FIRST SECTION
CASE OF CULI v. CROATIA
(Application no. 29481/13)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 July 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Culi v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Ksenija Turković, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 June 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 29481/13) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Ms Vesna Culi (“the applicant”), on 15 April 2013.
2. The applicant was represented by Ms V. Šnur, a lawyer practising in Vinkovci. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
3. On 17 July 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Jarmina.
A. Enforcement proceedings
5. On 14 November 2008 the applicant applied to the Vinkovci Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Vinkovcima) for enforcement of a final judgement by which D.C., the applicant’s former husband, was ordered to pay her alimony.
6. On 18 November 2008 the first-instance court issued a writ of execution ordering D.C. to pay the applicant amounts of 700 Croatian kunas (HRK) together with the statutory default interest for the period starting from 12 July 2007 until the payment, and also the amount of HRK 2,440 together with the statutory default interest starting from 10 June 2008 until the payment on account of costs and expenses.
7. The writ of execution was served on the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba Vukovar) for enforcement.
8. On 29 December 2008 D.C. appealed against the writ of execution and on 20 January 2009 the applicant responded to his appeal.
9. On 12 February 2009 the first-instance court held a hearing at which both parties gave their statements.
10. On 24 February 2009 the first-instance court instructed D.C. to institute separate civil proceedings with a view to declaring the enforcement inadmissible.
11. On 9 March 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 24 February 2009.
12. On 24 April 2009 the case-file was forwarded to the Vukovar County Court (Županijski sud u Vukovaru) to decide upon the parties’ appeals.
13. On 19 August 2009 the Vukovar County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and returned the case-file to the first-instance court.
14. However, since the Vukovar County Court failed to decide upon the appeal lodged by D.C., the case file was again returned to it and on 7 January 2010 it dismissed D.C.’s appeal.
15. On 26 January 2010 the first-instance court informed the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund, that the writ of execution became final and that it should be executed.
16. On 19 February 2010 the first-instance court again asked the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund to execute the final writ of execution.
17. On 24 March 2010 the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund transferred HRK 15,600 to the applicant’s account; on 15 April 2010 it transferred the amount of HRK 1,200; and on 14 May 2010 the amount of HRK 881.50.
B. Proceedings following the applicant’s request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time
18. Meanwhile, on 7 December 2009 and 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length of the above enforcement proceedings. In these proceedings the State was represented by the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske).
19. On 14 September 2010 the Supreme Court examined the case file of the Vinkovci Municipal Court and a submission of the Vukovar County Court, and found that the enforcement proceedings had started on 14 November 2008 and that they were still pending. It considered that the proceedings had not been excessively long and dismissed the applicant’s request.
20. On 6 September 2012 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court.
21. On 12 December 2012 the applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske).
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
22. The relevant provision of the Enforcement Act (Ovršni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 57/1996, 29/1999, 42/2000, 173/2003, 194/2003, 151/2004, 88/2005, 121/2005 and 6720/08) provides as follows:
Termination of the enforcement proceedings
Section 68
"(1) The enforcement proceedings terminate by the finality of the decision to reject or dismiss the request for enforcement, by the performance of the duty or discontinuation of the proceedings.
(2) The termination of the proceedings by the final act by which the duty has been performed shall be established by a court decision."
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
23. The applicant complained that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ arguments
24. The Government submitted that in her application to the Court the applicant had failed to specify that she had received the first payment on 24 March 2010 and the last on 14 May 2010, by which the enforcement proceedings had ended. She had therefore failed to inform the Court of the course of her enforcement proceedings of which she should have been aware. Moreover, she had failed to inform the domestic courts of the same facts. This in the Government’s view amounted to the abuse of the right of individual application. The Government also pointed out that, irrespective of the absence of a final decision of the domestic courts confirming that the enforcement proceedings had ended which had been anyway only of a declaratory nature, the enforcement proceedings had in total lasted for one year and six months, which was the period between the applicant’s lodging of the application for enforcement and the final payment. That period, in the Government’s view, had not been excessive and thus the applicant had not had victim status and, in any event, her application had been manifestly ill-founded.
25. The applicant contended that she had complained about the length of the enforcement proceedings because she had considered that already the period between her application for enforcement and the payment of the first instalment had been unreasonably long. She, however, did not contest that the later payments had been made as suggested by the Government.
2. The Court’s assessment
26. The Court notes that the applicant contended before it, notably in a somewhat unclear manner, that the enforcement proceedings at issue were unreasonably lengthy and she submitted the decisions of the domestic courts concerning her use of the domestic length-of-proceedings remedies. When deciding about the applicant’s complaints in the adversarial proceedings in which the State was represented by the competent State Attorney’s Office (see paragraph 18 above) the domestic courts had full access to all the relevant case files and documents. Based on their assessment of relevant facts they found that the proceedings had not been unreasonably long and dismissed the applicant’s complaint (see paragraph 19 above). It remained, however, unclear what was the effect of the payments made to the applicant on the enforcement proceedings. Even if it would be accepted, as the Government suggested, that the decision of the competent court attesting to the termination of the proceedings had only declaratory meaning, the facts remains that such decision was never adopted (see paragraph 22 above).
27. The Court therefore, noting that the competent domestic authorities were best placed and had every opportunity to establish all the relevant facts of the case and that their decisions were available to the Court, cannot clearly ascertain that the applicant deliberately intended to mislead the Court or the domestic authorities. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objection as to the abuse of the right of individual application.
28. As to the Government’s further objections the Court finds, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, that the applicant can claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. It also notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objections and declares the application admissible.
B. Merits
29. The Court notes that the enforcement proceedings at issue commenced with the lodging of the applicant’s application for enforcement on 14 November 2008. The Government submitted that the proceedings ended on 14 May 2010 with the last payment made to the applicant. The applicant did not contest that argument. The Court therefore sees no reason to hold otherwise and finds that the proceedings in total lasted for one year and six months.
30. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
31. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above; and Zglavnik v. Croatia, no. 28018/10, § 15, 24 July 2012).
32. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
33. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
34. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
35. The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. She also claimed EUR 2,000 in respect of pecuniary damage.
36. The Government considered this amount excessive, unfounded and unsubstantiated.
37. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. The Court considers, having regard to the circumstances of the present case and a violation found, ruling on an equitable basis, that the applicant should be awarded EUR 1,500 plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount, in respect of pecuniary damages.
B. Costs and expenses
38. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court.
39. The Government considered this amount unfounded.
40. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 500 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
C. Default interest
41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months the following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kuna at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 July 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachMirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy