CASE OF BUREŠ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF BUREŠ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

(Application no. 37679/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

18 October 2012

FINAL

18/01/2013

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Bureš v. the Czech Republic,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Dean Spielmann, President,
Karel Jungwiert,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ann Power-Forde,
Angelika Nußberger,
André Potocki,
Paul Lemmens, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 25 September 2012,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 37679/08) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Czech national, Mr Lukáš Bureš (“the applicant”), on 1 August 2008.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms B. Bukovská, Mr J. Fiala, Ms J. Marečková and Mr M. Matiaško, lawyers from the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre in Brno. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V.A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.

3. The applicant alleged that he was ill-treated in a sobering-up centre in violation of Article 3 of the Convention and detained in a psychiatric hospital in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.

4. On 16 June 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.

5. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits. In addition, third-party comments were received from the Harvard Law School Project on Disability, which had been granted leave by the President of the Chamber to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Brno. He is a violoncello player and has been diagnosed as having a psycho-social disability. At the material time he weighed 64 kg and was 176 cm tall. In the past, he has been treated in Italian psychiatric hospitals as a voluntary patient. At the time of the events at issue, he was using Akineton, a calming psychiatric medication prescribed to him by his psychiatrist.

7. On 9 February 2007 the applicant inadvertently overdosed on Akineton. In the evening, he left his flat and went to buy some food. Being under the influence of the medication, he did not notice that he was wearing only a sweater, but no trousers or underwear. On the way he was stopped by a police patrol that assumed that he was a drug addict and called an ambulance, which took him to Brno-Černovice Psychiatric Hospital. The record drawn up by the ambulance staff states that the applicant was receiving psychiatric treatment and that he was calm during transport.

8. At the hospital he was examined by Dr V., who did not find any injuries on the applicant’s body and sent him to the sobering-up centre in the same hospital at about 8 p.m. The applicant was calm during the medical examination. In the sobering-up centre he was again examined by Dr H., who confirmed that there were no injuries on the applicant’s body when he was admitted to the centre.

9. On 10 February 2007 at 7:24 a.m. the applicant was transferred to the Intensive Psychiatric Care Unit where, according to the admission record, he had visible abrasions on the front of his neck, both wrists and both ankles, caused probably by friction against textile, and abrasions of an unspecified different type on his knees. He complained about his treatment in the sobering-up centre to the hospital authorities, but they did not take any action.

10. On 15 February 2007 the applicant was examined by a neurologist, who stated that as a result of the use of straps the applicant suffered severe paresis of the left arm and medium to severe paresis of the right arm. He began a course of intensive treatment at the Rehabilitation Unit.

11. The applicant remained in the hospital involuntarily until released on 13 April 2007.

12. However, because of his two-month hospitalisation, he was confused and was not able to fully take care of himself. He voluntarily returned to the hospital on 14 April 2007 and remained there until 1 July 2007.

A. The applicant’s treatment in the sobering-up centre

13. The following facts are disputed by the parties.

14. According to the applicant, at 8.10 p.m. on 9 February 2007 he was strapped to a bed with leather straps around his wrists, knees and ankles by two male nurses, Mr M. and Mr H. While strapping him, they kneeled on his chest and verbally abused him. He remained strapped for the whole night, until 6.30 a.m. The staff did not check up on him during that time. As the straps were too tight, he struggled to breathe and as a result of insufficient blood circulation the nerves in his arms were damaged.

15. According to the Government the applicant was strapped to a bed for three intervals, namely, from 8.10 p.m. to 10 p.m., 4.30 a.m. to 5 a.m. and 6.30 a.m. to 7.15 a.m.

16. They submitted a record from the sobering-up centre containing the following information. When brought to the centre the applicant was intoxicated and was put to bed. He was unstrapped at 10 p.m. At 4.30 a.m. he attacked a nurse and was strapped again. Checks were carried out. The applicant was restless. At 6.30 a.m. he was checked on and again strapped. The record noted that he showed destructive behaviour. He was released at 7.15 a.m. and sent to the psychiatric hospital.

17. The version of the record submitted by the applicant and obtained from his medical files contains less information. The information about the release of the applicant at 10 p.m. is illegible. According to the Government, the version submitted by the applicant was an incomplete version sent to the psychiatric hospital as an accompanying document.

B. Review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s involuntary admission to the psychiatric hospital

18. On 12 February 2007 the hospital informed the Brno Municipal Court (městský soud) that the applicant had been detained because he showed signs of a mental illness and was a danger to himself and his surroundings. He was described as –“restless, aggressive and suspected of intoxication by psycho-stimulants”.

19. On 16 February 2007 the court began reviewing the lawfulness of the applicant’s involuntary admission under Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it appointed an attorney, Ms P., to represent the applicant in the proceedings. On the same day a court employee visited the hospital and questioned the applicant’s treating doctor, Dr V., in the absence of the applicant and his representative. Dr V. testified that the applicant had been admitted to the hospital due to his confusion, restlessness and inappropriate behaviour and that he had been intoxicated when admitted. He further stated that the applicant was only partly able to understand the proceedings. The court employee did not question or even see the applicant because Dr V. told her that contact with him “would not be entirely beneficial”.

20. On the same day and without any further evidence the court ruled that the applicant’s involuntary admission had been lawful because he suffered from an illness that made him dangerous to himself and his surroundings. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative only. The latter did not take part in the proceedings, not being aware of them as the decision on her appointment was sent to her together with the decision on the merits. The applicant never saw her during his detention.

21. After his release in July 2007, the applicant contacted a local office of the Mental Disability Advocacy Center (“the MDAC”). On 10 July 2007 an MDAC lawyer lodged an appeal on his behalf, applying at the same time for a waiver of the deadline for lodging the appeal.

22. On 20 August 2007 the Municipal Court granted the waiver. However, on 31 October 2007, the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud), terminated the appeal proceedings without deciding on the merits. It stated that the applicant had been released on 13 April 2007, that on 30 May 2007 the Municipal Court had stayed the proceedings on the applicant’s continuing detention and that, therefore, the court did not have the authority to deal with the case.

23. In the meantime, on 23 July 2007, the applicant lodged an action for nullity (žaloba pro zmatečnost) under Article 229 § 1 c) of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to have the Municipal Court’s decision of 16 February 2007 quashed on the ground that he had been denied the right to participate in the proceedings and had not been properly represented. On 22 May 2008 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding, inter alia, that Ms P. had not been wholly inactive, referring to a letter of 26 February 2007 by which she had allegedly tried to establish contact with the applicant, but which, according to the applicant, had never been delivered to him. On 25 February 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision.

