CASE OF CARRETO RIBEIRO v. PORTUGAL

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF CARRETO RIBEIRO v. PORTUGAL

(Application no. 20075/21)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

25 April 2024

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Carreto Ribeiro v. Portugal,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Branko Lubarda, President,
 Anne Louise Bormann,
 Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,

and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 4 April 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application against Portugal lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 April 2021.

2.  The Portuguese Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application.

THE FACTS

3.  The applicant’s details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table.

4.  Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the excessive length of the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him by the Portuguese Bar Association. The applicant also raised a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.

THE LAW

5.  The applicant complained principally that the length of disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the Portuguese Bar Association in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. He also complained about the lack of a domestic remedy in this respect. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention.

6.  The Government argued that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage as he had not been prevented from exercising his profession during the disciplinary proceedings at issue; he had not proven to have suffered damages or losses caused by the proceedings; and his reputation or image had not been affected by the proceedings or suffered stigma on account of their secrecy. In this regard, it is noted that the fact that it took five years and seven months for the Portuguese Bar Association to decide on the above disciplinary proceedings, during which period the applicant did not know which disciplinary penalty would be applied to him, must have had a negative effect on his personal situation (see, Ferreira Alves v. Portugal, no. 25861/11, § 17, 18 February 2014). With respect to the argument that the applicant did not suffer any stigma or interference with his reputation or image, the Court reiterates that disciplinary proceedings liable to result in expulsion carry a significant degree of stigma (see, mutatis mutandis, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 196, 6 November 2018). Thus, it cannot be said that he did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government’s objection in this regard must therefore be rejected.

7.  The Government further submitted that the applicant was no longer a “victim”, as he had eventually benefited from the delay considering that the disciplinary proceedings at issue had been discontinued as time barred. According to the well-established case-law in length-of-proceedings cases, a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged a violation, either expressly or in substance, and afforded redress for it (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98, ECHR 2006-V, and Gil Leal Pereira v. Portugal (dec.), no. 48956/99, 15 November 2001). In the present case, the applicant claimed compensation for the breach of the “reasonable time” requirement and the administrative courts nevertheless dismissed his claim. The applicant can thus still claim to be a “victim”. Therefore, the Government’s objection in this respect must be rejected.

8.  The Court reiterates that it has constantly held that disciplinary proceedings in which the right to continue to exercise a profession is at stake give rise to “contestations” (disputes) over civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the present case, with the institution of the disciplinary proceedings, the applicant’s right to continue to practice as a lawyer was at stake. Article 6 § 1 is therefore applicable under its civil head to the disciplinary proceedings at issue (see Ferreira Alves v. Portugal, no. 78165/12, §§ 13-16, 18 February 2014, and Reczkowicz v. Poland, no. 43447/19, §§ 183-185, 22 July 2021).

9.  It further notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

10.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

11.  In the leading case of Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal (no. 73798/13, 29 October 2015), the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case.

12.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings at the national level. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement (compare Ferreira Alves, cited above, § 21).

13.  The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the lack of an effective remedy with regards to the excessive length of proceedings. In view of the Court’s finding as regards the “reasonable time” requirement, the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be considered “arguable” for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131).

14.  The applicant attempted to remedy his grievance through the adequate mechanism, which resulted in the South Central Administrative Court’s finding that the length thereof was not sufficient to find there had been a violation under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the domestic courts failed to examine the overall length of the proceedings. In the present case, the applicant therefore cannot be said to have had the benefit of an “effective remedy” in terms of the Court’s case-law (compare Hoholm v. Slovakia, no. 35632/13, §§ 55-58, 13 January 2015).

15.  There has accordingly been a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention.

16.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Valada Matos das Neves, cited above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 April 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Viktoriya Maradudina Branko Lubarda

 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention

(excessive length of disciplinary proceedings and lack of and effective remedy thereof)

[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.