FIRST SECTION
CASE OF BLASKO v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 50301/22)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 April 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Blasko v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Davor Derenčinović, President,
Artūrs Kučs,
Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 50301/22) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 22 October 2022 by a Slovak national, Mr Marian Blasko (“the applicant”), who was born in 1978, is detained in Želiezovce and was represented by Mr M. Ganczner, a lawyer practising in Nové Zámky;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the presumption of innocence and an alleged lack of impartiality under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention to the Slovak Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns an alleged violation of the applicant’s right to the presumption of innocence and to an impartial tribunal.
2. On 8 July 2015 the applicant was arrested and on 9 July 2015 criminal charges on account of drug trafficking were brought against him and N.K., his co-accused.
3. On 14 December 2015 the Levice District Court (“the District Court”), sitting in a formation composed of presiding judge M.J. and two lay assessors, O.G. and E.B., approved a plea‑bargain agreement between the Public Prosecution Service and N.K., and found the latter guilty of participating in drug trafficking. The relevant parts of the court’s judgment read as follows:
“On several occasions between April and June 2015, in exchange for financial remuneration, N.K. drove the accused, Marian Blasko, ... at his request, from his permanent residence in Šahy to villages near the town of Sereď, where the accused, Marian Blasko, purchased methamphetamine from persons unknown after agreeing in advance via telephone to do so. The accused, N.K., was aware of [that arrangement], and after [each] purchase they returned to Šahy together in the above-mentioned vehicle.”
4. The applicant’s trial started at the District Court with Judge M.J. as the presiding judge and two lay assessors, E.K. and P.T.
5. On 6 March 2017 the applicant’s lawyer challenged the impartiality of Judge M.J. on the ground that she had presided over the hearing at which the applicant’s co-accused had been convicted. His request was dismissed by the District Court, sitting in the same composition.
6. On 23 October 2017 the District Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking. The applicant’s further appeal, which included his allegations about the lack of impartiality and violation of the presumption of innocence, was dismissed by the Nitra Regional Court. A subsequent appeal on points of law was also dismissed by the Supreme Court.
7. On 26 May 2022 the Constitutional Court, by decision no. III. ÚS 46/2022, dismissed a constitutional complaint by the applicant. In its decision, the court acknowledged that Judge M.J. had failed to draft the judgment against N.K. in a way that clearly distinguished his procedural position from that of the applicant. It held that, in that aspect, the judgment in respect of N.K. “clearly could not be considered perfect”. Nevertheless, it found that “[that] shortcoming alone could not ... justify the conclusion that [the judge had been] biased against [the applicant] in the proceedings against him”. The applicant received the decision on 23 June 2022.
8. The applicant complained before the Court under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that the wording of the judgment delivered by Judge M.J. against N.K., his co‑accused, had been prejudicial to his right to be presumed innocent as he had been referred to as a criminal, and that Judge M.J. had been biased when subsequently convicting him.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
9. The Government submitted that the wording used in the judgment against the applicant’s co-accused had not violated the principle of the presumption of innocence, and they emphasised that the applicant had failed to properly raise the complaint of a lack of impartiality before the domestic courts. In any event, the judge in question had not been biased.
10. The applicant failed to submit his observations within the prescribed time-limit.
11. As regards the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court finds that the applicant sufficiently raised the complaint about the lack of impartiality at the domestic level, in particular, at one of the hearings at the first instance court as well as in all of his appeals and in his constitutional complaint (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above).
12. Thus, the Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
13. In the present case, given that the issues of the presumption of innocence and impartiality of Judge M.J. are interrelated but not overlapping the Court will consider them one by one (see Tsaava and Others v. Georgia [GC], nos. 13186/20 and 4 others, §§ 225-29, 11 December 2025). First, the Court will determine whether the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention were violated by the impugned statements.
14. The general principles concerning the presumption of innocence have been summarised in Lavents v. Latvia (no. 58442/00, § 125, 28 November 2002), Nešťák v. Slovakia (no. 65559/01, § 88, 27 February 2007), Karaman v. Germany (no. 17103/10, § 41, 27 February 2014) and Mucha v. Slovakia (no. 63703/19, §§ 57-58, 25 November 2021).
15. In the present case, the judgment approving the plea‑bargain agreement between the applicant’s co-accused and the Public Prosecution Service contained a detailed description of the offence in question, which included the applicant’s name and his role as one of the perpetrators. It was thus capable of raising doubts as to whether it prejudged the question of whether the applicant himself had fulfilled all the elements of the criminal offence necessary to be held criminally liable for it. Referring to the applicant and his actions in such a way may, in principle, have engaged the protection of his right to be presumed innocent (see Mucha, cited above, §§ 55-56, and paragraph 3 above).
16. The applicant was described as an “accused” person throughout the judgment. The court thus appears to have used the statements at issue not to declare him guilty, but to substantiate its decision against his co‑accused. However, the lack of an intention to breach the right to the presumption of innocence cannot rule out a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 37816/12 and 25260/14, § 69, 22 April 2021).
17. The court made no proper reference to the fact that the applicant was being “prosecuted separately” or that the court’s only concern was assessing his co-accused’s criminal responsibility within the scope of the proceedings in issue (contrast Karaman, cited above, § 69).
18. Statements made by judges are subject to stricter scrutiny than those made by other authorities (see Pandy v. Belgium, no. 13583/02, § 43, 21 September 2006). The Court considers that in the present case the statements at issue went beyond describing a “state of suspicion” against the applicant and represented him as someone who had committed a criminal offence. The overall manner and context in which the statements were made therefore risked leaving no doubt that the applicant had committed the criminal offence in question (see Maksim Savov v. Bulgaria, no. 28143/10, § 73, 13 October 2020, and Avaz Zeynalov, cited above, § 70).
19. Lastly, it does not seem that the courts made any appropriate attempt to correct the defect in issue (see Avaz Zeynalov, cited above, § 71).
20. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.
21. As regards impartiality of Judge M.J., the Court first notes that the general principles relating to impartiality have been set out in, for example, Meng v. Germany (no. 1128/17, §§ 42-52, 16 February 2021) and Mucha (cited above, § 49). It further observes that the above findings concerning the nature of statements made by Judge M.J. in the proceedings against the applicant’s co-accused are sufficient to enable the Court to make a conclusion about the lack of impartiality of the District Court in the applicant’s case (see Ferrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy, 7 August 1996, §§ 59-60, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III). The fact that Judge M.J. was a member of the bench is not in itself decisive for the objective impartiality issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In view of the secrecy of the deliberations, it is impossible to ascertain the presiding judge’s actual influence on that occasion. Therefore, the impartiality of that court could be open to genuine doubt (see Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, nos. 4184/15 and 4 others, § 67, 6 November 2018). Moreover, the challenge of bias was considered in the same composition as the composition considering the merits of the case (see paragraph 5 above). The Court has already held that the situation where judges consider challenges against themselves can raise doubts as to impartiality (see Kolesnikova v. Russia, no. 45202/14, § 55, 2 March 2021). In the present case, the other two members of the panel were lay assessors who were not professional judges. The presiding judge also had a significant role in conducting the hearings and deliberations, taking account of her experience and procedural status (see, mutatis mutandis, Karrar v. Belgium, no. 61344/16, §§ 37-38, 31 August 2021). Finally, the judgment approving the plea-bargain agreement and convicting the applicant’s co-accused, the decision on the challenge of Judge M.J.’s impartiality and the judgment convicting the applicant were all signed only by the presiding judge – Judge M.J. – which could additionally create an impression that the relevant decisions were made only by that judge and prompt objectively held misgivings as to impartiality from the point of view of the external observer.
22. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION23. The applicant submitted no claims for just satisfaction with the prescribed time-limit. Accordingly, the Court makes no award.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Liv Tigerstedt Davor Derenčinović
Deputy Registrar President