CASE OF CILIA v. MALTA

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF CILIA v. MALTA

(Application no. 33988/21)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

16 September 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Cilia v. Malta,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Faris Vehabović, President,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland,
 Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Veronika Kotek, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 33988/21) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 May 2021 by two Maltese nationals, Ms Joan Mary Cilia and Mr Emanuel Cilia (“the applicants”), who were born in 1958 and 1959 respectively, live in Ħamrun and were represented by Dr N. DeBono, a lawyer practising in Valletta;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Maltese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Dr C. Soler, State Advocate, and Dr J. D’Agostino, Advocate at the Office of the State Advocate, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 26 August 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns a unilaterally imposed lease under Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) affecting the first applicant’s property no. 243, Vangius, Flat 1, Triq Qrejten, Ħamrun, as of July 2008. Following her parents’ respective demise, the first applicant acquired the property in its entirety by a contract of division in September 2014. Before that she owned a quarter undivided share as of 1982, and three quarters undivided share as of 2013, resulting from parts which she inherited following her parents’ respective demise. The second applicant is her husband. The annual controlled rent payable for the period 2008-2013 amounted to 1,072 euros (EUR), that between 2013-2016 to approximately EUR 1,184, and that between 2016-2018 to approximately EUR 1,202.

2.  In 2019 the applicants lodged constitutional redress proceedings complaining that the application of Article 12 of the Ordinance was in breach of their property rights as well as that of their predecessors in title, particularly due to the low amount of rent received. They limited their claims to 2018, the applicants having instituted proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board in 2019 consequent to amendments to the Ordinance (see Cauchi v. Malta, no. 14013/19, § 22, 25 March 2021). On the basis of the court‑appointed expert’s report, the annual market rent payable for the period 2008-2012 amounted to EUR 4,248, that between 2013-2016 to approximately EUR 5,320, and that between 2017-2018 to EUR 8,040.

3.  By a judgment of 24 February 2021, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence (hereinafter “the FHCC”) found that the second applicant had no interest to act, him having no possession at issue. It then found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as the first applicant suffered an indefinite imposed lease at an inadequate rent and awarded her EUR 10,250 in pecuniary damage and EUR 2,500 in non‑pecuniary damage. It also held that the tenants could no longer retain title to the property on the basis of the impugned law. In establishing compensation, the court bore in mind, inter alia, the time when the discrepancy in rent arose as well as the fact that, while the property had been affected by the imposed lease as of 2008, the first applicant’s predecessor in title had not instituted any proceedings, and that the first applicant only became the owner of the property in 2014.

4.  No costs were to be paid by the applicants. None of the parties appealed.

5.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that they remained victims of the violation upheld by the domestic court.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

6.  Given the uncalled-for submissions of the parties, it is opportune to note that the only complaint notified to the Government was that under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the remainder of the application having been declared inadmissible by the President acting in a single-judge formation at communication stage (see Rule 27A § 2(a) and Rule 54 §§ 2(b) and 3 of the Rules of Court).

7.  In so far as the application to the Court was also lodged by the second applicant, the Court need not examine the Government’s objection relating to his victim status (on the basis that the FHCC dismissed his application considering that he had no standing in those proceedings). Indeed, the Court notes that the second applicant did not appeal against that part of the decision (see paragraph 4 above) and thus the Court upholds the Government’s objection to this effect. It follows that the complaint in respect of the second applicant is, in any event, inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Deguara Caruana Gatto and Gera v Malta (dec.), no. 20064/21, § 23, May 2023).

8.  The Court refers to its general principles concerning victim status and its established case‑law in cases similar to the present one (see, among many other authorities, Apap Bologna v. Malta, no. 46931/12, §§ 41, 43, 48 and 82, 30 August 2016). The Court observes that the domestic court has acknowledged the violation and awarded EUR 12,750 in compensation covering pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, having considered that the first applicant’s predecessor in title had remained inactive and that she obtained full ownership in 2014, date of the contract of division (see paragraph 3 above).

9.  In the present case the Court need not enter into the question of the first applicant’s title prior to the contract of division, as in any event it transpires from the domestic judgment that the complaint to the domestic court also concerned the period during which her ancestors had been affected (see paragraph 2 above). The Court has already had the opportunity to observe that the FHCC’s jurisprudence was not uniform on this point and that the Constitutional Court had taken a more consistent approach (see Vassallo v. Malta [Committee], no. 52795/20, § 10, 12 September 2023, and Bonnici and Others v. Malta, [Committee], no. 15217/20, § 8, 14 November 2023). The latter considered that in those circumstances where the plaintiffs were the universal heirs of their predecessors (and therefore had stepped into the shoes of the deceased, inheriting all rights and obligations of that person), they should be awarded compensation also in respect of the period during which the property was held by their predecessors in title. The matter having been determined by the Constitutional Court and consistently applied, there is no reason for this Court to take a different approach (ibid.). Moreover, the Government having brought to the Court’ attention only judgments of the FHCC, there is no reason to find otherwise in the present case. Thus, the first applicant having been nominated as heir as to an undivided share by both her parents, there was no reason to exclude the consideration of the period during which her ancestors had been affected by the impugned law.

10.  These considerations suffice to find that the redress provided by the domestic court did not offer sufficient relief to the first applicant, who thus retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Portanier v. Malta, no. 55747/16, § 24, 27 August 2019). The Government’s objection to this effect is therefore dismissed.

11.  In so far as the Government considered that the first applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, the Court notes that it has already held that the first decisions confirming the shift in the Constitutional Court’s practice in relation to compensation in this type of case, which continued to be applied throughout that year, were adopted on 27 January 2021 and that that change of case-law must have become public knowledge six months later, that is on 30 July 2021 (see Rizzo and Others v. Malta, no. 36318/21, § 59, 16 January 2024). Given the relevant timeline in the circumstances of the present case the first applicant could not have been expected to lodge an appeal to the Constitutional Court challenging the compensation prior to that date, that is, in March 2021 when the time-limit to appeal expired (compare Rizzo and Others, cited above, § 60). This objection is therefore also dismissed.

12.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

13.  As to the merits, the Court refers to its general principles as set out, for example, in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, §§ 52-59, 15 September 2009).

14.  Having regard to the findings of the domestic court relating to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraph 3 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to re‑examine in detail the merits of the complaint. It finds that, as established by the domestic court, the first applicant was made to bear a disproportionate burden. Moreover, as the Court has already found in the context of the objection on victim status (see paragraph 10 above), the redress provided by the domestic court did not offer sufficient relief to her.

15.  The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the first applicant.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

16.  The first applicant claimed EUR 12,815 in respect of pecuniary damage representing lost rent from 2008 to 2019 according to her calculation of the relevant deductions in the light of the Court’s case law in Cauchi (cited above). She further claimed an unquantified sum of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

17.  The Government insisted that no pecuniary damage was due for the period prior to the applicant obtaining full ownership and that the FHCC had already awarded non-pecuniary damage.

18.  The Court has made all the considerations applicable in this type of cases, as set out in Cauchi (cited above, §§ 102-07). Noting in particular that the award of the FHCC remains payable if not yet paid, and that the claim was limited to 2018, the Court awards the first applicant EUR 5,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in non‑pecuniary damage.

19.  The Court rejects the unquantified and unsubstantiated claim for costs before it, in the absence of any relevant supporting documentation (see Rule 60 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three months, the following amounts:

(i)  EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Veronika Kotek Faris Vehabović
 Acting Deputy Registrar President