24. On 5 February 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal challenging the decision of 31 October 2007 and alleging a violation of his rights to liberty, a fair trial and an effective remedy because the Regional Court had failed to rule on the merits of his appeal and thus the legality of his detention in the psychiatric hospital.

25. On 18 March 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) dismissed his appeal on the grounds that he had not exhausted all available remedies. It held that the applicant should have lodged a plea of nullity under Article 229 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the 31 October 2007 decision of the Regional Court.

C. Review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s continuing detention

26. After ruling on the lawfulness of the applicant’s involuntary admission to the hospital, the Municipal Court continued proceedings under Article 191d of the Code of Civil Procedure to review the lawfulness of the applicant’s continuing detention. On 6 March 2007 a forensic psychiatric expert was appointed for these purposes. On 30 May 2007 the court terminated the proceedings without deciding on the merits, the applicant having been released in the meantime.

D. Proceedings regarding the applicant’s alleged inhuman and degrading treatment

27. On 7 June 2007 the applicant filed a criminal complaint concerning the measure of restraint applied to him and alleged ill-treatment on the night from 9 to 10 February 2007 in the sobering-up centre of the psychiatric hospital.

28. He was questioned by the police on 29 June 2007 and gave a full account of the events. The police then questioned numerous other persons.

29. The male nurses on duty, Mr M. and Mr H., did not recall the applicant at all and were not able to provide any specific information about him. Mr. M noted that during the winter of 2007 checks had been always carried out in accordance with the instructions of the psychiatric hospital management.

30. The third nurse on duty that night, Ms K., stated that the applicant had been strapped to the bed because he had been restless and intoxicated by an unknown substance and had refused to undergo a blood test to identify the substance. She admitted that it was possible that regular checks every twenty minutes might not have been performed due to the high number of patients at the centre that night. She also alleged that the applicant had attacked a male nurse at 4.30 a.m. but she could not remember who exactly.

31. Dr H., who had been on duty at the sobering-up centre that night, confirmed that the applicant had had no injuries when he had been admitted. He noted that the applicant had been strapped to the bed due to his restlessness but that he and other staff had duly checked on him.

32. Nurse P. recalled that while she was taking over patients from Ms K. at around 6 a.m. in the morning of 10 February, the applicant’s arms and legs had been strapped. They had tried releasing the straps one by one but because he defended himself each time a limb was released he was strapped again.

33. In his report of 10 December 2007 commissioned by the police, a forensic expert, Dr V., stated that the applicant had suffered bilateral severe paresis of the elbow nerves as a result of compression of the nerves and blood vessels. He confirmed that these injuries corresponded to the cause as described by the applicant. According to him, the injury on the applicant’s left arm limited his ability to play the violoncello. He concluded that the injury would have a long-lasting effect which was unlikely to be permanent.

34. On 11 December 2007 the Brno-Komárov Municipal Police Directorate (městské ředitelství policie) terminated the criminal proceedings, finding that no criminal offence had been committed regarding the applicant’s strapping on the night of 9 to 10 February 2007. It held that the applicant had suffered the injuries partly as a result of the staff’s failure to check on him regularly but that the extent of the guilt of individual suspects could not be determined. It also held that the injuries had almost healed and that the applicant was partly responsible for them.

35. The applicant appealed, disputing the conclusions of the police, and requested that the doctors and nurses give evidence again.

36. On 12 February 2008 the Brno Municipal Prosecutors’ Office (městské státní zastupitelství) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Without examining any additional evidence it stated that the strapping of the applicant on account of his aggressive behaviour at the time of his admission to the sobering-up centre had been in compliance with the law and the hospital’s internal rules and he had been checked on every twenty minutes. The applicant had been strapped from 8.10 p.m. to 10 p.m., from 4.30 a.m. to 5 a.m. and from 6.30 a.m.

37. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal claiming a violation of Articles 3, 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention. He alleged that the investigation had not been effective because, inter alia, he had not been allowed to be present during the questioning of witnesses and put questions to them.

38. On 30 October 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed his constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It held that there was no right to have a third person prosecuted so the applicant could claim his rights only in civil proceedings for damages and protection of his personality rights (ochrana osobnosti). It further found no violation of procedural obligations as developed by the Court under Article 3 of the Convention. It noted that the police had conducted a number of interviews and examined other evidence and that the investigation had also been independent and prompt. Lastly, it held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the ill-treatment in the hospital because that was an instantaneous act, whereas it could only rule on interference with rights that was ongoing and that could be remedied by a decision on its part.

E. Proceedings for protection of his personal rights

39. On 8 December 2008 the applicant instituted proceedings for protection of his personality rights against Brno-Černovice Psychiatric Hospital, claiming a violation of his right to liberty, inhuman treatment and interference with his health and physical integrity.

40. On 19 January 2012 the Brno Regional Court rejected his claim, holding that the applicant’s internment in the sobering-up centre and the use of restraints had been necessary for his own protection and that of his surroundings.

41. The applicant appealed and the proceedings are pending.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. 99/1963)

42. Under Article 191a a health-care facility that admits a patient against his or her will must inform the competent court within twenty-four hours.

43. Under Article 191b § 1 a court has to review the lawfulness of an involuntary admission to a health-care facility within seven days. Article 191b § 2 provides that the patient has a right to be represented by counsel of his or her own choosing. If he or she does not have counsel, the court shall appoint him or her an attorney. In accordance with Article 191b § 3, the court shall assess evidence, hear the detained person, his or her treating doctor and other persons at the detained person’s request unless it considers it unnecessary.

44. Under Article 191c an appeal can be lodged against a decision taken under Article 191b, but does not have a suspensive effect. The health-care facility can release the patient even if a court has declared that the involuntary admission was lawful.

45. Article 191d § 1 provides that if the court finds that the admission was lawful, it shall continue to review the lawfulness of the continued confinement. Pursuant to paragraph 2, the court shall appoint an expert to assess the necessity of the confinement. That expert must not be working in the health-care facility where the person is detained. In accordance with paragraph 3 the court shall hold a hearing and summon the patient and his or her counsel (provided that according to the treating doctor or written expert opinion the patient is able to follow and understand the meaning of the proceedings). At the hearing, the court shall hear the expert, the treating doctor if needed and the patient and assess any other relevant evidence. Its decision must be issued no later than three months from the decision by which the admission to the health care facility was approved.

46. Under Article 191f the patient, his or her counsel, guardian and other persons close to him may, before the expiration of the time for which his or her admission to the health-care facility was approved, request a new medical examination and release, if there is a reasoned presumption that continued confinement is not necessary.

47. Under Article 229 § 1 c) a final court decision may be challenged by an action for nullity on the ground that a party to the proceedings lacked legal capacity to act or could not attend the court and was not properly represented. Paragraph 4 provides that an action for nullity may also be lodged against a final decision of an appellate court by which an appeal was dismissed or the appellate proceedings were terminated.

B. The Public Health Care Act (Act no. 20/1996)

48. Under section 23(4)(b) a person can be involuntarily hospitalised if he shows signs of a mental illness and is a danger to himself or his surroundings.

C. Act no. 379/2005, on measures for the protection against damage caused by tobacco products, alcohol and other drugs

49. Section 17(1) defines an alcohol and drug sobering-up centre as a health-care facility established by a regional self-governing unit.

50. Section 17(2) stipulates that should a health-care facility find that a person’s life is not endangered by failure of basic vital functions but that he or she is under the influence of alcohol or another drug and cannot control his or her behaviour, thereby directly endangering him or herself or other persons, public order or property, or is causing public annoyance, that person shall undergo treatment and stay at the sobering-up centre for however long is necessary for the acute intoxication to subside.

D. Guideline no. 1/2005 of the Journal of the Ministry of Health, on the use of measures of restraint on patients in psychiatric facilities in the Czech Republic

51. This guideline stipulates, inter alia, the following:

“The use of measures of restraint must be considered as a last resort in cases when it is necessary for the protection of the patient, other patients, the patient’s surroundings and staff of psychiatric facilities. They may be used only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. Any decision to restrain the patient must be sufficiently grounded. Restraint cannot be used to facilitate treatment or to deal with a restless patient. Potential causes of problematic behaviour, for example, pain, discomfort, side effects of medicinal products, stress, interpersonal problems between the caregivers and the patient, or other illnesses must always be identified. The use of measures of restraint is justified only if a removable cause of the patient’s behaviour cannot be found or in situations when the risk arising from the patient’s behaviour is unacceptably high. The benefit of the use of restraining means must outweigh the risks ...

2. Measures of restraint can be used only exceptionally and only when the patient behaves in a way which endangers himself and his surroundings, and not on an educational or corrective basis. In the case of each individual patient it is necessary to use the most gentle and appropriate means of restraint ...

5. A patient restrained by these means shall be checked on on a regular basis, intervals between the checks shall be specified, provisions shall be put in place to prevent the patient hurting himself or suffering from dehydration, malnutrition, hypothermia and pressure ulcers, and to allow for personal hygiene. Measures of restraint should be used for the shortest time possible, and during checks the need for the measures and the possibility of using less restraint should be reassessed ...

6. The doctor shall decide on the use of measures of restraint, and make a record that shall always include: the name of the person who ordered the measure of restraint, the type of restraint used, the reason for using it, the time when restraint was employed and the time when it ended, the frequency of checks by the medical staff and the doctor, a description of the person’s physical and mental condition ... A member of the medical staff shall inform the doctor of any change in the patient’s symptoms. The record on the use of restraint shall be subsequently signed by the head doctor during the ward round.”

E. Psychiatrie, Guidelines for psychiatric treatment issued by the Czech Psychiatric Society, December 2006

52. In its section on the use of restraints the Guidelines contain similar principles as the above-mentioned Guideline no. 1/2005 of the Journal of the Ministry of Health. In particular they state that mechanical restraints should be used only as a matter of last resort. Strapping to a bed should be applied only in cases of serious manifestations of distress endangering surroundings, auto-aggressive manifestations with immediate risk of self‑harm or suicide or conditions that will with the highest probability result in these manifestations.

They also state that all circumstances connected with the use of restraints must be transparently and clearly documented. Every use of restraints must be recorded in a concrete way, including, inter alia, the time when the restraints were applied and removed and checks on the patient.

F. Opinion of the Civil Law and Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, no. Cpjn 29/2006, as regards proceedings to determine the lawfulness of admission to and detention in a health-care facility

53. On 14 January 2009 the Supreme Court adopted an opinion on this matter, because the courts had not been dealing with cases concerning proceedings to decide on the lawfulness of admission to a health-care facility (Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure) and continuing confinement therein (Article 191d of the Code of Civil Procedure) in a uniform manner.

It held, inter alia, that if the detained person is released there are no more reasons for continuing the proceedings either under Article 191b or 191d and both should be discontinued.

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

A. Articles on State Responsibility (noted by the UN General Assembly resolution no. 56/83 of 12 December 2001)

54. The Articles, drawn up by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, are largely considered to contain rules of customary international law. They stipulate, inter alia, the following possibilities of attribution of a conduct to a State:

Article 4. Conduct of organs of a State

“1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.

2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.”

Article 5. Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements
of governmental authority

“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”

In its commentary to Article 5, the International Law Commission explained that the rule dealt with situations when entities which were not considered organs of a State exercised functions of a public character normally exercised by State organs, and the conduct of the entity was related to the exercise of the governmental authority concerned. It gave the power of detention as an example of such a public function.

B. Recommendation Rec(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders, 22 September 2004

55. Article 27, entitled “Seclusion and restraint” stipulates:

“1. Seclusion or restraint should only be used in appropriate facilities, and in compliance with the principle of least restriction, to prevent imminent harm to the person concerned or others, and in proportion to the risks entailed.

2. Such measures should only be used under medical supervision, and should be appropriately documented.

3. In addition:

i. the person subject to seclusion or restraint should be regularly monitored;

ii. the reasons for, and duration of, such measures should be recorded in the person’s medical records and in a register.

4. This Article does not apply to momentary restraint.”

C. The CPT Standards (the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) concerning using restraints in psychiatric establishments (CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1- Rev. 2010)

56. The CPT standards contain the following rules on restraining patients in psychiatric establishments:

“Involuntary placement in psychiatric establishments Extract from the 8th General Report [CPT/Inf (98) 12]

47. In any psychiatric establishment, the restraint of agitated and/or violent patients may on occasion be necessary. This is an area of particular concern to the CPT, given the potential for abuse and ill-treatment.

The restraint of patients should be the subject of a clearly-defined policy. That policy should make clear that initial attempts to restrain agitated or violent patients should, as far as possible, be non-physical (e.g. verbal instruction) and that where physical restraint is necessary, it should in principle be limited to manual control.

Staff in psychiatric establishments should receive training in both non-physical and manual control techniques vis-à-vis agitated or violent patients. The possession of such skills will enable staff to choose the most appropriate response when confronted by difficult situations, thereby significantly reducing the risk of injuries to patients and staff.

48. Resort to instruments of physical restraint (straps, strait-jackets, etc.) shall only very rarely be justified and must always be either expressly ordered by a doctor or immediately brought to the attention of a doctor with a view to seeking his approval. If, exceptionally, recourse is had to instruments of physical restraint, they should be removed at the earliest opportunity; they should never be applied, or their application prolonged, as a punishment ...

50. Every instance of the physical restraint of a patient (manual control, use of instruments of physical restraint, seclusion) should be recorded in a specific register established for this purpose (as well as in the patient’s file). The entry should include the times at which the measure began and ended, the circumstances of the case, the reasons for resorting to the measure, the name of the doctor who ordered or approved it, and an account of any injuries sustained by patients or staff.

This will greatly facilitate both the management of such incidents and the oversight of the extent of their occurrence.”

“Means of restraint in psychiatric establishments for adults Extract from the 16th General Report [CPT/Inf (2006) 35]

43. As a general rule, a patient should only be restrained as a measure of last resort; an extreme action applied in order to prevent imminent injury or to reduce acute agitation and/or violence ...

52. Experience has shown that detailed and accurate recording of instances of restraint can provide hospital management with an oversight of the extent of their occurrence and enable measures to be taken, where appropriate, to reduce their incidence.

Preferably, a specific register should be established to record all instances of recourse to means of restraint. This would be in addition to the records contained within the patient’s personal medical file. The entries in the register should include the time at which the measure began and ended; the circumstances of the case; the reasons for resorting to the measure; the name of the doctor who ordered or approved it; and an account of any injuries sustained by patients or staff. Patients should be entitled to attach comments to the register, and should be informed of this; at their request, they should receive a copy of the full entry.”

D. Report to the Czech Government on the visit to the Czech Republic carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 March to 7 April 2006 and from 21 to 24 June 2006 (CPT/Inf (2007)32)

57. The CPT visited also Brno-Černovice Psychiatric Hospital and stated, inter alia, as follows:

“118. At Brno Psychiatric Hospital ... [t]he restraints would be applied either on the patient’s own bed or in a separate room close to the nurses’ office. A protocol on the use of immobilisation was in force, but the protocol does not mention the surveillance intervals; it appears that the hospital staff had adopted a practice to monitoring an immobilised patient every twenty minutes.

The delegation was pleased to note that registers recording the use of restraints had been introduced on the wards of Brno Psychiatric Hospital, thus meeting a long‑standing CPT recommendation. However, the delegation found that the entries were not always meticulously kept; the release time and, on occasion, the moment of application of the immobilisation were not recorded.

As indicated above (cf. paragraph 114), in the CPT’s view, patients who are immobilised should always be subject to continuous, direct personal supervision by a member of staff. However, the delegation was told that a pilot project on ward 12 to have patients accompanied by a member of staff for the full duration of the immobilisation had failed due to a lack of staff. Nevertheless the CPT considers that hospital management should ensure the permanent presence of a staff member whenever a patient is immobilised.

The CPT recommends that in Brno Psychiatric Hospital:

- the register on restraints clearly records the duration of the measure, as well as all other events that occur during the period of restraint;

- the protocol on restraints be amended in order to include a paragraph on supervision of an immobilised patient.

Further, the CPT recommends that all patients who are immobilised are always subject to continuous, direct personal supervision by a member of staff.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT

58. The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated in the sobering-up centre in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

59. The Government contested that argument.

A. Admissibility

60. The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that the civil proceedings against the hospital were pending and they constituted a sufficient remedy for the alleged wrongs. They referred to a number of cases of medical malpractice where the Court had required exhaustion of civil remedies.

61. The applicant disagreed, maintaining that he had been wilfully restrained in detention and that in those circumstances a civil claim for compensation was not an adequate remedy.

62. The Court considers that the issue of effectiveness of a civil remedy is closely linked to the substance of the present complaint and should be joined to the merits.

63. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Arguments of the parties

64. The applicant complained that his strapping down for ten hours, with no medical justification and no regular checks, had caused him severe mental and physical suffering with long-lasting effects and had constituted inhuman treatment. Moreover, the use of restraints was not adequately and comprehensively recorded.

65. He maintained that under the applicable international and national legal and medical standards physical restraints could be used only as a matter of last resort and must be fully justified. Yet, as stated in the official reports, he had been calm when he had been transferred to the psychiatric hospital and had no history of aggressiveness. He had not needed to be strapped upon his arrival at the sobering-up centre. Moreover, his alleged restlessness could not justify such treatment, the purpose of which had rather been to ease the hospital staff’s workload due to a staff shortage.

66. According to the applicant, the treatment had reached the minimum level of severity required for Article 3 of the Convention to come into play. The straps had been applied to his wrists, knees and ankles and had been so tight that he could not move, resulting in great pain and suffering. At times he had even thought that he would suffocate. The treatment had had a long‑term negative effect on his health and he had been unable to finish his studies and pursue his career as a violoncello player.

67. The Government maintained that the acts of the medical staff in the sobering-up centre, who were not state agents, could not be attributed to the State. In any event, according to them, the restraining of the applicant had not reached the minimum threshold of severity required for application of Article 3 of the Convention. They considered that it was more appropriate to examine the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention. Actually, the strapping of the applicant had been necessary for the protection of his own health, it not having been possible to use a less severe measure, such as tranquilisation with medicines, because the applicant had refused to give a blood sample in order for the doctors to be able to identify the substance the influence of which he had been under.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) The relevant facts

68. Before examining the case, the Court will address the factual dispute between the parties concerning the duration of the applicant’s strapping.

69. It observes that the police did not ascertain the actual duration of the strapping, referring to the applicant’s version of the facts (see paragraph 34 above). However, the Brno Municipal Prosecutor established that the applicant was restrained from 8.10 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 9 February 2007, then on 10 February 2007 from 4.30 a.m. to 5 a.m. and again from 6.30 a.m. until his release from the sobering up-centre. Yet the prosecutor did not mention on what she had based her conclusions or give any reasons why the applicant’s version of facts was not credible (see paragraph 36 above).

70. The Court observes that the applicant supported his description of events mainly by the sobering-up centre’s record, which does not say that he was released at 10 p.m. but includes two illegible letters instead. Nevertheless, the Court considers plausible the Government’s explanation that this was a typing mistake which was remedied in the later edition of the document. The Court further observes that the document submitted by the applicant does not fully support his version of the facts either, as it states that restraints were applied at 4.30 a.m. In fact, if he had been restrained for the whole night it would not have been necessary to apply the restraints again at 4.30 a.m.

71. The Court notes, on the other hand, that the Government’s version of facts is also open to doubt, being considerably undermined by the testimony of nurse P., who remembered that while taking over duty from Ms K. at 6 a.m. on 10 February, the applicant had been strapped to the bed by his arms and legs. This is precisely the time when, according to the Government, the applicant was not restrained.

72. Accordingly, even though the Court has some doubts about the exact duration of the applicant’s strapping, and given that his version of the facts was not fully supported by any evidence, it will proceed to the examination of the case on the basis of the Government’s description of the duration of the applicant’s strapping.

(b) Negative or positive obligations

73. The Court must next consider the objection of the Government that the actions of the medical staff could not be attributed to the State.

74. The events complained of occurred during the applicant’s detention in a sobering-up centre, which amounts to a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which is not disputed by the parties (see Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, § 46, ECHR 2000-III). A person in a sobering-up centre is within the complete control of its staff.

75. The Court has considered the treatment of persons, including the application of restraints to detainees in sobering-up centres, from the point of view of the negative obligations of the State (see Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612/02, 31 March 2009, and Mojsiejew v. Poland, no. 11818/02, 24 March 2009).

76. Under Czech law, sobering-up centres are public bodies established by regional self-governing units that are entitled by law to hold persons under the influence of alcohol or another drug who cannot control their behaviour, thereby directly endangering themselves or other persons, public order or property, or whose condition causes a public disturbance.

77. Even accepting the Government’s contention that the medical staff in the sobering up-centre are not State agents, they nevertheless perform governmental authority of detention (compare § 54 above). The State is responsible for the well-being of detainees (Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000‑XI, and Moisejevs v. Latvia, no. 64846/01, § 78, 15 June 2006) and cannot evade its responsibility by delegating its power to other entities.

78. The Court further considers crucial in the present case that what is at stake is not the applicant’s injury as an unintended negative consequence of medical treatment, as submitted by the Government, but the use of the restraints itself. The applicant’s injury was only incidental to the intentional treatment, which is the issue from the point of view of Article 3 of the Convention. The present case significantly differs from cases where voluntary medical treatment had negative consequences on the health of patients. The Court thus does not consider the string of case-law concerning medical negligence referred to by the Government relevant to the present case. More pertinent to the present case are cases concerning the use of restraints on persons in detention, which the Court has always considered from the point of view of negative obligations (see, for example, Herczegfalvy, cited above, § 83; Istratii and Others v. Moldova, nos. 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05, 27 March 2007, § 57; and Kashavelov v. Bulgaria, no. 891/05, § 40, 20 January 2011).

79. Consequently, the Court considers that the State must be held directly responsible for the use of restraints on the applicant in the sobering-up centre and the Court will consider that treatment in the light of the negative obligations of the State.

80. It further follows from the above that the cases of medical malpractice referred to by the Government are neither relevant to the present case in the context of exhaustion of civil remedies. The application of restraints was not medical treatment that the detainee could refuse. The issue is thus not that the applicant objected to his medical treatment, but that restraints and force were applied to him that would only be allowed by Article 3 of the Convention if made strictly necessary by his own conduct (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 38, Series A no. 336).

81. The Court reiterates that in cases where an individual has an arguable claim under Article 3 of the Convention, the notion of an effective remedy entails, on the part of the State, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 79, ECHR 1999-V, and in the context of a treatment in a psychiatric hospital including application of restraints, Filip v. Romania (dec.), no. 41124/02, 8 December 2005). Wilful ill-treatment of persons who are within the control of agents of the State cannot be remedied exclusively through an award of compensation to the victim (see Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99, § 60, 30 September 2004, and Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933/04, § 130, 29 July 2010).

82. Accordingly, a criminal complaint was an adequate remedy in the present case for the applicant’s complaint that he had been ill-treated in detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Mojsiejew v. Poland, no. 11818/02, § 41, 24 March 2009, where the Court reached the same conclusion regarding death in a sobering-up centre). Once the criminal proceedings had been terminated, the applicant was not required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to pursue and await the outcome of the civil proceedings instituted by him. The Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be rejected.

(c) General principles

83. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances or the victim’s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, like in the present case, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see Wiktorko, cited above, § 48).

84. To fall under Article 3 of the Convention, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the gender, age and state of health of the victim. Further factors include the purpose for which the treatment was inflicted together with the intention or motivation behind it, as well as its context, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 88, ECHR 2010).

85. The Court has recognised the special vulnerability of mentally ill persons in its case-law and the assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3 has, in particular, to take into consideration this vulnerability (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 111, ECHR 2001‑III, Rohde v. Denmark, no. 69332/01, § 99, 21 July 2005 and Renolde v. France, no. 5608/05, § 120, ECHR 2008 (extracts)).

86. In respect of persons deprived of their liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by their own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99, § 53, 30 September 2004). In the context of detention in a sobering-up centre, it is up to the Government to justify the use of restraints on a detained person. Regarding the use of restraining belts, the Court accepted that aggressive behaviour on the part of an intoxicated individual may require recourse to the use of restraining belts, provided of course that checks are periodically carried out on the welfare of the immobilised individual. The application of such restraints must, however, be necessary under the circumstances and its length must not be excessive (see Wiktorko, cited above, § 55).

87. The position of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with. Nevertheless, it is for the medical authorities to decide, on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to be used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of patients who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom they are therefore responsible. The established principles of medicine are admittedly in principle decisive in such cases; as a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist (see Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 82, Series A no. 244).

(d) Application in the present case of the above-mentioned principles

(i) The severity of the treatment

88. The Court notes that the applicant was a young man of a fragile build, suffering from a mental illness. He was brought to the sobering-up centre in a state of intoxication, as a result of overdosing on medicine that was part of his treatment. He was thus in a particularly vulnerable position. Even though the applicant was calm during transport and admission to the hospital, he was immediately attached by restraining belts to his bed in the sobering-up centre due to his alleged restlessness. He was left in restraints for almost two hours. He was again restrained in the same way for half an hour at night on account of an alleged attack on a male nurse, and lastly for forty-five minutes the next morning for allegedly being destructive to his surroundings.

