CASE OF DERREK AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF DERREK AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 31712/21)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

29 April 2025

FINAL

29/07/2025

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Derrek and Others v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
 Peeter Roosma,
 Darian Pavli,
 Andreas Zünd,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Diana Kovatcheva,
 Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 31712/21) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by six Russian nationals (“the applicants”, see the appendix), on 28 May 2021;

the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 3, Article 5 § 1 and Articles 8, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the observations submitted by the applicants;

the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the elected judges of the Court to sit as an ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule 29 § 2 of the Rules of Court (see Kutayev v. Russia, no. 17912/15, §§ 5-8, 24 January 2023);

Having deliberated in private on 28 January and 18 March 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns a police raid on a venue hosting a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) event.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicants’ details are provided in the appendix. They were represented by Mr A. Ryzhov, a lawyer practising in Moscow.

3.  The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin and Mr A. Fedorov, former Representatives of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by their successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  According to the applicants, on 5 December 2020 the LGBT community in Yaroslavl held a workshop for human rights and LGBT activists. The organisers invited three speakers from the ABC of Activism Project. There were 11 participants, including the speakers. The workshop started at 1.30 p.m., and at 2.40 p.m. the police and special forces raided the venue. K., the chief of the local police, was also present. The police filmed the raid. The participants were ordered to stand facing the wall for over 30 minutes. They were searched and questioned, and their identity documents were checked and filmed. K. refused to provide any explanations to the applicants and called them “faggots”. No drugs were found. The police seized some books that had been brought to the workshop by the third applicant. On the same day several persons published the videos taken during the raid on their pages on social media.

6.  At 3.20 p.m. the police took the applicants and the other participants to a local hospital for obligatory drug testing. All of them tested negative. The first, fifth and sixth applicants were released at approximately 6 p.m. The second, third and fourth applicants were taken to a police station for further questioning. They were released at around 9 p.m.

7.  The applicants submitted that the atmosphere during the searches had been intimidating: the policemen had been armed and had been wearing masks covering their faces (see paragraphs 8-11 below for further detail).

8.  On 25 December 2020 the fifth applicant complained about the police raid of 5 December 2020 to the Investigative Committee. In particular, he alleged that the law enforcement officers had used excessive force, and that the personal search and drug testing had been unlawful. He also claimed that the police’s conduct had been hate-motivated and discriminatory. According to the applicant, over thirty people had entered the premises, including policemen, special forces, representative of a regulatory agency and several individuals with cameras. They had refused to explain the reasons for the raid. One of the cameramen had filmed the fifth applicant and his passport. K., the head of the local police, had also been present. He had ordered that the fifth applicant be taken to the police station. Then he had come up to the second applicant, who was standing by the wall, slapped him on the legs and told him to spread his feet wider. When the third applicant had asked K. about the purpose of the raid, K. had grabbed him by the chin and called the workshop participants “faggots”. A man dressed in plainclothes had searched the participants, including women, touching their bodies in the process. Then the fifth applicant had been questioned. K., who had been angry that the fifth applicant had called his lawyer to report the raid to him, had hit him on the soles of his shoes. For 30 minutes the participants had been made to stand by the wall with the arms up and the legs spread. The police had taken five participants, including the fifth applicant, to the hospital for alcohol and drug testing. The participants had been taken to the lab for testing one by one. After that, they had been taken back to the van. The fifth applicant had been allowed to get out of the van for some time. At around 6 p.m. the fifth and sixth applicants had been allowed to leave. Then the first applicant had been released too. The other three applicants had been taken to the police station. They had been allowed to leave between 8 and 9 p.m. Relying on those facts, the fifth applicant considered that the conduct of law enforcement officers had amounted to abuse of power, a criminal offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

9.  On 25 January 2021 the regional office of the Ministry of the Interior informed the fifth applicant that the inquiry conducted in response to his complaint had not disclosed any professional misconduct or unlawfulness in the actions of the police. The actual results of the inquiry were not provided. He was advised of his right to appeal against the dismissal of his complaint.

10.  The fifth applicant also lodged a challenge against the police raid with the Kirovskiy District Court of Yaroslavl. On 10 March 2021 the District Court dismissed the fifth applicant’s complaint without consideration of the merits, noting that the complaint had not complied with the relevant rules of procedure. In the court’s view, it was not authorised to assess the lawfulness of the police raid of 5 December 2020, in respect of which there had been no criminal investigation. The fifth applicant appealed against that decision, but on 4 May 2021 the Yaroslavl Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision of 10 March 2021.

11.  The other applicants also lodged similar complaints to no avail. The content of the complaints was similar to the ones lodged by the fifth applicant (see paragraph 8 above). The third applicant also complained that he had not been allowed to close the door to the toilet during the drug test and that a female medical practitioner had been able to see him while he had been urinating. The domestic courts dismissed the complaints without consideration on the merits.

12.  The administrative case file stated that on 5 December 2020 the police had received a call from M., who had reported that drugs were being distributed and used during the workshop. The applicants submitted that they knew M. personally and that he had denied having made such a call.

13.  The administrative case file contained a report prepared by a police officer on 5 December 2020. The report indicated that the participants in the workshop had failed to comply with preventive measures against COVID-19. In particular, some of them had not worn masks and had failed to respect the minimum physical distancing requirements.

14.  The file also contained a report on the inspection of the scene of the raid which referred to the seizure of the third applicant’s books.

15.  The file included the decisions not to institute administrative proceedings against the applicants on the charges of drug use with reference to their negative drug tests. There was also a decision to discontinue administrative proceedings against the fourth applicant on the charge of failure to comply with measures against COVID-19. None of the applicants were prosecuted on administrative charges.

16.  The applicants submitted that the file did not contain the decisions authorising their mandatory drug testing.

THE LAW

17.  The Court observes that the facts giving rise to the alleged violations of the Convention occurred prior to 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention. The Court therefore decides that it has jurisdiction to examine the present application (see Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2 others, §§ 68‑73, 17 January 2023, and Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, § 46, 6 June 2023).

18.  In view of the Court’s continuing jurisdiction under Article 58 of the Convention, Articles 38, 41 and 46 in particular, as well as the corresponding provisions of the Rules of Court, continue to be applicable after 16 September 2022. The respondent Government’s abstention from further participation in the proceedings does not release them from the duty to cooperate with the Court and does not prevent the Court from continuing with the examination of applications where it retains jurisdiction (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, §§ 435-39, 30 November 2022, and Svetova and Others v. Russia, no. 54714/17, §§ 29-31, 24 January 2023). The Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate from a party’s failure or refusal to participate effectively in the proceedings (Rule 44C of the Rules of Court).

19.  The applicants complained under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14, that during the police raid on 5 December 2020 they had been subjected to treatment prohibited by the Convention, which had aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and humiliation, and that there had been no effective investigation into the alleged police misconduct.

20.  Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 114, 20 March 2018), the Court finds it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 and under Article 13 of the Convention. Those provisions read as follows:

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

Article 14

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

21.  The Court notes that these complaints are neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

22.  The guiding principles to the Court’s approach, as to the State’s responsibility for violence committed by its agents and motivated by hatred, and its duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and an act of violence have been recently summarised in Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia (no. 7224/11, §§ 35-38, 42‑44 and 46, 8 October 2020).

23.  In line with this approach, the Court considers it appropriate to start the examination of the merits of this part of the application by first addressing the complaint about the alleged inadequacy of the investigation and then turning to the question of whether the State can be held responsible for the purported ill-treatment.

(a)   Alleged inadequacy of investigation

24.  The Court observes that the applicants lodged criminal complaints alleging abuse of power by police officers during the raid of 5 December 2020 and asking specifically to take into consideration the allegedly discriminatory aspects of the conduct of the police officers and special forces (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above). It notes the lack of evidence in the file that the obligatory drug testing had been based on any objective indication of a drug offence being committed. In such circumstances and regard being had to the well‑documented hostility against the LGBT community in Russia at the material time (see Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, § 59, 30 May 2023), the Court finds it established that, in the present case, the domestic authorities were confronted with prima facie indications that the police’s actions could have been motivated by the applicants’ sexual orientation. Accordingly, it considers that it was incumbent on the domestic authorities to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the possibility that discrimination had been the motivating factor behind the law enforcement officers’ conduct.

25.  The Court discerns no evidence in the materials submitted for it to conclude that a meaningful inquiry was conducted in response to the applicants’ complaints. The Ministry of the Interior summarily dismissed the complaints without disclosing any findings of their inquiry. The domestic courts refused to examine the complaints on the merits considering, contrary to the position of the Ministry, that the inquiry could not be subjected to judicial review. As a result, the authorities’ response to the applicants’ complaint was limited to the statement that the police’s actions had been lawful and at no time did they attempt to address the applicants’ complaints that the incident had been motivated by homophobia (see paragraphs 9-11 above). Such attitude on the part of the authorities, in the Court’s view, demonstrated unexplained failure to examine the role played by homophobic motives in the alleged police misconduct.

26.  The Court thus finds that the domestic authorities have failed to conduct an effective investigation into the applicants’ allegations of ill‑treatment with discriminatory intent by the police. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 under its procedural limb taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.

(b)   Alleged ill-treatment

27.  The Court, without delving into the issue of existence of a probable cause for police intervention during the workshop, observes at the outset that the applicants’ version of the events that had unfolded during the police raid on 5 December 2020 was not contested by the Government. That being so, and drawing inferences from the available material and the parties’ conduct, and, in particular, the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation in response to the applicants’ complaints, the Court finds that the facts as submitted by the applicants are sufficiently convincing and have been established beyond reasonable doubt (see, for instance, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, §§ 164-67, ECHR 2012).

28.  The Court finds that the treatment the police subjected the applicants to on 5 December 2020 reached the requisite threshold of severity to fall within the ambit of treatment proscribed by Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The police officers and special forces wilfully humiliated and debased the applicants.

29.  The Court is particularly concerned by the fact that the applicants were subjected to personal searches and then to obligatory drug testing. No record justifying those measures was ever drawn up. In that context, the Court shares the applicants’ view that those searches and obligatory drug testing did not have any investigative value whatsoever, and that their sole purpose was to make the applicants feel intimidated and humiliated and thus punish them for their association with the LGBT community. The use by the chief of the police of hate speech and derogatory name calling for everybody present on the premises to hear during the raid and the subsequent disclosure of the video footage further supports the Court’s findings.

30.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the wholly inappropriate conduct of the law enforcement officers during the raid on 5 December 2020 was motivated by homophobic hatred and must necessarily have aroused in the applicants feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity which were not compatible with respect for their human dignity.

31.  The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude there has been a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.

32.  In view of the above finding, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately whether there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

33.  The applicants complained that they had been deprived of their liberty unlawfully by the police in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(b)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;

(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so[.]”

34.  In order to determine whether the applicants were “deprived of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, the Court will rely on its well-established case-law (see Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 211-12, 21 November 2019; De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 80, 23 February 2017, with further references; and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 64, 15 December 2016). It reiterates that Article 5 § 1 may also apply to deprivations of liberty of a very short length (see, among many authorities, M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, § 190, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).

35.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that at about 2.40 p.m. on 5 December 2020 the police and a special forces unit entered the premises where the applicants were taking part in a workshop. The applicants were questioned and then taken to a hospital for mandatory drug testing. While the first, fifth and sixth applicants were allowed to leave at around 6 p.m., the other three applicants were taken to a police station and were released at around 9 p.m. on the same day.

36.  The Court further notes that there is nothing in the materials submitted to suggest that the applicants had been free to leave the workshop venue at their own discretion, or to object to being taken to a hospital for drug testing or to a police station for questioning. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the relatively short duration of the events, the Court considers that the applicants were deprived of liberty during the periods indicated (compare Aftanache v. Romania, no. 999/19, § 82, 26 May 2020, and Zelčs v. Latvia, no. 65367/16, § 40, 20 February 2020). The Court is accordingly competent ratione materiae to examine the complaint.

37.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

38.  The Court reiterates that the key purpose of Article 5 is to prevent arbitrary or unjustified deprivations of liberty (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 311, 22 December 2020; S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, § 73, 22 October 2018; and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 30, ECHR 2006-X). The right to liberty and security is of the highest importance in a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 76, ECHR 2010, and Ladent v. Poland, no. 11036/03, § 45, 18 March 2008).

39.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that no record was drawn up of the applicants’ arrest or detention on 5 December 2020.

40.  In this connection the Court observes that the absence of an arrest record must in itself be considered a most serious failing, as it has been the Court’s constant view that unrecorded detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. The absence of a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention (see Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, § 87, ECHR 2006-III; Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, § 78, 25 October 2005; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 125, Reports 1998-III).

41.  Nor can it be said that the escorting of the applicants to the hospital for the drug testing by the police has been accompanied by any procedural guarantees or by any relevant documents authorising such testing (compare Aftanache and Zelčs, both cited above).

42.  The lack of a proper record of the applicants’ deprivation of liberty on 5 December 2020 is therefore sufficient for the Court to find that their confinement at the workshop venue and subsequent transfer to a hospital and a police station for several hours on 5 December 2020 was contrary to the requirements implicit in Article 5 of the Convention for the proper recording of deprivations of liberty (compare Menesheva, cited above, §§ 87-89, and Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, §§ 154 and 157, ECHR 2002-IV). There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

43.  The applicants complained that the disruption of their workshop on 5 December 2020 by the authorities had amounted to a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

44.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

45.  The general principles concerning the right to freedom of assembly have been summarised in the case of Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC] (no. 37553/05, §§ 91-92 and 100, ECHR 2015).

46.  In the present case, it is clear to the Court that the authorities’ actions leading to the disruption of the applicants’ small-scale gathering constituted “a restriction” within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. While the Court can accept that it might have been incumbent on the police to respond to the information received as to the allegedly illegal activities ongoing during the workshop, the manner in which the police carried out their duties is of particular concern to the Court.

47.  While the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the workshop took place at the time when the COVID-19 restrictions were still in place and that the police report mentioned that the preventive measures had not been fully complied with by the participants, it notes that the relevant administrative proceedings were discontinued. Against such background, the Court is unable to establish that the alleged failure of the participants to comply with those preventive measures had been a factor underlying the authorities’ decision to disrupt the gathering. Accordingly, the Court does not discern any ground to suggest that the measures taken by the police and their conduct vis-à-vis the applicants, which has already found to be in contravention of Articles 5 and 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention were “necessary in a democratic society”. On the contrary, the Court considers that they had a chilling effect and discouraged the applicants and others from taking part in similar gatherings (compare Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, § 404, 7 February 2017). Lastly, the Court notes that the domestic judicial authorities refused to accept the applicants’ relevant complaints for consideration, depriving them of an opportunity to obtain redress for the violation of their rights.

48.  The Court considers these findings to be sufficient to conclude that there was a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly. The disruption of the workshop was not justified by a “pressing social need” and therefore not “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention on that account.

49.  The applicants reiterated their grievances about the disruption of their gathering on 5 December 2020 relying on Articles 13 and 14, read in conjunction with Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention. The Court notes that this part of the application relates to the matters already examined by it (see paragraphs 33-48 above). It declares the complaints admissible. However, in the light of its previous findings the Court considers that there is no need for a separate examination of the remainder of the application (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, § 156, cited above).

50.  The applicants raised other complaints under Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of their transport to the hospital and the manner in which K.L., another participant in the seminar, had been treated during the drug testing.

51.  Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as they fall within its competence, the Court finds that the above complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

52.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

53.  Ms Yerokh claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) and the rest of the applicants each claimed EUR 16,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

54.  The Court awards the applicants the amounts claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

55.  The applicants did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, in respect of non-pecuniary damage:

(i)  EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to Ms Yerokh;

(ii)  EUR 16,000 (sixteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to each of the remaining applicants;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 April 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Ioannis Ktistakis
 Deputy Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Zünd is annexed to this judgment.

PARTLY CONCURRING, PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ZÜND

1.  I voted with the majority in finding that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 and of Article 11 of the Convention. However, I disagree with the finding of a violation of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment was not attained in the present case.

2.  Based on a telephone message indicating that drugs were being distributed and consumed during a workshop organised by the LGBT community, the police raided the venue, searched and questioned the participants and checked their identity documents. No drugs were found. Nevertheless, the eleven participants were brought to a local hospital for drug testing. All of them tested negative. They were later released, some only after further questioning.

3.  The police raid may initially have been justified based on the suspicion that drugs were being distributed and consumed at the venue. However, from the moment that no drugs were found, the police no longer had good reason to go any further. By not allowing the gathering to proceed, they infringed the participants’ freedom of assembly. By taking the participants to the hospital for testing, they detained them without sufficient reason. Accordingly, on these points, I agree with the majority: there has indeed been a violation of Articles 11 and 5.

4.  However, the circumstances of the raid were not such that they qualified as degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3. To be sure, obligatory drug testing was no longer justified, since no drugs had been found, but drug testing as such cannot be regarded as degrading, regardless of whether the measure was justified or not. No doubt, the use of a derogatory term (“faggots”) by the police chief was unacceptable (see paragraphs 8 and 29 of the judgment), and the same must be said of the subsequent disclosure of the video footage of the raid. The Court should not, however, equate police misconduct with degrading treatment.

5.  The majority refer in paragraph 22 of the judgment to the guiding principles of the Court’s approach to the question of the State’s responsibility for violence committed by its agents and motivated by hatred, and to its duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and an act of violence, as summarised in Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia (no. 7224/11, §§ 35-38, 42‑44 and 46, 8 October 2020). However, in the case at hand, police violence or threats of violence were not at issue and the minimum level of severity required for the events to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention was not attained (compare Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, no. 19237/16, §§ 52‑57, 1 June 2021, and R.B. v. Hungary, no. 64602/12, §§ 48-52, 12 April 2016). I do not deny, however, that the conduct of law enforcement adversely affected the applicants’ psychological well-being and dignity and, accordingly, their private life. It attained the requisite level of seriousness for Article 8 of the Convention to come into play. Therefore, Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, are applicable in the present case (compare Association ACCEPT and Others, cited above, §§ 66-68, and Basu v. Germany, no. 215/19, §§ 26-27, 18 October 2022).

6.  In a number of earlier cases concerning allegations of discrimination on the ground of race in the context of identity checks performed by the police in public, the Court has considered that once there is an arguable claim that the person concerned may have been targeted on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the authorities’ duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent’s act is to be considered implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention, including when examined in conjunction with Article 8 (see Basu, cited above, § 33; Muhammad v. Spain, no. 34085/17, §§ 64-69, 18 October 2022; and Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, § 91, 20 February 2024). In my view, these considerations hold true in the context of the protection of individuals against homophobic acts.

7.  I share the majority’s view that obligatory drug testing had no investigative value whatsoever in the circumstances. The use of derogatory terms by a police officer during the raid was unacceptable, as was the disclosure of the video footage. I would therefore have concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, on both procedural and substantive grounds. However, I think the threshold for Article 3 to come into play was not attained.

APPENDIX

List of applicants:

No.

Applicant’s Name

Year of birth

Nationality

Place of residence

1.

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DERREK

1998

Russian

Yaroslavl

2.

Aleksey Nikolayevich NAZAROV

1978

Russian

St Petersburg

3.

Aleksey Vladimirovich SERGEYEV

1979

Russian

St Petersburg

4.

Nikolay Anatolyevich SHCHERBAKOV

1996

Russian

Moscow

5.

Yaroslav Nikolayevich SIROTKIN

1991

Russian

Yaroslavl

6.

Alena Andreyevna YEROKH

1998

Russian

Yaroslavl