CASE OF CHATINYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF CHATINYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA

(Application no. 70173/14)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

6 March 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Chatinyan and Others v. Armenia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Andreas Zünd, President,
 Armen Harutyunyan,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 70173/14) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 October 2014 by five Armenian nationals, relevant details listed in the appended table, (“the applicants”) who were represented by Mr K. Tumanyan, a lawyer practising in Vanadzor;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the quashing of a final judgment in the applicants’ favour to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 6 February 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The present case concerns an alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty and of the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on account of the quashing of a final judgment in their favour. They complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

2.  Following the destruction of the applicants’ flat in the city of Vanadzor as a result of the 1988 earthquake, they lived in a temporary shelter.

3.  On 26 February 2007 the applicants entered into an agreement with Vanadzor community (“the community”  համայնք), represented by the Mayor of Vanadzor (the head of the community who represents its executive body) whereby the applicants were to vacate the land where their temporary shelter was located and the community was to alienate the given land for the construction of a multi-flat building, where the applicants would be provided with a flat measuring no less than 55 square metres.

4.  The applicants released the land and it was sold by the community to a private construction company.

5.  In 2009 the Mayor of Vanadzor informed the applicants that the construction of the building had been postponed after which the applicants lodged a civil claim against Vanadzor Mayor’s Office (“the municipality”) with the Lori Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) seeking compensation.

6.  After several rounds of proceedings, the Mayor of Vanadzor made a written offer to the applicants on behalf of the community and the parties reached a settlement. By its judgment of 5 October 2011 the Regional Court affirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicants, the Mayor of Vanadzor, acting on behalf of the community, and the construction company (see paragraph 4 above) according to which the municipality and the given company undertook to (i) provide the applicants with a flat measuring at least 55 square metres by 1 October 2013; (ii) pay them living expenses (around 30 euros (EUR) per month) until they had been provided with a flat; and (iii) pay them compensation in the amount of 38,000 US dollars (USD) if undertaking (i) had not been fulfilled. The judgment became final.

7.  The applicants were not provided with a flat by 1 October 2013 and sought enforcement of the judgment.

8.  On 30 January 2014 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings and attached the municipality’s assets.

9.  On 13 February 2014 the Council of Elders of the community (its representative body elected in September 2012  “the Council”) lodged an appeal against the judgment of 5 October 2011 (see paragraph 6 above) arguing that it had not given its consent to the friendly settlement which that judgment had affirmed and that it had become aware of the judgment from the bailiff’s decision of 30 January 2014.

10.  On 3 March 2014 the Civil Court of Appeal took a decision to admit the Council’s appeal. It rejected the applicants’ argument that the Council ought to have become aware of the judgment of 5 October 2011 (see paragraph 6 above) earlier given that for several years the municipality had issued payment orders to them (with reference to that judgment) with the Council approving the community’s budget. The Court of Appeal stated that the fact of the Council’s knowledge of the judgment of 5 October 2011 could not be inferred from the payment orders in question.

11.  By a decision of 30 April 2014 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 5 October 2011 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the grounds that the head of the community had failed to obtain the Council’s consent for the alienation of the community’s property. By a decision of 20 August 2014 the Court of Cassation refused to grant the applicants leave to appeal.

12.  Within the framework of the fresh examination of the case the Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ civil claim (see paragraph 5 above) and set aside the agreement of 26 February 2007 (see paragraph 3 above). The applicants’ appeals against the Regional Court’s judgment were unsuccessful.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

13.  The applicants complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 5 October 2011 had been in breach of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

14.  The Government submitted that the six-month time-limit in respect of the application should be calculated from 3 March 2014  the date of the decision of the Civil Court of Appeal to admit the Council’s appeal (see paragraph 10 above). Since the application was lodged with the Court on 20 October 2014, the applicants had failed to comply with the six-month rule.

15.  The applicants submitted that the decision of the Civil Court of Appeal of 3 March 2014 could not be considered a “final decision” in respect of their complaints.

16.  As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset, however, that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant, and, where the situation is a continuing one, once that situation ends (see, among other authorities, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, § 259, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).

17.  The decision of 3 March 2014 was a procedural decision concerning the admission of the Council’s appeal for examination (see paragraph 10 above). It was by the decision of 30 April 2014 that the Civil Court of Appeal set aside the final judgment of 5 October 2011, and the Court of Cassation took a final decision on the matter on 20 August 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The applicants lodged their application on 20 October 2014, that is in compliance with the six-month time-limit. The Government’s objection should therefore be dismissed.

18.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

19.  The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, encompasses the requirement that, where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). A departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character, such as the correction of fundamental defects or a miscarriage of justice (see Karen Poghosyan v. Armenia, no. 62356/09, § 44, 31 March 2016, and Tığrak v. Turkey, no. 70306/10, § 48, 6 July 2021).

20.  The present case concerns the reopening of proceedings after a lapse of time on the grounds that an affected party had not been aware of them. The Court has previously upheld the principle of legal certainty in a similar situation (see Karen Poghosyan, cited above, §§ 45-47, as well as §§ 32 and 33 for the description of the relevant domestic law).

21.  The applicants brought detailed arguments to contest the Council’s claim that it had only become aware of the impugned judgment on 30 January 2014. The Court of Appeal, however, failed to provide proper reasons for dismissing their arguments (see paragraph 10 above). Neither did the Court of Appeal examine whether the Council  which had been elected in September 2012 that is to say almost a year after the adoption of the impugned judgment  could and/or should have been specifically made aware of it (compare Karen Poghosyan, cited above, §§ 48 and 49).

22.  Furthermore, the final judgment of 5 October 2011 was quashed on the grounds that the (presumably then) Council had not approved the friendly settlement agreement affirmed by that judgment (see paragraph 11 above). However, the Court has emphasised that the risk of a mistake by a public authority in judicial or other proceedings must be borne by the State, especially where no other private interest is at stake, and that any errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned (see Magomedov and Others v. Russia, nos. 33636/09 and 9 others, §§ 87-89 and 94-95, 28 March 2017). At no point was it explained by the Government why the newly-elected Council would not take legal action against the Mayor in relation to the latter’s actions, which it considered unlawful, rather than seeking to have a final judgment in the applicants’ favour set aside to their detriment.

23.  In view of the foregoing, there is nothing to suggest that there were any circumstances of a substantial and compelling character justifying the re‑examination of a matter which had been determined in a final and binding judicial decision. The Court therefore finds that, by setting aside the final judgment of 5 October 2011, the courts breached the principle of legal certainty.

24.  Turning to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court notes that the final judgment of 5 October 2011 affirmed a friendly settlement according to which the applicants were to be provided with a flat or compensation if they had not been provided with it (see paragraph 6 above). It reiterates that a judgment debt may be regarded as a “possession” for the purposes of Article  1 of Protocol No. 1 and that setting such a judgment aside in violation of Article 6 may also constitute an interference with the judgment beneficiary’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his or her possessions (see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 61, ECHR 2003-IX). As the Court has already found that the final judgment had been reviewed in violation of the principle of legal certainty, it follows that there has also been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that respect (see Karen Poghosyan, cited above, § 52, with further references).

25.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

26.  The applicants claimed USD 38,000 (EUR 35,000) and EUR 1,800 in respect of pecuniary damage. The first amount was the equivalent of the compensation of USD 38,000 due to them under the friendly settlement agreement (affirmed by the judgment in their favour which was set aside) in the event that they were not provided with a flat. The second amount constituted the living expenses due to them under the same agreement which were not paid between April 2014 (the date when the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the relevant judgment) and April 2019 (when the applicants submitted their claims). The applicants further claimed EUR 25,000 in total in compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,000 in respect of legal costs incurred before the Court.

27.  The Government failed to submit their comments.

28.  As regards pecuniary damage, having regard to the approach adopted in similar cases (see, for example, Bezrukovy v. Russia, no. 34616/02, § 53, 10 May 2012, and Simonyan v. Armenia, no. 18275/08, § 31, 7 April 2016), the Court awards the applicants the amount which they would have received had the final judgment of 5 October 2011 (see paragraph 6 above) not been quashed i.e. EUR 35,000. As for the claim of EUR 1,800, the applicants failed to state the grounds thereof. The Court therefore rejects this part of the claim. It further awards the applicants jointly EUR 3,000 in compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them.

29.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR 2,000 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 35,000 (thirty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(iii)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 March 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Andreas Zünd
 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applicants: