 December 2020) and Komissarov v. the Czech Republic (no. 20611/17, §§ 45-47, 3 February 2022). Where extradition will enable the requesting State to try the person concerned, the Court reiterates that the requested State is obliged to act with special diligence, since (a) the person being detained must be presumed innocent; (b) he or she cannot exercise defence rights at that stage; and (c) the requested State is not entitled to consider the merits of the complaint (see Gallardo Sanchez v. Italy, no. 11620/07, § 42, ECHR 2015).

28.  In the present case, the applicant was placed in provisional detention by the Istanbul Anadolu Second Magistrate’s Court on 14 March 2018, in line with section 14 of Law no. 6706. Following the Azerbaijani authorities’ submission of the official extradition request, the applicant’s case was assigned to the Assize Court. On 17 April 2018 the Assize Court ordered the applicant’s continued detention under section 16 of Law no. 6706.

29.  The Court notes at the outset that sections 14 and 16 of Law no. 6706 provide distinct legal bases for detention pending extradition, depending on the stage of the proceedings. The former provision governs provisional detention before an official extradition request has been submitted by the requesting State, limiting such detention to a maximum of 40 days. If the requesting State fails to submit a request within that period, the provisional detention must be discontinued.

30.  The latter provision, by contrast, applies to the stage of proceedings after the formal extradition request has been submitted. It authorises an assize court to order detention in accordance with Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further provides that any protective measure, such as detention, must be lifted if the President does not approve the extradition within one year of the assize court’s final decision on the admissibility of the request.

31.  The Court observes that the applicant’s provisional detention lasted from 14 March until 17 April 2018, covering a period of 35 days. As regards the second statutory time-limit prescribed by section 16(3) of Law no. 6706, the Assize Court’s decision finding the extradition request admissible was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 12 July 2018. The applicant was subsequently extradited on 11 April 2019, nine months after the final decision on the admissibility of the extradition request. The Court therefore finds that neither the duration of the applicant’s provisional detention, nor that of his detention pending the extradition proceedings, exceeded the maximum periods laid down in Law no. 6706.

32.  At this juncture, the Court reiterates that the existence or absence of time-limits is one of a number of factors which it might take into consideration in its overall assessment of whether there existed sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrariness in the extradition proceedings. In and of themselves, time-limits are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention (see, for example, Gallardo Sanchez, cited above, § 39). In Auad v. Bulgaria (no. 46390/10, § 131, 11 October 2011), the Court found that even if fixed time-limits were complied with, it would still find an applicant’s detention to be in breach of Article 5 § 1 (f) if deportation was not pursued with the requisite due diligence.

33.  Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant’s detention pending extradition lasted for a period of almost one year and one month. That duration cannot in and of itself be considered short. In determining whether the overall duration of the proceedings exceeded the duration that was reasonably required for the purpose pursued, the Court must assess whether the domestic authorities remained inactive at any time (see M.C. v. Türkiye, cited above, § 52, and the cases cited therein).

34.  The Court observes that the official extradition request was received on 10 April 2018, less than a month after the applicant’s provisional detention began. Having regard to the evidence in the case file, the Court cannot agree that the domestic courts acted with undue delay for the following reasons. The Assize Court carried out its preliminary examination of the extradition request on 17 April 2018 and, at the very first hearing (on 15 May 2018), delivered a decision finding it admissible. Furthermore, the appellate review was conducted swiftly, with the Court of Cassation deciding on the Assize Court’s decision within a period of two months.

35.  Admittedly, a period of nearly nine months elapsed following the decision of the Court of Cassation. However, the Court observes that that delay was principally attributable to the authorities’ decision to await the outcome of the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of his international protection application. As noted above (see paragraph 16 above), although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior saw no political impediment to the extradition, they recommended that the process be stayed pending the conclusion of those proceedings. On 4 February 2019 the Directorate General was notified that the Istanbul First Administrative Court had dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Consequently, on 14 March 2019 the Ministry of Justice submitted the extradition file to the Presidency in accordance with section 19 of Law no. 6706. The President approved the extradition on 20 March 2019. Following the conclusion of the domestic procedures, the authorities made the necessary practical arrangements with their Azerbaijani counterparts and the applicant was handed over on 11 April 2019.

36.  In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the domestic authorities displayed the requisite diligence throughout the extradition proceedings. It notes, in particular, the active role played by the Directorate General, which was responsible for coordinating the various institutions involved. As the case file demonstrates, the Directorate General maintained regular contact with the relevant ministries and courts, frequently drawing their attention to the urgency of the matter in order to ensure the swift conclusion of the process (see paragraphs 14, 15, 17 and 19 above).

37.  As regards the applicant’s allegation that the extradition proceedings failed to comply with domestic and international law, the Court observes that the Assize Court had at its disposal detailed information concerning the charges and the facts of the case, thus refuting the claim that the extradition request was incomplete. Furthermore, the domestic courts expressly addressed and dismissed as unfounded the applicant’s argument that the request was politically motivated, citing the non-political nature of the offences. In the absence of any indication of arbitrariness in the domestic courts’ assessment, the Court finds that the applicant’s allegations in this regard are unsubstantiated.

38.  For these reasons, the Court finds that the domestic authorities acted with the special diligence required in the circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

       ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

39.  The applicant also alleged that his application to the Constitutional Court had not been an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, as that court had classified his complaints erroneously and had failed to deliver a decision in a speedy manner.

   Admissibility

40.  The Government submitted that a compensation claim under Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided an effective remedy for allegations of unlawful detention, which the applicant had failed to pursue.

41.  The applicant contested that argument, submitting that he had exhausted all available and effective remedies.

42.  The Court reiterates that the applicable domestic legal framework and practice regarding the application of Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be found in Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no. 14305/17, §§ 155 and 205‑14, 22 December 2020).

43.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 exclusively concerns the effectiveness of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. As the remedy referred to by the Government does not apply to the alleged lack of effectiveness and excessive length of proceedings before that court, the Government’s plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.

44.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

   Merits

45.  The Government submitted that the Constitutional Court had displayed the requisite diligence in examining the applicant’s case. They contended that the applicant had formulated his individual application in a complex manner, raising a number of issues which had not concerned the extradition proceedings. In the Government’s view, the crux of the complaint before the Constitutional Court had concerned the allegations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, specifically the risk that the applicant’s extradition would violate his right to life or expose him to ill-treatment. Consequently, the Constitutional Court had joined the application to other cases raising similar legal issues regarding the risk of refoulement and had conducted its assessment accordingly.

46.  The applicant reiterated his initial arguments in response.

47.  The Court refers to the general principles set out in Ilnseher v. Germany ([GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, §§ 251-56, 4 December 2018); Khlaifia and Others (cited above, §§ 128-31); and Kučera v. Slovakia (no. 48666/99, § 107, 17 July 2007), and notes that Article 5 § 4 is applicable to proceedings before constitutional courts (see Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, no. 13237/17, § 159, 20 March 2018). Additionally, the fact that the Court has found no breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention does not mean that it is dispensed from carrying out a review of compliance with Article 5 § 4. The two paragraphs are separate provisions and observance of the former does not necessarily entail observance of the latter (see Douiyeb v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 31464/96, § 57, 4 August 1999).

48.  The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 does not impose an obligation on a court examining an appeal against detention to address every argument contained in the appellant’s submissions. However, the domestic courts cannot treat as irrelevant, or disregard, concrete facts invoked by the detainee and capable of putting into doubt the existence of the conditions essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of the deprivation of liberty (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 94, 26 July 2001). Furthermore, if the court fails to give adequate reasons, or gives repeated formula decisions which provide no answer to the arguments of the applicant, this may disclose a violation by depriving the guarantee under Article 5 § 4 of its substance (see G.B. and Others v. Turkey, no. 4633/15, § 176, 17 October 2019).

49.  In the present case, the question remains as to whether the Constitutional Court provided the applicant with an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention when he was actively seeking to secure a court ruling on the lawfulness of his detention (ibid., § 183).

50.  In this connection, the Court observes that while the applicant’s complaints concerned the unlawfulness of his detention pending extradition (see paragraph 13 above), the Constitutional Court joined his application to a group of cases concerning the administrative detention of foreign nationals pending deportation. Consequently, it declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, relying on the reasoning in its B.T. judgment, which concerned the legal regime governing administrative detention with a view to deportation (see paragraph 22 above).

51.  The Court notes, however, that the applicant was detained strictly for the purpose of extradition and was never subject to administrative detention for deportation purposes. The remedy indicated in the Constitutional Court’s judgment therefore cannot be said to have been effective in the circumstances of the present case. It follows that neither the Constitutional Court’s characterisation of the complaints nor its subsequent conclusion addressed the substance of the applicant’s allegations regarding the lawfulness of his detention pending extradition.

52.  Lastly, the Court reiterates that while the standard of speediness under Article 5 § 4 is less stringent before a court of appeal, constitutional courts are still bound by the requirements of speediness (see G.B. and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 184). Since the liberty of the individual is at stake, the State must ensure that the proceedings are conducted as quickly as possible (see Khlaifia and Others, cited above, § 131, 15 December 2016). In that connection, the Court notes that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court lasted 1 year, 8 months and 21 days, during which the applicant remained in detention pending extradition for the first 8 months and 12 days. The applicant’s application was not particularly complex: it concerned several allegations of unlawfulness in the extradition proceedings (compare Ilnseher, cited above, § 262). The Court observes that by the time the Constitutional Court delivered a decision in his case, the applicant had already been extradited. Accordingly, it finds that the Constitutional Court failed to act with the speed that the special circumstances of the present case required.

53.  In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 on account of the lack of an effective and speedy review by the Constitutional Court of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

54.  The applicant claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 20,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

55.  The Government argued that the applicant’s claims were unsubstantiated and excessive.

56.  As the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, it rejects this claim.

57.  Having regard to its findings with respect to Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention and in view of the procedural nature of the violation, the Court considers that its finding of a violation of Article 5 § 4 constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction. It accordingly finds it appropriate not to make an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

58.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Regard being had to the fact that the applicant failed to submit any documents in support of his claims, the Court makes no award under this head.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the complaint concerning Article 5 § 4 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 

 Sophie Piquet María Elósegui
 Acting Deputy Registrar President

 

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