89. The Court must also take into account the serious consequences the treatment had on the applicant in evaluating whether it reached the minimum level of severity required for application of Article 3 of the Convention. It notes that an expert report commissioned by the police ten months after the treatment concluded that the applicant had suffered very severe bilateral paresis of the elbow nerves caused by the compression of nerves and blood vessels, that this injury still limited his ability to play the violoncello and that it would have a long-lasting effect which was unlikely to be permanent.

90. Accordingly, the Court considers that the strapping of the applicant must have caused him great distress and physical suffering and that Article 3 of the Convention is in principle applicable to the present case (see also the practice of the CPT, which considers the use of physical restraints an area of particular concern given the potential for abuse and ill-treatment).

(ii) The justification of the treatment

91. The Court will turn now to the examination of whether such treatment was justified in the present case and whether periodic checks were carried out.

92. According to the Government, the applicant’s restriction was necessary for the protection of his own health although they did not indicate in what way the applicant’s health was endangered. The Court notes that the record from the sobering up centre and the testimonies of the medical staff do not specify the extent or indeed existence of the danger the applicant posed to himself. They show that the reason for the applicant’s restriction for two hours in the evening of 9 February 2007 was his restlessness. His restraint at night and in the morning was justified by his allegedly aggressive behaviour towards the medical staff.

93. The Court must determine whether the mere restlessness of a patient justifies his or her being restrained by straps to a bed for almost two hours, taking into account the current legal and medical standards on the issue (see Herczegfalvy, cited above, § 83).

94. The applicant was detained in a sobering-up centre, a health care facility that was part of a psychiatric hospital, the purpose of which is to treat persons under the influence of drugs. The fact that the applicant was a person suffering from a mental illness was or should have been known to the staff of the centre, as it was already stated in the record drawn up by the ambulance staff who had brought the applicant to the psychiatric hospital. Therefore the Court considers that the rules and standards on using restraints on patients with mental disabilities in psychiatric hospitals are relevant for the interpretation and application of Article 3 of the Convention to the facts of the present case.

95. The Court notes that both the European and national standards (see “Relevant domestic law” and “Relevant international standards” above) are unanimous in declaring that physical restraints can be used only exceptionally, as a matter of last resort and when their application is the only means available to prevent immediate or imminent harm to the patient or others. The Czech Guideline expressly states that restraints cannot be used when the patient is merely restless (see paragraph 51 above).

96. In line with these standards, the Court considers that using restraints is a serious measure which must always be justified by preventing imminent harm to the patient or the surroundings and must be proportionate to such an aim. Mere restlessness cannot therefore justify strapping a person to a bed for almost two hours.

97. The Court further observes that even though restraints should be used as a matter of last resort, no alternatives were tried in the applicant’s case. He was restrained immediately on arrival at the sobering-up centre on account of his alleged restlessness, without any methods of calming him down having been tried. Strapping was applied as a matter of routine. It thus cannot even be said that the domestic guideline was complied with.

98. Regarding the use of restraints as a result of the applicant’s alleged aggressiveness at night and in the morning the Court agrees that attacking medical staff can be a sufficient reason for applying restraints. Nevertheless, it is not satisfied that it was conclusively established that the use of restraints was to prevent further attacks and that other means of trying to calm the applicant down, or less restrictive restraints, had been unsuccessfully tried. In this context the Court considers that it is unacceptable to use restraints as a punishment.

99. The Court observes that the two male nurses did not mention the alleged attack by the applicant at 4.30 a.m. to the police and there are no details about the nature of the attack anywhere in the case file. Ms K. only told the police that she did not remember which nurse had been attacked. The only details about any physical force used by the applicant were submitted by nurse P., who went on duty at 6 a.m. on 10 February and who reported that when any of the applicant’s limbs had been unstrapped he had immediately started to defend himself and resist being strapped again. The Court, however, considers that using restraints can be hardly justified by the fact that a person resists their application.

100. The Court thus concludes that even though it is up to the Government to justify the use of restraints on a detained person (see Wiktorko, cited above, § 55) it has failed to show that the use of restraints on the applicant was necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.

101. In addition to this finding, the Court notes that the CPT recommended to Brno-Černovice Psychiatric Hospital that “patients who are immobilised should always be subject to continuous, direct personal supervision by a member of staff” after it found in its visit in 2005 that this was not the case (see paragraph 57 above).

102. The Court also notes that the domestic police investigation found that checks were not performed at regular intervals. The Court reiterates that restrained patients must be under close supervision. This obviously was not the case, which must have been one of the reasons for the damage to the applicant’s health with long-lasting effect. The domestic authorities thus failed in their obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of their liberty (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 111, ECHR 2001‑III, and Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, § 60, 21 December 2010).

103. The Court further takes into account the European and national standards requiring proper recording of every use of restraints, which, among other things, facilitates any subsequent review of whether their use was justified. The Court has stressed the need for keeping proper medical notes in its case-law as well (see Keenan, cited above, § 114).

104. In the present case the Court finds the record kept about the use of restraints against the applicant very rudimentary. It does not contain any information on when the restraints were first applied, merely stating that the applicant was released at 10 p.m., and that the restraints were again applied at 4.30 a.m., but not when they were removed. The record only states that the restraints were lastly applied at 6.30 a.m. and finished at 7.15 a.m. The record contains no explicit reasons for applying the restraints, save for the alleged attack on a male nurse at 4.30 a.m., yet even that is not clear from the record. Otherwise, there are only general notes about the applicant being restless, and at 6.30 a.m. as being aggressive towards his surroundings. There is no information about when checks were carried out.

105. In these circumstances the Court cannot but conclude that the records were far from satisfactory and it is evident that they undermined the proper establishment of the facts and hampered the domestic criminal investigation in the case.

106. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court is of the view that the applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. There has accordingly been a substantive violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS PROCEDURAL ASPECT

107. The applicant maintained that his complaints about his ill-treatment in the sobering-up centre had not been effectively investigated in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

108. The Government contested that argument.

A. Admissibility

109. The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies regarding some of his complaints concerning the alleged procedural violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, in his complaint against the police authority’s decision on the termination of the investigation, he had failed to mention that the proceedings had failed to satisfy the requirement of promptness and independence and had not been public because he was not allowed to be present during the questioning of witnesses and put questions to them (see paragraph 35 above).

110. The applicant disagreed.

111. The Court notes that the applicant challenged the effectiveness of the investigation before the prosecutor and the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 35 and 37 above). It further notes that the alleged lack of independence lies not only in the conduct of the police but of the prosecuting authorities as a whole. Therefore the applicant could not have complained of it in his appeal to the prosecutor; that is, before the alleged deficiency had materialised.

112. Regarding the complaint of lack of promptness, the Court in turn, does not consider that mentioning it in the appeal to the prosecutor could have had any effect. The police had already terminated the investigation and thus the prosecutor could not have remedied any alleged delays in the conduct of the investigation by the police.

113. Lastly, regarding the complaint that the proceedings were not public, the Court notes that in his appeal the applicant requested that the medical staff be questioned again. It also notes that he complained of the lack of their public nature in his subsequent constitutional appeal.

114. Consequently, the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.

115. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Arguments of the parties

116. The applicant complained that the investigation had not been initiated on the authorities’ own motion. He had complained to the hospital authorities but they had not forwarded his complaint to the prosecuting authorities. Furthermore, it had not been effective either in law or in practice as the prosecuting authorities had not made a serious attempt to find out what happened and base their decision on established facts. The investigation had concerned only the crime of causing bodily harm and not inhuman treatment, and the investigating authorities had failed to establish the person responsible for his injuries even though the police had found out that the restraints had been used unlawfully. He had been unable to be present when the witnesses had been questioned or to suggest gathering additional evidence. The investigation had not been independent or speedy, as the investigating authorities had heavily relied on the explanations of the hospital staff, the police had taken twenty-two days to question the applicant and it had commissioned a forensic report only three months and nineteen days after the receipt of the criminal complaint.

117. The Government maintained that the investigation had been effective in that the factual circumstances of the case had been clarified to the maximum extent possible and all possible investigative steps had been taken. It was only logical that the complaint had been investigated as the criminal offence of causing bodily harm and not inhuman treatment because there had been no intentional offence and the offender, if any, could only have been someone from the medical staff and not a State authority, local self-governing authority or a court.

118. They noted that the investigation had been instituted immediately after the police had received the criminal complaint and had proceeded with promptness.

119. In the Government’s opinion the observance of the principle of the public nature and transparency of the investigation had been sufficiently secured by the fact that the applicant was able to request to be allowed to inspect the investigation file and lodge a complaint against the police authority’s decision on the setting aside of the case. They also noted that in that complaint he had not challenged the content of the depositions of the medical staff at all, nor had he claimed that he should have been able to put questions to them. The Government believed that given the context, this opportunity to participate in the investigation had been sufficient to secure the applicant’s rights and that transparency of the investigation and the applicant’s legitimate interests had not required that the applicant be present at the questioning of the medical staff.

120. Lastly, they opined that there was no hierarchical, institutional or close working relationship between the medical staff and the police authority that could raise any doubt about the independence and impartiality of the investigation.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

121. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against personal integrity, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. The domestic legal system, and in particular the criminal law applicable in the circumstances of the case, must provide practical and effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 (Đurđević v. Croatia, no. 52442/09, § 51, 19 July 2011).

122. Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000‑IV). Even though the scope of the State’s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence is inflicted by private individuals, the requirements as to an official investigation are similar (see Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704/04, § 100, 17 December 2009).

123. In its case-law the Court has established that for an investigation to be considered effective it must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617/01, § 108, 26 January 2006). The investigation must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704/04, § 100, 17 December 2009). But the obligation on the States is not to elucidate all facts of the case but only those important for establishing the circumstances of the use of force and to determine whether official responsibility is engaged (see Anusca v. Moldova, no. 24034/07, § 40, 18 May 2010).

124. The investigation must further be independent, in that it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Đurđević, cited above, § 85).

125. There must be also a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, § 212-213, 24 February 2005). However, that does not mean that the victim’s right to access to investigation in all its stages arises from the Convention, because the interests of other persons or the risk of jeopardising the achievement of the aim of the investigation can prevail over his interest (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, 4 May 2001, § 129).

126. The investigation must also start promptly once the matter has come to the attention of responsible authorities and conducted with reasonable expedition.

127. Lastly, the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention (see Isayeva and Others, cited above, § 209).

(b) Application in the present case of the above-mentioned principles

128. The Court firstly observes that the police started the investigation promptly after the applicant had lodged his criminal complaint and it did not suffer from any unnecessary delays. The applicant was interviewed about two weeks after the police had received his criminal complaint. The interviews of other persons, collection of documents and drawing up of an expert report were carried out in the following months. The police closed the investigation within six months. Such length is not unreasonable to an extent that it would make the investigation ineffective. The Court adds that for the purpose of fulfilling the requirement of promptness, the investigation could not have been started when the applicant complained to the hospital staff, because they are not a state authority that could have instituted a criminal investigation.

129. Regarding the alleged lack of independence the Court does not consider that the present case can be compared to the situation in Ergi v. Turkey (28 July 1998, § 83, Reports 1998‑IV) as suggested by the applicant, where the Court criticised the heavy reliance of the prosecuting authorities on a report by the gendarmerie, given that the gendarmes themselves were suspected of shooting the applicant’s sister. However, in the present case, the prosecuting authorities based their conclusions on several witness testimonies, documents and an independent expert report.

130. Regarding the level of public scrutiny of the investigation, the Court observes that the applicant had access to the investigation file and could have lodged an appeal against the decision of the police to terminate the investigation. In his appeal, or indeed at any time, he was free to dispute the veracity of any evidence collected by the police or to suggest the taking of further evidence. The Court therefore finds that the applicant was involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his legitimate interests and that it was not indispensable that he be present when the police took statements from the witnesses.

131. The Court further reiterates that it is not its task to interpret the domestic law, including the Criminal Code. Therefore, it will not express a view on whether the applicant’s ill-treatment should have been investigated as the crime of torture and other inhuman or cruel treatment. It must concentrate on the purpose of the obligation of effective investigation, which is to secure an effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right not to be tortured and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability (see Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 94, 4 May 2001) and to enable the facts to become known to the public (see Siemińska v. Poland (dec.), no. 37602/97, 29 March 2001).

132. It appears from the decision of the police that the main reason for the termination of the investigation was that they considered that no crime had been committed. This is explicitly stated in the decision of the prosecutor, who considered the treatment of the applicant to have been in compliance with the law. Such conclusions are, however, hardly reconcilable with the obligation of States that the domestic legal system must provide practical and effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3. The Court must take into account that the application of restraining belts on the applicant was a wilful act constituting inhuman and degrading treatment, as it has found above.

133. The Court is further struck by the resolute conclusion of the prosecutor that the applicant was aggressive at the time of his admission to the sobering-up centre and therefore he was restrained. It is not clear on what this statement is based, especially given that there is no single piece of evidence in the case file that would support such a conclusion. The written evidence and the statements mention only that the applicant was restless at the time of his admission, but not that he was aggressive. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s conclusion that the applicant was checked on every twenty minutes also lacks any reasoning, which is particularly striking given that the police, on the basis of the same evidence, reached a different conclusion. Both these conclusions were crucial for the legal assessment of the events and had a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the investigation. In consequence, it cannot be said that it was thorough.

134. In view of these considerations, the Court concludes that the investigation in the present case did not provide the applicant with practical and effective protection of his rights guaranteed by Article 3. Consequently, there has been a procedural violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

135. The applicant complained that his involuntary admission and detention in Brno-Černovice Psychiatric Hospital violated his right to liberty. He relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants ...”

136. The Government contested that argument. They argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and that he had been detained for two unrelated reasons, which had to be considered separately.

137. First, he had been detained in the sobering-up centre overnight from 9 to 10 February 2007. Detention in sobering-up centres involved deprivation of liberty for several hours maximum, and therefore the law did not envisage any approval by a court. The appropriate legal tool was a subsequent reparatory remedy, namely, an action for the protection of personality rights under the Civil Code against the health care facility concerned, which the applicant had failed to lodge.

138. Secondly, the applicant had been detained in a psychiatric hospital, in which case court proceedings under Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure had been automatically instituted. The applicant, however, had failed to lodge a constitutional appeal in compliance with the procedural requirements. They remarked that in the months prior to the lodging of the applicant’s constitutional appeal all the chambers of the Constitutional Court had adopted the approach of requiring previous recourse to an action for nullity. That approach had been subsequently confirmed by a decision of the plenary session of the Constitutional Court of 16 December 2008, no. 79/2009.

139. The applicant disagreed. First, he contested the division of his detention into two phases, holding that since 9 February 2007 he had been detained in the same psychiatric hospital, and that he had not been released from the sobering-up centre but transferred to a different unit of the hospital.

140. He then maintained that an action for nullity was not an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 of the Convention. Actually, such an action could not remedy the deficiencies alleged by him under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, lodging it would have no chance of success in view of the Opinion of the Supreme Court no. Cpjn 29/2006 (see paragraph 53 above).

141. The Court reiterates that Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires not merely the use of the requisite remedies but that the complaint intended to be made subsequently to the Court must first have been made – at least in substance – to the appropriate domestic body, and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law (see Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], no. 34869/05, § 32, 29 June 2011).

142. The Court finds, and this is not in dispute between the parties, that a constitutional appeal as such was an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It observes that the applicant’s constitutional appeal was dismissed for non-exhaustion of remedies, namely, for failing to lodge an action for nullity, without a decision on its merits.

143. The Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and that the Court will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. This applies in particular to the interpretation by domestic courts of rules of a procedural nature. Although procedural rules governing appeals must be adhered to as part of the concept of a fair procedure, in principle it is for the national courts to police the conduct of their own proceedings (see Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports 1997‑VIII, and Matoušek v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 32384/05, 7 September 2010).

144. On the other hand, the Court notes that on numerous occasions it has found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because of lack of access to court, when a procedural rule was construed in a way that was unpredictable and in variance with the principle of legal certainty (see Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, no. 46129/99, §§ 53-54, ECHR 2002‑IX), or the domestic court showed excessive formalism (see Bulena v. the Czech Republic, no. 57567/00, § 35, 20 April 2004). In these instances, it then dismissed the Government’s objection to the admissibility of other complaints (see Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 47273/99, 11 December 2001 and Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 46129/99, 11 December 2001).

145. The Court, however, does not consider that such a situation arose in the present case. It notes that the Government extensively referred to the Constitutional Court’s case-law, built up before the applicant lodged his constitutional appeal, where it had consistently required the lodging of an action for nullity before lodging a constitutional appeal. Therefore it cannot be said that its decision could not have been foreseen by the applicant (see, a contrario, Faltejsek v. the Czech Republic, no. 24021/03, § 32, 15 May 2008).

146. The Court also notes that the Opinion of the Supreme Court no. Cpjn 29/2006, relied on by the applicant, was adopted only on 14 January 2009 and thus could not have any relevance to the decision of the Constitutional Court given before.

147. In conclusion, the applicant failed to lodge a constitutional appeal in compliance with the procedural requirements, which were not applied arbitrarily, unforeseeably, or with excessive formalism.

148. Consequently, this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

149. The applicant complained that he did not have access to a proper judicial review of his detention. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

150. The Government considered that the case-law on the applicability of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was inconsistent and asked the Court to clarify to which proceedings in the context of involuntary hospitalizations in the Czech Republic Article 5 § 4 applied. They maintained, however, that Article 5 § 4 ceased to apply once a person was released and this part of the application was therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.

151. The Government further raised the same inadmissibility plea on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, submitting the same arguments as in the context of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

152. The applicant disagreed and maintained that Article 5 § 4 continued to apply even after a detainee’s release.

153. Regarding the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicant referred to his submissions under Article 5 § 1.

154. The Court does not consider it appropriate in the context of the present case to examine the question of applicability of Article 5 § 4 to the appeal proceedings brought by the applicant after his release as the applicant’s complaint about deficiencies in the judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention is in any event inadmissible for the following reason.

155. The Court held in Knebl v. the Czech Republic (no. 20157/05, § 77, 28 October 2010) that a constitutional appeal was an effective remedy that had to be exhausted for complaints that a procedure under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention did not provide guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question. The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.

156. In view of the conclusions above under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court concludes that the complaint under Article 5 § 4 must be also rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies since the applicant failed to lodge a constitutional appeal in compliance with the procedural requirements.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

157. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

158. The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

159. The Government considered that amount excessive.

160. The Court is of the view that as a result of the circumstances of the case the applicant must have experienced considerable anguish and distress which cannot be made good by a mere finding of a violation of the Convention. Having regard to the circumstances of the case seen as a whole and deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage.

161. The applicant did not claim reimbursement of any costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

162. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Decides to join to the merits the Government’s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and rejects it;

2. Declares the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Czech korunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 October 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Claudia WesterdiekDean Spielmann
RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy