CASE OF BUDESCU v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF BUDESCU v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 79632/13)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

16 January 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Budescu v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

The application (no. 79632/13) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 December 2013 by a Moldovan national, Mr Andrei Budescu (“the applicant”), who was born in 1975, lives in Chișinău and was represented by Mr I. Simboteanu, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their then Agent, Mr M. Gurin, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 12 December 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns the quashing of a judgment in the applicant’s favour by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal, contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2.  In particular, in 2009 the applicant’s father, B.V., sought to obtain ownership of a plot of land measuring 1,234 sq. m adjacent to his house. The Chișinău municipality failed to examine his request within the statutory time‑limit and B.V. initiated court proceedings with the same claims. On 23 June 2009 the Chișinău Court of Appeal granted B.V.’s claims and ordered the Chișinău municipality to grant B.V. ownership of the plot “in accordance with the applicable law”. On 4 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld this judgment.

3.  On 15 May 2012 the Chișinău municipality issued decision no. 4/13‑26 with the purpose of enforcing the final judgment of 23 June 2009. This decision divided the plot of 1,234 sq. m into two separate plots: B.V. was granted ownership of one, measuring 600 sq. m, and the other, measuring 657 sq. m, was declared municipal property. B.V. appealed against the municipality’s decision.

4.  The Chișinău Court of Appeal examined B.V.’s claims in administrative proceedings and by a judgment of 14 November 2012 upheld B.V.’s claims and annulled decision no. 4/13‑26, concluding that under the final judgment of 23 June 2009 B.V. was entitled to receive the ownership of the plot of land measuring 1,234 sq. m, adjacent to his house. The judgment relied on the Law on administrative court proceedings (Legea contenciosului administrativ) but its operative part read that it was subject to an appeal on points of law within two months.

5.  On 21 February 2013 the Chișinău municipality lodged an appeal on points of law by means of the postal service. The appeal was received by the registry of the Supreme Court of Justice on 25 February 2013. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice B.V. argued that the municipality’s appeal was time-barred because it was lodged outside the statutory time-limit of fifteen days provided by Article 30 (1) of the Law on administrative court proceedings. Alternatively, B.V. also argued that the two‑month time-limit had not been respected either because the appeal had been lodged on 25 February 2013.

6.  On 8 May 2013 B.V. died and the applicant undertook his claims and debts as the heir apparent based on B.V.’s will.

7.  On 6 September 2013, with the applicant’s participation, the Supreme Court of Justice declared the appeal on points of law admissible, concluding that it was lodged within the time-limit of two months, as provided by Article 434 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, upheld it and quashed the judgment of 14 November 2012 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal, dismissing the applicant’s claims.

8.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the domestic courts had upheld a time‑barred appeal on points of law, contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which had led to the deprivation of his property confirmed by the final judgment of 14 November 2012 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal.

9.  The relevant provisions of Law no. 793 on administrative court proceedings, enacted on 10 February 2000, in force at the time of the proceedings, read as follows:

Article 3. Applicability of the administrative court proceedings

“(1)  The administrative court proceedings are applicable to administrative decisions, of a normative and individual character ... issued by:

a)  public authorities and authorities assimilated to them within the meaning of this law...”

Article 8. Jurisdiction of the courts of appeal

“(1)  The courts of appeal acting as first instance courts shall examine the claims related to ... the lawfulness of administrative decisions issued by public authorities ... .”

Article 30. Remedies

“(1)  The administrative court judgment shall be subject to an appeal on points of law which has to be lodged within 15 days from the date of its delivery, or from the date of its service if the party did not participate in the proceedings.”

10.  The relevant parts of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Moldova, enacted by Law no. 225 of 30 May 2003, in force at the time of the proceedings, read as follows:

Section 2

Appeal on points of law against the acts of the courts of appeal

Article 429. Decisions subject to appeal on points of law

“(1)  Shall be subject to appeal on points of law decisions handed down by the courts of appeal as appellate courts, as well as the judgements issued by the courts of appeal in insolvency proceedings.”

Article 434. Time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law

“(1)  The time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law is two months from the date of service of the reasoned judgment or of the reasoned decision.”

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

12.  The applicant submitted that the proceedings had breached the principle of legal certainty as safeguarded by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because the domestic courts upheld a time‑barred appeal, after the Supreme Court of Justice declared the Chișinău municipality’s appeal on points of law admissible, upheld it and quashed the judgment of 14 November 2012 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal, dismissing the applicant’s claims. In particular, he contended that B.V.’s claims had been examined before the Chișinău Court of Appeal in administrative proceedings, for which the applicable law provided a time‑limit of fifteen days for lodging an appeal on points of law. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Justice declared the appeal on points of law admissible, concluding that it was lodged within the time-limit of two months, provided by the general civil procedure rules, failing to give any reasons to the applicant’s arguments about the applicability of the administrative proceedings.

13.  The Government disagreed, arguing that the appeal on points of law was not time-barred considering that the Chișinău municipality received the judgment of 14 November 2012 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal on 20 December 2012 and on 21 February 2013 had lodged its appeal on points of law by means of the postal service. The Government argued that in accordance with Article 434(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure the statutory time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law was two months from the date of service. The Government did not address the applicant’s argument concerning the applicability of the special Law on administrative court proceedings.

14.  The general principles concerning the principle of legal certainty in civil proceedings have been summarised in Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, (no. 14385/04, §§ 97-98, 19 December 2006), Baroul Partner-A v. Moldova (no. 39815/07, §§ 36-37, 16 July 2009), Banca Internaţională de Investiţii şi Dezvoltare MB S.A. v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 28648/05, §§ 35‑44, 16 October 2012). The general principles concerning the obligation for the courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions have been summarised in Covalenco v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 72164/14, § 24, 16 June 2020), Anđelković v. Serbia (no. 1401/08, § 24, 9 April 2013), Petrović and Others v. Montenegro (no. 18116/15, § 41, 17 July 2018).

15.  From the outset, the Court notes that the applicant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the applicable time-limit was the one of fifteen days, provided by Article 30 (1) of Law no. 793. However, the Supreme Court of Justice never explained why the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which referred to other types of decisions being subject to an appeal on points of law were applicable instead (see paragraphs 9-10 above).

16.  The Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature such as the prescribed manner and time for lodging an appeal. The Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention in general and with the principle of legal certainty in particular (see Platakou v. Greece, no. 38460/97, § 37, ECHR 2001‑I, and Dacia SRL v. Moldova, no. 3052/04, § 75, 18 March 2008). The Court should not act as a fourth-instance body and will therefore not question the national courts’ assessment under Article 6 § 1, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, § 149, 17 October 2019; De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, 23 February 2017; and Mont Blanc Trading Ltd and Antares Titanium Trading Ltd v. Ukraine, no. 11161/08, § 81, 14 January 2021).

17.  The Court notes that the cited provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure refer in a straightforward way to judgments and decisions issued by the courts of appeal and not as first-instance courts, like in the applicant’s case, but as appellate courts or as acts handed down in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 10 above). At the same time, Law no. 793, which is cited by the Chișinău Court of Appeal in its judgment, refers to proceedings initiated against administrative acts, like in the applicant’s case, and explicitly refers to only one type of appeal on points of law, which could be lodged within a time‑limit of fifteen days.

18.  Considering that the Chișinău Court of Appeal acted as a first-instance court and on 14 November 2012 adopted a judgment which was not handed down in insolvency proceedings, the Court finds that the applicant’s arguments about the applicability of Law no. 793 and the expiry of the fifteen‑day time‑limit to lodge an appeal was sufficiently pertinent to require an explicit answer from the Supreme Court of Justice. This element was brought to the knowledge of the domestic courts. However, the Supreme Court of Justice failed to consider it or to explain why it would indeed have been irrelevant.

19.  In the light of the above, the Court cannot discern an explanation why another legal time-limit was applied to allow the domestic courts to accept an appeal on points of law which otherwise would have been time‑barred (see, mutatis mutandis, Anđelković, cited above, § 27).

20.  Therefore, the Court concludes that the Supreme Court of Justice either failed to examine the arguments concerning the applicable law or reached arbitrary conclusions concerning the non-expiry of the time-limit for appeal. In such circumstances, the Court comes to the conclusion that the interpretation given by the domestic courts to the rules concerning the prescribed time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law had an effect which was incompatible with the principle of legal certainty as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.

21.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

22.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal and the ensuing deprivation of his property is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

23.  The applicant submitted that his right of property, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, over the plot of land measuring 1,234 sq. m., confirmed by the final judgment of 14 November 2012, was violated by the upholding of a time-barred appeal.

24.  The Government submitted that in the present case the property right, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, was not violated considering that the appeal on points of law was not time-barred.

25.  The Court considers that the applicant had a “possession” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It already found that the upholding of a time-barred appeal in the absence of any compelling reasons was incompatible with the principle of legal certainty (see paragraphs 19-21 above). In such circumstances the Court cannot but conclude that the upholding of the Chișinău municipality’s appeal on points of law, resulting in the quashing of a judgment favourable to the applicant constituted an unjustified interference with the applicant’s right to property, because a fair balance was not preserved and the applicant was required to bear an individual and excessive burden (compare also Ipteh SA and Others v. Moldova, no. 35367/08, § 38, 24 November 2009). The domestic courts did not provide any justification whatsoever for such interference.

26.  It follows that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27.  In his submissions on just satisfaction, the applicant did not make any claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, or costs and expenses, arguing that the finding of a violation in the present case would amount to sufficient just satisfaction for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained by him.

28.  Accordingly, the Court is not called to award the applicant any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 January 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström
 Deputy Registrar President