CASE OF D.D. v. LITHUANIA

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF D.D. v. LITHUANIA

(Application no. 13469/06)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG 

14 February 2012

FINAL

09/07/2012

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 (c) of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of D.D. v. Lithuania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Françoise Tulkens, President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
Işıl Karakaş,
Guido Raimondi,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 24 January 2012,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 13469/06) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Ms D.D. (“the applicant”), on 28 March 2006. The President of the Chamber acceded to the applicant’s request not to have her name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court, as in force at the material time).

2. On 8 January 2008 the applicant, who had been granted legal aid, signed a power of attorney in favour of Mr H. Mickevičius, a lawyer practising in Vilnius, giving him authority to represent her before the Court. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.

3. The applicant complained that her involuntary admission to a psychiatric institution was in breach of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. She further alleged that she had been deprived of the right to a fair hearing, in breach of Article 6 § 1.

4. On 20 November 2007 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

5. Written submissions were received from the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions and from the Harvard Project on Disability, which had been granted leave by the President to intervene as third parties (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court, as in force at the material time).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The applicant was born in 1963 and currently lives in the Kėdainiai Social Care Home (hereinafter “the Kėdainiai Home”) for individuals with general learning disabilities.

A. The circumstances of the case

7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. The applicant’s psychiatric treatment, guardianship and care

8. The applicant has had a history of mental disorder since 1979, when she experienced shock having discovered that she was an adopted child. She is classed as Category 2 disabled.

9. In 1980, the applicant was diagnosed with schizophrenia simplex. In 1984 she was diagnosed with circular schizophrenia. In 1999, the applicant was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia with a predictable course. She has been treated in psychiatric hospitals more than twenty times. During her most recent hospitalisation at Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital in 2004, she was diagnosed with continuous paranoid schizophrenia (paranoidinė šizofrenija, nepertraukiama eiga). The diagnosis of the applicant remains unchanged.

10. In 2000 the applicant’s adoptive father applied to the Kaunas City District Court to have the applicant declared legally incapacitated. The court ordered a forensic examination of the applicant’s mental status.

11. In their report (no. 185/2000 of 19 July 2000), the forensic experts concluded that the applicant was suffering from “episodic paranoid schizophrenia with a predictable course” (šizofrenija/paranoidinė forma, epizodinė liga su prognozuojančiu defektu) and that she was not able “to understand the nature of her actions or to control them”. The experts noted that the applicant knew of her adoptive father’s application to the court for her incapacitation and wrote that she “did not oppose it”. The experts also wrote that the applicant’s participation in the court hearing for incapacitation was “unnecessary”.

12. On 15 September 2000 the Kaunas City District Court granted the request by the applicant’s adoptive father and declared the applicant legally incapacitated. In a one-page ruling, the court relied on medical expert report no. 185/2000. Neither the applicant nor her adoptive father was present at the hearing. The Social Services Department of the Kaunas City Council was represented before the court.

13. On 17 May 2001 the applicant’s adoptive father requested her admission to the Kėdainiai Home for individuals with general learning disabilities. The applicant’s name was put on a waiting list.

14. On 13 August 2002 the Kaunas City District Court appointed D.G., the applicant’s psychiatrist at the Kaunas out-patient health centre (Kauno Centro Poliklinika), as her legal guardian. The applicant was present at the hearing. Her adoptive father submitted that “he himself did not agree with being appointed her guardian because he was in disagreement with his daughter (jis pats nepageidauja būti globėju, nes su dukra nesutaria)”. Nonetheless, he promised to take care of her in future and to help her financially.

15. By a decision of 24 March 2003, the director of the health care centre dismissed D.G. from her work for a serious violation of her working duties. The decision was based on numerous reports submitted by D.G.’s colleagues and superiors.

16. On 16 July 2003 D.G. wrote to the Kaunas City District Court asking that she be relieved of her duties as the applicant’s guardian. She mentioned that she had only agreed to become the applicant’s guardian because she had observed a strained relationship between the applicant and her adoptive father. However, D.G. claimed that the applicant’s adoptive father had asked her to hand over the applicant’s pension to him, even though the applicant had been receiving her pension and had been using the money perfectly well on her own for many years. D.G. also contended that the applicant’s adoptive father had attempted to unlawfully appropriate the applicant’s property.

17. On 1 October 2003 the Kaunas City District Court relieved D.G. of her duties as the applicant’s guardian at her own request. In court D.G. had argued that as she was litigating for unlawful dismissal she could not take proper care of the applicant.

18. By letter of 9 December 2003, the Kaunas City Social Services Department suggested to the district court that the applicant’s adoptive father be appointed her guardian, although the Department noted that relations between the two of them were tense.

19. On 21 January 2004 the Kaunas City District Court appointed the applicant’s adoptive father as her legal guardian. The court relied on the request by the Kaunas City Council Department of Health, which was represented at the hearing. The applicant’s adoptive father did not object to the appointment. The applicant was not present at the hearing.

20. Upon the initiative and consent of the applicant’s adoptive father, on 30 June 2004 the applicant was taken to the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital for treatment. The applicant complained that she had been treated against her will. A letter by the hospital indicates that the applicant’s adoptive father had asked the hospital staff to ensure that her contacts with D.G. were limited on the ground that the latter had had a negative influence on the applicant. However, on 3 September 2004 the prosecutor for the Kaunas City District dismissed the applicant’s allegations, finding that she had been hospitalised due to deterioration in her mental state upon the order of her psychiatrist. The applicant had also expressed her consent to being treated.

21. On 8 July 2004 a panel designated by Kaunas City Council to examine cases of admission to residential psychiatric care (Kauno miesto savivaldybės asmenų su proto negalia siuntimo į stacionarias globos įstaigas komisija) adopted a unanimous decision to admit the applicant to the Kėdainiai Home.

22. On 20 July 2004 a medical panel of the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital concluded that the applicant was suffering from “continuous paranoid schizophrenia” (paranoidinė šizofrenija nepertraukiama eiga). The commission also stated that it would be appropriate for the applicant to “live in a social care institution for the mentally handicapped”.

23. On 28 July 2004 a social worker examined the conditions in which the applicant lived in her apartment in Kaunas city. The report reads that “the applicant is not able to take care of herself, does not understand the value of money, does not clean her apartment, is not able to cook on her own and wanders in the city hungry. Sometimes the applicant gets angry at people and shouts at them without a reason; her behaviour is unpredictable. The applicant does not have bad habits and likes to be in other persons’ company”. The social worker recommended that the applicant be placed in a social care institution because her adoptive father could not “manage” her.

24. On 2 August 2004 an agreement was concluded between the Kėdainiai Home, the Guardianship Department of Kaunas City Council and the Social Services Department of the Kaunas Regional Administration. On the basis of that agreement, the applicant was transferred from the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital to the Kėdainiai Home, where she continued her treatment.

25. On 6 October 2004 the applicant signed a document stating that she agreed to be examined by the doctors in the Kėdainiai Home and to be treated there.

26. On 10 August 2004 the applicant’s adoptive father wrote to the director of the Kėdainiai Home with a request that during the applicant’s settling into the Kėdainiai Home she should be temporarily restricted from receiving visits by other people. The director granted the request. Subsequently, the Kaunas District Administration upheld the director’s decision on the ground that the latter was responsible for the safety of patients in the Kėdainiai Home and thus was in a better position to determine what steps were necessary.

27. On 18 August 2004, upon the decision of the Kėdainiai Home director, D.G. was not allowed to visit the applicant. The applicant’s medical record, which a treating psychiatrist signed the following day, states that “[the applicant] is acclimatising at the institution with difficulties, as her former guardian and former doctor [D.G.] keeps calling constantly and telling painful matters from the past (...) [the applicant] is crying and blaming herself for being not good, for not preserving her mother, for having lived improperly. Verbal correction is not effective”.

28. According to a document signed by Margarita Buržinskienė on 23 February 2005, she had called the Kėdainiai Home to speak to the applicant but the employees had told her that, on the director’s orders, the applicant was not allowed to answer the phone (vykdant direktorės nurodymą Daivos prie telefono nekviečia).

29. On 15 June 2006 the applicant’s adoptive father removed her from institutional care and taken her to his flat. On 15 July 2006 the applicant left his home on her own. A police investigation was started following a report by the applicant’s adoptive father of the allegedly unlawful deprivation of the applicant’s liberty. She was eventually found and apprehended by the police on 31 October 2006, and was taken back to the Kėdainiai Home.

30. On 6 September 2007 the applicant left the Kėdainiai Home without informing its management. She was found by the police and taken back to the institution on 9 October 2007.

31. As can be seen from a copy of the record of the Kėdainiai Home’s visitors submitted by the Government, between 2 August 2004 and 25 December 2006 the applicant received one or more visitors on forty-two separate occasions. In particular, her adoptive father saw her thirteen times, her friends and other relatives visited her twenty-six times and she was visited by D.G. on twelve occasions.

2. Proceedings regarding the change of the applicant’s guardianship

32. On 15 July 2004 the applicant asked the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital to initiate a change of guardianship from her adoptive father to D.G. The applicant wrote that her adoptive father had had her admitted to the psychiatric hospital by force and deception, thus depriving her of her liberty. The hospital refused her request as it did not have competence in guardianship matters.

33. The applicant states that a similar request was rejected by the Kėdainiai Home.

34. On 2 September 2005, assisted by her former guardian and then friend, D.G., the applicant brought an application before the courts, requesting that the guardianship proceedings be reopened and a new guardian appointed. She submitted that she had been unable to state her opinion as to her guardianship, because she had not been informed of and summoned to the court hearing during which her adoptive father had been appointed her guardian. The applicant relied on Article 507 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and stated that her state of health in the previous year could not have been an obstacle to her expressing her opinion as to the appropriateness of the guardian proposed at the court hearing. She claimed that in 2004 she had used to visit her friend in a village for a couple of weeks at a time. The applicant also noted that when she returned to Kaunas, her adoptive father had often threatened to have her committed to a mental asylum.

35. The applicant also argued that by appointing her adoptive father to be her guardian without informing her and without her being able to state her opinion as to his prospective appointment, in contravention of Article 3.242 of the Civil Code and Article 507 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court had disregarded the strained relationship between the two of them. The applicant drew the court’s attention to the ruling of the Kaunas City District Court of 13 August 2002, in which the applicant’s adoptive father had himself stated that their relationship had been tense. The applicant drew the court’s attention to Article 491 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stipulating that the court had to take all necessary measures to avoid a possible conflict between the incapacitated person and her potential guardian.

Lastly, she stated that she had only learned of her adoptive father’s appointment in April 2004.

36. By a ruling of 29 September 2005 the Kaunas City District Court decided to accept the applicant’s request for examination.

37. On 27 October 2005 the applicant wrote to the Chairman of the Kaunas City District Court. She complained of her incapacitation on her adoptive father’s devious initiative without having being informed of the incapacitation proceedings. The applicant also pleaded that she had been unlawfully deprived of her liberty and involuntarily admitted to the Kėdainiai Home for an indefinite time and where she had been unable to obtain legal aid.

38. On 7 November 2005 judge R.A. of the Kaunas City District Court held a closed hearing in which the applicant, her guardian (her adoptive father) and his lawyer, and D.G. took part. The relevant State institutions were also represented at the hearing: the Kėdainiai Home, the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital, the prosecutor and the Social Services Department of Kaunas City Council. The applicant’s doctor did not take part in the hearing. The court noted that the doctor had been informed of it and had asked the court to proceed without him.

39. In her application form to the Court, the applicant alleged that at the beginning of the hearing the judge had ordered her to leave her place next to D.G. and to sit next to the judge. The judge had also ordered D.G. “to keep her eyes off the applicant”. Given that this was not reflected in the transcript of the hearing, on 19 November 2005 D.G. had written to the court asking that the transcript be rectified accordingly.

40. According to the transcript of the hearing, at the beginning thereof D.G. requested that an audio recording be made. The judge refused the request. The applicant asked to be assisted by a lawyer. The judge refused her request, deeming that her guardian was assisted by a lawyer before the court. Without the agreement of her guardian, a separate lawyer could not be appointed. The lawyer hired by the applicant’s guardian was held to represent both the interests of the applicant and her guardian.

41. As the transcript of the hearing shows, the applicant went on to unequivocally state that she stood by her request that the guardianship proceedings be reopened. She argued that she had neither been informed of the proceedings as to her incapacitation, nor those pursuant to which her guardian had been appointed. The decisions had been taken while she had been in hospital. During the hearing, the applicant expressed her willingness to leave the Kėdainiai Home and stated that she was being kept and treated there by force. She submitted that she would prefer to live at her adoptive father’s home and to attend a day centre (lankys dienos užimtumo centrą). The applicant also argued that D.G. had been forced to surrender her duties as her guardian and to allow the applicant’s adoptive father to become her guardian because of pressure from him with the aim of transferring the applicant’s flat to him. The applicant also noted that in the Kėdainiai Home she was cut off from society and had been deprived of the opportunity to make telephone calls. Her friends could not visit her and she was not allowed to go to the cinema. In the Kėdainiai Home “she was isolated and saw only a fence”. The other parties to the proceedings opposed the applicant’s wish that the guardianship proceedings be reopened.

42. In her application to the Court, the applicant alleged that during a break in the hearing she had been ordered to follow the judge to her private office. When the applicant had refused, she had been threatened with restraint by psychiatric personnel. In private, the judge had instructed her not to say anything negative about her adoptive father and that, should she not comply, her friend D.G. would also be declared legally incapacitated. As stated in D.G.’s letter seeking rectification of the transcript (paragraph 39 above), after the break was announced the applicant had wished to stay in the hearing room. However, she had been taken away and had returned very depressed (prislėgta). Responding to a question by the judge as to her guardianship, the applicant replied: “I agree that [my adoptive father] should be my guardian, because God asks that people be forgiving. I just wish that he [would] take me [away] from [the Kėdainiai Home] to Kaunas, to his place... and let me see D.G. and my friends”.

43. It appears from the transcript of the hearing that after the break, when giving her submissions to the court, the applicant agreed to keep her adoptive father as guardian, but insisted on being released from institutional care in order to live with her adoptive father. The relevant State institutions – the Kėdainiai Home, the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital, the prosecutor, the Social Services Department of Kaunas City Council – and the applicant’s guardian’s lawyer each argued that the applicant’s request for reopening was clearly unfounded and should be dismissed.

44. On 17 November 2005 the Kaunas City District Court refused to reopen the guardianship proceedings on the basis of Article 366 § 1 (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure, ruling that there were no grounds to change the guardian (see Relevant domestic law part below). The court noted that before appointing the applicant’s adoptive father as her guardian, the Kaunas City Council Department of Health had prepared a report on the proposed appointment of the applicant’s guardian and had questioned the applicant, who had not been able to provide an objective opinion about that appointment. The court confirmed that the applicant had not been summoned to the hearing of 21 January 2004, when her guardian was appointed, as the court had taken into consideration the applicant’s mental state and, on the basis of the findings of the relevant health care officials, had not considered her involvement in the hearing necessary. The court further noted that the findings had disclosed tense relations between the applicant and her adoptive father. Even so, the applicant’s adoptive father had been duly performing his duties. The court also referred to statements of the representatives of the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital and the director of the Kėdainiai Home to the effect that the applicant’s contact with D.G. had had a negative influence on her mental health.

45. The Kaunas City District Court proceeded to fine D.G. 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 290 euros (EUR)) for abuse of process. It noted that D.G. had filed numerous complaints before various State institutions and the courts of alleged violations of the applicant’s rights. Those complaints had prompted several inquiries which had revealed a lack of substantiation. The court noted:

“... by such an abuse of rights, [D.G.] caused damage to the State, namely the waste of time and money of the court and the participants in the proceedings. The court concludes that [D.G.] has abused her rights ... and the vulnerability of the incapacitated person”.

46. D.G. appealed against the above decision. She noted, inter alia, that the 21 January 2004 ruling to appoint the applicant’s adoptive father as her guardian had been adopted by judge R.A. The same judge had dismissed the applicant’s request that the court proceedings be reopened, although this was explicitly prohibited by Article 370 § 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The applicant also submitted a brief in support of D.G.’s appeal, arguing that persons admitted to psychiatric institutions should have a right to know the reasons for their admission. Moreover, they should be able to contact a lawyer who is independent from the institution to which they have been admitted.

47. The appeal by D.G. was dismissed by the Kaunas Regional Court on 7 February 2006 in written proceedings. The court did not rule on the plea that the district court judge R.A. had been partial.

48. On 11 May 2006 the Supreme Court declared D.G.’s subsequent appeal on points of law inadmissible, as it had not been submitted by a lawyer and raised no important legal issues.

49. By a ruling of 7 February 2007 the Kaunas City District Court, following a public hearing attended by social services representatives and the applicant’s legal guardian, granted the guardian’s request to be relieved from the duties of guardian and property administrator. The applicant’s adoptive father had argued that he was no longer fit to be her guardian because of his old age (seventy-seven years at that time) and state of health. The Kėdainiai Home was appointed temporary guardian and property administrator. The applicant was not present at the hearing.

50. On 25 April 2007, the Kaunas City District Court held a public hearing and appointed the Kėdainiai Home as the applicant’s permanent guardian and administrator of her property rights. The applicant was not present at that hearing; the court did not give reasons for her absence.

3. Criminal inquiry

51. On 1 February 2006 a criminal inquiry was opened on the initiative of some of the applicant’s acquaintances, who alleged that the applicant had been the victim of Soviet-style classification of illnesses which was designed to repress those who fall foul of the regime. The complainants submitted that, as a result of the persistent diagnoses of schizophrenia, the applicant had been unlawfully deprived of her liberty, had been ill-treated and had been overmedicated in the Kėdainiai Home, and that her property rights had been violated by her guardian.

52. On 31 July 2006 the investigation was discontinued, no evidence having been found of an abuse of the applicant’s interests, either pecuniary or personal. It was established that the immovable property belonging to the applicant had been let to a third person, with the proceeds used to satisfy the applicant’s needs. The applicant had had a bank account opened in her name on 6 October 2005, and the deposit made on that date had since been left untouched. Moreover, the applicant’s guardian had transferred to her account the sum received from the sale of their common property. There was thus no indication that the applicant’s adoptive father had abused his position as guardian.

53. As regards the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty, the prosecutor noted that the applicant had been admitted to an institutional care facility in accordance with the applicable legislation. The prosecutor acknowledged that the freedom of the applicant “to choose her place of residence [was] restricted (laisvė pasirinkti buvimo vietą yra ribojama)”, but further noted that she was:

“... constrained to an extent no greater than necessary in order to take due care of her as a legally incapacitated person. The guardian of [the applicant] can change her place of residence without first obtaining a separate official decision; she is not unlawfully hospitalised. Therefore, her placement in the Kėdainiai Home cannot be classified as an unlawful deprivation of liberty, punishable under Article 146 § 2 (3) of the Criminal Code”.

54. The prosecutor had also conducted an inquiry into an incident which had occurred at the Kėdainiai Home on 25 January 2005. After questioning the personnel of the Home, it was established that on that day the applicant had been placed in the intensive supervision ward (intensyvaus stebėjimo kambarys), had been given an additional dose of tranquilisers (2 mg of Haloperidol) and had been tied down (fiksuota) for fifteen to thirty minutes by social care staff.

55. The prosecutor noted the explanation of the psychiatrist at the Home, who admitted that the applicant’s restraint had been carried out in breach of the applicable rules, without the approval of medical personnel. However, after having read written reports on the incident produced by the social care personnel, he considered the tying down to have been undertaken in order to save the applicant’s life and not in breach of her rights.

56. Questioned by the prosecution as witnesses, social workers at the Kėdainiai Home testified that 25 January 2005 had been the only occasion on which the applicant had been physically restrained and placed in isolation. The measures had only been taken because at that particular time the applicant had shown suicidal tendencies.

57. The prosecutor concluded that the submissions made by the complainants were insufficient to find that the applicant’s right to liberty had been violated by unnecessary restraint or that she had suffered degrading treatment.

58. On 30 August 2006 the higher prosecutor upheld that decision.

4. Complaints to other authorities

59. With the assistance of D.G., the applicant addressed a number of complaints to various State authorities.

60. On 30 July 2004, in reply to a police inquiry into the applicant’s complaint of unlawful detention in the Kėdainiai Home, the Kaunas City Council Social Services department wrote that “[in] the last couple of years, relations between the applicant and her adoptive father have been tense. Therefore, on the wish of both of them, until 21 January 2004 [the applicant’s] legal guardian was D.G. and not her adoptive father”.

61. The Ministry of Social Affairs also commissioned an inquiry, including conducting an examination of the applicant’s living conditions at the Kėdainiai Home and interviews with the applicant and the management of the Home. The commission established that the applicant’s living conditions were not exemplary (nėra labai geros), but it was promised that the inhabitants would soon move to new premises with better conditions. However, it was noted that the applicant received adequate care. The commission opined that it was advisable not to disturb the applicant, given her vulnerability and instability. It was also emphasised that the State authorities were under an obligation to be diligent as regards supervision of how the guardians use their rights.

62. On 6 January 2005 D.G. filed a complaint with the police, alleging that the applicant had been unlawfully deprived of her liberty and of contact with people from outside the Kėdainiai Home. By letter of 28 February 2005, the police replied that no violation of the applicant’s rights had been found. They explained that, in accordance with the internal rules of the Kėdainiai Home, residents could be visited by their relatives and guardians, but other people required the approval of the management. At the request of the applicant’s guardian, the management had prohibited other people from visiting her.

63. On 17 May 2005 upon the inspection performed by food safety authorities out-of-date frozen meat (best before 12 May 2005) was found in the Kėdainiai Home. However, there was no indication that that meat would have been used for cooking. On 20 February 2006 the Kaunas City Governor’s office inspected the applicant’s living conditions in Kėdainiai and found no evidence that she could have been receiving food of bad quality.

64. On 28 April 2006 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Health about her admission to long-term care. By letter of 12 May 2006, the Ministry noted that no court decision to hospitalise the applicant had been issued, and that she had been admitted to the Kėdainiai Home after her adoptive father had entrusted that institution with her care.

65. On 6 October 2006, the Ministry of Health and Social Services, in response to the applicant’s complaints of alleged violations of her rights, wrote to the applicant stating that it was not possible to investigate her complaints because she had left the Kėdainiai Home and her place of living was unknown. Prosecutors were in the middle of a pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of the applicant’s disappearance from where she had previously been living.

66. By a decision of 18 December 2006, the Kaunas City District prosecutor discontinued a pre-trial investigation into alleged unlawful deprivation of the applicant’s liberty.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

67. Article 21 of the Lithuanian Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment of persons. Article 22 thereof states that private life is inviolable.

68. The Law on Mental Heath Care provides:

Article 1

“1. Main Definitions

...

5. “Mental health facility” means a health care institution (public or private), which is accredited for mental health care. If only a certain part (a “unit”) of a health care institution has been accredited to engage in mental health care, the term shall only apply to the unit. In this Law, the term is also applicable to psychoneurological facilities...”

Article 13

“The parameters of a patient’s health care shall be determined by a psychiatrist, seeking to ensure that the terms of their treatment and nursing offer the least restrictive environment possible.

The actions of a mentally ill person may be subject to restrictions only provided that the circumstances specified in section 27 of this Law are manifest. A note to that effect must be promptly made in the [patient’s] clinical record.”

Article 19

“In emergency cases, in seeking to save a person’s life when the person himself is unable to express his will and his life is seriously endangered, necessary medical care may be taken without the patient’s consent.

Where instead of a patient’s consent, the consent of his representative is required, the necessary medical care may be provided without the consent of such person provided that there is insufficient time to obtain it in cases where immediate action is needed to save the life of the patient.

In those cases when urgent action must be taken in order to save a patient’s life, and the consent of the patient’s representative must be obtained in lieu of the patient’s consent, immediate medical aid may be provided without the said consent, if there is not enough time to obtain it.”

69. Article 24 of the Law on Mental Health Care stipulated that if a patient applied with a request to be hospitalised, he or she could be hospitalised only provided that: 1) at least one psychiatrist, upon examining the patient, recommended that he or she had to be treated as an inpatient at a mental health facility; 2) he or she had been informed about his or her rights at a mental health facility, the purpose of hospitalisation, the right to leave the psychiatric facility and restrictions on the right, as specified in Article 27 of the law. The latter provision read that a person who was ill with a severe mental illness and refused hospitalisation could be admitted involuntarily to the custody of the hospital only if there was real danger that by his or her actions he or she was likely to commit serious harm to his or her health or life or to the health or life of others. When the circumstances specified in Article 27 of that law did exist, the patient could be involuntarily hospitalised and given treatment in a mental health facility for a period not exceeding 48 hours without court authorisation. If the court did not grant the authorisation within 48 hours, involuntary hospitalisation and involuntary treatment had to be terminated (Article 28).

70. As concerns legal incapacity and guardianship, the Civil Code provides:

Article 2.10. Declaration of incapacity of a natural person

“1. A natural person who, as a result of mental illness or imbecility, is not able to understand the meaning of his actions or control them may be declared incapacitated. The incapacitated person shall be placed under guardianship.

2. Contracts on behalf and in the name of a person declared incapacitated shall be concluded by his guardian...

3. Where a person who was declared incapacitated gets over his illness or the state of his health improves considerably, the court shall reinstate his capacity. After the court judgement becomes res judicta, guardianship of the said person shall be revoked.

4. The spouse of the person, parents, adult children, a care institution or a public prosecutor shall have the right to request the declaration of a person’s incapacity by filing a declaration to the given effect. They shall also have the right to apply to the courts requesting the declaration of a person’s capacity.”

Article 3.238. Guardianship

“1. Guardianship shall be established with the aim of exercising, protecting and defending the rights and interests of a legally incapacitated person.

2. Guardianship of a person subsumes guardianship of the person’s property, but if necessary, an administrator may be designated to manage the person’s property.”

Article 3.240. Legal position of a guardian or curator

“1. Guardians and curators shall represent their wards under law and shall defend the rights and interests of legally incapacitated persons or persons of limited active capacity without any special authorisation.

2. The guardian shall be entitled to enter into all necessary transactions in the interests and on behalf of the represented legally incapacitated ward...”

Article 3.241. Guardianship and curatorship authorities

“1. Guardianship and curatorship authorities are the municipal or regional [government] departments concerned with the supervision and control of the actions of guardians and curators.

2. The functions of guardianship and curatorship in respect of the residents of a medical or educational institution or [an institution run by a] guardianship (curator) authority who have been declared legally incapacitated or of limited active capacity by a court shall be performed by the respective medical or educational establishment or guardianship (curator) authority until a permanent guardian or curator is appointed...”

Article 3.242. Appointment of a guardian or a curator

“1. Having declared a person legally incapacitated or of limited active capacity, the court shall appoint the person’s guardian or curator without delay.

...

3. Only a natural person with legal capacity may be appointed a guardian or a curator, [and] provided he or she gives written consent to that effect. When appointing a guardian or curator, account must be taken of the person’s moral and other qualities, his or her capability of performing the functions of a guardian or curator, relations with the ward, the guardian’s or curator’s preferences and other relevant circumstances...”

Article 3.243. Performance of the duties of a guardian or a curator

“...

6. After the circumstances responsible for the declaration of the ward’s legal incapacity or limited active capacity [are no longer in existence], the guardian or curator shall apply to the courts for the cancellation of guardianship or curatorship. Guardianship and curatorship authorities, as well as prosecutors, shall also have a right to apply to the courts for the cancellation of guardianship or curatorship.”

Article 3.277. Placing under guardianship or curatorship

“1. An adult person declared legally incapacitated by the courts shall be placed under guardianship by a court judgment.”

Article 3.278. Monitoring of the guardian’s or the curator’s activities

“1. Guardianship and curatorship authorities shall be obliged to monitor whether the guardian/curator is fulfilling his or her duties properly.”

71. The Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that rights and interests of [disqualified] natural persons protected by law shall be defended in court by their representatives (parents, foster-parents, guardians) (Article 38 § 2). A prosecutor has the right to submit a claim to protect the public interest (Article 49).

72. Article 366 § 1 (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that proceedings may be reopened if one of the parties to them was incapacitated and did not have a representative.

Article 370 § 5 stipulates that when deciding upon a request that proceedings be reopened, the judge who took the decision against which the request has been lodged may not participate.

73. An application to declare a person legally incapacitated may be submitted by a spouse of that person, his or her parents or full-age children, a guardianship/care authority or a public prosecutor (Article 463). The parties to the proceedings for incapacitation consist, besides the applicant, of the person whose legal capacity is at issue, as well as the guardianship (care) authority. If it is impossible, due to the state of health, confirmed by an expert opinion, of the natural person whom it has been requested to declare incapacitated, to call and question him or her in court or to serve him or her with court documents, the court shall hear the case in the absence of the person concerned (Article 464 §§ 1 and 2).

74. Article 491 § 2 of the Code of Civil procedure stipulates that the courts are obliged to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and interests of persons who need guardianship are protected.

75. Pursuant to Article 507 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a case concerning the establishment of guardianship and the appointment of a guardian shall be heard by means of oral proceedings. The guardianship authority, the person declared incapacitated, the person recommended to be appointed as guardian and any parties interested in the outcome of the case must be notified of the hearing.

The case is to be heard with the attendance of a representative of the guardianship authority, who is to submit the authority’s opinion to the court. The person to be appointed the guardian must also attend.

The person declared incapacitated is entitled to give his or her opinion at the hearing, if his or her health allows, as regards the prospective appointment of the guardian. The court may hold that it is necessary that the person declared incapacitated attend the hearing.

Article 507 § 4 provides that in appointing a guardian his moral and other qualities, his capability to perform the functions of a guardian, his relationship with the person who requires guardianship, and, if possible, the wishes of the person who requires guardianship or care shall be taken into consideration.

76. The Law on Prosecutor’s Office provides that prosecutors have the right to protect the public interest, either on their own initiative or if the matter has been brought to their attention by a third party. In so doing, prosecutors may institute civil or criminal proceedings.

77. In a ruling of 9 June 2003 the Supreme Court stated that a public prosecutor could submit an application for reopening of proceedings, if the court’s decision had been unlawful and had infringed the rights of a legally incapacitated person having limited opportunity to defend his or her rights or lawful interests.

78. The Law on Social Services provides that the basic goal of social services is to satisfy the vital needs of an individual and, when an individual himself is incapable of establishing such conditions, to create living conditions for him that do not debase his dignity (Article 2 (2)).

79. The Requirements for residential social care institutions and the Procedure for admission of persons thereto, approved by Order No. 97 of the Minister of Social Security and Labour on 9 July 2002 and published in State Gazette (Valstybės žinios) on 31 July 2002, regulate the methods of admission to a social care institution. The rules provide that an individual is considered to be eligible for admission to such an institution, inter alia, if he or she suffers from mental health problems and therefore is not able to live on his or her own. The need for care is decided by the municipal council of the place of his or her residence in cooperation with the founder of the residential care institution (the county governor). Individuals are admitted to care institutions in the event that the provision of social services at their home or at a non-statutory care establishment is not possible. A guardian who wishes to have a person admitted to a residential care institution must submit a request in writing to the social services department of the relevant municipal council. The reasons for and motives behind admission must be indicated. An administrative panel of the municipal council, comprising at least three persons, is empowered to decide on the proposed admission. Representatives of the institution to which the person is to be admitted as well as the founder (the governor) must participate.

80. The Government submitted to the Court an application by the Kėdainiai Home of 6 October 2009 to the Kaunas City District Court for the restoration of capacity (dėl neveiksnumo panaikinimo) of an individual, G.P. The Kėdainiai Home had been G.P.’s guardian. The director of the Kėdainiai Home had noted that after G.P.’s condition had become better and he had become more independent, it had accordingly become necessary for the court to order a fresh psychiatric examination and make an order restoring G.P.’s legal capacity.

81. The Bylaws of the Kėdainiai Home (Kėdainių pensionato gyventojų vidaus tvarkos taisyklės), as approved by an order of the director dated 17 March 2003, provide that the institution shall admit adults who suffer from mental health problems and are in need of care and medical treatment. A patient may leave the institution for up to ninety days per year, but only to visit his or her court-appointed guardian. The duration and conditions of such leave must be confirmed in writing. The rules also stipulate that a patient is not allowed to leave the grounds of the facility without informing a social worker. If a patient decides to leave the Kėdainiai Home on his or her own, the management must immediately inform the police and facilitate finding him or her. A patient may be visited by relatives and guardians. Other visitors are allowed only upon the management’s approval. The patients may have personal mobile phones. They may follow a religion, attend church services and receive magazines.

82. In a ruling of 11 September 2007 in civil case No. 3K-3-328/2007, the Supreme Court noted that the person whom it is asked to declare incapacitated is also a party to the proceedings (Article 464 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure). As a result, he or she enjoys the rights of an interested party, including the right to be duly informed of the place and time of any hearing. The fact that the case had been heard in the absence of D.L. – the person whom the court had been asked to declare incapacitated – was assessed by the Supreme Court as a violation of her right to be duly informed of the place and time of court hearings, as well as of other substantive procedural rights safeguarding her right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court also found that by failing to hear the person concerned and without making sure that she had been aware of the proceedings, the first‑instance court had breached the principle of equality of arms, as well as D.L.’s right to appeal against the decision to declare her incapacitated, because the decision had not been delivered to her. The Supreme Court also referred to Principle no. 13 of Recommendation No. R (99) 4 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 85 below), stating that the person concerned should have the right to be heard in any proceedings which could affect his or her legal capacity. This procedural guarantee should be applicable to the fullest extent possible, at the same time bearing in mind the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this regard, the Supreme Court also referred to the Court’s case-law to the effect that a mental illness could result in appropriate restrictions of a person’s right to a fair hearing. However, such measures should not affect the very essence of that right (Golder, Winterwerp, both cited below, and Lacárcel Menéndez v. Spain, no. 41745/02, 15 June 2006).

83. In the same ruling, the Supreme Court also emphasised that determining whether the person can understand his or her actions was not only a scientific conclusion, namely that of forensic psychiatry. It was also a question of fact which should be established by the court upon assessing all other evidence and, if necessary, upon hearing expert evidence. Taking into consideration the fact that the declaration of a person’s incapacity is a very serious interference into his or her right to private life, one can only be declared incapacitated in exceptional cases.

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

A.  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006 (Resolution A/RES/61/106)

84. This Convention entered into force on 3 May 2008. It was signed by Lithuania on 30 March 2007 and ratified on 18 August 2010. The relevant parts of the Convention provide:

Article 12
Equal recognition before the law

“1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law.

2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.

3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.

4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and interests.

5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.”

Article 14
Liberty and security of person

“1. States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others:

(a) Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person;

(b) Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.

2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of the present Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.”

B. Recommendation No. R (99) 4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults (adopted on 23 February 1999)

85. The relevant parts of this Recommendation read as follows:

Principle 2 – Flexibility in legal response

“1. The measures of protection and other legal arrangements available for the protection of the personal and economic interests of incapable adults should be sufficient, in scope or flexibility, to enable suitable legal response to be made to different degrees of incapacity and various situations.

...

4. The range of measures of protection should include, in appropriate cases, those which do not restrict the legal capacity of the person concerned.”

Principle 3 – Maximum reservation of capacity

“1. The legislative framework should, so far as possible, recognise that different degrees of incapacity may exist and that incapacity may vary from time to time. Accordingly, a measure of protection should not result automatically in a complete removal of legal capacity. However, a restriction of legal capacity should be possible where it is shown to be necessary for the protection of the person concerned.

2. In particular, a measure of protection should not automatically deprive the person concerned of the right to vote, or to make a will, or to consent or refuse consent to any intervention in the health field, or to make other decisions of a personal character at any time when his or her capacity permits him or her to do so. ...”

Principle 6 – Proportionality

“1. Where a measure of protection is necessary it should be proportional to the degree of capacity of the person concerned and tailored to the individual circumstances and needs of the person concerned.

2. The measure of protection should interfere with the legal capacity, rights and freedoms of the person concerned to the minimum extent which is consistent with achieving the purpose of the intervention. ...”

Principle 13 – Right to be heard in person

“The person concerned should have the right to be heard in person in any proceedings which could affect his or her legal capacity.”

Principle 14 – Duration review and appeal

“1. Measures of protection should, whenever possible and appropriate, be of limited duration. Consideration should be given to the institution of periodical reviews.

...

3. There should be adequate rights of appeal.”

C. The 25 June 2009 report on visit to Lithuania by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), visit from 28 to 30 April 2008

86. This report outlines the situation of persons placed by the public authorities in social care homes for people with mental disorders or mental deficiency. Part C of the report (paragraphs 120, 125-132) analyses situation in the Skemai Residential Care Home.

87. The CPT noted that Lithuanian legislation does not provide for an involuntary placement procedure in social welfare establishments. At Skemai Residential Care Home, residents were admitted on their own application or that of their guardian through the competent district authority (Panevėžys District Administration). The decision on the placement was taken by the social affairs unit of Panevėžys District Administration on the basis of a report drawn up by a social worker and a medical certificate issued by a psychiatrist stating that the applicant’s mental health permitted his/her placement in a social welfare institution of this type. An agreement was then signed between the applicant and the authorised representative of the local government for an indefinite period.

That said, it appeared that even legally competent residents admitted on the basis of their own application were not always allowed to leave the home when they so wished. The delegation was informed that their discharge could only take place by decision of the social affairs unit of the Panevėžys District Administration. This was apparently due to the need to ascertain that discharged residents had a place and means for them to live in the community; nevertheless, this meant that such residents were de facto deprived of their liberty (on occasion for a prolonged period).

88. Specific reference was made to the situation of residents deprived of their legal capacity. Such persons could be admitted to the Skemai Home solely on the basis of the application of their guardian. However, they were considered to be voluntary residents, even when they opposed such a placement. In the CPT’s view, placing incapacitated persons in a social welfare establishment which they cannot leave at will, based solely on the consent of the guardian, entailed a risk that such persons will be deprived of essential safeguards.

89. It was also a matter of concern that all 69 residents who were deprived of their legal capacity were placed under the guardianship of the Home. In this connection, the delegation was surprised to learn that in the majority of these cases, the existing guardianship arrangements had been terminated by a court decision upon admission to the establishment and guardianship of the person concerned entrusted to the Home.

The CPT stressed that one aspect of the role of a guardian is to defend the rights of incapacitated persons vis-à-vis the hosting social welfare institution. Obviously, granting guardianship to the very same institution could easily lead to a conflict of interest and compromise the independence and impartiality of the guardian. The CPT reiterated its recommendation that the Lithuanian authorities strive to find alternative solutions which would better guarantee the independence and impartiality of guardians.

90. In the context of discharge from psychiatric institution procedures, the CPT recommended that the Lithuanian authorities took steps to ensure that forensic patients were heard in person by the judge in the context of judicial review procedures. For that purpose, consideration may be given to the holding of hearings at psychiatric institutions

91. Lastly, the CPT found that at the establishment visited the existing arrangements for contact with the outside world were generally satisfactory. Patients/residents were able to send and receive correspondence, have access to a telephone, and receive visits.

THE LAW

I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

A. The parties’ submissions

92. The Government argued, first, that the present application had been entirely based on knowingly untrue facts and therefore should be declared inadmissible for “abuse of the right of individual petition”, pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. For the Government, the content of the present application was contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application, as the information provided therein was untrue or insidious. An appropriate and carefully selected form of social care for the applicant had been portrayed as detention. Appropriate medical care and striving to save her life had been presented as her torture. The facts concerning the reopening of the guardianship proceedings were also untrue, as well as those related to the applicant’s complaints of the alleged refusal of the Kėdainiai Home’s management to allow the applicant to have personal visits and of the censorship of her communications.

93. Alternatively, the Government submitted that the application had been prepared in its entirety and lodged by D.G. and not by the applicant. They held highly critical views of D.G., claiming that she had been “not only deceiving the Court but also harming a vulnerable, mentally-ill person”. The Government contended in the present case that the term “applicant” referred to D.D. only in a formal sense, as in reality the person whose will the application reflected had been D.G., and, moreover, that will had clearly contradicted the interests of D.D., who had been misled and manipulated by D.G. It followed that the application as a whole was incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.

94. The applicant’s lawyer considered that the Government’s allegation of factual inaccuracy was best understood by reference to the fact that the parties to this application held diametrically opposed perspectives in relation to the facts presented. Both the applicant and the Government saw the same facts in a totally different light and held incompatible views on the way in which the rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities should be respected under the Convention.

95. As to the Government’s second argument, the applicant’s lawyer submitted that the application had been lodged with D.D.’s fully-informed consent. D.D. had been keenly aware of the proceedings and had spoken of them frequently. Attention had to be drawn to the vulnerability and isolation of persons in the applicant’s position, as well as the fact that domestic legislation had denied her legal standing to initiate any legal proceedings whatsoever. Consequently, it was ironic that the Government had not recognised D.D.’s ability to represent herself in domestic proceedings, requiring by law that she did so via another person, but that before the Court the Government seemed to insist that the applicant should act alone.

Lastly, the applicant’s lawyer pointed out that D.G. was the applicant’s closest friend, former psychotherapist and her first guardian. Moreover, since 8 January 2008 the applicant had been represented before the Court by a legal team.

B. The Court’s assessment

96. The Court first turns to the Government’s objection as to the applicant’s victim status, and, in particular, their allegation that the application does not express the true will of D.D. In this connection, it recalls that the existence of a victim of a violation, that is to say, an individual who is personally affected by an alleged violation of a Convention right, is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings (see Poznanski and Others v. Germany, (dec.), no. 25101/05, 3 July 2007).

97. Having regard to the documents presented, the Court notes that the original application form bears D.D.’s signature, without any indication that that signature could be forged (see, by converse implication, Poznanski, cited above). In paragraph 13 of the application, D.D. wrote that back in 2000, on her adoptive father’s initiative, she had been unlawfully declared incapacitated and in 2004 admitted to the Kėdainiai Home “for an indefinite duration”. She asked that, for the purposes of the proceedings before this Court, her adoptive father not be considered her legal representative, requesting that D.G. take on that role. After the application was communicated to the Government, the applicant was reminded that, in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, she had to designate a legal representative, which she did by appointing a lawyer, Mr H. Mickevičius. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant’s lawyer followed the initial complaints as presented by D.D. In the light of the above, the Court holds that D.D. has validly lodged an application in her own name and thus has the status of “victim” in respect of the complaints listed in her application. The Government’s objection as to incompatibility ratione personae should therefore be dismissed.

98. The Court further considers that the Government’s objection as to the applicant’s alleged abuse of the right to petition, on account of allegedly incorrect information provided in her application form, is closely linked to the merits of her complaints under Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the Convention. The Court thus prefers to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the case and to examine them together.

99. Lastly, the Court observes that the applicant submitted several complaints under different Convention provisions. Those complaints relate to the proceedings concerning her involuntary admission to a psychiatric institution, the appointment of her guardian, her inability to receive personal visits, interference with her correspondence, involuntary medical treatment, and so forth. Whilst noting that the complaint as to the initial appointment of a guardian has been raised outside the six months time-limit (see paragraph 19 above), the Court sees fit to start with the complaint related to the court proceedings for a change of her legal guardian and then to examine the applicant’s admission to the Kėdainiai Home and the complaints stemming from it.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE PROCEEDINGS FOR A CHANGE OF LEGAL GUARDIAN

100. The applicant complained that she had not been afforded a fair hearing in respect of her application for reopening of her guardianship proceedings and had not been able to have her legal guardian changed. In support of her complaints, the applicant cited Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention. In addition, relying upon Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant argued that she had not been afforded an effective remedy to complain of the alleged violations.

The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints fall to be examined under of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

A. Submissions by the parties

1. The applicant

101. The applicant submitted that the blanket ban on her right of access to court went to the heart of her right to a fair hearing and had been in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She pointed out that on 15 September 2000 she had been declared incapacitated during proceedings that had been initiated by her adoptive father. Solely on the basis of the medical report of 19 July 2000, the Kaunas City District Court had deemed that the applicant was not to be summoned. As a result she had not taken part in those proceedings. The local authority, whose presence had been obligatory, had not made a significant contribution during the hearing and had endorsed the conclusions of the medical report. The Kaunas District Court had not provided any reasons for its decision, other than reiterating the conclusions of the forensic experts. The district court had chosen not to assess other evidence which could have potentially shed light on the applicant’s circumstances, such as that which could have arisen by summoning the applicant or other witnesses, or by questioning the authors of the psychiatric report in person. The judge had not found it necessary to examine whether any ulterior reasons had underlain the incapacitation request.

102. The applicant argued, further, that she had not been given the opportunity to participate in any of the guardianship proceedings. She had never been notified of or summoned to any of the four sets of proceedings concerning the appointment or discharge of her guardian/property administrator. For the applicant, there had been no medical or other reasons relating to her health that would have precluded her from participating. Nonetheless, the courts had invariably based their decisions on the views of the local authority without examining the personal circumstances of the applicant. The proceedings had been very summary in nature, the hearings had been brief and the rationale underpinning judgments had been almost non-existent. On 15 September 2000 the Kaunas City District Court had appointed her adoptive father as her guardian without any involvement on her part. As a result, not only had she been unable to object to his appointment, but she had also been barred from appealing against that decision.

103. The applicant emphasised that the review proceedings in 2005 initiated by her with the assistance of D.G. had been the only opportunity that she had ever had to put her point of view across before a court of law. On this occasion, she had personally addressed the Kaunas City District Court on a number of issues of the utmost importance to her, such as her incapacitation, the identity of her guardian and her admission to an institution. However, the district court had chosen to dismiss her action on narrow procedural grounds.

104. The applicant’s main objection with regard to the review proceedings lay in the district court’s decision to turn down her express request to be provided with independent legal aid. The explanation that the applicant was already represented by her guardian’s lawyer had misunderstood the competing interests of the two parties. The effect had been to severely prejudice the ability of the applicant to engage with the procedural aspects of the hearing on which the district court’s decision had turned.

105. Lastly, the applicant argued that she had been financially able to afford to employ a lawyer to represent her at that or any other of the hearings. However, she had been denied access to her own money, and at many of the hearings her interests and those of the person with control over her funds had been divergent. She concluded that in view of her vulnerable position, the procedural complexity of the proceedings and the high stakes thereof, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had required that she be provided with free legal aid.

2. The Government

106. As to the applicant’s complaint that she had not been afforded a fair hearing in relation to her request that the proceedings by which her guardian was appointed be reopened, the Government referred to the Court’s case‑law to the effect that the right of access to court is not absolute and that the States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing what might be the best policy in this field (Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 38, Series A no. 18). That was especially true as regards persons of unsound mind, and the Convention organs had acknowledged that such restrictions were not in principle contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, where the aim pursued was legitimate and the means employed to achieve that aim were proportionate (G.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 12040/86, Commission decision of 4 May 1987, Decisions and Reports (DR) 52, p. 269).

107. Turning to the particular situation of the applicant, the Government noted that domestic law did not allow a legally incapacitated person to lodge a petition seeking that his or her guardianship be changed. As the applicant had deemed that her adoptive father was not a suitable person to be her guardian, the authorities responsible for oversight of guardians (the Social Services Department of Kaunas City Council) or a public prosecutor could have submitted an application for reopening of the proceedings. Nevertheless, the Kaunas City District Court had accepted the applicant’s request for reopening for examination and on 7 November 2005 had reviewed her case with a high degree of care.

108. The hearing of 7 November 2005 at the Kaunas City District Court had taken place in the presence of the applicant, her guardian (her adoptive father) and his lawyer, and D.G., as well as in the presence of the representatives of the relevant State authorities. Whilst admitting that at that hearing the applicant had asked to be assisted by a separate lawyer, the Government submitted that the court had not been able to grant the applicant’s request because of the decision of 15 September 2000 declaring her legally incapacitated. Even so, the applicant’s interests had been defended by the representative of the Kėdainiai Home, the representative of the Social Services Department and the public prosecutor.

109. The Government contended that during the hearing of 7 November 2005 the applicant had not sustained her request that D.G. be appointed as her new guardian. Contrary to what the applicant had stated to the European Court, in her submissions at the hearing at issue she had agreed to keep her adoptive father as her guardian, saying that she loved him, but had expressed her wish to be released from the Kėdainiai Home. For the Government, it appeared from the transcript of the hearing that this statement had been made by the applicant before the break, but not after, contrary to her allegation of being “threatened with restraint” for disobedience.

110. The Government pointed out that, pursuant to Article 507 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appointment of a guardian required to be heard in the presence of a representative of the authority overseeing guardians, who was required to submit the authority’s conclusions to the court, and the person to be appointed as guardian. Given that both of these persons had taken part in the hearing of 21 January 2004, the Kaunas City District Court in its decision of 17 November 2005 had reasonably found that the applicant had been properly represented at the hearing of 21 January 2004, and thus the provision on which the applicant had based her request to reopen the proceedings had not been breached.

111. Lastly, in their observations of 15 September 2008 the Government noted that as regards incapacitation proceedings the ministries had prepared legislative amendments to the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, which would be submitted to Parliament. The proposed amendments provide for compulsory representation of a person facing incapacitation proceedings before a court by a lawyer.

In the light of the preceding arguments, the Government considered that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

3. The intervening parties

112. The representatives of Harvard Law School submitted that in all cases a court or other judicial authority must ensure that a representative acts solely in the interests of the incapacitated person. In any case in which it is objectively apparent that the person being represented does not accept or assent to the steps taken by a representative, those matters must be explored by the judicial authorities. The judicial authorities must exercise thorough, additional supervision in all cases in which there is a filter between a person and a court, such as when a person is represented by another individual. This remains true even where the representative was appointed by a court.

113. The European Group of National Human Rights Institutions noted that the European Convention on Human Rights guaranteed rights and freedoms that must be protected regardless of an individual’s level of capacity. They also saw it important to mention the Court’s judgment in Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (24 October 1979, Series A no. 33), where the Court concluded that although mental illness may render legitimate certain limitations upon the exercise of the “right to access to court”, it could not warrant the total absence of that right as embodied in Article 6 § 1.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Admisibility

114. The parties did not dispute the applicability of Article 6, under its “civil” head, to the proceedings at issue, and the Court does not see any reason to hold otherwise (see Winterwerp, cited above, § 73, and Matter v. Slovakia, no. 31534/96, § 51, 5 July 1999).

115. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

(a) General principles

116. In most of the previous cases before the Court involving “persons of unsound mind”, the domestic proceedings concerned their detention and were thus examined under Article 5 of the Convention. However, the Court has consistently held that the “procedural” guarantees under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 are broadly similar to those under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 232, 17 January 2012 and the case-law cited therein). Therefore, in deciding whether the proceedings in the present case for the reopening of the guardianship appointment were “fair”, the Court will have regard, mutatis mutandis, to its case-law under Article 5 § 1 (e) and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

117. In the context of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court accepts that in cases involving a mentally-ill person the domestic courts should also enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Thus, for example, they can make appropriate procedural arrangements in order to secure the good administration of justice, protection of the health of the person concerned, and so forth (see Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009/05, § 68, ECHR 2008).

118. The Court accepts that there may be situations where a person deprived of legal capacity is entirely unable to express a coherent view or give proper instructions to a lawyer. It considers, however, that in many cases the fact that an individual has to be placed under guardianship because he lacks the ability to administer his affairs does not mean that he is incapable of expressing a view on his situation and thus of coming into conflict with the guardian. In such cases, when the conflict potential has a major impact on the person’s legal situation, such as when there is a proposed change of guardian, it is essential that the person concerned should have access to court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation. Mental illness may entail restricting or modifying the manner of exercise of such a right, but it cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right, except in very exceptional circumstances such as those mentioned above. Indeed, special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental health issues, are not fully capable of acting for themselves (see, mutatis mutandis, Winterwerp, cited above, § 60).

119. The Court reiterates that the key principle governing the application of Article 6 is fairness. Even in cases where an applicant appears in court notwithstanding lack of assistance by a lawyer and manages to conduct his or her case in the face of all consequent difficulties, the question may nonetheless arise as to whether this procedure was fair (see, mutatis mutandis, McVicar v. the United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, §§ 50-51, ECHR 2002-III). The Court also recalls that there is the importance of ensuring the appearance of the fair administration of justice and a party to civil proceedings must be able to participate effectively, inter alia, by being able to put forward the matters in support of his or her claims. Here, as with other aspects of Article 6, the seriousness of what is at stake for the applicant will be of relevance to assessing the adequacy and fairness of the procedures (see P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 56547/00, § 91, ECHR 2002-VI).

(b) Application to the present case

120. Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court again notes that it cannot examine the applicant’s initial placement under guardianship (see paragraph 99 above). Even so, the Court cannot overlook the fact that back in 2000 the applicant did not participate in the court proceedings for her incapacitation. In particular, nothing suggests that the court notified the applicant of its own accord of the hearing at which her personal autonomy in almost all areas of life was at issue, including the eventual limitation of her liberty (see paragraph 12 above). Furthermore, as transpires from the decision of the Kaunas City District Court of 15 September 2000, it ruled exclusively on the basis of the medical panel’s report, without having summoned the medical experts who authored the report for questioning. Neither did the court call to testify any other witnesses who could have shed some light as to the personality of the applicant. Accordingly, the applicant was unable to participate in the proceedings before the Kaunas City District Court in any form. Given that the potential finding of the applicant being of unsound mind was, by its very nature, largely based on the applicant’s personality, her statements would have been an important part of the applicant’s presentation of her case, and virtually the only way to ensure adversarial proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovalev v. Russia, no. 78145/01, §§ 35-37, 10 May 2007; also see Principle 13 of the Recommendation No. R (99) 4 by the Council of Europe).

121. The Court also notes that on 21 January 2004 the Kaunas City District Court appointed the applicant’s adoptive father as her legal guardian. The applicant was again not summoned because the court apparently considered her attendance to be unnecessary.

122. Next, the Court turns to the proceedings regarding the change of the applicant’s guardianship in 2005. The Court notes that there is no indication that at that moment in time the applicant was suffering from an incapacity of such a degree that her personal participation in the proceedings would have been meaningless. Although health care officials had considered that her involvement in the proceedings relating to her initial placement under guardianship in 2000 was unnecessary, as she had apparently been unable to provide them with an objective opinion (see paragraph 11 above), she did in fact participate in the hearing relating to the change of guardian on 7 November 2005. Indeed, she not only stated unequivocally that she maintained her request that the guardianship proceedings be reopened and asked to be assisted by a lawyer but also made a number of other submissions about the proceedings and expressed a clear view on various matters. In particular, the applicant emphasised that she had not been summoned to the hearing during which her adoptive father had been appointed her guardian. She also expressed her desire to leave the Kėdainiai Home. Taking into account the fact that the applicant was an individual with a history of psychiatric troubles, and the complexity of the legal issues at stake, the Court considers that it was necessary to provide the applicant with a lawyer.

123. The Government argued that the Kaunas City District Court’s finding that the applicant, who lacked legal capacity, had been properly represented by her adoptive father’s lawyer had been correct and in compliance with domestic law. However, the crux of the complaint is not the legality of the decision under domestic law but the “fairness” of the proceedings from the standpoint of the Convention and the Court’s case‑law.

124. As emerges from the materials before the Court, the relationship between the applicant and her adoptive father has not always been positive. Quite the contrary, on numerous occasions the applicant had contacted State authorities claiming that there was a dispute between the two of them, which culminated in her being deprived of legal capacity and her liberty (see paragraphs 32, 33 and 60 above). What is more, the social services had also noted disagreement between the applicant and her adoptive father (see paragraph 18 above). Lastly, on at least one occasion the applicant’s adoptive father had himself acknowledged their strained relationship (see paragraph 14 above). Accordingly, the Court finds merit in the applicant’s argument that, because of the conflicting interests of her and her legal guardian, her guardian’s lawyer could in no way have represented her interests properly. In the view of the Court, the interests of a fair hearing required that the applicant be granted her own lawyer.

125. The Government suggested that a representative of the social services and the district prosecutor attended the hearing on the merits, thus protecting the applicant’s interests. However, in the Court’s opinion, their presence did not make the proceedings truly adversarial. As the transcript of the hearing of 7 November 2005 shows, the representatives of the social services, the prosecutor, the doctors from the Kėdainiai Home and the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital clearly supported the position of the applicant’s adoptive father – that he should remain D.D.’s legal guardian.

126. Finally, the Court recalls that it must always assess the proceedings as a whole (see C.G. v. the United Kingdom, no. 43373/98, § 35, 19 December 2001). In particular, and turning to the spirit in which the hearing of 7 November 2005 was held, the Court notes that the judge refused a request by D.G. that an audio recording be made. Be that as it may, the Court is not able to overlook the applicant’s complaint, although denied by the Government, that the judge did not allow her to sit near D.G., the only person whom the applicant trusted. Neither can the Court ignore the allegation that during the break the applicant was forced to leave the hearing room and to go to the judge’s office, after which measure the applicant declared herself content (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above). Against this background, the Court considers that the general spirit of the hearing further compounded the applicant’s feelings of isolation and inferiority, taking a significantly greater emotional toll on her than would have been the case if she would have had her own legal representation.

127. In the light of the above considerations and taking into account the events that preceded the examination of the applicant’s request for reopening of her guardianship proceedings, the Court concludes that the proceedings before the Kaunas City District Court on 7 November 2005 were not fair. Accordingly, the Government’s preliminary objection of abuse of application must be dismissed. The Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

128. Under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention the applicant complained that her involuntary admission to the Kėdainiai Home had been unlawful. Article 5, in so far as relevant, provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(e) the lawful detention of persons ... of unsound mind...”

A. Submissions by the parties

1. The applicant

129. The applicant maintained her claims. She alleged that her involuntary admission to the Kėdainiai Home after 2 August 2004 had amounted to a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

130. With regard to the objective element of her complaint, the applicant argued that her liberty had been restricted on account of her complete confinement and the extreme degree of control over her daily life. The applicant, like other residents, had not been able to leave the grounds of the Kėdainiai Home. If a resident left without permission, the director was bound to inform the police immediately. The applicant had tried to abscond twice, in 2006 and 2007, only to be brought back by the police. Furthermore, the applicant had been entirely under the control of staff at the institution, who had been able to medicate her by force or coercion, place her in isolation or tie her down, as exemplified by the incident of 25 January 2005. According to the findings of the Prosecutor’s Office, on that day the applicant had been tied down to a bed in the isolation room and forcibly medicated, in contravention of the internal rules of the institution. It would be plain upon visiting the Kėdainiai Home that the vast majority of residents are heavily medicated.

131. Further, the applicant complained that all aspects of her life are controlled by the staff. Although in theory she is allowed to receive visits from people outside the institution, this right is subject to approval from the director. Upon her admission to the Kėdainiai Home in 2004, all visits other than those from her guardian had been restricted for a lengthy period of time.

The applicant submitted that she cannot decide whether or when to stay in bed, there is a limited range of activities for her to take part in, she is not free to make routine choices like other adults – for example, about her diet, daily activities and social contacts. She is subject to constant supervision.

132. With respect to the subjective element of her complaint, the applicant noted that her case was diametrically opposite to that of H.M. v. Switzerland (no. 39187/98, § 47, ECHR 2002-II), where the applicant had agreed to her admission to a nursing home. In the present case, the applicant’s views had not been sought, either at the time of her admission or during her continued involuntary placement in the Kėdainiai Home. However, under Lithuanian law it had, in fact, been irrelevant whether she had consented or not to her detention, because an individual lacking legal capacity and placed under guardianship becomes a non-entity under the law and loses the capacity to take any decisions. Even so, whilst she had been incapable de jure, she had still, in fact, been capable of expressing her consent. She had expressed strong objections about her continued involuntary admission to the institution, most emphatically by running away twice, in her arguments before the domestic court, in her correspondence with various State authorities and, finally, by submitting a complaint to the Court.

133. In sum, the applicant’s involuntary admission to and continued residence in the Kėdainiai Home after 2 August 2004 constituted a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

134. Lastly, the applicant submitted that her admission to the Kėdainiai institution was not lawful. The authorities involved in placing her in a psychiatric institution or those supervising the guardian’s activities failed to consider whether other less restrictive community-based arrangements would have been more suitable to address the applicant’s mental health problems. Instead they simply acquiesced in the guardian’s request to have the applicant placed in an institution. Most importantly, the applicant was excluded from this decision-making process altogether. Consequently, the applicant saw her detention as arbitrary, in contradiction with Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention.

2. The Government

135. The Government argued, first, that Article 5 of the Convention was not applicable to the instant case. They submitted that the Kėdainiai Home was an institution for providing social services and not forced treatment under a regime corresponding to that of a psychiatric institution. Whilst admitting that certain medical services continued to be provided in the Kėdainiai Home, the institution at issue was not primarily used for the purposes of hospitalisation or medical treatment. Having regard to the fact that the Kėdainiai Home had to take care of adults suffering from mental health problems, it followed that the limited restrictions on the applicant had corresponded to the nature of the facility and had been no more than normal requirements (Nielsen v. Denmark, 28 November 1988, § 72, Series A no. 144).

136. Turning to the particular situation of the applicant, the Government submitted that until September 2007 the applicant had lived in a part of the Kėdainiai Home called “Apytalaukis”, which had been an open facility. Although its grounds had been fenced, the gates had not been locked and residents had been able to leave the territory as they wished. The doors of the building had stayed unlocked. The same conditions had remained after the applicant’s resettlement, except that the grounds had not even been fenced. According to the personnel of the Kėdainiai Home, the applicant had not always adhered to the internal rules of the institution and had failed to inform the staff before leaving the grounds and going for a walk. Even so, this had neither been considered as absconding, nor had the applicant been sanctioned in any way. Also, similarly to the facts in H.M. v. Switzerland (cited above), and with the exception of the incident of 25 January 2005, the applicant had never been placed in a secure ward. Moreover, she had been free to maintain personal contacts, to write and receive letters, to practise her religion and to make phone calls.

137. As to the medical treatment the applicant had received in the Kėdainiai Home, the Government submitted that, except for the incident of 25 January 2005, she had not been forcefully medicated. Each time she had been required to take medicine a psychiatrist had talked to her and had explained the need for treatment. There had been periods when the applicant had refused to take medicine; those periods had always been followed by the deterioration of her mental health. However, after some time the applicant had usually accepted the doctors’ arguments and had agreed to continue treatment. The social and medical care she had received in the Kėdainiai Home had had a positive effect on the applicant, because her mental state had stabilised. Since her admission to the Kėdainiai Home she had never been hospitalised, whereas prior to that she had used to be hospitalised at least once a year.

In sum, the limited restrictions to which the applicant had been subjected in the Kėdainiai Home had all been necessary due to the severity of her mental illness, had been in her interests and had been no more than the normal requirements associated with the responsibilities of a social care institution taking care of inhabitants suffering from mental health problems.

138. The Government also noted that the admission of the applicant to the Kėdainiai Home had stemmed from her guardian’s decision and not from a decision of the State or the municipal authorities. The applicant’s adoptive father, as her guardian, had been empowered to act on her behalf and with the aim of exercising and protecting her rights and interests. In addition, the involvement of the municipal and State authorities in examining the applicant’s situation and state of mind had played an important role in verifying the best interests of the applicant and had provided necessary safeguards against any arbitrariness in the guardian’s decisions.

139. Turning to the subjective element of the applicant’s case, the Government submitted that the applicant was legally incapacitated and had thus lacked the decision-making capacity to consent or object to her admission. Her guardian and not the authorities had been able to decide on her place of residence.

140. In the light of the above considerations, the Government argued that this part of the application was incompatible ratione materiae with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

141. Alternatively, should the Court find that Article 5 § 1 was applicable to the applicant’s complaints, the Government contended that they were not founded. The applicant’s admission to the Kėdainiai Home had been lawful, given that it had been carried out in accordance with the procedure established by domestic law. Under the law, a person can be admitted to an institution at the request of the guardian, provided that the person is suffering from a mental disorder. The applicant was admitted to the hospital at the request of her official guardian in relation to a worsening of her mental condition. Furthermore, in the view of the Government, the involvement of the authorities in the procedure for the applicant’s admission had provided safeguards against any possible abuses.

142. In the further alternative, the Government submitted that even if the restrictions on the applicant’s movement could be considered as falling within Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, those restrictions had been lawful and necessary.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Admissibility

143. The Government argued that the conditions in which the applicant is institutionalised in the Kėdainiai Home are not so restrictive as to fall within the meaning of “deprivation of liberty” as established by Article 5 of the Convention. However, the Court cannot subscribe to this thesis.

144. It reiterates that in order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of liberty, the starting point must be the concrete situation of the individual concerned. Account must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular case such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, § 92, Series A no. 39; and Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 41, Series A no. 93).

145. The Court further recalls that the notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 does not only comprise the objective element of a person’s confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible length of time. A person can only be considered to have been deprived of his liberty if, as an additional subjective element, he has not validly consented to the confinement in question (see, mutatis mutandis, H.M. v. Switzerland, cited above, § 46).

146. In the instant case the Court observes that the applicant’s factual situation in the Kėdainiai Home is disputed. Be that as it may, the fact whether she is physically locked in the Kėdainiai facility is not determinative of the issue. In this regard, the Court notes its case-law to the effect that a person could be considered to have been “detained” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 even during a period when he or she was in an open ward with regular unescorted access to unsecured hospital grounds and the possibility of unescorted leave outside the hospital (see H.L. v. the United Kingdom, no. 45508/99, § 92, ECHR 2004-IX). As concerns the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the key factor in determining whether Article 5 § 1 applies to the applicant’s situation is that the Kėdainiai Home’s management has exercised complete and effective control by medication and supervision over her assessment, treatment, care, residence and movement from 2 August 2004, when she was admitted to that institution, to this day (ibid., § 91). As transpires from the rules of the Kėdainiai Home, a patient therein is not free to leave the institution without the management’s permission. In particular, and as the Government have themselves admitted in their observations on the admissibility and merits, on at least one occasion the applicant left the institution without informing its management, only to be brought back by the police (see paragraph 29 above). Moreover, the director of the Kėdainiai Home has full control over whom the applicant may see and from whom she may receive telephone calls (see paragraph 81 above). Accordingly, the specific situation in the present case is that the applicant is under continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave (see Storck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, § 73, ECHR 2005-V). Any suggestion to the contrary would be stretching credulity to breaking point.

147. Considerable reliance was placed by the Government on the Court’s judgment in H.M. (cited above), in which it was held that the placing of an elderly applicant in a foster home in order to ensure necessary medical care as well as satisfactory living conditions and hygiene did not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. However, each case has to be decided on its own particular “range of factors” and, while there may be similarities between the present case and H.M., there are also distinguishing features. In particular, it was not established that H.M. was legally incapable of expressing a view on her position. She had often stated that she was willing to enter the nursing home and, within weeks of being there, she had agreed to stay, in plain contrast to the applicant in the instant case. Further, a number of safeguards – including judicial scrutiny – were in place in order to ensure that the placement in the nursing home was justified under domestic and international law. This led to the conclusion that the facts in H.M. were not of a “degree” or “intensity” sufficiently serious to justify a finding that H.M. was detained (see Guzzardi, cited above, § 93). By contrast, in the present case the applicant was admitted to the institution upon the request of her guardian without any involvement of the courts.

148. As to the facts in Nielsen, the other case relied on by the Government, the applicant in that case was a child, hospitalised for a strictly limited period of time of only five and a half months, on his mother’s request and for therapeutic purposes. The applicant in the present case is a functional adult who has already spent more than seven years in the Kėdainiai Home, with negligible prospects of leaving it. Furthermore, in contrast to this case, the therapy in Nielsen consisted of regular talks and environmental therapy and did not involve medication. Lastly, as the Court found in Nielsen, the assistance rendered by the authorities when deciding to hospitalise the applicant was “of a limited and subsidiary nature” (§ 63), whereas in the instant case the authorities contributed substantially to the applicant’s admission to and continued residence in the Kėdainiai Home.

149. Assessing further, the Court draws attention to the incident of 25 January 2005, when the applicant was restrained by the Kėdainiai Home staff. Although the applicant was placed in a secure ward, given drugs and tied down for a period of only fifteen to thirty minutes, the Court notes the particularly serious nature of the measure of restraint and observes that where the facts indicate a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, the relatively short duration of the detention does not affect this conclusion (see X v. Germany, no. 8819/79, Commission decision of 19 March 1981, DR 24, pp. 158, 161; and Novotka v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 47244/99, 4 November 2003).

150. The Court next turns to the “subjective” element, which was also disputed between the parties. The Government argued that the applicant lacked de jure legal capacity to decide matters for herself. However, this does not necessarily mean that the applicant was de facto unable to understand her situation (see Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009/05, § 108, ECHR 2008). Whilst accepting that in certain circumstances, due to severity of his or her incapacity, an individual may be wholly incapable of expressing consent or objection to being confined in an institution for the mentally handicapped or other secure environment, the Court finds that that was not the applicant’s case. As transpires from the documents presented to the Court, the applicant subjectively perceived her compulsory admission to the Kėdainiai Home as a deprivation of liberty. Contrary to what the Government suggested, she has never regarded her admission to the facility as consensual and has unequivocally objected to it throughout the entire duration of her stay in the institution. On a number of occasions the applicant requested her discharge from the Kėdainiai Home by submitting numerous pleas to State authorities and, once she was given the only possibility to address a judicial institution, to the Kaunas City District Court (see paragraphs 34 and 37 above). She even twice attempted to escape from the Kėdainiai facility (see, a fortiori, Storck, cited above, § 73). In sum, even though the applicant had been deprived of her legal capacity, she was still able to express an opinion on her situation, and in the present circumstances the Court finds that the applicant had never agreed to her continued residence at the Kėdainiai Home.

151. Lastly, the Court notes that although the applicant’s admission was requested by the applicant’s guardian, a private individual, it was implemented by a State-run institution – the Kėdainiai Home. Therefore, the responsibility of the authorities for the situation complained of was engaged (see Shtukaturov, cited above, § 110).

152. In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that the applicant was “deprived of her liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention from 2 August 2004 and remains so to this day.

153. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

154. The Government argued that the applicant had been admitted to the Kėdainiai Home lawfully. The Court accepts that the applicant’s involuntary admission was “lawful”, if this term is construed narrowly, in the sense of the formal compatibility of the applicant’s involuntary admission with the procedural and material requirements of domestic law (see paragraph 79 above). It appears that the only condition necessary for the applicant’s admission was the consent of her official guardian, her adoptive father, who was also the person who had initially sought the applicant’s admission to the Kėdainiai Home.

155. However, the Court reiterates that the notion of “lawfulness” in the context of Article 5 § 1 (e) has also a broader meaning. The notion underlying the term “procedure prescribed by law” is one of fair and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person of his liberty should issue from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary (see Winterwerp, cited above, § 45).

156. The Court also recalls that in Winterwerp (paragraph 39) it set out three minimum conditions which have to be satisfied in order for there to be “the lawful detention of a person of unsound mind” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (e): except in emergency cases, the individual concerned must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind, that is to say, a true mental disorder must be established before a competent authority on the basis of objective medical expertise; the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.

157. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that just a few weeks before her placement in the Kėdainiai Home on 2 August 2004, the applicant had been admitted to and examined at the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital (see, by converse implication, Stanev, cited above, § 156). A medical panel of that hospital concluded that at that time the applicant suffered from “continuous paranoid schizophrenia”. The doctors’ commission deemed it appropriate for the applicant to live in a “social care institution for the mentally handicapped”. The Court further observes that soon thereafter a social worker concluded that the applicant was not able to live on her own, as she could not take care of herself, did not understand the value of money, did not clean her apartment and wandered in the city hungry. The Court also notes the social worker’s testimony as to the unpredictability of the applicant’s behaviour, given that sometimes she would get angry at people and shout at them without a reason (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). That being so and recalling the fact that the applicant had a history of serious mental health problems since 1979, the Court is ready to find that the applicant has been reliably shown to have been suffering from a mental disorder of a kind and degree warranting compulsory confinement and the conditions as defined in Wintertwerp had thus been met in her case. Furthermore, the Court also considers that no other measures were available in the circumstances. As noted by the social worker, the applicant’s adoptive father, who was her legal guardian, could not “manage” her (see paragraph 23 above). On this point the Court also takes notice of the fact that even being removed from institutional care and taken to her adoptive father’s apartment, the applicant escaped and was found by the police only three months later (see paragraph 29 above). In these circumstances the Court concludes that the applicant’s compulsory confinement was necessary (see Stanev, cited above, § 143) and no alternative measures had been appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The Court lastly observes, and it has not been disputed by the applicant, that in situations such as hers the domestic law did not provide that placement in a social care institution would be decided by a court (see, by converse implication, Gorobet v. Moldova, no. 30951/10, § 40, 11 October 2011).

158. In the light of the above, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant’s confinement to the Kėdainiai Home on 2 August 2004 was “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

159. The applicant complained that she is unable to obtain her release from the Kėdainiai Home. Article 5 § 4, relied on by the applicant, provides as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

A. Submissions by the parties

160. The applicant submitted that she had been admitted to the Kėdainiai Home upon her guardian’s request and with the authorisation of an administrative panel. The lawfulness of her involuntary hospitalisation had not been reviewed by a court, either upon her admission or at any other subsequent time. Being deprived of her legal capacity, the applicant submitted that she is prevented from independently pursuing any judicial legal remedy to challenge her continued involuntary hospitalisation. In relation to the possibility supposedly at the applicant’s disposal of asking for a prosecutorial inquiry, this remedy could not be regarded per se as judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4. As for the possibilities identified by the Government, namely to ask social services or a prosecutor to initiate a review of the applicant’s medical condition, these procedures were discretionary. In any event, the applicant had filed a number of complaints with the prosecutor’s office and other authorities, which had unanimously concluded that her hospitalisation in the Kėdainiai Home had been carried out in accordance with the domestic law, thus being disinclined to take any action to override the will of her adoptive father, acting as her legal guardian. Once the Kėdainiai Home had become her guardian, it had been clear that that facility clearly had an interest in stifling any of the applicant’s complaints and in keeping her in the institution. The applicant therefore submitted that her rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been breached.

161. The Government maintained that the applicant had had an effective remedy to challenge her hospitalisation at the Kėdainiai facility. Thus, she had been able to apply for release or complain about the actions of the medical staff through her guardians, who had represented her in dealings with third parties, including the courts. Further, the applicant had been able to ask the social services authorities or a prosecutor to initiate a review of her situation. For the Government, the applicant’s complaint was unfounded.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Admissibility

162. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

163. Among the principles emerging from the Court’s case-law on Article 5 § 4 concerning “persons of unsound mind” are the following:

(a) a person of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for an indefinite or lengthy period is in principle entitled, at any rate where there is no automatic periodic review of a judicial character, to take proceedings “at reasonable intervals” before a court to put in issue the “lawfulness” – within the meaning of the Convention – of his detention;

(b) Article 5 § 4 requires that the procedure followed have a judicial character and give to the individual concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question; in order to determine whether a proceeding provides adequate guarantees, regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in which such proceeding takes place;

(c) the judicial proceedings referred to in Article 5 § 4 need not always be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 § 1 for civil or criminal litigation. Nonetheless, it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation. Special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves (see Megyeri v. Germany, 12 May 1992, § 22, Series A no. 237-A; also see Stanev, cited above, § 171).

164. This is so in cases where the original detention was initially authorised by a judicial authority (see X v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981, § 52, Series A no. 46), and it is all the more true in the circumstances of the present case, where the applicant’s placement in the Kėdainiai Home was initiated by a private individual, namely the applicant’s guardian, and decided upon by the municipal and social care authorities without any involvement on the part of the courts.

165. The Court accepts that the forms of judicial review may vary from one domain to another and may depend on the type of the deprivation of liberty at issue. It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into what would be the best or most appropriate system of judicial review in this sphere. However, in the present case the courts were not involved in deciding on the applicant’s placement in the Kėdainiai Home at any moment or in any form. It appears that, in situations such as the applicant’s, Lithuanian law does not provide for automatic judicial review of the lawfulness of admitting a person to and keeping him in an institution like the Kėdainiai Home. In addition, a review cannot be initiated by the person concerned if that person has been deprived of his legal capacity. In sum, the applicant was prevented from independently pursuing any legal remedy of a judicial character to challenge her continued involuntary institutionalisation.

166. The Government claimed that the applicant could have initiated legal proceedings through her guardians. However, that remedy was not directly accessible to her: the applicant fully depended on her legal guardian, her adoptive father, who had requested her placement in the Kėdainiai Home in the first place. The Court also observes that the applicant’s current legal guardian is the Kėdainiai Home – the same social care institution which is responsible for her treatment and, furthermore, the same institution which the applicant had complained against on many occasions, including in court proceedings. In this context the Court considers that where a person capable of expressing a view, despite having been deprived of legal capacity, is deprived of his liberty at the request of his guardian, he must be accorded an opportunity of contesting that confinement before a court, with separate legal representation. Lastly, as to the prospect of an inquiry carried out by the prosecuting authorities, the Court shares the applicant’s observation that a prosecutorial inquiry cannot as such be regarded as judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see Shtukaturov, cited above, § 124).

167. In the light of the above, the Court dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection of abuse of application and holds that there has also been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION

168. Relying on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained of having been physically restrained on 25 January 2005, when she had been tied to a bed in an isolation room, and of the overall standard of medical treatment in the Kėdainiai Home. She also argued that she had been given poor quality food.

The Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the present case these complaints fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. The parties’ submissions

169. The applicant submitted that she had been forced to take medication provided by the Kėdainiai Home with little or no information about its use. On occasions she had refused medication, but had generally acquiesced to its administration because of persistent pressure from the staff. The incident of 25 January 2005 had exemplified that pressure at its worst, though the coercion is generally less dramatic and persistent.

170. The applicant also complained that at the Kėdainiai institution she had been given out-of-date products to eat.

171. The Government argued that the measures used in respect of the applicant had been therapeutic and necessary. Turning to the events of 25 January 2005, they submitted that the social workers had decided on their own to tie down the applicant as they had been afraid for her life. Although the exact length of time that the applicant had been tied up for was not clear, it could have lasted for only fifteen to thirty minutes and had not continued any longer than necessary. During the incident the applicant had been forcibly injected with 10 mg of Haloperidol, whilst the average therapeutic dosage of the said medication is 12 mg. Haloperidol is a common antipsychotic medicament prescribed for individuals suffering from schizophrenia in order to eliminate the symptoms of psychosis. According to the generally accepted principles of psychiatry, medical necessity had fully justified the treatment in issue. The Government also drew the Court’s attention to the prosecutor’s decision of 31 July 2006 to discontinue the pre-trial investigation in connection with the applicant’s forced restraint. They also noted the absence of any other similar incidents at the Kėdainiai Home in respect of the applicant. The Government summed up that even if the treatment of the applicant on 25 January 2005 had had unpleasant effects, it had not reached the minimum level of severity required under Article 3 of the Convention.

172. As to the applicant’s complaint that she had been provided poor quality food, the Government submitted that although the authorities had found out-of-date meat in the Kėdainiai Home, the meat had been frozen and had never been used for cooking. A follow-up report of 20 February 2006 did not contain any evidence that the applicant had complained of failure to provide any medical assistance to her in respect of alleged food poisoning. For the Government, the applicant’s accusations towards the care institution were unsubstantiated and hence manifestly ill-founded.

B. The Court’s assessment

173. Referring to its settled case-law the Court reiterates that the position of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients admitted on an involuntary basis to psychiatric hospitals calls for increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with. While it is for the medical authorities to decide, on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to be used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of patients who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom they are therefore responsible, such patients nevertheless remain under the protection of Article 3, whose requirements permit of derogation.

The established principles of medicine are admittedly in principle decisive in such cases; as a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist (see Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 82, Series A no. 244).

174. In this case it is above all the applicant’s restraint on 25 January 2005 which appears worrying. However, the evidence before the Court is not sufficient to disprove the Government’s suggestion that, according to the psychiatric principles generally accepted at the time, medical necessity justified the treatment in issue. Moreover, the applicant’s allegations that the use of restraint measures had been unlawful were dismissed by the prosecutors and the Court sees no valid reason to dispute their findings (see paragraphs 54-58 above). The Court also notes the Government’s affirmation that there were no more similar incidents in the Kėdainiai Home in which physical restraint and supplementary medication had been used in respect of the applicant.

175. Turning to the applicant’s submission of allegedly poor quality food and food poisoning, the Court notes with concern that out-of-date meat was found at the Kėdainiai Home (see paragraph 63 above). However, that fact alone is not sufficient to substantiate the applicant’s accusations of inhuman or degrading treatment, as directed towards the Kėdainiai institution, to such an extent that an issue under Article 3 of the Convention would arise.

176. The Court accordingly finds that the above complaints must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

A. Censorship of correspondence

177. The applicant alleged that the Kėdainiai Home had censored her correspondence, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads insofar as relevant as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

1. The parties’ submissions

178. The applicant argued that her correspondence, including that with the Court, and her telephone conversations, as illustrated by the incident of 18 January 2005, had been censored by the Kėdainiai Home. She also submitted that she had been denied books and newspapers.

179. The Government disputed the applicant’s submissions and argued that the residents of the Kėdainiai Home were guaranteed the right to receive periodicals and personal correspondence. There were no requirements that the residents should send or receive their correspondence through the personnel of the facility.

180. As to the particular situation of the applicant, the Government underlined that there had been neither stopping nor censorship of any of her communications, such as telephone conversations or letters, including those with the Court. Such allegations were totally unsubstantiated and there was no proof that any acts of interception of communications had occurred. As regards the only specified incident involving the telephone call from Ms M. Buržinskienė on 18 January 2005, which the applicant had not been invited to answer, the Government noted that in the context of a more intensified deterioration of the applicant’s health, the Kėdainiai Home personnel might have decided not to have the applicant temporarily disturbed. Nonetheless, since 2005 the applicant had possessed several of her own mobile phones and had used them at her own convenience and without hindrance. Furthermore, the applicant had not indicated either the addressees of her supposedly intercepted correspondence, or, at least, the approximate dates of such letters. Lastly, the Government submitted that the Kėdainiai Home had a room with newspapers, periodicals and books, to which all the residents, including the applicant, had unrestricted access.

Relying on the above considerations, the Government argued that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

2. The Court’s assessment

181. The Court recalls its case-law to the effect that telephone calls made from business premises, as well as from the home, may be covered by the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 (see Halford v. the United Kingdom, 25 June 1997, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III). Turning to the applicant’s situation, it observes that on 18 January 2005 the applicant was indeed prevented from receiving a telephone call from Ms Buržinskienė. However, taking into account the applicant’s medical diagnosis and the explanations provided by the Government, the Court is not ready to hold that on that occasion the applicant’s rights under Article 8 were limited more than was strictly necessary. The Court also notes that this part of the complaint has been raised out of time, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

182. Furthermore, having examined the materials submitted by the parties, the Court finds the applicant’s other complaints in this part of the application not sufficiently substantiated and therefore rejects them as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B. Visits

1. The parties’ submissions

183. The applicant further argued that her ability to build and sustain relationships had also been limited due to restrictions placed on her capacity to receive visitors and telephone calls. The applicant has had very little contact with members of the community outside the facility. Outsiders’ visits are generally limited and most visitors may not be received in private. The director of the Kėdainiai Home had in the past restricted visits from outsiders after the applicant’s institutionalisation, upon a request from her guardian. The list of visitors maintained by the Kėdainiai Home showed that between 2 August 2004 and 25 December 2006 only the applicant’s adoptive father had visited her, with few exceptions. Before the applicant got her own mobile phone, she had had to use the facilities provided by the institution. At that time, she had only been able to receive calls through the Kėdainiai Home’s switchboard. She relied upon the right to respect for private and family life under the above-cited Article 8 of the Convention.

184. The Government pointed out that the applicant, as with the other residents of the Kėdainiai Home, was entitled to unrestricted visits by her relatives and her court-appointed guardians. As to other visitors, such individuals could visit residents upon having obtained the management’s permission, which was required in order to protect the interests and the safety of the residents of the institution.

185. The Government submitted that the applicant’s adoptive father, as her guardian, had requested that the Kėdainiai Home prevent D.G.’s negative influence over the applicant and restrict her visits in order to avoid the applicant’s destabilisation. Only once on 18 August 2004, in accordance with that request and also having the oral consent of the in-house psychiatrist, had D.G.’s permission to visit been denied. In that connection, the Government also referred to a doctor’s report concerning the negative influence of D.G. over the applicant. Relying on the record of visitors to the Kėdainiai Home, the Government asserted that, contrary to what had been said by the applicant, she had received visitors. In contrast to what had been suggested by the applicant, it had not been her relatives, but rather her friends who had most often visited her.

186. In the light of the above, the Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

2. The Court’s assessment

187. The Court reiterates that Article 8 of the Convention is intended to protect individuals from arbitrary interference by the State in their private and family life, home and correspondence. The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”. However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to entirely exclude therefrom the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251-B).

188. Turning to the applicant’s case, the Court notes that, except for one occasion on which D.G. was not allowed to see her on 18 August 2004, the applicant has not substantiated her pleas of social isolation and restrictions on having people visit her. Even assuming that these matters have been raised in time, the Court is not ready to disagree with the Government’s suggestion that that single restriction was aimed at the protection of the applicant’s mental health and was thus in compliance with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention.

189. The applicant complained that by her admission to the Kėdainiai Home she had been segregated from society and cut off from social networks. Whilst acknowledging that because of her involuntary stay in the institution the applicant indeed could have faced certain restrictions in contacting others, the Court nonetheless observes that between 2 August 2004 and 25 December 2006 the applicant received one or more visitors on forty-two separate occasions. Of those visits, her friends, relatives and D.G. saw the applicant thirty-eight times (see paragraph 31 above). Lastly, the applicant had herself admitted that at one point she had got a mobile phone, which helped her to maintain contact with the outside world.

190. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that this part of the applicant’s complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and therefore inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION

191. The applicant complained that she had been prevented from practising her religion whilst resident in the Kėdainiai Home, in breach of Article 9 of the Convention.

192. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint was purely abstract in nature. It was not indicated in the applicant’s complaint when in particular she had been barred or impeded from practising her religion. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Kėdainiai facility, the residents thereof had the right to practise their chosen religion and to attend a place of worship.

193. The Court has examined the above complaint as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds the complaint wholly unsubstantiated and therefore rejects it as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

VIII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

194. Relying upon Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant also complained that she had had no effective domestic remedies at her disposal to seek redress for the alleged violations of which she had complained to the Court. Article 13 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The applicant

195. The applicant submitted at the outset that she is a very vulnerable individual. She is legally incapacitated with a history of mental health problems and has been admitted to a psychiatric institution against her will for an indeterminate period. The applicant’s guardian, who has the power to take decisions on all her aspects of life, is the care institution itself. In the applicant’s view, on account of her vulnerability, Article 13 of the Convention required that the State take supplementary measures to make sure that she could have benefited from effective remedies for the violations of her rights.

196. The applicant pointed out that she does not have independent standing to initiate any civil proceedings. Only once had she been successful in initiating court proceedings, namely those before the Kaunas District Court in 2005 concerning the change of guardianship. However, even then it had been not possible to pursue that remedy in full, given that the Kaunas District Court had decided to refuse the applicant’s request for legal assistance on the grounds that she had been represented by her legal guardian, who already had a lawyer.

197. The applicant further submitted that neither could she exercise her right to an effective domestic remedy through other persons. As concerns her guardian, who was her legal representative in accordance with the law, this remedy had been purely discretionary. More importantly, it was difficult to conceive how this remedy could have worked with regard to complaints challenging decisions taken by the guardian him, her or itself on the applicant’s behalf, such as the decision to hospitalise the applicant in the institution, or the decision by the Kėdainiai Home to restrict visitors’ access to the applicant.

198. The applicant also argued that she could not effectively act through the Social Services Department or the public prosecutor either. As concerns the first body, she emphasised the purely discretionary powers of the social services department and doubted the impartiality of an institution which had to a large degree been responsible for the appointment of her guardians and for her hospitalisation in the institution. As concerns the prosecutor, in the applicant’s view, his decisions were not binding and, as practice had showed, the prosecutor had invariably rejected the applicant’s complaints, mostly deferring to the decisions taken by the guardians or the social service authorities.

199. Lastly, the applicant submitted that decisions to remove incapacitation, although theoretically possible, were exceptional. Most importantly, the ability to bring an action to restore legal capacity did not belong to incapacitated persons themselves, but rather to their guardian. For most people, incapacitation is for life.

2. The Government

200. The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. Whilst acknowledging that the applicant had no independent standing in the domestic proceedings, the Government contended that she had been able to effectively act through her guardian, who had been her legal representative. They also pointed to the Kaunas City District Court’s decision of 7 November 2007 to accept the applicant’s application for change of her guardian for examination. For the Government, it could be presumed that the district court had reviewed the applicant’s request to reopen the proceedings with a high degree of care because of the essence of the applicant’s request – appointment of a guardian. Even though the court had refused the applicant’s request to have separate legal assistance, that refusal had been based on domestic law, pursuant to which a guardian is the legal representative of an incapacitated person. Furthermore, the actions of the applicant’s guardian had been supervised by the social services authorities, thus protecting the interests of the applicant.

201. The Government next argued that the protection of the rights and interests of the applicant fell within the notion of public interest. Thus the applicant had been able to apply to the prosecutor, who, in turn, had been entitled to file a civil claim or an administrative complaint. In this context the Government referred to the decisions of 3 September 2004 and 31 July 2006, by which the prosecutors had discontinued the official investigation into the complaints about alleged deprivation of liberty of the applicant. However, having considered the complaints to be unfounded, the prosecutors saw no reason to apply to the domestic courts in order to protect the public interest.

202. As to an effective remedy for the applicant to complain of the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention regarding her living conditions, the Government contended that, pursuant to the Law on Social Services, the applicant could have complained to social care officials, and, in the event that they dismissed her complaint, to the courts. Various complaints made by the applicant regarding her allegedly inadequate living conditions and ill-treatment in the Kėdainiai Home had been investigated by a number of municipal officials and interdepartmental panels, which had found no violations of the applicant’s rights. Moreover, neither a prosecutor nor the applicant’s guardian had ever applied to the courts with a claim for damages for any alleged violations of the applicant’s rights.

In sum, the applicant had had domestic remedies which were effective, available in theory and in practice, and capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and which had offered reasonable prospects of success.

203. Lastly, the Government submitted that declaration of the recovery of a person’s legal capacity upon the amelioration of his or her mental health was quite common practice in Lithuania. Such requests could be submitted by a social care institution, acting as a guardian, on its own motion. Moreover, a request to annul an incapacitation decision could also be lodged by a prosecutor in the public interest. Nonetheless, as regards the applicant, the circumstances warranting her incapacitation have never disappeared as no amelioration of her mental state has ever been established that would give her guardian, be it her adoptive father or the Kėdainiai Home, or the prosecutor grounds to apply to a court for the reinstatement of her legal capacity.

B. The Court’s assessment

204. The Court finds that this complaint is linked to the complaints submitted under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, and it should therefore be declared admissible.

205. The Court recalls its case-law to the effect that Article 5 § 4 provides a lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 126, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V). It also reiterates that the requirements of Article 13 are less strict than, and are here absorbed by, those of Article 6 (see, among many authorities, Kamasinski v. Austria, 19 December 1989, § 110, Series A no. 168). The Court further notes that, in analysing the fairness of the civil proceedings concerning the applicant’s guardianship and the lawfulness of the applicant’s involuntary placement in the Kėdainiai Home, it has already taken account of the fact that the applicant is deprived of legal capacity and thus is not able to initiate any legal proceedings before the domestic courts. When analysing the above complaints, the Court has also noted that the other remedies suggested by the Government, be it a possibility to act through her guardians or a request by the applicant to complain to a prosecutor or her complaints to the social care authorities, have not been proved to be feasible in the applicant’s case. This being so, having regard to its conclusions under Articles 5 § 4 and 6 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to re-examine these aspects of the case separately through the prism of the “effective remedies” requirement of Article 13.

IX. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

206. Relying upon Article 2 of the Convention, the applicant also complained that, due to overmedication, her life is at risk. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that one of the reasons for her involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation had been her bold poetic expression. Finally, without citing any Article of the Convention or its Protocols, the applicant complained of a violation of her property rights by her State-appointed guardian.

207. Having examined the materials submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to substantiate her claims. It notes that, according to the Government, the applicant had received and had had access to newspapers and reading materials (see paragraph 180 above). It further observes that the applicant’s complaints as to alleged breach of her property rights were dismissed by the prosecutors (see paragraph 52 above). The Court therefore rejects this part of the application as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

208. Relying upon Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained of her involuntary hospitalisation and treatment in the Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital from 30 June 2004 to 2 August 2004. The Court notes, however, that the applicant submitted this complaint on 28 March 2006. Accordingly, this part of the application has not been lodged within six months of the final effective measure or decision, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

X. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

209. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

210. The applicant claimed 300,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

211. The Government submitted that the above claim was wholly unsubstantiated.

212. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 5 § 4 as well as a violation of Article 6 § 1 in the present case. As regards the non‑pecuniary damage already sustained, the Court finds that the violation of the Convention has indisputably caused the applicant substantial damage. In these circumstances, it considers that the applicant has experienced suffering and frustration, for which the mere finding of a violation cannot compensate. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

213. The applicant claimed the sum of EUR 16,609.85 for costs and expenses before the Court, broken down as follows: EUR 62 for secretarial costs; EUR 3,500 in relation to legal fees for preparation of the submissions made by the applicant’s lawyer; and EUR 13,047.85 for fees for legal advice from Interrights.

214. The Government submitted that the sum was excessive.

215. The Court notes that the applicant was granted legal aid under the Court’s legal aid scheme, under which the sum of EUR 850 has been paid to the applicant’s lawyer to cover the submission of the applicant’s observations and additional expenses.

216. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Ruling on an equitable basis and taking into account the sums already paid to the applicant by the Council of Europe in legal aid, the Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000.

C. Default interest

217. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Dismisses the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s victim status;

2. Joins to the merits the Government’s preliminary objection of abuse of application and dismisses it;

3. Declares the complaints under Article 5 § 1 and 4 (concerning involuntary placement in the Kėdainiai Home and the applicant’s inability to obtain judicial review of her continuous placement), Article 6 § 1 (concerning the proceedings for change of guardianship), and Article 13 (concerning the absence of effective remedies) admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards the lawfulness of the applicant’s involuntary placement in the Kėdainiai Home;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as regards the applicant’s inability to obtain her release from the Kėdainiai Home;

6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account the unfairness of the guardianship proceedings;

7. Holds that there is no need to examine the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

8. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

(i) EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses;

(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 February 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Stanley NaismithFrançoise Tulkens              Registrar              President

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy