CASE OF CONTRADA v. ITALY

CASE OF CONTRADA v. ITALY

(92/1997/876/1088)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

24 August 1998

In the case of Contrada v. Italy[1],

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court B[2], as a Chamber composed of the following judges:

MrR. Bernhardt, President,
MrF. Gölcüklü,
MrC. Russo,
MrJ. De Meyer,
MrN. Valticos,
MrA.N. Loizou,
MrM.A. Lopes Rocha,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrT. Pantiru,

and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 25 April and 29 July 1998,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 22 September 1997, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 § 1 and Article 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 27143/95) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25 by an Italian national, Mr Bruno Contrada, on 4 November 1994.

The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby Italy recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

2.  In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 35 § 3 (d) of Rules of Court B, the applicant designated the lawyers who would represent him (Rule 31).

3.  The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr C. Russo, the elected judge of Italian nationality (Article 43 of the Convention), and Mr R. Bernhardt, who was then Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 § 4 (b)). On 25 September 1997, in the presence of the Registrar, the President of the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr B. Walsh, Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr N. Valticos, Mr A.N. Loizou and Mr K. Jungwiert (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 § 5). Subsequently Mr T. Pantiru and Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha, substitute judges, replaced Mr Walsh, who had died, and Mr Macdonald, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 22 § 1 and 24 § 1).

4.  As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 § 6), Mr Bernhardt, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Italian Government (“the Government”), the applicant’s lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 39 § 1 and 40). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the Government’s and the applicant’s memorials on 4 and 11 March 1998 respectively.

5.  In accordance with the President’s decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 April 1998. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

(a)for the Government
MrV. Esposito, Divisional President of the
Court of Cassation,Co-Agent;

(b)for the Commission
MrB. Conforti,Delegate;

(c)for the applicant
MrP. Tortorici, of the Palermo Bar,
MrB. Nascimbene, of the Milan Bar,Counsel,
MrsN. Tonolli,Adviser.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Conforti, Mr Tortorici, Mr Nascimbene and Mr Esposito.

AS TO THE FACTS

I.the CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A.The applicant’s detention and the accusations made against him by the pentiti of the Mafia

6.  The applicant, a senior police officer, was at the time of his arrest Deputy Director of the Civil Secret Service (SISDE) for Sicily, in Palermo. In the same city, he had previously been Head of the Mobile Unit, Head of the Criminal Investigation Police (Criminalpol) and Principal Private Secretary to the Anti-Mafia High Commission (Alto Commissario Antimafia).

7.  Mr Contrada was detained on 24 December 1992 at Palermo Military Prison under a warrant issued the previous day by the investigating judge (Giudice per le indagini preliminari) attached to the Palermo District Court, at the request of the public prosecutor’s office. He was accused of involvement in a mafia-type organisation (concorso in associazione de stampo mafioso – contrary to Articles 110, 416 and 416 bis of the Criminal Code) on the basis of statements of several pentiti – former members of the Mafia who have decided to cooperate with the authorities – during questioning in the course of various investigations into Mafia offences. All the pentiti had themselves been charged with or convicted of involvement in a mafia-type organisation and, in some cases, other offences, such as drug trafficking or murder.

On 2 January 1993 Mr Contrada was suspended from duty.

8.  The first four statements which led to the applicant’s arrest may be summarised as follows:

(a)G. Mutolo asserted that R. Riccobono, head of the Mafia clan of which he had been a “member” since 1973, had told him in 1981 that the applicant was at the service of key Mafia leaders for whom he had done a number of unspecified “favours”. R. Riccobono had also told him that one A.G., a property developer with Mafia connections, had provided the applicant with a flat and that in 1981 the Mafia had spent 15 million lire on a Christmas present of a car for one of the applicant’s mistresses.

As the Mafia had decided in 1975 to eliminate the applicant and two other high-ranking officials, and had instructed S. Micalizzi and himself to shadow the applicant, Mutolo had asked R. Riccobono why the applicant was still alive. Riccobono had replied that Mr Contrada was “at the
disposal” (of the Mafia). That same pentito had previously accused the public prosecutor in charge of his case, four of the judges who had convicted him in the Assize Court and the Assize Court of Appeal and the former President of the Palermo Court of Appeal of collusion with the Mafia.

(b)T. Buscetta, who gave evidence in 1984, said that R. Riccobono had advised him to return to Palermo and had assured him that the police would not look for him. T. Buscetta had subsequently informed S. Bontade (a member of the Mafia belonging to a different clan) of the tenor of his conversation with R. Riccobono. S. Bontade had then drawn Buscetta’s attention to the fact that R. Riccobono was passing information to the police and, in particular, the applicant.

As a result of those statements, an investigation was started into Mr Contrada’s activities, but was discontinued.

On 25 November 1992, Buscetta repeated the statement he had made in 1984, but added that he did not have first-hand knowledge of the facts.

(c)R. Spatola accused the applicant of having helped T. Riina, one of the most powerful Mafia leaders, to escape during a police operation in the early 1980s. He asserted that the applicant was a Freemason and had contacts with the Mafia leaders, also Freemasons. He also described how a police operation to arrest another mafioso, G. Gambino, had been foiled by a telephone call alerting him.

(d)G. Marchese stated on 4 November 1992 that in 1981, after returning from a meeting with senior Mafia leaders, his uncle had instructed him to alert T. Riina to the fact that he had been informed by the applicant that the police had found out where Riina lived and were preparing to search his home. T. Riina had as a result left that address and hidden elsewhere. During questioning on 2 October 1992, however, Marchese had said that T. Riina had left home to ensure his safety owing to clashes between rival Mafia clans.

9.  In making his order of 23 December 1992 the investigating judge held that the statements referred to above had to be considered reliable and to have been made voluntarily. They could therefore constitute serious evidence of guilt (gravi indizi di colpevolezza), which is a prerequisite under Italian law for a suspect to be detained. The judge also considered that the statements were corroborated by objective evidence confirming their credibility.

10.  The applicant was subsequently implicated in 1993 and 1994 by four other pentiti. Their statements may be summarised as follows:

(a)F.M. Mannoia referred to the applicant during questioning on 24 January 1994, stating that the applicant was a friend of R. Riccobono, also had contacts with S. Bontade and had been given the use of a flat by A.G.

(b)S. Cancemi said that Mr Contrada had accelerated S. Bontade’s application for a licence to carry firearms and had also intervened to secure the return of S. Bontade’s driving licence, which had been withdrawn as a preventive measure.

(c)P. Scavuzzo claimed to have seen the applicant in January 1991 in a flat in Palermo in the company of a member of the Mafia. He alleged that Mr Contrada had been involved in a valuation by a Swiss art expert of an amphora which P. Scavuzzo had brought to the premises and had, he asserted, been intended for the deputy police commissioner. P. Scavuzzo had convictions for armed robbery, drug trafficking and calumny.

(d)M. Pirrone, a member of the Ndrangheta, a Calabrian mafia-type organisation, said that a member of the Mafia, C. Conti, had told him that Mr Contrada was “useful” to the Mafia as he provided it with information about police raids.

11.  Lastly, on 23 March 1993 R. Spatola stated that while in a restaurant with two other members of the Mafia, the Di Caro brothers, they had drawn his attention to the fact that R. Riccobono was there with the applicant in a small room that had been reserved in the restaurant.

12.  Mr Contrada was questioned by the investigating judge shortly after his arrest, on 27 December 1992.

On 27 April 1993 he was questioned, at his request, by the public prosecutor and, on an unspecified date, transferred to Rome Military Prison.

Subsequently, the investigating judge committed him for trial and ordered that the trial should start on 12 April 1994 (see paragraph 25 below).

B.The investigation

1.The applicant’s initial request for release

13.  On 3 January 1993 the applicant filed an application with the Court of Cassation for release on the grounds that, firstly, the order of 23 December 1992 did not state what the “serious evidence of guilt” against him was and, secondly, in any event, the statements of the first four pentiti, which referred to events in the distant past most of which had been related to them by third parties, could under no circumstances constitute serious evidence of guilt. In that connection, he referred in particular to the Court of Cassation’s case-law under which a statement implicating another person did not constitute serious evidence of guilt within the meaning of Article 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP” – see paragraph 36 below) unless it was supported by objective evidence. He said that G. Mutolo and R. Spatola had never said what the favours he had allegedly
done for the Mafia leaders were and that, furthermore, it was impossible to check the truth of the information provided by G. Mutolo, G. Marchese and T. Buscetta, as the persons from whom it had been obtained had all died in the meantime. He also observed that the investigation into like allegations made by T. Buscetta in 1984 had been discontinued in 1985 for want of material corroborating evidence. Lastly, the applicant submitted that none of the conditions laid down in Article 274 CCP (see paragraph 37 below) could justify detention in his case.

14.  On 5 February 1993 the Court of Cassation dismissed his appeal on the ground that the investigating judge had given logical and sufficient reasons for his decision. The court noted that the judge had found that the pentiti statements were to be considered reliable, as they had been made by persons who had occupied senior positions within the Mafia and who had in the past enabled the investigators to establish the structure of that organisation. The Court of Cassation said in that regard that hearsay evidence could be admissible if it emanated from a reliable witness. The evidence had also to be considered “serious”, as the judge had referred to objective corroborative evidence. Emphasising that the statements in question had been made by different people and concerned different events so that their credibility was strengthened, the Court of Cassation concluded that the evidence assembled by the investigating judge pointed to the likelihood that the applicant was guilty of the offences with which he had been charged. Furthermore, under Article 275 CCP, the seriousness of those offences raised a rebuttable presumption that a risk existed that the applicant would tamper with evidence, abscond or reoffend.

2.The second request for release

(a)To the Palermo investigating judge

15.  On 23 July 1993 the applicant made a further application for release from detention to the investigating judge and at the same time applied for the charges to be dropped on the grounds that the offence had not been made out. He said in particular that the investigation up to that point had already provided the investigators with substantial evidence of his innocence. He referred to the active role he had played in a number of investigations into the Mafia, as a result of which he had even received death threats, and argued that he had opposed granting T. Buscetta day-release from prison, fearing, as proved to be the case, that Buscetta would take advantage of it to escape and resume his activities. He maintained that he had never met R. Riccobono or been a Freemason.

The applicant submitted that there was no real and current risk justifying his detention, given, in particular, that he would never be able to tamper with the evidence, since in the course of the lengthy investigation into the allegations against him all the evidence had already been obtained. Nor was there any risk of his absconding, since he had been aware of the pentiti statements before being arrested. In view of his career and the role he had played in investigating the Mafia, any risk that he might continue assisting the Mafia’s activities should also be ruled out.

16.  The investigating judge who had ordered the applicant’s arrest dismissed that application on 24 August 1993. He held that the pentiti statements, far from being refuted, had subsequently been successively confirmed by:

(i)further detailed statements by R. Spatola confirming that the applicant knew R. Riccobono;

(ii)the fact that the applicant had, after a search at the home of a member of the Mafia, allegedly asked another police officer to “ease up”; and

(iii)the fact that the applicant had tipped off O. Tognoli, who was suspected of having Mafia links, that an arrest warrant had been issued against him, thereby enabling him to get away.

The judge also considered that the pentiti’s decision to cooperate with the judicial authorities could not have been motivated by a grudge against the applicant, given the genuineness of their cooperation with the authorities. Lastly, in view of the fact that the applicant occupied a senior official position, there was a real risk – assuming the charges against him were founded – of evidence being tampered with and of his absconding.

(b)To the Palermo District Court

17.  Mr Contrada appealed against that order to the Palermo District Court, which had appellate jurisdiction on applications for release. As regards the further statements by R. Spatola (see paragraph 11 above) in which he had said that the applicant knew R. Riccobono well, the applicant submitted that it was only a few days before the applicant’s arrest that Spatola had started making allegations about him to the judicial authorities. Although R. Spatola had been cooperating with the judicial authorities since 1989 he was, apparently, unaware that the applicant had left the Anti-Mafia High Commission in 1985. No more reliable, in the applicant’s submission, was R. Spatola’s claim that he had seen the applicant with R. Riccobono in a well-known Palermo restaurant (see paragraph 11 above) for, at the time, Palermo had been the scene of a ruthless power struggle between the various Mafia clans and Riccobono had no interest in showing himself in public. As to his instruction to a colleague to “ease up”, his intention had not been to protect members of the Mafia, but to bring a junior police
officer in line following a search in which he had ill-treated the sons and wife of a mafioso wanted by the police.

18.  On 1 October 1993 the Palermo District Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it concerned points which had already been rejected and that new facts emerging from the investigation appeared to confirm the strength of the case against him. The court observed, inter alia, that the junior police officer had confirmed his statement regarding the pressure exerted on him by Mr Contrada. Even if no account could be taken of the statements by O. Tognoli in Switzerland, as they had been related verbally by the judges and had not been recorded in any document, all the other evidence against the applicant justified keeping him in detention pending trial. The court therefore upheld the order of 24 August 1993, while declaring that the statements concerning O. Tognoli’s evidence were inadmissible. Lastly, the court stressed once again the risk of evidence being tampered with given the network of contacts on which the applicant could rely, as had been demonstrated in particular by the fact that the applicant had voluntarily reported to the public prosecutor’s office on 17 November 1992, when the investigation should still have been secret. That circumstance confirmed that he had been aware, not only of the existence of an investigation against him, but also of the tenor of the accusations made by G. Mutolo.

(c)To the Court of Cassation

19.  The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, but his appeal was dismissed on 13 December 1993. While acknowledging that the reasoning of the courts below regarding the threat posed by the applicant had been somewhat concise, the Court of Cassation considered, among other things, that it was nevertheless neither manifestly illogical nor unlawful.

3.Extension of the maximum periods of detention pending trial

20.  On 7 December 1993, noting that checks were still being carried out at banks and requests for documents from the Ministry of the Interior and the police authorities were still in hand, the Palermo public prosecutor’s office applied for the applicant’s detention pending trial to be continued after the expiration of the statutory limit of one year on 24 December 1993. On 20 December 1993 the applicant opposed that application.

21.  On 23 December 1993 the investigating judge, relying in particular on the complexity of the investigation (involving, among other things, an outstanding request for judicial assistance, transcripts of tapped telephone conversations and an analysis of data relating to mobile telephones used by Mr Contrada) and the risk of the applicant tampering with evidence (whether to hand, or to be obtained), absconding and committing further offences, ordered that the period of detention pending trial be extended by sixty days.

22.  On 7 January 1994 the applicant appealed. He submitted, inter alia, that the investigative measures that had allegedly necessitated his continued detention could easily have been completed earlier and certainly before 24 December 1993 and that any delay should be attributed solely to the judicial authorities.

23.  On 2 February 1994 the Palermo District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that even if the data relating to the mobile telephones could have been requested and analysed earlier – it had not been requested until 8 November 1993 although the applicant had been in detention since 24 December 1992 – the prosecution could not be criticised in relation to the other investigative measures justifying the applicant’s continued detention. They had either been put in hand very early on or had been particularly complex, and the prosecution enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation in that regard. Furthermore, even if the risk of absconding could be discounted, the court considered that there was still a real risk that the applicant would reoffend or that evidence would be tampered with, given the extremely sensitive official position he had occupied. The court noted on that point that, after a year’s wait, the prosecution had still not obtained the files on, among other things, work done by the applicant for the Ministry of the Interior. Account also had to be taken of the fact that it would be very difficult for the applicant to extricate himself from the Mafia’s criminal network.

24.  Mr Contrada appealed to the Court of Cassation on 1 March 1994, but his appeal was dismissed on 27 May 1994. The Court of Cassation held, in particular, that there was a danger that the applicant might use his contacts to tamper with the evidence.

C.The trial

1.First application for release

25.  On 10 January 1995, following his committal and the start of his trial (see paragraph 12 above), the applicant made a further application for release. The Palermo District Court dismissed his application on 19 January 1995, holding once again that, as the investigation was complex, the applicant’s release might interfere with its progress. The applicant could have used his many contacts and connections – made while working at his former highly sensitive posts – to tamper with evidence or to exert pressure on witnesses. As to the risk of reoffending, the court emphasised that criminal links with the Mafia were generally long-lived, particularly bearing in mind the Mafia’s hallmark of subjugating its members.

2.Extension of the maximum periods of detention pending trial

26.  On 14 April 1995 the Palermo District Court granted the prosecution’s application of 31 March 1995 for an order pursuant to Article 304 § 2 CCP (see paragraph 39 below) extending the maximum periods of detention pending trial for the duration of the trial and deliberations at first instance, owing to the complexity of the proceedings. The court held that, given the number of hearings, witnesses’ depositions and statements from the applicant, the prosecution’s request appeared justified. As regards the applicant’s submission that the proceedings would have been completed earlier if the hearings had been held at more frequent intervals, the court considered that it had to take into account the court’s excessive workload and the fact that it had also had to deal with other cases involving accused detained pending trial.

27.  On 24 April 1995 Mr Contrada appealed against that order, submitting in particular that the provision for extension of the maximum periods of detention pending trial had been adopted in order to meet the requirements of trials of a very large number of defendants (maxi-processi). In his case, however, it had not been possible to complete the trial within the maximum period permitted for detention pending trial for reasons other than the complexity of the proceedings.

28.  The Palermo District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal in an order of 22 May 1995, ruling that all the conditions laid down in Article 304 § 2 CCP (see paragraph 39 below) were satisfied in his case: that is to say, in particular, the complexity of the proceedings (exacerbated by the court’s excessive workload) and the continuing applicability of the conditions laid down in Article 274 CCP (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant did not appeal to the Court of Cassation against that order.

3.The applicant’s release

29.  On 28 July 1995 Mr Contrada made a further application to the Palermo District Court for release, arguing that his detention was no longer necessary for the investigation and that his health was suffering, as attested by a psychiatrists’ report.

30.  The court granted the application (which was, moreover, supported by the prosecution) and the applicant’s release was finally ordered on 31 July 1995. The court held in particular that:

(i)at that stage of the trial, as the oral hearings had been completed, all the prosecution and defence witnesses heard, the documentary evidence obtained and various confrontations necessary for the investigation held, there was no longer any risk that the evidence would be tampered with or witnesses procured to give false evidence;

(ii)the risk of absconding could also be ruled out owing to the applicant’s state of health – he was suffering from a sufficiently acute form of asthenia –, the long period he had spent in detention and the fact that it was far from certain that a final conviction, which would necessitate precautions being taken to ensure that he served his sentence, would be secured; and

(iii)any risk of the applicant committing further offences could also be ruled out, owing to his state of health, the long period he had spent in detention pending trial and, lastly, the fact that since his arrest he had no longer been in his post.

31.  In a note of 8 November 1995, appended to the Government’s observations, the public prosecutor attached to the Palermo Court of Appeal admitted, with regard to the question of whether there had been a need to keep the applicant in detention pending trial, that there was an apparent contradiction between the decision of 14 April 1995 to extend the maximum period and the fact that the conditions justifying keeping the applicant in detention under Article 304 § 2 CCP had ceased to exist shortly afterwards, which showed that an overall view of the trial had been lacking.

4.Conduct of the trial and outcome of the proceedings at first instance

32.  The trial progressed at an average rate of two hearings a week. Additionally, a report by the President of the court dated 29 September 1995 shows that, after the maximum period of detention pending trial in the proceedings had been extended for the duration of the trial, the court proposed holding three hearings a week instead of two, but the applicant’s lawyers refused. It appears from the case file that the proceedings involved 165 hearings at the investigative stage and the examination of more than 250 witnesses or persons accused of offences connected with those with which the applicant was charged. There were also four confrontations; moreover, fourteen hearings were necessary merely to examine the applicant, thirteen of which were held in succession between 4 November and 29 December 1994. Fifty-eight witnesses called by the parties gave evidence at the trial. A large number of documents were lodged on the case file. The hearings between 22 April 1994 and 12 October 1995 were devoted to the hearing of witnesses. Seven pentiti were, for security reasons, questioned in the Rome and Padua prisons where they were detained. The public prosecutor made his submissions over the course of twenty-one hearings held between 23 November 1995 and 19 January 1996. Between 7 February and 29 March 1996, over twenty-two hearings, the applicant’s lawyer made his submissions for the defence.

In a judgment of 5 April 1996, which was filed with the court registry on 17 October 1996, the Palermo District Court sentenced the applicant to ten years’ imprisonment for aiding and abetting from the outside (concorso esterno) a mafia-type organisation (Articles 416 bis and 110 of the Criminal Code).

In the reasons for its decision it said:

“The court considers that the complex and extensive investigation carried out at the trial, at which the parties were able to put forward their respective arguments, enables the conclusion to be reached with total certainty that the accused was completely guilty. That finding is based on the accusations, all of which are consistent, made against him by people who have cooperated with the prosecution and which the court finds to be credible taken as a whole, whether individually or jointly with other items of evidence subsequently corroborated by a very large number of statements and documents from other sources, the accusatory content of which is unequivocal and the evidential value indisputable.”

33.  The applicant has appealed. The hearing of his appeal before the Palermo Court of Appeal began on 11 June 1998. At the end of a subsequent hearing on 2 July the appeal was adjourned to 22 October 1998.

II.Relevant domestic law

1.The offence with which the applicant was charged

34.  Article 416 bis of the Criminal Code provides, inter alia:

“A person who is a member of a mafia-type organisation of three or more persons shall be liable to imprisonment...

An organisation is of a mafia type if its members use the intimidatory power of the bonds of membership and the resulting vows of obedience and silence in order to commit an offence, to acquire (directly or indirectly) the management, or other form of control, of economic activities, licences, permits, public contracts or services or to gain unfair advantages or profits for its members or other persons, or to prevent or hinder the free exercise of the right to vote, or to secure votes for members or other persons in elections.

...”

35.  Moreover, Article 110 of the Criminal Code provides that where several persons are accomplices in the commission of an offence, they shall each be individually liable to the punishment laid down for that offence.

The case-law has applied the concept of aiding and abetting in cases concerning criminal organisations – and, more particularly, a mafia-type organisation – and has accepted that the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation may be committed from the outside. The latter concept applies to a person who is not a member of the organisation and has confined himself to doing one or more acts likely to further that criminal
organisation’s aims and motivated by an independent intention – limited in aim, duration and effectiveness – to commit a crime (see, among other authorities, the Court of Cassation judgment no. 88/179169).

That interpretation has, however, given rise to controversy among the Court of Cassation judges themselves. Thus, in its judgment no. 2699 of 30 June 1994, the Court of Cassation held as follows:

“As regards offences associated with belonging to a criminal organisation, and in particular a mafia-type organisation, the concept of criminal responsibility in the form of ‘aiding and abetting from the outside’ is unacceptable; a defendant who undertakes acts which facilitate the organisation’s aims either specifically intends to contribute to the furtherance of that organisation’s aims and is therefore indistinguishable from a member of the organisation, or does not have that specific intention, whereupon the conduct which facilitates the organisation’s aims should be treated differently from the offence of belonging to a criminal organisation... The impossibility of applying the concept of ‘aiding and abetting an organisation from the outside’ is confirmed by the fact that the offence of ‘aiding and abetting the members of a criminal organisation’ already exists (Article 418 of the Criminal Code) and that several provisions ... already provide for an offence committed ‘in order to facilitate’ the activity of Mafia or similar organisations...”

2.Provisions relating to the grounds capable of justifying the applicant’s arrest and continued detention

36.  Article 273 § 1 CCP provides:

“No one shall be detained pending trial unless there is serious evidence of his guilt.”

37.  Article 274 CCP provides that a person may be detained pending trial:

“(a)  if detention is demanded by special and unavoidable requirements of the inquiry into the facts under investigation concerning a genuine and present danger for the production or authenticity of evidence and based on matters of fact which must, on pain of nullity, be expressly set out in the decision, which the judicial authority may take of its own motion...;

(b)  if the accused has absconded or there is a real danger of his absconding, provided that the court considers that, if convicted, he will be liable to a prison sentence of more than two years;

(c)  where, given the specific nature and circumstances of the offence and having regard to the character of the suspect or the accused as shown by his conduct, acts or criminal record, there is a genuine risk that he will commit a serious offence involving the use of weapons or other violent means against the person or an offence against the constitutional order or an offence relating to organised crime or a further offence of the same kind as that of which he is suspected or accused...”

38.  Under Article 275 § 3 CCP, as amended by Legislative Decree no. 152 of 1991 (which became Law no. 203 of 1991) and Legislative Decree no. 292 of 1991 (which became Law no. 356 of 1991) there is a rebuttable presumption that such a necessity exists with regard to certain particularly serious offences, including the one with which the applicant was charged.

3.Provisions relating to the maximum periods of detention pending trial

39.  Article 303 CCP lays down the maximum permitted periods of detention pending trial depending on the stage reached in the proceedings. As the applicant was prosecuted for the offence laid down in Article 416 bis of the Criminal Code, the periods applicable to him during the proceedings at first instance were as follows:

(i)one year from the beginning of his detention until the order committing him for trial;

(ii)one year from the beginning of the trial until his conviction at first instance.

Article 303 CCP provides, inter alia, that if the order committing the defendant for trial has not been made or, as the case may be, the defendant has not been convicted at first instance within the relevant period, the detention pending trial shall cease to be lawful and the defendant must be released.

Articles 304 and 305 CCP provide for exceptions to these rules.

In particular, paragraph 2 of Article 304 provides that for certain offences, including the one provided for in Article 416 bis of the Criminal Code, the periods laid down in Article 303 may be extended during the hearings, the deliberations at first instance or the appeal, if the proceedings prove to be particularly complex. Article 304 provides that the length of detention pending trial must not, under any circumstances, exceed two-thirds of the maximum sentence for the offence with which the defendant is charged or the sentence imposed by the first-instance court.

Paragraph 2 of Article 305 provides:

“During the preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor may request an extension of a period of detention pending trial that is about to expire, where there is a serious need for precautionary measures which, in particularly complex investigations, make it absolutely necessary to extend the period of detention pending trial.”

That provision goes on to provide that such an extension may be renewed only once and that, in any event, the periods provided for in Article 303 cannot be exceeded by more than half.

4.Other relevant provisions

40.  Article 477 CCP provides, inter alia, that where the trial cannot be completed at a single sitting, the President shall order it to continue on the next working day. Moreover, the court may not adjourn the proceedings other than on grounds of absolute necessity and for a maximum of ten working days.

In that connection, the Court of Cassation has held that the ten-day period provided for in Article 477 § 2 CCP is a guideline (termine di natura ordinatoria), non-compliance with which does not render the detention unlawful and cannot have any effect on the extension of periods of detention pending trial under Article 304 § 1 CCP. While the court must comply with the time-limits laid down in Article 477 CCP, especially in cases where the length of the trial affects the length of the detention, the ability to adhere to the time-limits is inevitably dictated by the workload of the court concerned; if the court has a heavy workload, the trial cannot always be conducted within the period provided for in Article 477 CCP (see the Butera judgment of 18 February 1994).

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

41.  Mr Contrada applied to the Commission on 4 November 1994. He complained:

(1)  that his arrest and detention had been unlawful (Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention);

(2)  of the length of his detention (Article 5 § 3);

(3)  of the length of the proceedings (Article 6 § 1);

(4)  that he had spent so long in detention without plausible reason that his right to be presumed innocent had been infringed (Article 6 § 2);

(5)  that he had not had speedy access to his personal file;

(6)  of infringements of Articles 16 and 17 as a result of the above-mentioned violations.

42.  On 14 January 1997 the Commission declared the application (no. 27143/95) admissible as to the complaint relating to the length of detention pending trial and inadmissible as to the remainder. In its report of 10 July 1997 (Article 31), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (seventeen votes to fifteen). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the dissenting opinion contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment[3].

FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT

43.  The Government concluded their memorial by inviting the Court to hold that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

44.  The applicant’s lawyers asked the Court to hold that the Italian State had infringed Article 3 and Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 and to award their client just satisfaction.

as to the law

I.scope of the case

45.  In his memorial to the Court and at the hearing, the applicant challenged, as he had previously done before the Commission, the lawfulness of his arrest and detention, saying that they had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention as they had been based solely on the statements of former members of the Mafia (pentiti) who had decided to cooperate with the authorities. Relying for the first time on Article 3, he also submitted that the conditions of his detention (solitary confinement in military prisons) amounted to ill-treatment in breach of that provision.

On the basis of the Guerra and Others v. Italy judgment of 19 February 1998 (Reports of Judgments and decisions 1998-I), he said that the Court should hold that it had jurisdiction to hear both those complaints in view of their “close connection” with the complaint under Article 5 § 3.

46.  Before the Court, the Delegate of the Commission confined himself to saying that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 because the length of the detention had been unreasonable. The Government, on the other hand, said that the complaints under Article 5 § 1 (c) and under Article 5 § 3 were outside the scope of the decision on admissibility, since the first complaint had been dismissed as being manifestly ill-founded and the second as having been made out of time.

47.  The Court must therefore determine the extent of its jurisdiction ratione materiae.

48.  In the Guerra and Others judgment cited above the Court said in paragraphs 43 and 44 (p. 223):

“… Its jurisdiction ‘extend[s] to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of [the] Convention which are referred to it in accordance with Article 48’ (see Article 45 of the Convention as amended in respect of States which have ratified Protocol No. 9) and that ‘In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter [is] settled by the decision of the Court’ (Article 49).

… [S]ince the Court is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant, a government or the Commission. By virtue of the jura novit curia principle, it has, for example, considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by those appearing before it and even under a provision in respect of which the Commission had declared the complaint to be inadmissible while declaring it admissible under a different one. A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on...

The Court has full jurisdiction only within the scope of the ‘case’, which is determined by the decision on the admissibility of the application. Within the compass thus delimited, the Court may deal with any issue of fact or law that arises during the proceedings before it...”

Mrs Guerra and the thirty-nine other applicants had relied before the Commission on the fact that no information had been provided about the risks and procedure in the event of an accident at a chemical factory. The Commission had declared that complaint admissible under Article 10 (right to freedom of information). Before the Court, the applicants had relied on Articles 8 and 2 on the basis of the same facts and the Court held that although those grounds had not been expressly pleaded previously, they were “closely connected” with the one pleaded in the application to the Commission, as giving information to the applicants “could have had a bearing on their private and family life and their physical integrity”.

In those circumstances, the Court held that “it [had] jurisdiction to consider the case under Articles 8 and 2 as well as under Article 10” (see the Guerra and Others judgment cited above, pp. 223–24, §§ 45 and 46).

49.  In the instant case the Court observes, firstly, that on 14 January 1997 the Commission declared the complaint under Article 5 § 1 (c) inadmissible as it considered that the national authorities had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding what weight should be attached to the statements that had led to the applicant’s arrest. It further notes that although Mr Contrada complained from the outset that he had been detained for an unreasonable period (Article 5 § 3), the complaint under Article 3 concerns the actual conditions of detention, not its length.

50.  In conclusion, although both the relevant grounds concern the applicant’s deprivation of liberty the Court has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear them, as the first complaint is identical to the one declared inadmissible by the Commission and the second must be regarded as being a new complaint, unconnected to the complaint under Article 5 § 3, such that the Court is unable to adopt the legal qualification suggested by the applicant.

II.alleged violation of article 5 § 3 of the convention

51.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained for an unreasonable period, contrary to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

52.  The Commission agreed with that submission.

The Government, on the other hand, maintained that the national authorities could not be blamed. They had done everything possible to shed light on the facts in an extremely sensitive case, the investigation into which had required the hearing of a considerable number of witnesses and the accumulation of substantial documentation on the case file.

A.Period to be taken into consideration

53.  The period to be considered began on 24 December 1992, when Mr Contrada was arrested, and ended on 31 July 1995, when his release was ordered by the Palermo District Court (see paragraphs 7 and 30 above). It therefore lasted for two years, seven months and seven days.

B.Whether the length of the detention was reasonable

54.  Under the Court’s case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities the W. v. Switzerland judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254-A, p. 15, § 30).

It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to examine all the circumstances arguing for or against the existence of such a requirement and to set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the undisputed facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3.

The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (see the Muller v. France judgment of 17 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, p. 388, § 35).

1.Whether the length of the detention was justified

55.  The relevant authorities considered on ten occasions whether Mr Contrada should remain in detention (see paragraphs 14, 16–19, 21, 23‑25 and 30). The reasons given by the authorities for refusing to release him were that there was a risk that he would commit further offences or abscond and that evidence would be tampered with and witnesses suborned.

(a)The risk of the applicant’s committing further offences or absconding

56.  The applicant affirmed that none of the circumstances capable under the Court’s case-law of establishing that there was a risk of absconding, such as the length of the sentence faced, or the fact that an accused had a particularly low “tolerance” of detention or no firm links with the country in which he was to be detained existed in the instant case.

He referred as proof of that to the fact that some of the courts had held that the risk was non-existent (see the order of the investigating judge of 24 August 1993, the decisions of the Palermo District Court of 2 February 1994 and of the Court of Cassation of 27 May 1994 and the order of the District Court of 19 January 1995). Furthermore, if he had really intended to abscond, he could quite easily have done so during the five-weeks’ interval between his having voluntarily reported to the Palermo public prosecutor’s office (17 November 1992) and his arrest (24 December 1992).

The same applied to the risk of his committing further offences as the fact that he had been suspended from duty the month after his arrest would have deprived him of the connections that, according to the prosecution, would have enabled him to carry on assisting the mafia-type organisation.

57.  The Commission considered that it was unlikely that the applicant would have absconded given his character and the position he held in the police force. Moreover, as early as 2 February 1994, the Palermo District Court had held that the risk could be excluded.

As to the risk of his committing further offences, while such a risk might have been plausible at least at the beginning of the investigation in view of the serious accusations against the applicant, the Commission noted that the public prosecutor attached to the Palermo Court of Appeal had admitted in
a note of 8 November 1995 that there was a contradiction between the Palermo District Court’s decision of 22 May 1995, in which it was held that there was still a real danger of further offences being committed, and its decision of 31 July 1995, in which there was no longer any question of any such danger existing. Consequently, from a certain point onwards the fear that further offences might be committed could no longer by itself justify the applicant’s continued detention.

58.  The Court notes that Article 275 § 3 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 38 above) creates a presumption that there is a risk that a suspect will abscond, commit further offences or tamper with evidence in cases concerning serious offences such as those with which the applicant was charged. The risk of absconding significantly diminished during the preliminary investigation. However, it did not completely disappear as is indicated in particular by the decision of 22 May 1995. The fact that the court referred to the risk in general terms cannot detract from that conclusion.

As regards the fear of further offences being committed, it is apparent from the decisions refusing the applications for release that the relevant authorities considered there to be a real danger that Mr Contrada might use the network of contacts he had built up over his career in order to continue providing invaluable assistance to the Mafia leaders. It is clear that the same relations had enabled him to find out that the pentito, G. Mutolo, had made statements implicating him and what the substance of those statements was. Subsequently, he had reported to the Palermo public prosecutor’s office in November 1992 at a time when the investigation was secret.

In conclusion, although the risk of the applicant’s absconding substantially diminished at a certain point, the risk of his committing further offences remained, at least until the Palermo District Court had finished hearing the witnesses.

(b)The risk of tampering with evidence and suborning witnesses

59.  Mr Contrada affirmed that if he had been released he would have been unable to exert any influence over the obtaining of documents located in police stations or at the offices of the Ministry of the Interior as most of the witnesses were civil servants employed by the State and the police. Although several of those witnesses were friends of his, they were not the sort of people who would be vulnerable to pressure or make statements in favour of a person who had assisted the Mafia.

60.  In the Commission’s view, that risk, which the national authorities relied on until the applicant’s release, was the only one for which there was a solid basis. In view of the nature of the alleged offence – the constituent element of which was represented above all by the relations between the accused and the criminal organisation concerned –, the nature of the
evidence for the prosecution (which was almost entirely composed of statements by pentiti) and the applicant’s personal connections with many of the witnesses, the risk of pressure could have justified the applicant being kept in detention up to a certain point.

61.  The Court notes that the authorities responsible for hearing the applications for release carefully considered the grounds relied on and found that Mr Contrada’s continued detention was necessary in view, in particular, of the important duties he performed in the State institutions and of a police officer’s statement that the applicant had asked him to “ease up” when carrying out searches at the homes of mafiosi. Moreover, further statements by pentiti and evidence obtained against the applicant during the preliminary investigation and the investigation carried out by the trial court justified the fear of the prosecuting authorities that he would, if released, exert pressure on witnesses or tamper with other evidence.

(c)Summary

62.  In summary, although the risk of the applicant’s absconding diminished during the course of the investigation, the dangers of his committing further offences, tampering with evidence or exerting pressure constituted in the instant case relevant and sufficient grounds for his being detained throughout the period.

2.The conduct of the proceedings

63.  The applicant submitted that the national authorities had not complied with the “special diligence” rule in the conduct of his case. The investigating judge had justified extending the maximum period of detention pending trial through the need to carry out investigations such as checking movements on bank accounts, looking for certain documents at the Ministry of the Interior and at the police station, requesting judicial assistance in Switzerland regarding the statements of O. Tognoli, analysing data relating to the mobile telephones, transcribing tapped telephone conversations and obtaining certain items of evidence held by the Rome public prosecutor’s office. All of those measures could and should have been taken earlier and none of them made the applicant’s continued detention essential as they related to documents.

64.  The Commission conceded that in the instant case the statements of the pentiti could reasonably support the belief that plausible reasons existed for suspecting the applicant, thus justifying his detention. However, the fact that those statements, which by their nature needed to be treated with great caution, were almost exclusively at the disposal of the investigators could not be disregarded. The statements could have been made fraudulently with a view to obtaining the benefits which Italian law affords pentiti or by individuals seeking revenge. The national authorities were consequently
required to be particularly diligent and to conduct the inquiry as speedily as the requirements of the investigation permitted. They had instead extended the period of detention pending trial during the investigation and, on the ground that the court’s excessive workload did not enable it to hold hearings more frequently, extended the maximum period of detention during the trial.

Lastly, the applicant’s lawyers’ refusal to accept the court’s offer to hold three hearings a week instead of two and the undeniable complexity of the case were not factors that released the national authorities from their share of responsibility or resolved the inconsistency in the decisions relating to the applicant’s continued detention during the trial.

65.  The Government stressed that the inquiry had been extremely complex, as in all proceedings concerning the Mafia. It was necessary in particular to take into account the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of the applicant’s alleged collusion in view of his quality as a highly competent senior civil servant.

As regards the preliminary investigation, the Government stated that the applicant’s continued detention had been ordered because of the need to pursue complex investigations of which only one, that concerning the listing of the applicant’s communications on his mobile telephones, had been started late (in November 1993). The others had been made at the start of the investigation or as it had progressed.

The length of detention during the trial was explained by the complexity of the case and the difficulty in bringing the trial to a close earlier, given the workload of the court, which had performed a substantial amount of work as the case file showed.

66.  The Court observes that Mr Contrada was detained pending trial for two years, seven months and seven days, approximately fourteen months during the investigation and the remainder during the trial before the court (see paragraph 53 above). It notes that the public prosecutor’s office had to take a number of highly complex steps in the investigation, including checking the statements of the pentiti in minute detail, obtaining many items of evidence, hearing witnesses – in particular, police officers and judges engaged in the fight against the Mafia – and obtaining international judicial assistance. During that same stage of the proceedings the applicant was implicated by other pentiti, which entailed additional investigative measures being taken. Subsequently, the trial court heard evidence from no less than 250 witnesses or people being tried for offences connected with those of which the applicant was accused. Seven pentiti were, for security reasons, questioned in the Rome and Padua prisons in which they were detained.
Three confrontations were organised. Between 4 November and 29 December 1994 all thirteen hearings were devoted to hearing evidence from the applicant (see paragraph 32 above).

67.  The right of an accused in detention to have his case examined with particular expedition must not hinder the efforts of the courts to carry out their tasks with proper care (see the W. v. Switzerland judgment cited above, p. 19, § 42). In the instant case, with the exception of the analysis of the data relating to Mr Contrada’s mobile telephones, which could and should have been carried out earlier, and the excessive workload referred to by the trial court on 31 March 1995 (see paragraphs 23 and 26 above), the Court sees no particular reason to criticise the relevant national authorities’ conduct of the case, especially as, when the maximum periods of detention pending trial were extended, the trial court offered to increase the rate of the hearings, but the defence declined (see paragraph 32 above).

Furthermore, although investigative measures such as the hearing of witnesses and confrontations are quite unexceptional in criminal cases, it should not be forgotten that trials of presumed members of the Mafia, or, as in the present case, of persons suspected of supporting that organisation from within State institutions, are particularly sensitive and complicated. With its rigid hierarchical structure and very strict rules and its substantial power of intimidation based on the rule of silence and the difficulty in identifying its followers, the Mafia represents a sort of criminal opposition force capable of influencing public life directly or indirectly and of infiltrating the institutions. It is for that reason – to enable the “organisation” to be undermined through information supplied by former “members” – that detailed inquiries are necessary.

C.Conclusion

68.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the authorities who dealt with the case could reasonably base the detention in issue on relevant and sufficient grounds and that they conducted the proceedings without delay. There has therefore been no violation of Article 5 § 3.

for these reasons, the court

Holds by eight votes to one that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 August 1998.

Signed: Rudolf Bernhardt

                       President

Signed: Herbert Petzold

Registrar

In accordance with Article 51 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 55 § 2 of Rules of Court B, the dissenting opinion of Mr Loizou is annexed to this judgment.

Initialled: R. B.
Initialled: H. P.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE loizou

I regret that I cannot share the Court’s opinion in its conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in this case.

The facts of the case appear in the judgment of the majority but for the purposes of this brief dissenting opinion it is sufficient to refer to the period of detention and certain of its surrounding circumstances which have to be considered in relation to the applicant’s complaint that he had been detained for an unreasonable period, contrary to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

The applicant, a senior police officer, was arrested and detained on 24 December 1992 and his detention ended on 31 July 1995 when his release was ordered by the Palermo District Court. It therefore lasted for two years, seven months and seven days.

The preliminary investigations were concluded by 14 February 1994 when the applicant was committed for trial. The trial commenced on 12 April 1994 before the Palermo District Court and ended on 5 April 1996 when he was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for assisting a mafia-type organisation from outside. The applicant was, however, released by the same court on 31 July 1995 for the reasons that are set out in the Court’s judgment (see paragraphs 29 and 30).

As the judicial authorities of the respondent State in their examination of the applicant’s successive applications for release considered them from the point of view that there was a risk that he would abscond or commit further offences or that he would tamper with evidence and suborn witnesses, I shall proceed to examine these issues in that order.

Regarding the risk of absconding, it appears that from 2 February 1994 the judicial authorities were of the view that the risk could be ruled out.

On the question whether there was a risk that the applicant would reoffend there was, as rightly noted by the Commission, a contradiction in the judicial authorities’ reasoning. On the one hand they maintained on 22 May 1995 that there was still such a risk, whereas two months later, at the end of July, they considered that there was no longer such a risk.

Like the Commission, I consider that “from a certain point in time the risk of a further offence could no longer, in itself, justify keeping the applicant in detention on remand and that the presumption that such a risk existed was no longer justified”.

The risk of tampering with the evidence, which was a solid one in the light of the nature of the witnesses available who might be open to manipulation, could have been eliminated if the Italian authorities had exercised a special diligence and had conducted the investigations as speedily as possible, as they had a duty to do.

The excuse of the excessive workload of the courts to which the delay was partly attributed does not constitute a sufficient justification under the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

In matters relating to interference with freedom of the person the presumption of innocence should be overriding, unless the reasons invoked for depriving a person of his liberty completely outweigh all other considerations.

This was not the case for the whole of the period of the applicant’s detention in the present case.

It is for the above reasons that I came to the conclusion that the detention of the applicant had not been shown to have been necessary or justified within the provisions of the Convention for the whole period for which he was detained.

²

[1]Notes by the Registrar

.  The case is numbered 92/1997/876/1088. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[2].  Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, apply to all cases concerning States bound by Protocol No. 9.

[3].  Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry.

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