SECOND SECTION
CASE OF BENKŐ AND SOÓSNÉ BENKŐ v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 17596/12)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 July 2014
FINAL
08/10/2014
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Benkő and Soósné Benkő v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Helen Keller,
Paul Lemmens,
Egidijus Kūris,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 June 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 17596/12) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mrs Ottóné Benkő on 5 March 2012. She was represented by Mr A. Grád, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
2. On 15 May 2012 the Registry was informed that the applicant had died on 5 March 2012. Her children and heirs, Ms Klára Soósné Benkő and Mr Péter Benkő, requested to continue the application in her stead and retained the same lawyer to represent them. For practical reasons this judgment will continue to refer to Mrs Ottóné Benkő as the “applicant” although her heirs are today to be regarded as having that status (see Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 1, ECHR 1999-VI).
3. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
4. On 12 June 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
5. The applicant was born in 1937 and lived in Budapest.
6. On 23 April 2002 she brought an action before the Budapest XX/XXI/XXIII District Court, seeking the dissolution of common ownership.
7. On 22 November 2007 the Budapest Regional Court, acting as a second instance court, adopted a partial judgment in the case.
8. Pursuant to the applicant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court quashed the partial judgment on 25 June 2008 and remitted the case to the first instance court.
9. The case was terminated by the Budapest Regional Court on 1 December 2011 (service: 6 January 2012).
10. On 6 March 2012 the applicant’s lawyer posted a first communication to the Court, indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the application. The communication was dated 5 March 2012.
THE LAW
11. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
12. The Government contested that argument, as well as the locus standi of the heirs.
13. The Court notes that the applicant died on the day which, in accordance with the established practice of the Convention organs and Rule 47 § 5 of the Rules of Court (as in force until 1 January 2014), shall be considered to be the date of the application’s introduction – that is, on the date featuring on the first communication which had been posted on the day after the date which appears on it (see Kemevuako v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65938/09, §§ 19 and 24, 1 June 2010). The Court considers it appropriate to assume, for the purposes of deciding the issue of admissibility, that the applicant was alive at the presumed time of the introduction of the application.
14. As regards the standing of the applicant’s heirs, the Court recalls that in a number of cases in which an applicant died in the course of the proceedings, the Court has taken into account the statements of the applicant’s heirs or of close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, § 22, ECHR 2003‑IX, with further references). It sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case and therefore accepts that the applicant’s children can pursue the application initially brought by her.
15. The period to be taken into consideration began on 23 April 2002 and ended on 6 January 2012. It thus lasted 9 years and 8 months for three levels of jurisdiction.
16. In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
17. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
18. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
19. Relying on Article 41, the applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
20. The Government contested that claim.
21. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on the basis of equity, it awards her heirs jointly EUR 4,000 under that head.
22. Neither the applicant nor her heirs made any costs claim.
23. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant’s heirs, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros) jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 July 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley NaismithGuido Raimondi
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy