FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF ČETIĆ v. SLOVENIA
(Application no. 7054/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 February 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Četić v. Slovenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Ann Power-Forde, President,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Helena Jäderblom, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 February 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 7054/10) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovenian national, Mr Božo Četić (“the applicant”), on 18 December 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Odvetniška Družba Matoz O.P. D.O.O., a law firm practising in Koper. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs N. Aleš Verdir, State Attorney.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and that he had no effective remedy in this regard as required by Article 13 of the Convention.
4. On 27 April 2010 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1) and to give priority to it under Rule 41 of the Rules of the Court.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Ljubljana.
6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed section of Ljubljana prison in the period between 28 May 2009 and 27 February 2010. From 28 May 2009 to 23 September 2009 he was held in cell 2 (third floor), which measured 18 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility) and contained 5 sleeping places. From 23 September 2009 to 22 January 2010 and from 28 January 2010 to 27 February 2010 he was held in cell 129 (second floor), which measured 8.8 square metres (including a separate 1.3 square metre sanitary facility) and contained two sleeping places. From 22 January 2010 to 28 January 2010 he was held in cell 121 (second floor), which measured 18 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility) and contained six sleeping places. According to the applicant, five prisoners were being held in each of the cells during his detention. The Government submitted that in cell 2 the numbers varied between four and five, in cell 129 the applicant was held alone and in cell 121 three prisoners were held.
7. During his imprisonment the applicant had three consultations with a general practitioner and one dental appointment. He did not ask for psychological or psychiatric treatment.
8. As regards the general characteristics of the cells, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011.
9. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86).
10. From 26 October 2009 to 13 January 2010 the applicant was placed under a stricter regime as he had physically attacked another prisoner. During that time he could spend two hours per day outside his room during recreation time, he had two hours for visits per week and telephone contacts twice a week. He was not allowed to use a multipurpose hall and he received his meals in his cell.
11. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
12. For the relevant domestic law and practice as well as relevant international documents see Štrucl and Others, cited above, §§ 33-56.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
13. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, he complained of severe overcrowding which had led to a lack of personal space, poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restriction on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cells, inadequate health care and psychiatric support and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security.
14. He submitted that the situation amounted to a structural problem, and that this has been acknowledged by the domestic authorities.
15. The applicant also complained about restrictions on telephone conversations and correspondence. However, these complaints fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention only.
Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
1. Complaint relating to physical conditions of detention
16. As in the case of Štrucl and Others and Praznik v. Slovenia, no. 6234/10, 28 June 2012 the Government raised an objection of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies, relying on the same arguments as in the above cases. In Štrucl and Others the Court joined the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. After finding a violation of the latter provision it rejected the Government’s objection (§§ 62 and 98-113). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. It further finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It should therefore be declared admissible.
2. Complaints relating to inadequate health care and psychiatric support and insufficient security measures
17. The parties in the present case adduced the same arguments as in Štrucl and Others, where the Court found the part of the application concerning inadequate health care, psychiatric support and insufficient security measures manifestly ill-founded (§§ 63-69). The Court decided the same in Praznik. In the absence of any reasons that would lead the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case, the Court finds these complaints to be manifestly ill-founded and should therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Merits
18. The parties relied on the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others (cited above, §§ 70-79).
19. The Court refers as regards the relevant principles to paragraphs 72‑76 of its judgment in the case of Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011.
20. The Court notes that the applicant was held in the closed section of Ljubljana prison. As regards the number of prisoners held together with the applicant in the cells, the Government suggested that not all the beds in the cells were occupied all the time. For cell 2, containing five sleeping places, they stated that there were four to five prisoners held there. For cell 129, containing two sleeping places, they stated that the applicant was held there alone. As for cell 121, which contains six sleeping places, they stated that three prisoners were held there. The Court reiterates that the Government did not provide any official documents indicating the exact number of prisoners held in the cells in question during the applicant’s detention. As already found in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia (cited above, §§ 21 to 32), Ljubljana prison was severely overcrowded, the official capacity being almost twice exceeded. Therefore, the Court finds it hard to accept that the beds placed in the respective cells were not always occupied, except for perhaps short periods, which, however, have not been identified by the Government (see Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, § 81).
21. Therefore, the Court takes that when held in cell 2 with five other prisoner, the applicant had 3.26 square metres of personal space. In cell 129, shared with another prisoner, the applicant had 3.75 square metres of personal space. In cell 121, shared with five other prisoners, the applicant had 2.7 square metres of personal space. This space was further reduced by the amount of furniture (see Modarca v. Moldova, no. 14437/05, § 63, 10 May 2007).
22. The Court already found in Štrucl and Others a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the conditions of the applicants’ detention, limited personal space in cells (2.7 square metres of personal space for most of their detention), very limited out-of-cell time and high temperatures in the summer of 2009 (see Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, §§ 85 – 87 and 89). As regards personal space and out-of-cell time, the applicant in the present case, when held in cell 121, had the same conditions as the applicants in Štrucl and Others. Therefore, the Court finds that these conditions are as well contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
23. It was found in Praznik that the personal space of the applicant, which was for most of the period of his detention in the closed section about 3.3 square metres, and which was slightly larger than the space available to the prisoners in Štrucl and Others, still fell short of the recommendation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It was further found in Praznik that the applicant’s situation was exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell and by high temperatures in the cell in the summer (see Praznik, cited above, § 20) therefore, it was concluded that the conditions of detention were contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
24. Likewise, in the present case when the applicant was detained in cell 2 he had 3.26 square metres of personal space. His situation was further exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell and by high temperatures in the cell in the summer of 2009.
25. In cell 129 the applicant had 3.75 square metres of personal space, however, also here his situation was further exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell. Moreover, for the most part of his detention in cell 129 the applicant was put under stricter regime, allowing him even less out-of-cell time.
26. Having regard to the cumulative effects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in cells 2 and 129, the Court considers, as in Praznik, that the hardship he endured appears to have exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in detention, and finds that the resulting suffering went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention (see, Praznik, cited above, § 21 and mutatis mutandis, Szél v. Hungary, no. 30221/06, § 18, 7 June 2011, and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 75, ECHR 2001‑III).
27. The Court therefore finds that the conditions of detention of the applicant in the closed section of Ljubljana prison were contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired. He also alleged that his correspondence had been limited to certain identified people.
29. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
30. As already found in Praznik, the Court notes that in so far as the complaints under Article 8 overlap with those under Article 3 they should be for the same reasons and to the same extent declared admissible. However, in view of the applicant’s submissions and having regard to the finding relating to Article 3, the Court considers that no separate issue arises under Article 8 in this regard (see Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, § 198, ECHR 2009‑... (extracts)).
31. As regards the applicant’s complaints concerning his contact with persons outside the prison, the Court notes that the parties adduced the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others. In the latter case the Court found that these complaints were unsubstantiated (cited above, §§ 96-97). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. These complaints should therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
32. The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
33. In so far as the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention refers to the lack of effective remedies in respect of inadequate physical conditions of detention, as already found by the Court in Štrucl and Others and Praznik, this aspect of the complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
34. As to the lack of effective remedies in respect of the allegedly inadequate medical and psychological care, inadequate security measures and the restrictions on maintaining contact with people outside the prison, having declared the relevant issues under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention inadmissible, the Court concludes that the applicant has no arguable claim for the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362/02, §§ 74‑5, 20 May 2010). It follows that this aspect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention should be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Merits
35. The parties’ arguments are identical to those in the case of Štrucl and Others (§§ 101-117) in which the Court found that none of the remedies relied on by the Government could be regarded with a sufficient degree of certainty as constituting an effective remedy for the applicants (ibid., §§ 118‑33). Since there appear to be no reasons to reach a different conclusion in the present case, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant’s complaints in respect of the conditions of his detention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
36. Article 46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”
37. The applicant argued that his allegations related to a structural problem of overcrowding in Slovenian prisons. This assertion was disputed by the Government.
38. The parties’ arguments are identical to those in the case of Štrucl and Others. In the latter case the Court emphasized the need to take steps to reduce the number of prisoners in Ljubljana prison (ibid., §§ 137-141). In view of the fact that the applicant’s complaint of a structural problem applies to the same period of time that was addressed in Štrucl and others (2009), the Court considers that it raises no separate issue which would call for an examination under Article 46 in the present case (see Jevšnik v Slovenia, no. 5747/10, § 37, 9 January 2014).
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
39. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
40. The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
41. The Government contested the claim.
42. The Court awards the applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
43. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,520 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum consisted of EUR 1,500 in lawyer’s fees, which he claimed were calculated on the basis of statutory domestic rates and EUR 20 for material expenses.
44. The Government argued that this claim was excessive. They also argued that the Court should take into account the fact that the applicant’s representative was representing a number of other applicants before the Court and had submitted almost identical pleadings in all these cases.
45. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. With regard to an applicant’s Convention costs, the Court reiterates that it does not consider itself bound by domestic scales and practices, although it may derive some assistance from them (see, among many other authorities, Gaspari v. Slovenia, no. 21055/03, § 83, 21 July 2009, and Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, § 98, ECHR 1999-IV). In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and in particular the fact that the law firm representing the applicant has already been reimbursed in six other cases for preparation of submissions almost identical to the present ones (see Mandić and Jović, cited above, §§ 133-35, Štrucl and Others, cited above, §§ 146-48 and Praznik, cited above §§ 38-40), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 500 to cover the costs of the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
46. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, as well as the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention relating to the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention under Article 8 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 February 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen PhillipsAnn Power-Forde
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy