CASE OF CHUGUNOV v. RUSSIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF CHUGUNOV v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 18883/12)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

11 October 2016

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Chugunov v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Helena Jäderblom, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Branko Lubarda, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 18883/12) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Aleksandr Vasilyevich Chugunov (“the applicant”), on 29 March 2012.

2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr V. Shukhardin, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.

3. On 4 November 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant was born in 1982 and is serving a prison sentence in Donskoy, Tula Region.

A. Conditions of the applicant’s detention and medical care

5. On 27 June 2005 the Zhukov District Court of the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of battery and manslaughter and sentenced him to eleven years and one month’s imprisonment. On 6 September 2005 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.

6. On 20 December 2005 the applicant started serving a prison sentence in correctional colony no. IK-1 in the Tula Region. Prior to the applicant’s arrest and conviction, he suffered from duodenal ulcer, chronic bronchitis and high blood pressure. In detention he developed chronic gastritis, hernia of a diaphragm, chronic cholecystitis, lipomas and pilonidal cysts.

7. On 23 January 2012 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell. During the day time, the pull-down beds were folded up during the day. The inmates were able either to stand or sit on a metal stool fastened to the floor. The cell was cold and damp. There was no ventilation system. Because of the cracks in the door and windows, there was constant draught. The toilet was separated with a 80-centimetre high partition from the living area of the cell. There was no hot water supply. The applicant was allowed 1.5 hours’ daily exercise and one 30 minutes’ shower per week.

8. On 21 March 2012 the applicant started having a fever resulting from an inflamed pilonidal cyst in the coccyx area.

9. On 22 March 2012 a prison doctor examined the applicant, prescribed him a treatment by antibiotics and pain killers. The doctor also recommended that the applicant consult a surgeon.

10. On 23 March 2012 the head of the correctional colony extended the applicant’s detention in a disciplinary cell for another fifteen days. The prison doctor examined the applicant and concluded that he was fit for detention in the disciplinary cell. He continued the prescribed treatment.

11. On 28 March 2012 the applicant was admitted to a prison hospital at correctional colony no. IK-5. According to the applicant, he was able to consult a surgeon only on 5 April 2012. The applicant’s surgery was scheduled on 10 April 2012.

12. On 8-9 April 2012 the applicant’s cyst opened up and the inflammation stopped.

13. On 18 April 2012 the applicant was released from hospital and transferred back to the correctional colony.

14. On 25 April 2012 the applicant consulted a surgeon and a neurologist at the hospital of correctional colony no. IK-2. He was prescribed medication for high blood pressure. The surgeon recommended that the applicant undergo a surgery in connection with the pilonidal cyst.

15. From 14 to 30 August 2012 the applicant underwent additional examination and treatment at the surgical division of the hospital at correctional colony no. IK-5. According to the doctors who treated the applicant, no surgery was required.

B. Correspondence with the Court

16. According to the applicant, on 5 June 2012 the applicant was summoned by the head of the operations division of the colony. There were several officers present in the office. They advised the applicant to withdraw his application before the Court. They threatened him that, should he choose to pursue his application, he would be serving the rest of his sentence in a disciplinary cell without family visits and he could be charged with another offence. The applicant complied. He signed a letter. It was stamped by the colony and dispatched to the Court on 6 June 2012.

17. On 14 June 2012 the applicant wrote another letter to the Court wherein he asked the Court to disregard his previous letter that he had had to write because of the pressure put on him by the administration of the colony.

18. On 25 June 2012 the Court received the applicant’s letter wherein he asked for withdrawal of his complaint. The letter bore a stamp of the correctional colony and a number attributed to by the administration.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

19. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the conditions of his detention and lack of medical assistance in the correctional colony had not been compatible with the standards set out in Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

He further alleged that he had not had at his disposal effective remedies in respect of his grievances under Article 3 as required by Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

20. The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, including the time during which he had been detained in a disciplinary cell, had been compatible with Article 3 of the Convention. At all times he had received necessary medical treatment. The Government submitted a copy of the applicant’s medical case-file in support of their argument. They further argued that the applicant failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint. In particular, he could have lodged a civil claim before a court. However, he had not explained why he considered such recourse to be futile in the circumstances of his case.

21. The applicant maintained his complaint. He submitted that he had been detained in appalling conditions in a disciplinary cell from January to March 2012. He further claimed that the medical treatment he had received in connection with the pilonidal cyst in March-April 2012 had been inadequate. Lastly, he argued that the inhuman and degrading conditions of detention in Russian correctional facilities were a systemic problem and, accordingly, he had been dispensed with an obligation to bring his grievances concerning the conditions of his detention to domestic courts before applying to the Court.

Admissibility

22. The Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, it is not necessary for it to examine the Government’s objection concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, as these complaints are in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

1. Conditions of detention in a disciplinary cell

23. As regards the allegedly appalling conditions of the applicant’s detention in a disciplinary cell from 23 January to 28 March 2012, the Court reiterates that, in order for it to examine the merits of the complaint, the applicant must provide an elaborate and consistent account of the conditions of his detention which would enable the Court to determine that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any other grounds (see, for example, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 122, 10 January 2012). Regard being had to the applicant’s submissions on the point (see paragraph 7 above), the Court is unable to conclude that the condition of his detention reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as unhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

24. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. Medical assistance

25. The Court further observes that the thrust of the applicant’s complaint about the alleged lack of due medical care is the authorities’ failure to ensure proper treatment for the pilonidal cyst in the coccyx area the applicant suffered from in March-April 2012. Having examined the medical documentation submitted by the parties, the Court, however, finds the applicant’s allegations unsubstantiated. According to the applicant’s medical file, at the relevant time he was examined by medical practitioners and prescribed requisite treatment which led to his recovery. The irregularities in the medical assistance provided to him, if any, were not such as to render it incompatible with the standards set out in Article 3 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. Effective remedies

26. As to the applicant’s complaint that he did not have an effective domestic remedy for his complaints under Article 13 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that a complaint may only be made under Article 13 in connection with a substantive claim which is “arguable” (see, for example, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 137, ECHR 2003‑VIII, with further references). The Court has found that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the conditions of his detention and alleged lack of adequate medical care are manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. It accordingly finds that that claim cannot be said to be “arguable” within the meaning of the Convention case-law (compare Aleksandr Dmitriyev v. Russia, no. 12993/05, § 42-43, 7 May 2015). It follows that the corresponding complaint under Article 13 is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGATION OF HINDRANCE IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicant complained that on 5 June 2012 the officers of the correctional colony where he was serving a prison sentence had made him write a letter to the Court asking to withdraw his application. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads:

“The Court may receive applications from any person... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

28. The Government contested that argument. They submitted that, while it had been open to the applicant to dispatch any letters to the Court, he had chosen not to send any via the administration of the correctional colony. At no time had the applicant been subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment during the time he had been serving a prison sentence at the correctional colony.

29. The applicant maintained his complaint.

30. The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article 34 of the Convention that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV, and Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996‑VI, p. 2288, § 105). Whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, regard must be had to the vulnerability of the complainant and his or her susceptibility to influence exerted by the authorities (see Akdivar, cited above, § 105). The applicant’s position might be particularly vulnerable when he is held in custody with limited contacts with his family or the outside world (see Cotleţ v. Romania, no. 38565/97, § 71, 3 June 2003).

31. The Court observes that the Government have not challenged the applicant’s allegation that the meeting between him and the officers of the correctional colony did take place on 5 June 2012. However, the Government have not provided any detail as to the purpose of the meeting or its outcome. Nor have the Government furnished any explanation as to why the applicant’s letter of 6 June 2012 contained the correctional colony’s stamp and a registration number. Their submissions on the matter were of a very general nature and contained no specifics to accept or disprove the applicant’s allegations.

32. Accordingly, the Court lends credence to the applicant’s account of the events of 5 June 2012 and considers it established that the applicant asked the Court to discontinue the examination of his case as a result of the pressure put on him by the officers of the correctional colony. The actions on the part of the administration of the correctional colony had an intimidating effect on the applicant and constituted an inappropriate interference with the exercise of his right of individual petition in breach of the respondent State’s obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.

33. It follows therefore that the respondent State has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

34. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

35. The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

36. The Government considered the applicant’s claims excessive. In their opinion, the acknowledgement of a violation would constitute adequate just satisfaction in the circumstances of the case.

37. The Court considers that the applicant must have experienced anguish and suffering resulting from the undue pressure exerted on him by the administration of the correctional colony and that this would not be adequately compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 7,500 under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

B. Costs and expenses

38. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,220 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

39. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence in support of his claims and that he should not be entitled to any compensation under this head.

40. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court notes that EUR 850 has already been paid to the applicant by way of legal aid. Having regard to the documents submitted by the applicants in support of their claims, the Court does not consider it necessary to make any additional award under this head.

C. Default interest

41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to proceed with the examination of the applicant’s complaint under Article 34 and declares the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that the respondent State has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fatoş AracıHelena Jäderblom
Deputy RegistrarPresident

 

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